An Attempt at Discussing Some ‘Disparities’: Terrorism, Religion, Truth and Belief.

Taking a cue from Amorinblog, I am making an attempt to speak to the notion of disparities. Lets see how is goes.


What is terrorism?

When we think about the activities of terrorism, a marginal view might situate terrorism in terms of truth. What we have with the possibility of terrorism is a function of truth, or “true-Being”. In the consideration of what human beings do, we should not ignore or set aside this aspect of truth: Truth is Being truth. To set this function of human consciousness in terms of ‘belief’ merely reifies the Western colonial construct of subjective centrism, a construct that posits free will and choice in an absolute context of the ability for the subject to align itself with a transcendent course, such as we found in the American context “manifest destiny”. This is to say, we ostracize such “pre-terrorists”, people who might not have becomes terrorists yet they did, through the ideological matrix of the self-referential ethics of choice to say that the one who is a terrorist is choosing unethical behavior;  the native tribes of the western northern hemisphere were for most purposes to the early American government, terrorists in every light, even though we understand now how the American “post-colonial” period was an unethical act (still we do very little to repair the wrong). ‘Choice’, and correspondent terms such as ‘free will’, can be understood as a Western liberal code for creating antagonism in the world, an aggravating aspect of Western capitalism and its war machine.

Yet see that the question is not one about an essence of choice. It is practically nonsense to suggest that we do not have choice. But at the same time, if we do not recognize a dual aspect of consciousness, then we always stay within the ideological paradigm of an absolute ethics despite how we might want to situate or define any other liberal ethics of inclusion; we will routinely stay in the unity of consciousness that is able to consider parts of itself, parts it conceives, the unity that appropriates plurality to its uses. Reflection, in this way, is misunderstood axiomatically to be witnessing something outside of itself. As part of the liberal ethical front (and I mean this to describe a kind of Western impetus, a certain manner of coming upon reality) we should not worry so much about what others are doing, in fact, we are only able to understand such ‘other’ through this antagonistic orientation that is first and foremost based in worry, fear, and philosophical resentimentOurs is based in a contradicting antagonism, and our plight, as well as our ability to act, is based upon a cognitive platform of reconciliation in knowledge. We have then, as we are, to deal with our own BS if we are to ever stop jutting forth to then recoil in the usual modern oscillation of the war solution. In an odd sort of reprimand, the very idea of enlightenment typically does not translate into domination through war; no wonder colonial-exploratory Europe had to see other non-Europeans as ‘less than human’.

Two things here: This is not a argument against war or that we should not have war; this is not an argument for pacifism. Neither is this a suggestion that we should (somehow) withdraw from interacting with others; the point is toward an ability to be honest with ourselves about the situation at hand. As part of an ideological situation, we indeed have a front line; we cannot but be involved with a partition, of sorts, whereby we face and have confrontation with those aspects of the world in which we find ourselves. To move this understanding into any sort of utopian theme of ‘universal peace’ would then be to set aside our moment, our modernity, to basically negate our moment into a whole past to say then that all wars and conflict in history arose due to these constraints, whereas the truth of the matter is that which arrives only within our modern situation as wars stemming from these defined antagonisms: Basically we identify our moment by establishing the contradiction in this context. If we are ever to realize (which is to say, understand the truth of) our situation, then it seems the manner must take place within as the contradiction that is outside of the ideological or mythological construct, a situation that is not accorded to the construct to be thereby abstract (it is indeed occurring within the norm) but, is rather marginalized to the extreme, actively being withheld for the purposes of maintaining a particular kind of reality (ethics).

This is no longer a critique of meta-narratives; such a critique was still occurring in the antagonistic space, a space that could only be resolved through various ‘faiths’ that resolve the modern contradiction (the Deleuzian “Zen”, the New Age Spirituality, the Eastern Karmic cosmos, the “Christian” denominations that are not properly Protestant nor Catholic, and other discourses that take place in ironic suspensions). We have found that the critique of meta-narratives was how a particular ideological state perpetuates itself through ulterior colonialist motions. The Postmodern (but particularly the subsequent ‘method’) thought itself as an exception to the metanarrative, and used irony to suggest its difference, but we found that it merely supplied the ‘final’ narrative to substantiate Capitalism as the ground of real discourse (the “postmodern methodological platform”; see Lyotard “The postmodern condition”, and “The Differend”: The demand for a ground of real veracity, a limiting of irony, calls forth the criterion of ‘efficiency’ that brings about ‘experts’ to define what knowledge is valid, which knowledge is allowed to be considered as true, as well as the reparations that will be made to that aspect of knowledge that was excluded in the interest of efficiency.) But we were not done with irony, that is why definition is insufficient to bring about decisive changes in ideology; hence the various philosophical reconciliations for identity that we find all over the internet, and hence the instigation of a divergence in philosophy.

(Note: The question for divergence seems to be noticed. What others have been trying to do with ‘non-standard’ ideas and such, I simply address directly and say I am a philosopher and this ‘other’ manner of philosophy is still true as it can be identified thus conventional because the orientation upon objects by which it addresses things to gain its veracity. We do not speak from the unitive philosophical paradigm but rather admit that such a paradigm exists at least in parallel. Only one kind of argumentation exists which can reduce all signals to a single matrix, and that is the conventional philosophical route; it does not propose that it is capable of doing this, and that is why we are able to identify its mode with nothing. As I have said elsewhere, we are dealing with the instance of what stays static while something else changes, a calculus, of philosophical reckoning. What has withdrawn has indeed withdrawn beyond all argumentation: It has already been established. As well, any further argumentation is superfluous, redundant but indeed real and valid.)

So this is also not a critique of such identities. It is a describing of how humanity functions; we should not expect such understanding will change our behavior. It indeed will bring about or be involved with some sort of change, but the change will be related in a particularly real manner that seems to be able to avoid the truth of statements and yet likewise be able to argue effectively for how the truth is not what originally was there (a mistaken intension of intentionality). Neither is this a pragmatics, nor a promotion of a way into praxis. This is analysis, a possibility into a beginning of a science that has been brewing for some time (time is not the issue). The fact of atomic interactions is related to the war machine only through incidental, circumstantial yet real discussion, negotiation and argument; the science itself dealt only with the interrelating of factual situations, itself as a founding term that actually departs (instead of merely feigning departure). When we rely only upon a determination of human activity through this former method (of the circumstantial discussion) we arrive at never having the bomb built in the first place, no nuclear energy, no astrophysics, no understanding of our sun or the solar system, etc. No wonder there has been an effort to get back to the “pre-modern” Real thing.

We thus have now reached that point of discernment, an ability to deal with the being of human without recourse to incessant mythological justifying defaults that reify the free intuiting agent of transcendence. Thus far, we have not had a scientifically philosophical way to gain access into what human beings do because we were too busy doing it, busy using the manner; as an analogy, we’ve been like astronomers who have been looking at ourselves looking at the stars thinking we were actually looking at and discussing the stars: Through this approach we can only get so much information about the stars. The most recent of this manner is what we could generalize into a category of ‘Enlightenment’, but other categories that need be sorted are ‘State’ and ‘Capitalism’, among others, and “Neurophysiology” is not one of these primary aspects at this moment. We do not know yet how these function for human beings; we have only been using such categories in a proposal to find out how we might Be, indeed, using them to Be. In our finding this out, then, we have reached a kind of apogee in mythological function: Coming upon such self-reflection there by understands such knowledge as a means to enact, what is now/then seen, as a Truth. Only when this occurs does a moment arise by which to view through a larger frame of what has occurred. It does not occur through any choice in the matter, but indeed functions to begin to detract from itself.

From this moment we might be able to understand what ‘Terrorism’ might be. The first order of business, though, is to dismiss oneself from the reflection of identity, and this does not occur through any choice of free will. As I noted above, this is not a suggestion to indicate that terrible things have not occurred throughout human history, or that we can identify some essential human attribute or psychology to thereby alleviate us from such terrible occurrences. This is a description of what role Terrorism is playing in the reality of being human: Terrorism, in a large sense, is the antithesis of free will and choice; quite terrible. Psychology, at this moment, is too overdetermined in solution to be able to ponder a fact that does not move toward choices of human solutions; there are too many human issues in the world for an institution to consider bare facts; all such facts are ideological and political arguments that function as platforms by which to enact a possibility of real solution. It does no discredit to such psychological method to point out what it does, though, but the reaction that would take such a description as indicating a fault of psychology, or as suggesting that psychology is incorrect or wrong, is missing the point of fact for the sake of its ideological purpose, which is to rely upon the self-evidence of its teleology of real solution. Science concerns facts; real solutions are of a different order, of a different moment. And such moments are not, or at least do not have to be, at odds.

We thus make a proposal that seems almost a truism: Terrorism is the act that takes place from an ideological point of exclusion; terrorism exploits points of access.

I have suggested above that the idea (ideal) of human ‘belief’ is a manifestation of an ideological lack, a founding term that is supposed by the constituents of the ideology to account for what lay outside its purview. It is a colonizing ideal: Belief. Again, in this conceptual moment, we need separate ourselves from the notion that human beings all throughout history have been having beliefs. We are not concerned with what history might have to say about what human beings might “have been” believing (for indeed they were); that is of a different order of analysis. What occurs in terrorism is that the open door, that is supposed to be welcoming and inclusive of various human capacities and manifestations of belief, is not being taken. There is something about the welcome that is understood intuitively and innately to not be welcoming; to wit, the sensible response: My belief is not a belief, it is the Truth. Regardless of how we wish to emphasize our open ideal, in the case of terrorism, it has not worked, that’s why such acts are “terrible”, because they make no sense, they occur outside of our sensibility, our ability to make sense. Our sense of it is 1)that it is terrible, 2)unethical, 4)insane, 5) inhuman,6)of a ‘bad’ sort of religious fundamentalism. Perhaps we even make sense of the people’s acts patronizingly; they are ignorant, they are delusional, they are uneducated, they have been raised in an intolerant culture, they are the product of ‘bad’ ideology or psychology, they have been brainwashed. We cannot dismiss that any of these disclaimers may be the case, but for the act itself, especially individuals who willingly and with intent sacrifice their own lives in the act of terrorism – how else are we to make sense of such acts but through the unitive aspect of consciousness and its humanity that has good and bad psychologies accompanied by ethical mandates ? One cannot choose to escape their reality.

In these kind of reckonings there is no consideration of, as Alain Badiou has said, “difference as indeed different”, in other words, there is no considering their position for what it is in actuality, which is to say, as indeed a Truth that does not reconcile or fit snugly and comfortably in ‘our’ ideological nest. Indeed; I recently heard of how Donald Trump approaches foreign policy in a way that is different than what America has historically: Instead of attempting to defeat authoritarian regimes or dictatorships, reprimanding them with trade and alliance penalties, like the monarchy of Saudi Arabia, Trump approaches other nations on their own ground, allowing their political organization to function in whatever way it does so long as it does not interfere with American interests specifically. This appears very much like a situation where what is different is engaged with in its difference. How ironic that the person who so many in America see as contrary to American interests would be the person who would take an approach that can appear philosophically sound? I doubt Trump is that smart or educated, but it goes to show that we are not speaking about practical reconciliations of thought and action, but indeed a scientific description of the situation at hand. Could this be an indication of a possible beginning of a philosophical science that does not answer to conventional philosophical method?

Terrorism occurs at points of access. (Side note: The paranoia that often arises out of the consideration of an actual Artificial Intelligence develops the very point of access that an A.I. would be able to take advantage.) Terrorism is the revealing that access is not automatic nor guaranteed by any sort of discursive item, and that access now must be authorized (by experts). This is not homicide or murder, in as much as those events target individual people for specific identifiable reasons; e.g. Sam hates Pablo. Of course, we could see some similarities breaching this codification in the U.S. legalizing the corporation as an individual person: The experts tell us now that the human being is an incorporation, and not the other way around. It is not that corporations have become people, its that people must be incorporated to have ‘free’ access. In this sense, then, “in the name of (the True) Islam, I kill a number of symbolic representatives of the Christian West” is murder because this individual is incorporated (with an institution called ISIS, Boko Haram, Al-kaeda, Neo-Nazi, Free-Speech Movements, Pro-life, Black Lives Matter, whatever.. ). The irony, and the evidence that such terrorist groups see themselves through the lens they wish to destroy, is that they are asserting their freedom of access, pointing out the contradiction inherent in the (Western Liberal Capitalist) liberal mind set. This is the divine beauty of Capitalism: Its apparent omnipotence. Those who are not terrorists are those who are definably and axiomatically free to access: They are born incorporated: Nationalism has ‘bred’ itself into an offspring. Of course terrorism is insensible: How does one make sense of an act of assertion that positions itself against something that is already inherent to the act itself? This is the contradiction as well as the blind spot we find also involved in the critique of race relations. How much more non-sensible can it be for those who must behave through such ideological mechanisms? But this is not an issue of knowledge and education as much as it is what is occurring. The fact that such marginalized groups would have to speak about how to gain for themselves basic and inalienable rights is just about the most ridiculous thing that could occur given our ideological ground. Might the ‘terrorist’ actually be more sane??

This is not my position, necessarily, by the way, nor am I arguing anything about what sanity might be. But, an analysis of a situation must be able to point out facts about the situation if we are to get anywhere: Speaking about or describing what is offensive should not be taken as an argument for that which offends. A person of color is not asking me to change my skin color, reject my heritage nor deny myself as a human being in the world; she just asks me to be open to facing some harsh truths that come from outside of my ability to reckon on my own.

Identity has been taken to a further extreme, perhaps as a counterpoint to the extreme absence of sense that the act of terrorism evidences. I am not going to make an argument against that kind of reckoning, but only point out that such situations are about the political order. As to facts, if I may take the Islamic Terrorists as a case example (though we could put this analysis to any so called Terrorist), the suicide bomber is not targeting specific people, in fact, the hatred is entirely ideological (as I said): It is not Burt that I hate but that Burt is American, and he is not so much an American, as I reestablish the Truth of my sense, the sense of Truth, and re-appropriate to assert the Truth, as much as he is an Infidel. The point of access is a symbolic act against symbols, the scheme of which, on the part of the Terrorist, functions to reclaim conceptual territory (see my REBLOG post about conceptual territory) through lumping the antagonist into the counter-partial founding category by which a closing is understood as an opening (an act of faith); the corresponding ideal of the West is ‘belief’. The point of access is exactly the gap that opens up with murder without personal motive; the personal motive is the successful attack upon Truth. It is no secret that the opening for belief allows for all sorts of ethical compromises that brings into question every ‘belief system’ that functions under its umbrella. Only in the “blasé” attitude (Walter Benjamin ?) that accompanies the pursuit of real identity may someone have a valid ‘belief’; one must suspend their ideals in ‘nothing’ in order to ‘really believe’ (or to have faith). It is this kind of nihilism that is terrified by someone who is willing to die to destroy even the smallest piece of the antagonizing ideological leviathan; the transcendence that accompanies the modern nihilism is of a different sort than that usual Western ideal that places religious thinking in the category of concern with a transcendent ‘creator’. The Western religion of nihilism (the state of belief) cannot bring itself to have any sort of passion strong enough that would allow itself to willingly kill itself; how ironic. Here we even have the beginnings of a philosophical explanation of addiction, as well as the reason why it has reached epidemic proportions in America; but as well, a possible explanation of China and how it becomes present in the West.

The point of the terrorist act is to destroy the antagonistic state, the state that directly confronts the Truth through the ideal of human belief (the ideal of ‘belief’ is a singular ideological Truth). The terrorist act thus is an act that is already admitting what it is losing; like the Kamikaze fighters of World War 2 Japan, Japan had already lost the war, but would not admit it. Slavoj Zizek speaks of this kind of ideological instance in the analogy of the cartoon character, say, Wile E. Coyote, chasing the road runner off a cliff, running out into the air. Coyote does not fall until he looks down and realizes that he is standing on nothing, and even then, he has time to wave good-bye to the camera. The interesting part of this, though, is that the terrorists are already a part of the ideology that they are terrorizing, because they are already admitting that this antagonistic state has a claim in their Truth: They are fighting against the ideal of belief, an ideal concept –like that which is unstable within Anslem’s argument for the proof of the existence of God, — that they already and inherently understand; we might see the contradiction suspended in the terrorist act in as much as they destroy their own lives in the process of attempting to destroy the whole of the antagonistic state: A ‘not-life’ for a ‘life’.  Likewise, they know that their act will not actually destroy the whole of the infidel’s kingdom, but perhaps (who really knows) they ‘believe/know’ that their act will cause some sort of cascading event of collapse, as their disruption in concert with the ongoing series of disruptions will inevitably achieve their ideological goal, which is to dispense with ideology (as belief). We might see again a similar ideological activity in the events of Helter Skelter, ,where the murders of Hollywood celebrities would instigate a race war. Such antagonisms supply the fodder that ironically sustains the Capitalist ideology.

Terrorism could be marking that point when Capitalism has run out in to the air; perhaps it is now waving to us, but I doubt it. If I have to summarize the point of this essay on terrorism, perhaps it is that terrorism is an ideological construct that has its basis in nothing, an irony, because while it destroys people, actual lives, it is already serving Capitalism as a source of capital, of “magic”, of supplying energy to the ideological fetishized commodity that is identity: Terrorism is understood effectively, axiomatically, automatically to be identifying a real-true thing. Disgusting ethical juxtaposition really, but again this is why Capitalism could be said to be the umbrella Religion of Nothing, because people have to have faith in order to be able to ignore the incredible depth of the nothingness in which such events, and their labels, induce.

It is within such determinations that we find necessarily that I am not speaking of a unitive situation, but indeed, I am speaking about how such a unitive situation operates.




I could go on, and there is a further bit having to do with explosions, but Ill leave it here for now.


Revisiting Nick Land 

Through VITUAL BORSCHT thru Sytheic Zero.
Nick land is an interesting character. I like him Only because of his definition of dark enlightenment on his infamous essay that I can’t seem to find a link to but it’s there. That being said, I think his character and politics is reactionary and childish, pretty much a ‘Self Half-claimed mysterious child who poses as a mature and sophisticated intellectual’.  If feel like his whole purpose in this world is to make money while inflating his thinker-ego, which is nothing new really. While his essays is interesting, it does mark a classifiable type. Remember Nine Inch Nails (great band), Insane Clown Posse (lame), White Zombie (ok) came out of the 90s.  Nick Land is a type. 

He is noted for coining the term “dark enlightenment”. I like that idea, but because I like that idea I think Nick land is caught in a enchanted fantasy. Now, I don’t mean this to discredit him or to say that he’s wrong or anything like that; this is not a point to indicate his incorrect ideas (though they are inflated; he’s a church of Nick) I say that because given the facts, the fact that I am able to understand where he is coming from, often even more than I can understand what he is saying about some world or something like that — somehow I seem to intuitively understand what he saying also — It must mean that the position from which he gains his perspective, that we might generalize  into calling “the dark enlightened state”, is itself a function of consciousness that comes about under certain conditions. Like certain Atari games of the 80s or Intelevsion, there are certain conditions that must be met in the order of thinking to thereby be able to even come upon an idea such as the dark and lighten meant, a position as well as an object of consideration. It’s like someone’s playing video game and then they happen to cook some buttons and move the joystick in a certain order in a particular part of the game and then a secret room opens up or some sort of secret message appears out of nowhere, A message or chamber that is completely irrelevant to the playing of the game itself, the kind of secret knowledge by which the rest of the game takes on a new quality, a different quality than I had before. 
The condition is not a generalized condition; it does not include all human beings in potential but is actually a particular type of understanding, what I call a particular orientation upon objects. The strange thing about it is if I’ve entered this other chamber or I have found the secret little instance of activity that allows me to get the secret message in the video game, if I go to other players then who have not encountered it and try to tell them where this instance is in the game it is very difficult for them to find that exact instance, that single bit on the screen but more than the screen, that single bit that single position in the whole map and layout of the video game where in one must also do a series of button pushes in joystick manoeuvres. In fact it is so difficult to communicate this to a person that for all purposes that are effective in our world of reality in which Nick land might be enlightened to some darkness, that we might call it incommunicatable. And this is what Nick relies upon for all the other derivatives (accelerationalism, etc..), that the secret will not be exposed. Great for religion. 

So foreign and almost impossible to re-create for another person in the game, that we got a call it a fantasy, and indeed a product of enchantment with reality. 

More later

The Perfect Crime: Enchantment as Vehicle of Subjective Purpose. 

Comment on this REPOST..

I’m not very familiar with this B guy philosopher that I hear a lot of here and there. (sorry I’m voice dictating and I didn’t really feel like going back and finding out exactly how to spell boy do they really lard lol) .

I’m only going off of a quote that’s on the link of the link. So I could be completely wrong and what the conclusion really is that this guy says be on the excerpt.

From what I’ve gathered from B it seems that he’s kind of a complainer. This excerpt in the link talks about some sort of lamenting that we’re no longer in the sacred zone or something like that. Hey saying like oh nothing is sacred any longer because now everything is a commodity everything has been flattened so we have no sense of the sacred. 

I think he is representing and immersion within transition. The From and the Where To don’t really matter in as much as the expression is one that goes along with transition, and this is to say the feeling that goes along with an attachment to what is seen of the past as good or somehow quality and a perceived future or even present situation that is indicating a future that is not as good or somehow lacking in substance.

Now, when  we are able to get beyond such lamenting transitions, we might then see clearly that we have not lost the sacred but we have merely moved the blocks around; the sacred is still there. The terms have changed but they indicate the same situation. The question is do I still have a sense of spirit to spite what I think the world is doing? And, is the world ever a holy and sacred place? What am I depending on when I say that we have lost a sense of the sacred? 

I would say that “we” have not lost anything, And that the people who love a sword of doom and gloom philosopher of a bleak future are ” optimists”, because they hang onto a static and stable sense of the past and or their central sense of being projected into a future hope that more and more never comes to pass. I, on the other hand, am a sort “pessimist ” because I see each moment as full of potential as I try not to project my resentments out upon the world to cloud my view. They of course are a certain kind of Realist because in reality everyone has all sorts of opinions and attitudes upon situations and their outcome, and of course their presence in the world is very serious matter. 😄

 So it is that B evidences a type of human moment that sees words as indicating actually true essences of being, such that the larger conflation of these essences show them reflexively and automatically a bad end. 

Yet, When we discover what an object is, we are no longer are caught in that kind of limited paradigm, no longer caught in reliving the past as a present identity toward the future;  which is, as many have said, death. Hence the lament. 

The perfect crime is that B himself has committed the crime but is putting it off into something else so we all look over there and not at the actual culprit. 

The manner of Being enchanted follows the rationale behind Plato’s Allegory of the Cave. The Allegory itself is an enchanted image of realty where people are existing in various roles and stages in a progressive march of the human species into the future. 

So it is that when we can see B as merely   expressing a particular mode of Being a human in history, then B can appear to resound with the meaning of Graham Harman’s “always been disenachanted”. If we understand that the human being is always (as a general and common condition) caught ‘in the middle’, seeing no correspondence of their Being with any being that is outside the human correlation: The evidence of other human beings correlated with ‘the only Being’ allowed, as a thoughtful excersizing, presents an axiomatic limitation in all a thinker can know. This limit thus supplies the necessary catalyst for displacement of Self in order for it to commune with a transcendent ‘other’ that confirms its exceptional placement in the universe, but also an exceptional role whereby such Being can have an effect upon the ‘separated’ and functioning world. This displacement thereby allows such human Being to understand its alienation within a context of purpose, which manifests as (probably) one of three Selves: The Colonizer who speaks the future as a ‘good’ Being as The Soveriegn whereby all others gain their purpose; the Colonized who speaks the past to bring about a ‘good’ future; the Complainer who speaks the future as the ‘good’ past. But in fact, all three are caught in what Paulo Freire called “the game of the oppressor”. These are thus subjects of enchantment, or for another term, Enlightemnent, as each plays their role in the respective world of progress. 

We find that human beings have always been dis-enchanted when we start to understand consciousness through what it does rather than by what it processes, as a universal object before a centralized thinking subject. We find that the Allegory of the cave, while an enchanted idea, nevertheless always finds itself as describing a relational situation wherein the (conventionalized, normalized) point of the Allegory withdraws from view to allow for what Badiou might call ‘the beginning of the count’. 

Description and argument: Discerning Resentment and Bias in Philosophy.

REPOST of a bit in Ressentiment.

Nietzsche talks about in one of his essays somewhere (or maybe it is Kierkegaard) how he seems to have more compassion and understanding and relation to authors of the past, of a history, of a presence that is detached or somehow distant from himself, than toward contemporary philosophers, philosophers that existed at the same time as him, that he has little or no compassion.

I often feel the same way.

Slavoj Zizek and myself seem to have been moulded from the same bed of clay. I doubt that I will ever meet him and I doubt that he will ever hear of me, and so such speculations, however incorrect or presumptuous on my part, must indeed be the case. We may not of be dressed in the same fabric, our hairstyles and musical interests depart from one another’s, and our accents and mannerisms are definitely of different characters.

Nevertheless, I came to the same conclusion that he so eloquently and oddly describes and develops, and I even heard recently Levi Bryant suggest, namely, that an author does not fully realize the meaning of his proposals, and often and strangely enough, in fact, doesn’t even realize what they mean, and even more strangely and contradictory, sometimes makes incorrect arguments that stem from their own ideas!

One of the situations I point out in my book has to do with an apparent confusion in the discipline of philosophy. Sure, we have come up with a number of sub-disciplines such as ontology and epistemology, and even a greater division with Continental and Analytical philosophy, but I think there is a more subtle yet significant issue going on besides whether we are talking about methods, semantics or syntax. I say that this distinction has to do with an orientation upon objects. (See my book if you are curious as to how this relates to Graham Harman’s Object Oriented Ontology/Philosophy). Part of this issue is that there a basic and fundamental breakdown in communication that cannot be over come through current conventional methods.

More relevant to this essay here is the distinction between description and argument. The question might arise as to whether a description is an argument in disguise, but I think the significance involved is when one sees an argument as a description. When this occurs we have a different animal growling. The problem, as I tend to see it, is when a description is understood automatically as an argument.

When I say “tree” and point over there, there is no argument. I say “tree with leaves”; no argument. If I say “the tree has a brown trunk and green leaves, all of which are made of cells”, there is no argument in there. It is a description. When I goto the bar and order a beer, I am not making an argument to the bartender about beer (usually).

Yet for some reason, when it comes to philosophy, the automatic recourse to an apparently overwhelming amount of self-reported-philosophers is that certain statements are automatically arguments. If I say anything that remotely resembles philosophy, it is taken as an argument to be debated as to its veracity and qualifications. I call this common mode a real mode and also a conventional mode. I suggest that the discipline of philosophy is at a point when we need to begin to find away to discern between these two routes, and without arousing resentment from those conventional philosophers that have automatic recourse to the single view of argumentation. (See Heidegger “What is it we Call Thinking, about this one dimensional manner). Because, if I may use Nietzsche here: the conventional philosophers are unable to think outside of their resentment, and so use what is common as a leverage to pull what could be exceptional back into the regularity of the ideological norm. They argue their Being. 

To not argue Being is an extremely unpopular idea; no one wants to admit that thier rationality and ability is compromised by an aspect of themselves that withholds or otherwise cuts them off from the possibility of Reason –even if Reason is problematized likewise. One is not allowed to admit that there is a manner of discussion that excludes some people, but this is because those so offended simply are not understanding the issue at hand nor then do they want to nor see that it is possible

An example about ressentiment: I do not and will never know how to program machine language, yet somehow this does not offend me. The idea that I will not ever be able to do certain things regardless of what conventional potential might be shown to me, does not offend me. But for some reason, if I suggest that there is a manner of thinking upon things that not all people will be able to comprehend despite education or intelligence, then I have breached a social ethic, and I become biased as people get offended. Such recourse simply evidences an approach to things that is ignorant; such philosophers and people in general do not understand how such a discourse could be not biased.

Just think of race relations and social justice: White people cannot understand the lived experience of people of color ( generally speaking, at least, in the U.S., Africa, perhaps India, maybe everywhere in fact..). And, not only is it an incorrect sentiment to say that “oh, I don’t see color, I only deal with individuals”, but it is indeed racist. At best, White people can be allies to people of color by getting over their ressentiment that the human Being is a common sort by through which everyone may have access to knowledge within the potential of discourse, because this common sort, as we find in the critique of race relations, is a sort that is and has been implemented by discourses of power (bias; systems of power; colonialist white privilege ). Then, and only then, can we begin to discuss racism and its solutions. So I say of (conventional) philosophy of its mode. Not that it is racist necessarily, but that it will not admit its own lack.

For now, I merely throw this out there. I am not going in to all the repercussions involved with this most apparent and usually common ideological methodology.

Pondering Determinism.

Ive been having a discussion with Marvin from  A Keen Graspblog about determinism, and Im posting my latest reply. Please see my post Preliminary thoughts on the parameters of determination: Phenomenology and Object Orientation.and its comments for our ongoing discussion…


The question that is suspended there is the issue of mind and brain. The assumption is that there is a brain (and or mind) that we can know that is not a model, upon which or generally from which, or due to its operating, that models are made. One question would be how do we know when the modeling stops? Of course, I would imagine that it stops at what is obvious, or what is practical; the questioning of matters stops with what is apparent. Upon such apparent matters, we base our observations, relations, judgements conclusions, opinions, etc…

I agree with this. Likewise, I can understand religion as spiritual support.

I have pretty cogent ideas about how many things fit together philosophically (but Im open to dabate and change); they are the content of books, written and being written. But one piece Im looking at is determinism, so its good to have the definition you give, at least in so far as the significant piece there; correct me if I am wrong, its seems the burden of proof for determinism is is predicitive capacity.

This is a good definition. It allows me to again point to what is real, and say that indeed this definition is very practical, involved with determining what of reality is indeed real or possible.

I do not have fixed ideas around determinism (oddly enough, lol). I am working through the possibilities involved. Throwing stuff around, seeing where it lands, so to speak. Currently I am seeing the practical definition of determinism a bit light.

I do not question that I have to live in a very practical manner, think in certain ways, make choices, regardless of if they meet a definitional criteria of “pragmatic”. While definition is a real feature of discussion, though, I am not sure that ‘definition’ is a sufficient category to be able to encounter all that may be acting or involved. At every point I have to ask what I am suspending in order to come to a definite idea of a situation, and then how I am able to carry that suspension into other contexts? That the brain/body behaves in a certain manner practically, I think is narrow in its reckoning. While I do see that we must only describe what the body (the body in the sense of bodies, or objects, possibly) is doing, I think too often we first rely upon a limit that is immediately apparent, given, and then make decisions on this seeming “absolute” limit by which we come upon things.

There are many instances which could displace pragmatics as a viable manner by which to discern what is true. A sole reliance upon definition can be seen as slightly faulty.
For example of your apple: The assumption of limit that the model itself is exempt from being merely a condition. If we investigate, say, into the apple, we find that our model of the real apple that was once working, at some point along the investigation, fails, or at least we find that the model “apple” is constituted with an array of things that are not properly the apple. So at some point we merely ‘decide’ that X= apple= real, and not-X is an illusion or an aspect that makes what is ‘real’ a kind of illusion with respect of what we find in the investigation. For example: I find that apples are made of atoms, atoms of electrons, protons.. etc.. until we come into quantum estimations, etc..

The assumption here is that consciousness is giving me reliable data to work with; very practical and real, of course. The issue is not that it may not be giving me reliable data, but that this set of data is functioning in a manner to give me data that is irrefutable, or only refutable given certain conditions that are already a part of the particular manner. It seems to me that we have found a manner that consciousness functions: It is not that it finds actually true things, and not even models, but that such models function as Truth, and so to say that it is merely a model serves as a justifier for that particular manner of consciousness given data that is come upon as automatically true. It is like a redundant an unnecessary act to have to say “models”; its like every time I goto drive my car, I cant just drive my car without announcing to everyone all the time that I use it to go places. It is almost like a particular set of knowledge has become so tentative and found itself on such precarious grounds, that now it has to announce the truth that is in fact happening as “merely a model”. I see this as a feature of religion: It must produce apologies for its lack, for what innately occurs by the religious reckoning that is actually offensive to the functioning of the mode of knowledge, the ‘positive’ faith. I cant just say that God is real, I have to justify it along certain lines. My question is like, if God exists and is functioning truly, why would I have to justify it?

This conclusion, and the effect of such a conclusion, whether cognized or merely effecting, appears to have explanatory power for what is occurring in many places politically. No longer are people and groups feeling they just justify their actions and beliefs to a common sort, rather they just cut off rationalizing to the general sphere and act. The extreme examples are the American alt right and islamic terrorist groups. Well the Islamic terrorist groups probably have never felt the need to justify their activity to secular or Western powers, The alt right on the other hand being involved and invested in western ideals can be seen to be appropriating what otherwise are liberal postmodern intellectual philosophical concepts correctly but then applying them in a manner that is really offensive to the institutions that gave rise to these philosophical ideas. It’s as if the alt right has committed a foul in the game of intellectualism. 


But See that I am not making an argument about what is true or false, or about what may be more true or less true, but I am attempting to describe what is occurring. This approach really does nothing for an ability to choose upon activites or where or what I might be in reality, it is not a practical philosophy; I do not feel I need to know why I do things except in as much as I rely upon a practical manner of reconciling behavior to its justifying and predictive attributes –and indeed I do rely upon such avenues. Nevertheless, the nature of this investigation appears thus to be necessary, because it has little to do with what I might choose to do, what I might choose to be interested in, as though I might weigh up options of what might be interesting to talk and think about; I cannot help but put everything through a particular filter, a particular lens. Due to this apparent necessity, and my inability to chose what I cannot choose, the description seems to arise out of determined set of qualifiers, qualifiers that themselves arise within a necessary arena in which we choose. Indeed, I can choose upon various topics, but its seems that every occasion yields from me the same order of activity, yet framed in different instances. Its predictive quality thus might be found as a kind of history of the future, similar to what we find in the Bible.



I am understandning in a very practical way, how people came to the notion of a difference in philosophy between European continental and (generally) English-AMerican analytical philosophy. So I appreciate this opportunity. Part of my issue, also, is that what we have come to rely upon as continental, and indeed the now traditional divide, is almost useless. Often enough, what is deemed ‘continental’ is misunderstood as much as it is placed in a sort of scholastic category of speculation, which, to me, completely misses the point that the discerning came about, and indeed ironically becomes a topic that some philosophers (Badou and Zizek come to mind) even address about how what is original is commandeered by what is subsequent and or redundant, such that we have is a ‘changing of the past’ that can no longer be reckoned to its basis in common circles because of the nature of the change. Can we ask then what of those who see the substance that is the changed as no having fidelity to the intension involved?

But again: the point is not that what is practical and real has any other ‘more truth’ underneath it. The point is that there are two irereducible and mutually exclusive routes upon objects. Ill shut up now.

“Everyone knew” 

Re-post About The what’s his name Hollywood producer who is a fucking moron and how no one had the balls to stop it.
And also — I don’t mean to condemn everyone likes to go watch women strip, but who the fuck goes to strip bars and actually enjoys it? 
I love sex, but who the fuck hires professionals sex workers for a business party? 

I’m just gonna come right out and just call like half of the men in the world is just fucking complete idiots. Because you know what ? there are a lot of men that like to go to strip clubs. and hey – you know there’s a lot of women who make a lot of money by stripping naked for the idiot guy sitting there drinking booze and coming on themselves. A Mutually beneficial situation of responsible parties involved in whatever kind of sex act, hey, I’m all for it, do your thing.

But come on; so many people just straight idiots. Powerful yes in many cases, but idiots just the same. 
I mean for real..w t f. 

What is magical thinking? 

One knows what this is in a philosophical as well as quite un-philosophical sense.


I mean, don’t we?

Hasn’t everyone had at least some portion of their lives, some phases, where they’re living in a fantasy land whether you knew it or not, that at some point you came to realize that it was kind of a fantasy? Like, then you come back to reality?

I think these expressions have some basis in truth. I think everyone has these moments.

This little essay isn’t going to be about how we discern fantasy from reality, it’s really more on a philosophical level; less on a psychological level and more critical level. I have difficulty with the psychological models that would presume to cast an umbrella over all humanity to say that there are some fundamental truths that are common amongst us all human beings; I think there is a difference between the psychological models that frame themselves around mental illness and dysfunction, and a psychology of the common human sort. Indeed psychology must deal in these absolute terms in order to even have a way to diagnose and or treat mental illness, but I reject the idea that works in reverse. Certain psychological treatment might indeed address a mental illness — Do not read this to implying that there is not mental illness— but it does not necessarily relate that the common human being is subject to the diagnoses and explanations of these mental illnesses. I find my ground in a more positive science (as opposed to a deficit science. A science of failure of not a deficit science).

That little divergence almost goes to the point of what we might mean by magical thinking. The question is always involved with: at what point does the human being find an actual truth, or ground that is “no longer magical“?

By what criterion are we discerning what is magical thinking, or enchantment, and non-magical or disenchanted thinking? What condition must arise for us to stop thinking magically? And why is it bad? Is it bad?

My questions arise from the mere notice that there might be magical thinking. How we discerning this? Indeed this involves a kind of philosophical calculus: what is moving and what is stable?

The problem with the idea of “magical“ thinking is the possibility involved with the moment that I discover that my thinking has been “magical“, or not based in reality, Fantasy. The question that must go along with this realization is, what is occurring that I have been able to discern that the “previous“ thinking was a fantasy?

We can gain our bearings in this discussion by some very actual situations. World War I and then the Nationalist Socialist, and a recent US election whereby Donald Trump was elected president. It is no mere coincidence  to be set aside in a song of synchonicity that these two events have been associated.

In both of these events there was a feeling of a kind of necessary motion, a sort of good feeling that everything is going to work out, followed by a sudden rupture, seemingly in the fabric of reality. Zizek calls these moments “events”: a moment where history is rewritten in the present retrograde, but I think they might be something else also.

If I have my history correct, World war one was a large upset to Europe. Everybody loved the Germans prior to World War I; all the great philosophers and ideas came out of northern Europe. Everyone love the Germans. But then the Germans got cocky; it appears that they were taking their big ideas too seriously. It seems that because the world loved their ideas that made their ideas even greater that they felt that they should naturally be the leaders of your up if not the world.

So in a way that great German idealism had a reality check by the rest of the world in World War One. So then there was like this check upon such huge thoughts such presumptuous thinking, and it appears that Germany got humble with the Weimar Republic that occurred in between the world wars. During this time is when the idea of genetic purity began to be associated with nationalism in an industrial sense: The point now is to produce that identity as the imperative of Being-the-world (Being-there). The ideal was one cannot simply BE, one must ACT. We might begin to see how this plays out in every era, but in particular you can see that the big thought of idealism was not so easily quelled by a few small minds, even if the small minds were pretty much the rest of the world. The Ideal of German Idealism seems to disregard what part of the planet a person is from, but nevertheless seems to involve those who are involved with Western Europe. The very idea of colonization can take on new meaning when we understand ourselves as colonizers, as having appropriated the game of the oppressor for the purpose of gaining an identity in the world that we helped define, but indeed were impotent to define by ourselves; but that is for another essay.

I read “Mein Kampf“ while ago because I was curious and I remember how about the first 20 or 30 pages seemed fairly reasonable, considering. But then all of a sudden Hitler gets crazy; all of a sudden, if I recall correctly, I am no longer on board with his book because it has grabbed my attention in a way that he probably did not consider (I was not his audience). All the sudden he talks talking about the Jews in the Jew problem and – basically a whole bunch of self-righteous ideas based on hatred, in the justification is that a rise out of that. You get the feeling that Germany had been spanked and put to stand in the corner for 15 minutes, but that really did nothing but piss them off. Democracy itself comes under fire as a disease of the weak, the name of this weakness, Judaism. Again, everything seemed to be going great, and then out of nowhere KAPLOoEY! The Frankfurt School tries to decipher what happened.

It’s a funny thing about being pissed off, I mean when you are really angry, angry to the point that you know what’s gonna come out of your mouth everyone’s going to hate and they’re going to think something is wrong with you. In these moments you generally come up and discover two kinds of people: there’s the type who mediately start yelling in like punching pillows and walls and shit, starts getting in your face and yelling at you and pointing his finger in your eyeballs. It might suck but the two responses to this kind is to either walk away or knock the guy out.

The other way That this kind of anger is dealt withis moredevious. This kind of anger is quiet and scheming. This kind of anger put on a face of civility, of concern, of yearning for progress and solution. This angry person is intelligent, and we might even say that this kind of intelligence paired with the idealism of the enlightenment you all did a particularly evil form of self righteous goodness.

The self-righteous goodness is what everyone sees because the face is of compassion and passion, hopefulness and concerned with your well-being. It is through this kind of camaraderie, this kind of empathy that hard lines are drawn, slowly and subtly people become convinced that the great ideal is indeed a good idea to implement.

And then, Bam! The reality of the situation appears, seemingly out of nowhere and places what is common sense, what was indeed commonsense what is indeed common to a regular sense of what a regular human being desires: happiness, contentment, friends, community, self fulfillment, (ah ha!). All of a sudden, this reality is disrupted by hatred and violence, of enforcement and imposition, and these values that seems so normal are usurped and used as the ground for the partitioning off one group from another; the other becomes the cause and justification for its rejection. We all know the rest…

The point I am making is not that either was magical thinking, but that both were. Despite what ground we wish to place under our ideals for what reality should be, they both take place in an ideal world, a world of ideas. Only the manner of negotiating these ideals is different. Because the discourse that describe Nazi ideology and the religious structure that occurred within and around it (Aryan, Nordic, Christian distortions) is merely a justification based in a different set of ideals. How do we know if they are distorted?

So the question then becomes, again; How do we discern what magical thinking is? How do we know when our thinking is magical and when it is based in a ‘rational’ real foundation?

Is it when we consider all human beings a part of the same group who should have equal and equitable access to justice and materials for life? Or is it when we group a set of disparate ideologies into a single ideology for the purpose of furthering a common group that we call ‘human’, even while we subject much of that common group to unfair routes of access as part and parcel of coming to terms with the equitable standard? Or perhaps it is the idea that we create our own worlds? That discourse constitute the entirety of world? That we can think outside of discourse? That we cannot know of object in-themselves? That we can? That humanity functions on models that are particularly human and do not actually reference anything but the human model? That God has the plan? That Yoga gets us right with our Karma? That we are living in the End Times? there are unicorns and elves living in the forest near you?

No answers. Just a thought.

PS:  I have not yet seen from the authors that use this trope “magical thinking” a definition that supplies a basis for what is not magical thinking.

Anyone find one?