International Overdose Awareness Day. 

Today is International overdose awareness day.

Are you taking any pain medications Soley because your doctor offered them to you?

I don’t know the exact statistics but and astonishingly large amount of  people that find themselves addicted to opiates, and many nowadays who find themselves strung out on heroin , were originally prescribed legal pain medication from their doctor for a legitimate medical situation. 

Do you really need that Vicodin or Percacet or could an 800 mg ibuprofen have done the trick? 

Don’t be naive. Please.  

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All is Vanity, for Real…Kant, Latour and the Pass, part 2.

220px-allisvanity

Ok; here is the post I meant to put:

So we come to Bruno Latour, and his notion of the pass. What is it that allows for the repetition whereby self-fulfillment is denied? This is the question of ‘what happened’. We will never get to answer the question of what ‘is happening’ until we answer the question of ‘what happened’. This is because if we do not find out what happened, then it will happen again. We are then keen to Kierkegaard’s “Repetition”, for the question that most everyone wants to answer is the subsequent question, the question of Being, “What is happening”, why is there what is and not what is not? This question, though, denies its own bases and so asks upon itself without ever even looking for, let alone being able to see, what it lacks. What ontology always finds then is itself, or an other (an other and self are constituents of the real state). All is indeed vanity.

Further; philosophy as an ontological practice cannot escape the political, ideological and in general social dynamics. It is a simple thing to see the reason why I call such conventional philosophical method real. What is real is what is happening. But because thinkers, as opposed to Beings, but consistent with being real, take the products of themsleves as indication of the potential involved with other beings, and take this as evidence of not a whole, but actually The only whole, they thus always (1) take everything real as a product of some sort, be-caused of some thing or other, and (2) take as an automatic demand upon all things within their field their proof toward what is happening, and this, even to the extent that they demand that the question of ‘what happened’ must conform to the state of Being that is happening.

*

Bruno Latour begins his book “An Inquiry into Modes of Existence” with a description of what a pass is with an analogy. I don’t have the book right with me, but he writes about a mountain trail or path that goes from the base to its peak. Note that I will not here follow his description exactly; I am not putting forth a strict analysis of his book and what it means in this post. It is enough that he came up with a pretty good analogy, a good term that can indicate the issue and the way it is dealt with. What is significant with Latour, at least in his AMIE project , is that he sees the need for an opening. It is clear from visiting his webpage that he understands the problem of a multi-vocalized reality similar to the type that Lyotard suggested in the conditions of the post-modern moment . Namely, the problem of communication between worlds. The salient question of every significant philosopher worth considering is “Is communication taking place?” For it is from this pivotal question that the world manifests in its ways.

So, if we can understand what this question means, which is to say, if communication has taken place through this one phrase, then we have found a common pass (a given ontological base). It doesn’t really matter too much if we identify it with Latour’s scheme (supposedly he describes 15 types of passes, 15 ‘modes of existence’; hence the book’s title “Inquiry into Modes of Existence”). What is significant is that he saw the need not so much for another reconciliation, not another philosophical reduction to some essential truth for which the author is trying to gain traction for through their communion with the intuition god, but rather some way to relieve the reduction from being the responsibility of one authors’ intuitive argumentative assertion. What is significant is that he sees that the method is at issue, the philosophical reductive method and its associated (and invisible) givens are at issue, and that the only way to get past this method is to somehow poke a hole in it! Instead of giving into the nihilism that arises in conventional minds, we need to create an opening whereby people can begin to communicate.

In my upcoming book, we might get into the complicity of needs that relates François Laruelle and Bruno Latour’s works; I am getting off the track of this post. The upcoming book probably will answer all the stray ponderings and vectored analyses.

For now, it is enough to understand the simplicity of the idea. First off, ontological foundations must be admitted given. If a traveler does not admit to an already given ontological truth that has already been explored, then the significance of the pass will make no sense; the trail will be missed and avoided. In order to pass, we must set aside the want to apply redundant deconstructivist techniques to every clause. This is because only once we understand the ontological foundations of existence, only once we admit to that truth, can we begin to see the passes. While I see really only one effective pass, Latour sees this pass as expressed in different ways.

The first kind of pass (probably not in the same order or number that Latour notes) is just this: Where a particular methodological application accounts for all that is allowed, a pass has occurred in the scheme of meaning that accounts for real estimations. We might even call this kind of pass a ‘given’, because it functions to allow reasoning to grant reality despite the problem it poses upon that reason to attach to real things. For example: If there is a question of the truth of Being, for which a particular formula answers this question, whether is be God, or whether it be a series of philosophical arguments, such as Deleuze’s Rhizomes, or various ‘arrived-at’ states or situations that we can associate with metaphorical ‘plateaus’ – where such an explanation of what is happening routes all occurrence back into its logic or reasoning such that every event is account for or deflected within that scheme, a pass has occurred to ‘miss’ the meaning of an alternate suggestion. The person effectivly ‘passes over’ the situation where someone is expressing a different reality because everything is making sense to the logic of the first person’s ‘total’ explanation of the situation. This is the post-modern condition.

But lets back up. Latour uses the analogy of a mountain pass. The meaning of the forgoing paragraph is that first we have to admit that there is a mountain in front of us. I show you a mountain and say that we are going to hike that mountain, and I start to walk. But you don’t move; you stand there pondering whether or not there is indeed a mountain. I tell you to come on, lets go, there are great views at the top of this mountain. But you stand there and reflect upon the possible aesthetics involved in being at the top of an epistemoloigcal situation that we cant agree upon.

This is the very problem we face when a philosopher will not admit ontological foundations as true. But I am not going to go into all the ramifications of this discussion here.

Again, enough to say that Latour’s analogy is of a mountain and a way to hike to the top. There are all sorts of dangers on this trail though. We will have to cross some fast streams and climb some crazy rocks, some steep terrain, but it is navigable, we just have to follow the route.

Now; the problems that Latour comes across and discusses in his book are due to the issues of this same type; he is still justifying the situation ontologically and thus has to address, and or finds, 15 types of passes that represent 15 types of manners or ‘modes’ that account for reality for the various types of people (various people use various modes so reality stays ‘whole’ –for those of the particular modes). This is why his gets sticky; because as soon as he attempts to justify something that is passing ontological constructions, he then has to use a pass that somehow avoids any of the passes he lists, or incorporates. Ironically, the need he notices gets set aside as another ‘religious’ dogma, another philosophical reductive scheme, accepted by some and rejected by others.

The point that he himself misses (and we will discuss somewhere the duplicity involved with conventional significance) is that in order to be able to see a pass one has to admit that ontological justifications rely themselves upon a pass. Simply speaking, Latour is attempting to answer a teleological question through ontological justifications.

Another kind of pass, a good one, and I think one of the first passes that Latour notes, is: Say we have a map of the mountain and the route leading up to the top. We mark our progress along the trail by markers in the map that indicate, like ‘when you get to a big dead oak jetting out of a rock, then you go east for two miles until…’ or symbols or pictures that say just as much. How are we able to transpose or translate the actual mountain to the map of it or vice-versa? The map itself looks nothing like the mountain, and in fact is nothing like the mountain. Yet there is some sort of resemblance between the two, and indeed, provided that something has not happened to have changed or altered the actual physical landmarks that the map notes, we are able to stick to the directions on the map and get to the top. In this kind of transferal there is a pass enacted in our understanding of reality. While I am not here addressing all the peculiarities of the situation, it is a simple thing to see that there is an obstruction in the actual Being of things to get around or past, and this can be analogous to two Beings attempting to communicate. In order for us to be able to follow the map of the course up the mountain, there has to be a sort of pass that allows us to ignore the problem that occurs in between the actual physical mountain and the small paper drawing of symbols that describe how to get up the mountain. This pass thus marks a particular manner of coming upon reality, a particular ‘mode of existing’.

The significant point, though, of noticing this situation is that in order to get beyond the dead end that is the modern-post-modern obstruction where no communication takes place (again: what do I mean by this? Read my past posts and my books to find out!, (and maybe check out some killer tunes to boot!)) is that an opening is needed through which people can be free to describe, what frankly amounts to, the ‘insane realties’ that actually occur in the meaningful life, but without fear of judgment of reprisal. Yet, this is not so much some sort of auto-biographical non-fiction or something, nor some authorial-fantasy of artistic license. It is more a manner by which we might be able to find out some facts about what reality really is.

At least, this is the idea behind Latour’s vision.

While I do enjoy the idea and see the need for a pass, I am not so optimistic as Latour.

Crash Space and the Move to a ‘Science’ (of the Subject): To Ping or Not to Ping, Phenomenology and Observer Effects. REPOST

 

THREE POUND BRAIN Im finding has got some cool observations, often a manner of approach that seems insightful.

In the discussion of a philosophical scientism, the post below appears to me to indicate more a datum, a kind of data point, over a semantic content. If we hold to the idea that indeed we will be able to come upon a ‘phenomenological science’, so to speak (for lack of a term; maybe it is better voiced as a science of continental philosophy, science of the Subject, or a science of philosophy, or existential science) it will come when when the content of proposals does not fold back into itself to ask questions of its epistemological and ontological being. The problem we (as a kind of Western dominator-colonialist hegemonic discourse) have been dealing with for some time in philosophy is the problem of redundancy; that is, the recurrent check upon sovereign privilege. Yet we cannot escape the issue that surrounds the statement ‘for those who understand’, for, there is indeed an issue for those who understand, if you catch my drift*.

This is where this essay by THREE POUND BRAIN seems to have purchase. Quite compelling; these thinkers have conflated particular arms of the issue to further close the gap that occurs in the perpetual philosophical deferring of redundancy. The issue of what we are calling a science of the Subject (again, for lack of a better term), concerns our ability to dismiss ourselves from the semantic content of philosophical discourses: This only occurs for those ‘who understand’ the issue. The issue is, as I just said, the recurrent enfolding of meaning; this issue has to do with a kind of route where the thought is always extricating itself from the object of its proposal in the effort to find a more true thing of reality. So, if this be the real case, what is and has been occurring all through our history of critical thought, then what is it issue in our ‘science’ concerns an ability to be removed from that recurring redundancy.

The redundancy, the space of ‘naught’ that the redundancy covers, the ‘pass’ that maintains the current paradigm that situates ‘subject’ and ‘object’, is what the essay below calls a ‘crash space’, for another term, and aside from the struct Husserlisan phenomenological reduction, it takes a certain kind of understanding of the issue (this, itself another kind of redundancy) to see and accept the the Reduction is indeed a facet of everyday human life, over a particular methodological approach.

What we find, though, what inevitably is a part of the science that accepts instances of truth (objects) is that this essay below thus becomes another data point. In order to see this, we then need to understand what the traditional philosophical method does, and how it produces ‘Objects’, which is to say ‘ideological/mythological objects’, as opposed to witnessing and involving the manipulation of mere objects themselves.

We need notice that philosophical reduction can occur with any object, that the Phenomenologist reduction is not a particular meaning upon a particular clausal route, as if it occurs only when one thinks in a manner that Husserl denotes, describes or explains. In fact, any object may be looked into to find that its basis is naught; but this does not mean that it thus is a relative ideological manifestation, but more indeed that the ideological manifestation itself reduces to naught, that the route is incorrect in its maner of reckoning. Yet again, this does not mean that there is nothing ‘outside’ of whatever. This ‘nothing’ is the crash space. All discourses arise an an ideological mandate, as a intrinsic mythology, due to the substantiation of a single foundational fact, this fact being the uncontroversial term, the ‘given’ of the discussion.

It is here that Harman’s ‘over’ and ‘under’ determination becomes operative as relational analogous categories to describe what his occurring, again, not as substantial real components of objective quality. His arguments are against particular contexts, particular discursive ‘givens’ that he must confront as a member of the academy, for which he must produce content.

So also, we then see, as much as the essay below represents a datum over another semantic point of argument, it is because it takes another ‘given’ as a means to argue a particular point about what may be real; this time a sort of ‘brain’ or ‘physical operation’ of such real structure. The given of the physical brain producing experiences has allowed a view that sees itself as a partial manifestation of an impartial effect, and has understood that without such partiality (the partiality wherein what is impartial likewsie resides in meaning), ‘nothingness’ occurs in meaning and its corresponding ‘feeling’, which is the collaspe of knowledge into itself, collapsing upon itself. And, that this means only that when there is no view that there is no view; it does not mean that there being no view means that the world is the view. This fact reveals something about the nature of being human, and it is more than an existential nihilistic uselessness amd purposelessness.

Similar to Bruno Latour’s effort in AMIE to first identify the need for an opening, and then to allow for the facts that can be discerned because an opening has been allowed: So it is that we might begin to find these ‘givens’, and how they manifest discourse as proposing substantial content. These ‘givens’ as datum, rather than the argument upon what is reduced or produced from the discourses, which result in redundancy; seeing there discourses as results of a given situation, thereby grants us the data by which to discern our sought after science. The data will then be the content, but not in its argumentative capacity, but rather what it is doing. 

The example is, say, a chair. How much do you need to say in describeing a chair before I understand what you are talking about? Probably very little. Yet conventional philosophy says that you can never describe enough, and I will never realize what you are describing as a chair. It takes little more than this to realize that philosophy of this sort is based in a fantasy. So we might see that the idea behind these two aspects of the philosophical method is: Left only with a capacity to know, which is to say, if I already did not have a conception or idea of what a chiar is, and or I did not have recourse to a personal gesture from the first person toward the object in question at hand for reference, and or in some imaginary world where there might be a being or intelligent creature who is not human who has no access to a chair nor has ever experienced what a chair might be — in the condition of at least one of these three conditions, knowledge left to itself would never be able to convey the chair to another’s knowledge suffuciently to supply this other with ‘chairness’. Always there would be another question that would have to be qualified, and the answer to which that would fail to qualify exclusively what a chiar actually is.

Nevertheless: There is a chair right there and I do have recourse to many human aspects and relationships to be able to convey to me what a chair is sufficiently enough for me to not only use it functionally (to sit down on it), but as well to use it in communication on many levels. One might ask: What else is a chair then? Wee; it is more than ideology and political social justice, though these things are indeed necesaary and good (we should instead just call them what they are instead of lumping them into the category of ‘philsophy’.)

Conventional philsophy would have it that we have access to what the chair might actually be, but not only this. Conventional philosophy assumes as it is important that we not only acknolwege that the chair exists as ‘more than’ a chair, but also argues this importance. This is why modern conventional philosophy has been accused of being nothing less than sophistry. The aggravating issue has to be what happens when we notice what conventional philsophy is doing.

We notice that philosophy is arguing its own validity even in the face of the exposure that its validity is merely an argument. The idea is this: Do I have to argue that a chair is a chair for it to be a chair, or is it always already a chair? I would say that the chiar is a chair regardless of what I want to say about it, but that further I can say many things about a chair, but I dont have to argue its existence for me to be able to consider the many things about what a chair may be.

Now; when we look at philosophy and we realize what it is doing, what does that mean?

I say thay it means that we have found the object called philosophy despite its argument about how it cannot be found. I say that this object is conventional philosophy because most philosophers are so caught up in the method, the substance that is logic step 1, logic step 2, step 3…as of logic is more than merely a tool, that they are incapable of admitting that thier method has been identified, in fact, as an object. They will be completely mystified as to what I can possibly mean, and will use the method to prove to me I am wrong, that philosophy is not an object that can be found. Yet it is because I used no method to find it, I stick with what I am doing to call it philosophy, and distinguish the arguments of convetional philosophy as now a near empty set, an object whose content I may now use as data.

So we might continue along this idea: How much do I have to read of Emmanual Kant before I understand what he is talking about? I say not very much, because , just like the chair, once you understand what he is saying, you understand the object he is talking about. Likewsie; how much do I need to read of Hurserl? Quite soon in the reading of Husserl you see the object he is describing. What about Derrida? Delueze? Wittgestien? Hegel?

What happens when we admit the object they are talking about is indeed a common object, rather than a secret and deep, complex and elusive object? Answer: We can begin to address what these authors are saying as data, that is, as examples of what Subjects are doing with the common philosophical object. Relieved of psycholoigcal theological approximations that rely upon intuited transcedental subjective interpretations to manifest identity, we can thereby begin to view the human object, as opposed to having only the enfolded and redundant subjective interpretation of objects. Once we can begin to accumulate data on what the Subject is doing with the common philosophical object, we can begin to more fully understand what the human being is, and what it does.

 

The THREe POUND BRAIN essay evidences a certain cognition, a certain intentional acknowledgment of the issue, as well as intuiting what needs to occur. It seems that, at least here, THREE POUND BRAIN evidences a closer move toward this science.

 

 

* “The Moment of Decisive Significance: A Heresy” which will be out soon , fingers crossed , addresses these concerns, albeit in a non-conventional manner. The Revised edition has an added Preface, Preface to the Introduction, Forward and an Introduction, as well as an Author’s Note,  just to make sure everything is handled. 😄

REPOST:

 

JAMES XAVIER: Sam, what’s the range of human vision? SAM BRANT: Distance? JAMES XAVIER: No, wavelength. SAM BRANT: Between 4000 angstrom units and 7800 angstrom units.* You know that. JAMES XAVIER: Less than one-tenth of the actual wave spectrum. What could we really see if we had access to the other ninety-percent? Sam, we […]

via To Ping or Not to Ping: Physics, Phenomenology, and Observer Effects — Three Pound Brain

 

[NOTE: A variation of this comment about an essay posted in THREE POUND BRAIN forms part of the “Preface to the Intorduction” of the revised 1st edition of the book “Absolution“, that is called now: “The Moment of Decisive Significance: A Heresy“. It is copyright 2016 by Lance A. Kair.]

An Brief Heretical Outline of Our Current Situation: Phenomenology and Scientism.

Here is an end note from my upcoming book.

I have changed the title to “The Moment of Decisive Significance: A Heresy“.

This is a book of blatant confrontation and direct exposure, and not of spirituality or self help.

BTW: One of my ex-professors read a small bit of my unedited copy and replied to me: “It appears that you have written a self-help book, and being as I am not very interested in self-help, I probably won’t read the rest.”  Talk about pompousness and presumptive privilege. He was even a religious studies philosophy professor. Yes, its is an object oriented view through the Gospels, but Fuck man. I hope all you people are not as myopic and dense as he is. Funny I used to have respect for him. I can’t even imagine Where he would have come up with such an idea. I guess its because my ideas are So offensive (correctly framed 😛) that was the only way he could come to terms with what I am saying.

But hey; Ive said I appreciate any feedback. He gave me his feedback. And I think his ’emeritus’ title is undeserved. So there.

 From what I have experienced in my 3 so years of blogging, I am skeptical of academic presumptiveness and pompousness, and Dr.– just topped it off. So if you are an academic, and honest, please take my occasionsal discursive promiscuity and crass lip with a hint a compassion and understanding. I am most probably not talking about you, and even as I might overgeneralize and say ‘academic’, I do have respect for many scholars.

I am honest and often naive; but fool me once, shame on me…   
“note 129.

The ‘historical moment’ of Jesus is intended to reference the facticity of history over the negotiated interpretation of it. The difference is found when we consider that we have yet to exhaust the phenomenonalist intension ( in a general sense meaning ‘centrist subject’);  the conventional method of finding truth that is likewise involved with an establishment of identity is problematic. This is why there is and has been an issue with some ‘continental philosophers’ suggesting their ideas might denote a kind of science, or that we might be able to develop some sort of a phenomenologist scientism, if you will. What we might call a ‘pure’ method of science is one that moves in laborious increments punctuated by momentous insights that cannot be anticipated, not only around perhaps a single scientist with a purpose in mind, or an aspect to investigate, but through all the multitudinous scientists likewise working on often tiny aspects of the same issue. While one could argue there is a kind of concern for identity in every person (as well as a subjective bias such as Bruno Latour proposes to have uncovered), the science itself, for the hard core scientist, is what is important and drives the effort.
Admittedly, this might be a bit deluded in ideal, but if we are going to apply a philosophical reduction here likewise (not necessarily a phenomenologist reduction), then we would have to ask how even science itself, the proper science of physical mechanics and such, functions in the way it does for accomplishments. Of course we cannot completely dismiss real subjective ‘interference’ with objectivity, but the issue here is not about absolutes. This issue concerns methods. The issue concerns the real cohesion of disparate situations. What we are calling ‘conventional method’ is meant to specifically draw our attention to philosophy and its domain; we suggest that there is a type of real endeavor that works to draw all things unto itself, to reconciliation, and this is the motion of identity, of real objects. This motion for the human being is thus involved with what we usually call subjectivity but is really more an indication of ‘being value’. In other words, this translates for the human being into having ‘self-worth’ or even ‘relevancy’ or ‘importance’; we might even say that there is a libidinal drive for identity, and this is indeed part of the constitution of reality.

So it is that in reality, the conventional method misses vital components of truth for the sake of identity and even argues identity as a ubiquitous feature of what might possibly be true; conventional method draws all things unto itself and then argues its truth as if it is the only truth possible. And this is to say that even allowing for the possibility of more than one truth is indeed a move of this drawing toward unity. It is a unitive proposal to say that there is more than one reality. This is, in itself, a phenomenalist move. The point here, though, as I have said, is that such a method is completely incapable of entertaining that which lay outside is purview, but this does not mean that there is ‘nothing’ that it does not address or is capable of addressing; rather, this is to say that reality is the negotiation of terms and thus the historicity can never be contemplated by the conventional method due to its foundation is what is real. Conventional method is thereby centered around a subjective interpretation of what is occurring and the negotiation of these relative subjective agents. Also, again; this is not to say that somehow it is incorrect, but only that this is the way it behaves, this is the true description of how real philosophical negotiation occurs.

Thus when we speak of the ‘historical moment’ of Jesus, we mean to refer to that fact not negotiated. Here then, we can only be speaking from the historical motion itself; and this is to say that in this particular historical moment, the event of the minimal human experience is seen to involve ‘God’ as this universal and basic form can be communicated across disparate arenas, which we are finding through our venture through the Gospels here, are two different teleological fields, as we say, two routes of coming upon the object. The historical moment of Jesus is that moment wherein there is only a real human experience, a one common ontological arena, such that what is definitively and absolutely two teleological bases is understood as implicating a further unity, at that, as ‘secret’ or ‘spiritual’ unity, as if a real ontology necessarily, automatically, axiomatically and omnipresently involves the totality of all things.
The problem then of the usual conventional philosophical route is that because it is incapable of allowing for anything that is not determined in subjective negotiation, when the logic of the ends of discourse is presented in history, it is understood as such rather than experienced; which is to say there are two types of what is called ‘experience’ that are proposed to equate to meaning the same thing. What is understood through philosophical proposal is viewed the same thing as what is posed in philosophical proposal. The ‘ends’ is viewed upon as a logical conclusion based upon the subjective center of thought ‘thinking and considering’ such logical pathways. This is to say that despite what definitions might arise to say reality is this-and-that different than before or what another definition might have proposed, still the thinker is thinking these things through, considering various discursive designations from a central and prioritized Self, consciousness, or subjective agency. Even if we were to somehow logically crawl step by step to be able to say “From dog flower spichz consliger fghkioh tomorrowpd cloud ring flies to refridgerator” and mean something significant, the metaleptical slide that has occurred to be able to have that clausal phrase mean something meaningful gets nowhere further that the sentences we are using at this moment to convey an idea. And this is to say that the human being will always be a human being despite what clausal structure we set upon it. The political and ideological structure may change, but the question is always how we were able to develop a global society out of different ‘humanities’ speaking different languages who all have different terms and even grammars that order various ‘realities’ if we were not all human?

The conventional philosophical method has thus ‘skipped’ (what Latour might call a pass) the end of phenomenology through the application of logic upon it to thereby posit by a sort of reasoning that we should move to consider something else besides the dead end phenomenological reduction. This is because the conventional method requires novel ideas. But these very ideas are based into the phenomenologist move, as we said above, these ideas are based in the reduction, in drawing all meaning unto a centrist occasion. Hence phenomenology has not ended but was merely passed over for the sake of establishing another real identity. It matters little if anyone prescribes to Hursserl’s method or moves along his methodological pathway to a particular (non?) definitional ‘experience’ because when it comes down to it, this kind of method or attitude upon definitional paths, merely yields another definitional situation (that here we can call the ‘phenomenological reduction’); an individual moving along Husserl’s clausal path to his meaning avoids the path that is already being allowed for the ability to even take his path to any meaning, whether it agrees with him or not.

 

The point here is that while conventional philosophy would sooner not have to argue over how identity is a feature that must be dealt with in reality at all times, and as well not have to expose the weak point of the platform by which the institution continues, the whole platform that is taken as a necessary condition of real negotiation has already been argued and found lacking. But where these arguments have occurred, they are taken in stride to merely be another part of the negotiating of the ubiquitous ever-presence. In order to come to terms with what is actually occurring, conventional method must be set aside as a feature of a kind of functioning of human consciousness. When this happens, or may be seen to be possible, we begin to see how scientism might become viable, but the only way is to disregard what the conventional method has to say about it, but more, that whatever it has to say about the analysis based upon this view, is itself more evidence of what consciousness does.”

–from “The Moment of Decisive Significance: A Heresy” C. 2016. Lance A Kair.


 

AUTHOR’s COMMENT ON THE NOTE: The opening to the discussion of what consciousness is actually doing, as opposed to the discussion of what consciousness gives to be considered, is made by fully acknowledging that the phenomenological occasion is a capitalistic subjective identity that does not account for the totality of human existence, that what its gives is a religious foundation for Being. It is an effective theological directive. What occurs outside this capitalistic determination is a situation that threatens identity; it is a heresy. Thus, somehow, the opening will be made for those to whom that threat is of no concern.  This is the proposal upon which a science of human consciousness seems must be based.

But we will see what occurs.

Because I Choose To.

The present state of philosophical effort can be summed up if we are honest: It is less philosophiical and more a Critical Methodology.

The reason for this is found by the insistance of the priviledged subject, the thinker who no matter what discursive arrangments, no matter how passionatly one might assert and wish it, will never be able to argue past or beyond Choice.

This is so much the case that the only way  philosophers can get beyond it is tomake a deal with themselves, and by result a whole institution arises that functions to enforce the limit of what is then an umbrella of failure that reflects the feeble efforts of a bought soul. This is Cypher’s deal.

One has only to watch the movie “The Matrix” to fully understand our current philosophical paradigm.

And then read my earlier post on telos. 

The issue would seem to be that there is the ‘regular’ world (the matrix) and then a ‘real’world. Philosophers either are ‘in the matrix’ attempting to situate what is true of it and how to best negotiate the conditions. Or philosophers have discovered what is ‘actually real’ and attempt also to effect human goodness from ‘being outside’ the matrix.

Most philosophy i come accross stems from one of those two situations, and bothgo back and forth aguing who has the best and more true; and they both argue that there is ‘nothing’ beyond this situation.

And, both posit some ‘grand reckoning’. One finds the reckoning in the great human future at one end, and an actually of God coming down in the form of Christ at the other, and the degradation and disintegration of humanity and its world in the middle.

[Total side: Why do we have a 40 hour work week? Why did the workers agree to a 8 hr day? Why didn’t they hold out for a 4 or 5 hour day? Where are we going so fast? Why does everything need be done so quickly? Does it matter if we colonize Mars in 20 years, 50 or 100? Who is making this call to get everything done so fast? Who is convincing us that competition is the best way? Haven’t we already noticed that the very idea of competition is excluding many excelling and able candidates (see my earlier post)? Answer: Eat the rich. better: If you are one of those people who subscribe to the need to get things done so fast, we should be eating you and making you work our fields. lol Ahhh hahahahahah.  (evil laugh)]

The way out of this nihilistic universe that the Matrix has defined, is to see simply that this dualistic version is incorrect. It should have been noticed right when ‘nothing’ came into view, but instead we resorted to political and ideological critique. In a certain skew with Miellasoux, the question should be

“Why, when we noticed that our current manner of reckoning is founded upon nothingness, did we jump back into the nihilistic arena.”

It is because, as I just said, we cannot chose to not be the central thinker who chooses.

That is, until that no longer happens. It s comic on one hand, but where it is serious, there we have the problem that is reality as One. 

Most everyone will submit whatever is said to the conditions of ‘the matrix’, and will argue the matrix even unto contradiction and beyond. They will uphold their limit.

Hence we have the pass of Bruno Latour, and well as the problematic of Alain Badou, where (paraphrase) the agent of truth must relinquish that truth for the sake of reality.

And hence we have the divergence that merely suggests that we need no longer answer to such limited recall. We are in the process of verification, no longer of proving. 

What we see, then, is that we no longer are aguing over ontology and various aspects of real involvment. We find that we are involved in history, at that, in a defferent teleology. 

The Fallacy of Realism.

(Da Sein and the Phenomenon, part 2)

If we pay attention, then we may notice that we have been deceived. But most do not notice. The distinction, then, is made between these two ‘awarenesses’, these two ‘knowledges’. So we have really three distinctions, three ‘modes’ evidenced in philosophical authorship.

One; of the deception. Denial that there is a possibility of various modes. This is denial as ignorance. This is no acknowledgment of any sort of some grand, real deception. Here reality is reality. There is no problem here. Reality offers the truth of all things possible to human understanding through the interaction of humanity in the universe. All possibility falls within reality.

Two: coming upon the deception and seeing it not as as absolute limit. This is denial
– either in knowing of the limit and revolting back from it, as an essential mandate of being.
– or, knowing of the limit and using that limit to actively create. This is denial in the deceptive sense.

Three: Knowing that the limit only concerns reality.

But see; this is not a description of a One ‘true’ situation. This is a description of three manners of appropriation. We are talking about how meaning functions, and not about some true-real reduction to some common humanity.

This proposal always reveals this triad. Those who see that all expression must reduce to a common human understanding, what we call and is the modern situation; those who have encountered a type of confrontation or awareness of the modern situation but who nevertheless consciously operate within it, the post postmodern situation; those who do not reside within the modern paradigm, those of the post-modern situation, of Da Sein.

Da Sein is not a description of some whole humanity, as if everyone, every human being somehow exists as a Da Sein. No; he is describing an exceptional situation. It is the subsequence that Heidegger had to defend against; but also the reason why his system did not work, and likewise why he though the German Nationalist Socialists were the way to go. Likewise, this is the reason why certain post postmoderns have to defend against being identified as Da Sein: Because they do not wish to have to confront the conventional subsequence, the conventional ignorance, that would (mis-)identify Da Sein as somehow having to do with Modern terror. Indeed, it still does, but under a different guise. Deception.