An Brief Heretical Outline of Our Current Situation: Phenomenology and Scientism.

Here is an end note from my upcoming book.

I have changed the title to “The Moment of Decisive Significance: A Heresy“.

This is a book of blatant confrontation and direct exposure, and not of spirituality or self help.

BTW: One of my ex-professors read a small bit of my unedited copy and replied to me: “It appears that you have written a self-help book, and being as I am not very interested in self-help, I probably won’t read the rest.”  Talk about pompousness and presumptive privilege. He was even a religious studies philosophy professor. Yes, its is an object oriented view through the Gospels, but Fuck man. I hope all you people are not as myopic and dense as he is. Funny I used to have respect for him. I can’t even imagine Where he would have come up with such an idea. I guess its because my ideas are So offensive (correctly framed 😛) that was the only way he could come to terms with what I am saying.

But hey; Ive said I appreciate any feedback. He gave me his feedback. And I think his ’emeritus’ title is undeserved. So there.

 From what I have experienced in my 3 so years of blogging, I am skeptical of academic presumptiveness and pompousness, and Dr.– just topped it off. So if you are an academic, and honest, please take my occasionsal discursive promiscuity and crass lip with a hint a compassion and understanding. I am most probably not talking about you, and even as I might overgeneralize and say ‘academic’, I do have respect for many scholars.

I am honest and often naive; but fool me once, shame on me…   
“note 129.

The ‘historical moment’ of Jesus is intended to reference the facticity of history over the negotiated interpretation of it. The difference is found when we consider that we have yet to exhaust the phenomenonalist intension ( in a general sense meaning ‘centrist subject’);  the conventional method of finding truth that is likewise involved with an establishment of identity is problematic. This is why there is and has been an issue with some ‘continental philosophers’ suggesting their ideas might denote a kind of science, or that we might be able to develop some sort of a phenomenologist scientism, if you will. What we might call a ‘pure’ method of science is one that moves in laborious increments punctuated by momentous insights that cannot be anticipated, not only around perhaps a single scientist with a purpose in mind, or an aspect to investigate, but through all the multitudinous scientists likewise working on often tiny aspects of the same issue. While one could argue there is a kind of concern for identity in every person (as well as a subjective bias such as Bruno Latour proposes to have uncovered), the science itself, for the hard core scientist, is what is important and drives the effort.
Admittedly, this might be a bit deluded in ideal, but if we are going to apply a philosophical reduction here likewise (not necessarily a phenomenologist reduction), then we would have to ask how even science itself, the proper science of physical mechanics and such, functions in the way it does for accomplishments. Of course we cannot completely dismiss real subjective ‘interference’ with objectivity, but the issue here is not about absolutes. This issue concerns methods. The issue concerns the real cohesion of disparate situations. What we are calling ‘conventional method’ is meant to specifically draw our attention to philosophy and its domain; we suggest that there is a type of real endeavor that works to draw all things unto itself, to reconciliation, and this is the motion of identity, of real objects. This motion for the human being is thus involved with what we usually call subjectivity but is really more an indication of ‘being value’. In other words, this translates for the human being into having ‘self-worth’ or even ‘relevancy’ or ‘importance’; we might even say that there is a libidinal drive for identity, and this is indeed part of the constitution of reality.

So it is that in reality, the conventional method misses vital components of truth for the sake of identity and even argues identity as a ubiquitous feature of what might possibly be true; conventional method draws all things unto itself and then argues its truth as if it is the only truth possible. And this is to say that even allowing for the possibility of more than one truth is indeed a move of this drawing toward unity. It is a unitive proposal to say that there is more than one reality. This is, in itself, a phenomenalist move. The point here, though, as I have said, is that such a method is completely incapable of entertaining that which lay outside is purview, but this does not mean that there is ‘nothing’ that it does not address or is capable of addressing; rather, this is to say that reality is the negotiation of terms and thus the historicity can never be contemplated by the conventional method due to its foundation is what is real. Conventional method is thereby centered around a subjective interpretation of what is occurring and the negotiation of these relative subjective agents. Also, again; this is not to say that somehow it is incorrect, but only that this is the way it behaves, this is the true description of how real philosophical negotiation occurs.

Thus when we speak of the ‘historical moment’ of Jesus, we mean to refer to that fact not negotiated. Here then, we can only be speaking from the historical motion itself; and this is to say that in this particular historical moment, the event of the minimal human experience is seen to involve ‘God’ as this universal and basic form can be communicated across disparate arenas, which we are finding through our venture through the Gospels here, are two different teleological fields, as we say, two routes of coming upon the object. The historical moment of Jesus is that moment wherein there is only a real human experience, a one common ontological arena, such that what is definitively and absolutely two teleological bases is understood as implicating a further unity, at that, as ‘secret’ or ‘spiritual’ unity, as if a real ontology necessarily, automatically, axiomatically and omnipresently involves the totality of all things.
The problem then of the usual conventional philosophical route is that because it is incapable of allowing for anything that is not determined in subjective negotiation, when the logic of the ends of discourse is presented in history, it is understood as such rather than experienced; which is to say there are two types of what is called ‘experience’ that are proposed to equate to meaning the same thing. What is understood through philosophical proposal is viewed the same thing as what is posed in philosophical proposal. The ‘ends’ is viewed upon as a logical conclusion based upon the subjective center of thought ‘thinking and considering’ such logical pathways. This is to say that despite what definitions might arise to say reality is this-and-that different than before or what another definition might have proposed, still the thinker is thinking these things through, considering various discursive designations from a central and prioritized Self, consciousness, or subjective agency. Even if we were to somehow logically crawl step by step to be able to say “From dog flower spichz consliger fghkioh tomorrowpd cloud ring flies to refridgerator” and mean something significant, the metaleptical slide that has occurred to be able to have that clausal phrase mean something meaningful gets nowhere further that the sentences we are using at this moment to convey an idea. And this is to say that the human being will always be a human being despite what clausal structure we set upon it. The political and ideological structure may change, but the question is always how we were able to develop a global society out of different ‘humanities’ speaking different languages who all have different terms and even grammars that order various ‘realities’ if we were not all human?

The conventional philosophical method has thus ‘skipped’ (what Latour might call a pass) the end of phenomenology through the application of logic upon it to thereby posit by a sort of reasoning that we should move to consider something else besides the dead end phenomenological reduction. This is because the conventional method requires novel ideas. But these very ideas are based into the phenomenologist move, as we said above, these ideas are based in the reduction, in drawing all meaning unto a centrist occasion. Hence phenomenology has not ended but was merely passed over for the sake of establishing another real identity. It matters little if anyone prescribes to Hursserl’s method or moves along his methodological pathway to a particular (non?) definitional ‘experience’ because when it comes down to it, this kind of method or attitude upon definitional paths, merely yields another definitional situation (that here we can call the ‘phenomenological reduction’); an individual moving along Husserl’s clausal path to his meaning avoids the path that is already being allowed for the ability to even take his path to any meaning, whether it agrees with him or not.


The point here is that while conventional philosophy would sooner not have to argue over how identity is a feature that must be dealt with in reality at all times, and as well not have to expose the weak point of the platform by which the institution continues, the whole platform that is taken as a necessary condition of real negotiation has already been argued and found lacking. But where these arguments have occurred, they are taken in stride to merely be another part of the negotiating of the ubiquitous ever-presence. In order to come to terms with what is actually occurring, conventional method must be set aside as a feature of a kind of functioning of human consciousness. When this happens, or may be seen to be possible, we begin to see how scientism might become viable, but the only way is to disregard what the conventional method has to say about it, but more, that whatever it has to say about the analysis based upon this view, is itself more evidence of what consciousness does.”

–from “The Moment of Decisive Significance: A Heresy” C. 2016. Lance A Kair.


AUTHOR’s COMMENT ON THE NOTE: The opening to the discussion of what consciousness is actually doing, as opposed to the discussion of what consciousness gives to be considered, is made by fully acknowledging that the phenomenological occasion is a capitalistic subjective identity that does not account for the totality of human existence, that what its gives is a religious foundation for Being. It is an effective theological directive. What occurs outside this capitalistic determination is a situation that threatens identity; it is a heresy. Thus, somehow, the opening will be made for those to whom that threat is of no concern.  This is the proposal upon which a science of human consciousness seems must be based.

But we will see what occurs.


Redrawing the Partition Whereby Philosophical Discourse Leads to Particular Decisions of Route. 

It is interesting to me the various places and occasions that move us to consider things and their lighting.  Here is one of those occasions:

NPR: Gender and Willingness to Compete.

Of course, this is a general overview presented in its brevity for the purpose of the general education of the reasonably intelligent. But nevertheless, what strikes me is that here again is a questioning that appears out of seemingly nowhere, that confronts the perceived natural order of things. This time, the manner by which we figure to find the best candidate performer of any situation, as well as what the best group of candidates means, and the the very functioning of real mechanisms, is brought to issue. But that is not what is particularly significant to me. What appears significant is not that the system is faulty; rather, it is that the way by which the system has been questioned does not open a new vector for discussion. In fact, it does more than bring the situation in to question; it suggests that there is a substantial lack involved in the situation as it is. If we have been following my ideas through this blog: It actually indicates a particular substance, an actual situation of position that is not able to be considered by the present route of real meaning, even while this route poses its total inclusion.

Now, for those so keen, it is difficult to miss the past 50 years of social justice that can be wrapped up in this situation. The too often misappropriated seminal essay by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s  on political representational voice, “Can the Subaltern Speak” begins to stir in memory. But the issue I notice on this pass is not a silence that has been left out due to the functioning of a systematic ideology of oppression; i do not propose a recinciliation of parties. So much of philosophy and critical thinking is dead set upon social justice that almost every contemporary philosopher must enjoin her ideas with political meaning, while missing the ‘subject-effect’. We are indeed still confined by the post-colonial/post-modern appropriation of social justice. Spivak’s critique begins to evoke an end, but it is an end that finds its beginning once the political subaltern has been ‘fully colonized’, or perhaps more politically correct phrasing “free”. For, in that great post-modern era, there was still a sort of idealism that felt somehow the colonial motion could be ‘dissolved’; dissolved indeed it was, but into its enforcer that we call ‘Capitalism’. But make no mistake: We all have been colonized, and most thoroughly. (Zizek: The most difficult thing is to imagine outside of capitalism.) The dream of Spivak and her bud Derrida (and the like) was more than that upon the finding of the question that opened the door to ‘nothing’ thus revealed in the destruction of the soveriegn Western Subject that a multiplicity of agents lay hidden in oppression, but that the universe was indeed constituted by this multiplicity, that freedom was in this release; dread for us to find that this was just a deception that functioned for the West to make everyone Subjects. 

Nevertheless; the bodies should be counted and ordered, and everyone has to first speak for this to happen, and there indeed is a value, and a goodness, in bodily freedom, even as it might be theoerticaly bound, (note the first paragraph of pg 68 in Spivak, on desire) Yet those kind of ideal appropriations came about and took place (to take place) in a moment when there was still a kind of exoticism hanging around the West; orientalism still colored the world through the shadow of European colonialism. It was the last age of magical thinking that still could go on with a certain aire of plausibility. Now, though we are still working out the finer details of how the ideals of equality, freedom and human opportunity should be applied, and magically adjusting reality in the processes, even while we try to stamp out the ignorance of at least blatant (if not institutional) racism and bigotry, it is not difficult to see that the World is indeed, and has become, The World in a proper objective sense; as they say, globalism is more than some big idea, media and technology allow us to have good neighbors 3000 and more miles away. It is (now really) a small world after all.

So when we now look at Jean Francios Lyotard’s ‘The Differend’, we might be able to begin to see it in its proper light, apart from the direct appropriations of feminism and race relations; this is to say that while we indeed do involve others in an ethically considerate reflection, we should maybe start, maybe begin to be able, to understand that a reflection never gets further than the view that beholds it – or more precisely, if we have been keeping up, that there are two routes such that there is one type of reflection that does get further than its view.

Consider this latest post in Dark Ecologies about Slavoj Zizek:

REPOST: Stranger in our Midst

The point that is made by Zizek, explained along a particular path in the link, is that the stranger is not someone we do not know. It is not the situation at hand that a stranger is someone foreign to us. Rather, it is that the stranger is the situation that we know all too well. It is not that we don’t know, for his example of the migrants in Europe, these strangers that are coming into our land; on the contrary, we know exactly who and what they are, and it is this kind of knowing that allows the EU to maintain the conditions of its situation as such. We are concerned that these people coming into our country will cause all sorts of catastrophic problems that could lead to the disintegration of the EU (will Britain pull out now? Germany?): Because the integration that is the EU is situated in the terms that tell us exactly what these strangers are, it is the contradiction inherent of the stranger confronting our boarders that frieghtens us and causes all sorts of stir. For example, it is not that migrants are raping our women; everyone is raping everyone all the time no matter what label we put on a group to justify our statistics. We integrate difference into our union by allowing for the stranger to act in strange (or deviant) ways, to thus confirm our boundaries and what we know (qualified by that “we don’t know”) as true.

Yet the significance I see, that which I have been let unto, is that it is in this knowing the stranger that also allows us to perpetually put off and defer what is really strange, what we might say is alien, to merely a stranger who comes in and disrupts everything and does heinous acts. What is alien is that which defies our sense of truth such that it remains invisible to our view. Effective as it may be, we routinely usurp the power of what may be alien through what means truth by virtue of what we see or are able to view, through what means truth allows us to see.

Before we get to this point, though, and as we remain in the political realm of social justice, and derive discourse from the paradigm of a particular vector cycle of meaning (correlational), there is what I have called a partition that allows for the correlational cycle to appear solute, to appear as though it addresses everything that can possibly be. By this partition, we have a position, identity, but it is an identity that is based in what Francios Laruelle might call a philosophical decision. It is this position, the placement of the partition in meaning that can define a paradigm, but also what we can call an intrinsic mythology, what I call, in short, a route of meaning, by which I may situate True Objects.

Yet, when we consider the studies from the first link that shows that women tend not to enter a competitive situation when they know it is competitive even when they will have excelled in the activity, we have an indication of a situation that is viewed as pervasive and ubiquitous as it is prosaic, a situation the meaning of which and the manner of which is commonplace and taken thereby as obviously true; for, a feminist need not be a woman as well as the statistics are speaking of gender. But not only this; usually such a kind of result that brings the question leaves us in a lurch wondering what might be the content of this hole that was created by the available question. Yet here we have also the indication that indeed we can identify the content of the the ‘subaltern’. But see; this is only similar to the colonial recordings of the colonized practices and beliefs, such as Nicholas Dirks notices in his book “Castes of Mind”. Here we do not have to wonder about what might truly be the content of such proscriptions and then wait for the subaltern colonized bodies to speak themselves. Here we know exactly what the content is, or at least that there is indeed a content we know of that we are merely denying. The difference lay, on one hand, in where we place the partition, but on the other, which way we look, in what direction, and how we see things, what i call orientation. Women, Indian-Asian, Native-American, Latino, and more  –indeed they were and are being denied by the practice of colonial oppression, but they were being denied as a practice or effect of or because of, not what the colonizer did not want to see, but exactly because of the colonizer could not see. In our present considerations we are not nullifying that there are still bodies that cannot be seen who need to find their voice; instead, we are saying that once the bodies are found and the voices heard then the political no longer is the ‘last frontier’, or to put it in specifically post-modern terms: The ‘fact’ that we might be confined and limited by discourse does not mean that the only recourse we have is to the political-ideological realm, nor to the philosophical iterations that serve to reify its domain; similar to what Mr. Vedantam suggests in the NPR story, such an automatic default is most probably a false choice, a recourse that is seen to be the only route due to the placement of the partition of meaning, but that indeed now we might be able to see that there is some content beyond the limit, and as such, the limit would be then proposing itself in denial of the content that lay beyond it.

Hence, I am also reminded of the situation in which I find myself, because somehow I don’t like to compete and routinely go around direct test comparisons of assets, even though I am a man and (i like to think) quite masculine to boot. It is this apparently auspicious combination of traits that then moves me to withdraw from competition while all the while working on subversive means to win. Like Captain James Kirk in the Kobayashi Maru:

Kobayashi Maru
2009 Kirk Cheats
In a way, I don’t like to lose, and because I found myself in a no win (post-modern white wash) situation, I realized that this could not be the absolute case. And in fact, the discourses that revolve around, through and every which way upon a political and ideological, as well as psychological, solution somehow left me out and is leaving me out. Not as a Spivakian subaltern with no voice, but some kind of different invisible content, noticed yet denied.

(Hey; wasn’t there a Vulcan officer in one of the Star Trek movies who was named “Spivak” ???)

Awareness: part 2

Some one posted a comment to this post of mine, to which I replied, but then I made it into a new posting.

You can check the comments of the original post  here: 

“We will find, inevitably, as a kind, that the only things that change are the objects of our view, and not any ‘essential mode’ of being human. Humans do not change; only its world changes. There is no’grasp’ that links these forms, but that of a present faith, a present sort of ideological religion.”

…and here’s my new post: 
Yes. That is one type of essential reduction . Thank you . The furthering question is what is happening that this is not apparent; that is, as it often has to be taught. And more: That it sometimes doesn’t have to be taught. 
The reason why I say ‘one type’ is because there is only a certain type of reasoning that would say that an experience has any essentially true relation to words, which is to say, terms. Where there is an essential linkage, there we find an essential agency, a sort of ‘central and foundational’ effect. But in truth, any word (term) can be found to uphold the same tenants of being. I can say ‘consciousness’, but any term could be used and find the same types of meaningful organization, a same typeof scheme. The example is the Copernican universe. It is not that the sun’really’ exists at the center of the solar system; this is just a mathematical convention that makes easy sense. In fact we could construct models that place any point-object in the universe at the center. Hence, this means that there are only objects. 
The problem with saying ‘consciousness’ and or ‘awareness’ is that one usually tends to associate these discursive foundations as meaning actually foundational and essential things. Hence they are directed toward more a ‘use’ and ‘practicality’ than what should be otherwise an actual truth. For people who need or want a way to mitigate the mental and emotional issues such as anger, fear, and general life difficulty. It is proper then that we can say they are Real,because reality has to do with essential practical linkages of meaning. 
But a more deeper sense finds that there was s no ‘foundational’ or central ‘thing’ that is ‘me’ or ‘my consciousness’ behaving in any way unto itself, that is, as a sort of ‘spiritual being’ that is sufficiently segregate from some world to be able to ‘have’ an effect upon or within some world.

The fact is s that in the consistency that is an unsegregated being, there is still the apparent world there, no matter how I might come to terms with it, no matter what experiences I have about some truth. Ina certain sense, this is what Samraj is saying about consiouness, but if we don’t stop there, we might find that it is not really consciousness at all. 
This then brckons an investigation beyond the mere phenomenon. Because now, all that is left, is being here now, and the doing of it. 
There is a return that occurs though. Once we get beyond that fantastic experience of some intervening deity, move past the awakening of the divine center, we are left with an experience that is somehow more than the experience, what can be said to ‘exceed’ what could considered human experience. 
But we must be careful here: What most often and typically occurs with this move of excess is an impossibility of meaningful reconciliation. Rather; usually all one is left with is a back pedaling to either (now) Real Things, aka empirical science , ‘speculative’ imagining, or a kind of spiritual fundamentalism. But both of these as part of the same move, or the move of the same, mere reenact the repetition of the terms of theoretical discourse, and will end again at the same points.
Hence, what is actually excessive is a kind of historicity where two routes of the knowing human being are exposed, two routes that do not reconcile in reality for a ‘more real’ or ‘more true’ truth.  

The Fallacy of Realism.

(Da Sein and the Phenomenon, part 2)

If we pay attention, then we may notice that we have been deceived. But most do not notice. The distinction, then, is made between these two ‘awarenesses’, these two ‘knowledges’. So we have really three distinctions, three ‘modes’ evidenced in philosophical authorship.

One; of the deception. Denial that there is a possibility of various modes. This is denial as ignorance. This is no acknowledgment of any sort of some grand, real deception. Here reality is reality. There is no problem here. Reality offers the truth of all things possible to human understanding through the interaction of humanity in the universe. All possibility falls within reality.

Two: coming upon the deception and seeing it not as as absolute limit. This is denial
– either in knowing of the limit and revolting back from it, as an essential mandate of being.
– or, knowing of the limit and using that limit to actively create. This is denial in the deceptive sense.

Three: Knowing that the limit only concerns reality.

But see; this is not a description of a One ‘true’ situation. This is a description of three manners of appropriation. We are talking about how meaning functions, and not about some true-real reduction to some common humanity.

This proposal always reveals this triad. Those who see that all expression must reduce to a common human understanding, what we call and is the modern situation; those who have encountered a type of confrontation or awareness of the modern situation but who nevertheless consciously operate within it, the post postmodern situation; those who do not reside within the modern paradigm, those of the post-modern situation, of Da Sein.

Da Sein is not a description of some whole humanity, as if everyone, every human being somehow exists as a Da Sein. No; he is describing an exceptional situation. It is the subsequence that Heidegger had to defend against; but also the reason why his system did not work, and likewise why he though the German Nationalist Socialists were the way to go. Likewise, this is the reason why certain post postmoderns have to defend against being identified as Da Sein: Because they do not wish to have to confront the conventional subsequence, the conventional ignorance, that would (mis-)identify Da Sein as somehow having to do with Modern terror. Indeed, it still does, but under a different guise. Deception.

Comment on the comment of Tom Sparrow’s “The End of Phenomenology”. 

The New Realism is just that: A manner of justification for a new reality.  No big deal; its cool. I just wonder how critical they go. What is their purpose.  Well, an intro to Toms book goes like this:

           “In the 20th century, phenomenology promised a method that would get philosophy ‘back to the things themselves’. But phenomenology has always been haunted by the spectre of an anthropocentric antirealism.

Tom Sparrow shows how, in the 21st century, speculative realism aims to do what phenomenology could not: provide a philosophical method that disengages the human-centred approach to metaphysics in order to chronicle the complex realm of nonhuman reality.

Through a focused reading of the methodological statements and metaphysical commitments of key phenomenologists and speculative realists, Sparrow shows how speculative realism is replacing phenomenology as the beacon of realism in contemporary Continental philosophy.”

(From Edinborough University Press epub site) 

I cant help but wonder: if i was in advertizing, would i not say advertizing things? I mean, is the advertizer saying things about humans? More to my point, why do advertizers only say things about advertizing? I think most would say that the Ad-er say things about humans through looking at the fact of their Ad-er ness. 

So, what is the intro to this book saying? And in as much as it is being tallied as a Speculative Realist book, what is going on here? 

 “In the 20th century, phenomenology promised a method that would get philosophy ‘back to the things themselves’. But phenomenology has always been haunted by the spectre of an anthropocentric antirealism.”

Perhaps I am not well read, but the fact that such a statement has been made shows a particular orientation upon reality. This orientation sees itself as the last word in things because it falls within as it takes from the established manner of coming to truth: power in numbers and the generation of numbers through indoctrination; which is to say, conditioning through reward, the reward of towing the party line. Now, this is not to say it is a wrong route, merely that this is what the route, as a necessary mode, does: It argues against that for which which it cannot account. But more: Because most people cannot understand what is not already given them in advance, together they create a common state that justifies that inability; i.e. They form a ‘gang’ (lol), or, they form a group to enforce against what is offensive to the group. 

In this case, the blatant calm by which this statement is made exhibits the obviousness that is taken for granted; the group has such reach, a member of the group can say almost anything they want without fear of rebuttal because, again, in this case, all route for rebuttal is assumed as it is enforced.

“…phenomenology promised a method that would get philosophy back to the things in themselves. ” 

This statement shows that the author of it does not expect that the thing in itself is what is being proposed by the Speculative Realists. It suggests by its saying that somehow the SRs are saying something that moves beyond “the 20th century phenominalism”. In other words, the commentator (at least) is involved with seeing that terms have an ability to convey things that are actually true, but somehow never get to the thing in itself, and so the SRs are supposed to have given up on such phenominalist reckoning. 


Does anyone else see the problem here? 

It is so annoyingly frustrating to have to wonder how SR could have ever gotten off the ground considering that the SRs are supposed to be so informed about philosophical ideas.  It seems blatantly obvious to me that these SRs are being deceptive in thier proposals. 

“… speculative realism aims to do what phenomenology could not: provide a philosophical method that disengages the human-centred approach to metaphysics in order to chronicle the complex realm of nonhuman reality.”

How is this possible? How is it possible to be human and not use a method that is human centered?

Does anyone else see the problem??? 

One of the problems is the SR occupy a space so privileged that they cannot and will not entertain critiques. 

The philosophical problem is that the reason why these SRs can be so confident in their speculations is because not only do they rely upon a critical post-modern maxim, that discourse determines as it reflects reality, but that this maxim is enforced. 

I don’t know about you, but there is nothing about discourse that I can see that anywhere determines what is real, except that there are these “philosophers” that say it’s does, and or use discourse in a manner that proposes to be determining reality differently that some proposed ‘before’. It is a hoax, a con perpetrated upon the world through a particular methodological assertion of power, for the purpose of allowing them thier position of power. 

The mode of these SRs is that they argue as they accept that the power is ubiquitous and thus no longer interesting to talk about. So great, as I said: The discourse that views the Ibjects from a one sided and obvious real orientation is necessary, yet also inherently avoids its counterpart because it is assumed to have been already addressed. But thier mistake is that phenominalism is taken to be that counterpart — but it is only the counterpart to what is Real because such Phenominalism likewise proposed upon what is Real, as what is real exists within a particular ideological horizon that is enforced against offense. In as much as the Realists make notice, they form a precipitate Invisible to their view. 

This is all to say that somehow there is a traditional interpretation of what philosophers were saying, that this interpretation is taught as toward and from a position of free thought. This confinment of teaching thus also produces a certain type of thought, a certain type of conclusion. Hence we can see that this statement (above) can make a proposal of method because itself is based in a particular methodological arena wherein types of method may be discerned. 

Yet, such as it is, this move of SR merely affirms that a divergent mode of philosophy has become necessary, and this is to say that contrary to the mode that says that discourse is intricately involved with the reality, the SR Reality is indeed also necessary, but in a manner that leaves at least some of their proposals, their route, exposed. 

Much of these Realist proposals are merely a philosophical fad likeclothes and music; this Realism is a career posing, a thinking for thoughts sake, art for the sake of the artist. Yet that there is clothes and music never changes; what people wear may say something of the time, it thus says something of reality, but then true to the above statement’s assertion of phenomenology, it also resists an “anti realism”. Yet it is the limit of traditional interpretation of phenomenology that indeed produced phenomenology, of Hursserl most probably, but the antirealism that has arisen by which our current Realism arises is an anti realism in the context of the phenominalist reduction — which posits itself by an anthropocentrism, I.e. By the limit that is the human centric universe. It is this interpretation that yields the Speculative Real route, but the route that is concerned only with what is real because what is real had been determined by the route to be the only sensible thing to be considered. 

These folks do not consider that it is the spot that is missed, that which is not real that allows for the platform by which an investigation into the object can even be considered viable. It is the nature of what is not real that allows for reality to be situated upon the object in itself unto itself, such that objects can be said to have reality unto themselves. 

It is through the phenomenon that what is real may be determined along a particular vector, but due to this, what is real is not the only vector.

Object Orientation and the New Realism.

Adding a comment upon the previous two posts: 

it should be no wonder that there is no more overt questioning of how we are to go about things in the world: We have to buy and sell stuff, material. It appears the young generation had just accepted this without question where the grown, if there was a question, they have just capitulated. This is the New Realism: An automatic acquiescence to the reality of material objects. The theorists don’t even offer a why or a reason how they were able to negotiate their thoughtful philosophical world to come to this new object oriented reality. They just did. Besides, true to the Object Realists proposal, they are just following the route they established, which is that they should be allowed to be an authentic individual. So this authenticity is thus purchasing power; marketing, positioning, proposing , rhetoric, sales, products, commodity. And they do so in no uncertain terms by simply deciding that they are bored with the Cartesian/Phenomenal subject. So hey, who can fault them for putting forth a marketable product as legitimized theory?  

And part of Bryant’s great idea is that this determination of objects occurs in such a way to allow them to have a place in the world where they ‘can’t help’ but produce theory that says they are determined in what they can do, are or otherwise are being/producing. Amazing.

I wonder if Bryant himself will notice that his Material Unconsciousness is just a half step away from having a sort of communion or intuition of the purpose of a sort of transcendental agent. For, what is the difference between a God that we o ly partially can know, that presents us with situations wherein we choose our path, but that is ultimately ‘God’s plan’, and a Material Unconsciousness where we have choice except that we don’t notice that the situation has been set such that we indeed always only have one choice, determined in our movements ?

It all begins with Aphilosophy. The move into the object is based in a denial of the situation, for it is the situation of real meaning that has lead theorists to ‘the last’ contradictory place, such that they can only now function, that is, make theoretical capital, through denial. 

The Aphilosophical route will expose the foundationless positions these New Realists are contriving: It is a discursive fad that leads back to a re-establishment of a transcendental causal agent. But this time, within a truely universal ‘catholic’ world religion. 

Post-modernism’s Worth. 

When we are too close to an event, we talk about it as from a distance. That is, what we say is automatically distanced from the event, a maximum distance. The event is thus, by this occurrence, an object. As opposed to our psychotherapeutic model, the closer we are to an event, the more dishonest we are about its true bearings, that is, the truth of the matter, why it is that the (the wholeness of the) event has occurred the way it has. The impetus and the reaction can be come upon as an included item, a truth in-itself, only when we are distanced from the event. The truth of an object, as opposed to the True Object, can only be viewed in its truth from a distance. The equation is thus of inversion, of ratio.

Here then we may have a basis upon which to properly view foundational post-modern writers, namely, Derrida, Deleuze and Guittari, but others also.  To wit: Their descriptions were from a basis too close to the event, such that they attempted to quickly and finally establish a ground for the event; the event being thus so profound and significant, they were compelled to offer a reason.

They were not wrong, only rash. 

It is analogous to an explosion. We have now the data from the explosion, having encountered it ourselves, but also come across the initial first hand rationalization and fact crunching reports of the explosion itself – with that, subsequent explosions, and now the reports and experience of the aftermath(s) of explosions, we can now safely report upon the truth of the whole event. 

Repost: A little bit on Object Ontology.

Nonsense! Ridiculousness! The usual suspects rage.
So now we need to try and reel it in. If the fish has been snagged by the line, then we need to start to bring it back away from the fish of mere ideas, back from objectival discourse that sees authors and their ideas as True Things to be apprehended in their in-itself-ness, where the fish was swimming around looking for food and found it on the end of a hook and decided (whether it be of ‘natural’ instinct or not) to bite — we need to bring back the fish that has been snagged by the line.
See that this is not a rebuttal of Object Oriented Ontology; rather the distinction that finds OOO accordant with the divergent move is an occasion to speak about the Significant Event. To say that our issue concerns one’s orientation upon the object, and to further delineate that reality concerns a faith in the True Object, is actually the converse of Harman’s Object Oriented Ontology, and not its ‘opposite’ that would be then the ‘subject orientation’ necessarily.
To explain: Our thesis involving the pocket veto has implicated the Speculative Realists as dealing with reality in reality. If we have not been explicit, theirs (but Graham Harman in particular) is concerned with closing the ‘gap’ that appears to separate the subject and object in an extended discursive analysis based in traditional Western Philosophy, the gap that appears poignantly with Kant; Harman speaks about “how two objects touch”. Yet we should see that the primary concern that appears shaded if not explicitly avoided there is how to bring the subject individual human being into direct relation (contact) with the object. Harman moves for a leveling of the playing field by categorizing all real things, including the human being, as objects. The notice enacted here is that there was a previous discursive situation that presented a conceptual structure for reality that allowed for the gap. Thus SR divergence in this first sense, a real divergence.
What we should then see is that it is the subject-centered ‘reason’, ala Quentin Miellassoux, by which we may come to an idea of how one in reality is oriented upon objects, because it is by such subjective centrality that objects may be presented as such. The issue is put forth in the essays of Constructive Undoing as having to do with subjects, human beings, that are oriented upon True Objects. This is to mean that the individual of reality sees and references itself by and through Objects, and because such Objects cannot be known in-themselves, i.e. known as True in the sense of giving to us information about them that has nothing to do with our (subjective) perceiving or comprehending them, neutral data, so to speak, their Truth, the Truth about objects that we take and behave with as if they indeed are absolutely True is an act of faith. Such it is that reality in itself is a manifestation of faith. Hence, a divergence in a second sense that distinguishes what is True from what is real, that is, what is ironic from the faith in the True Object.
As shown in part 7 of this essay, the significance which links these two senses of divergence is the show of power. Specifically, it is the basic real assumption of post, but at least, post-post modernist assertion, that discourse determines reality. We have outlined how Miellasoux frames this in his ‘Correlationalism’, the weak and the strong forms. What is divisive (if we can follow the same type of categorizing for divergence) in the weak sense, is that such reality, if we may use this in the strong as well as weak correlational sense, already assumes that discourse does indeed reside as the omnipotent power for reality, so much though, that it is assumed and proposed given to include even our ‘innermost’ person, the makings and structures of our thoughts, such that there is no human being that is not determined in its manifestation as well as its moves (read: choices, options for movement) by discourse, that indeed discourse had and has determined what reality is. It is by this correlation that we have discussed the ‘individual of reality’ that is the individual of faith in the the True Object, and have thereby offered the strong divergence that succeeds from what we have called the ‘hard’ correlational limit.
It is by this designation that we argue the SRs are dealing with reality in reality; they are subject to the hard correlational limit, and thereby diverge from the previous determination of reality, the ‘subject orientation’ to the proposed new determination, ‘object orientation’. Due to the hard correlationalist model, because they were are already invested in reality, where the weak and strong correlationalism functions, they were already dealing in their being oriented upon the True Object. Hence the irony involved with Harman, at least, noticing this limit and finding his vector back in the limit to find and discuss what this True Object is, how it manifests in reality as reality. He is discussing the ‘subject as object’ and the real ramifications of this move. So it is also that what he is finding and what he is saying evidences the significance of divergence; both its weak and strong moves evidence the pocket veto.
We have come to an odd point that is in fact so odd that the fast reader might even miss it; I say ‘fast’ and immediately indicate the point of contention. Either this odd point is not so odd but is noticed as capable of being odd, or it is rejected. What is really odd though is if it has been rejected, we can account for it: the rejection is based in the assumption of (a prior posterior maxim, an experience of which is given prior to the experience) the real common humanity of individuals of whom the reader is part and in which the reader is invested through his her identity. The rejection is so commonplace of reality that the fast reader misses it, and often misses that a rejection has even been called for, and this is because the rejection is based in the maxim that all individual human beings have available the resource of intuition; so to say, as the previous segment Part 7, that Miellassoux has come by his argument by intuition is to say nothing more than he is a human being. Yes; this is true. But the point here, as we discuss the point of contention, is to say that which everyone assumes as true, out loud, to their face. It is to point to what it is we say is real and to elicit a reaction where what is revolutionary has been missed. The point is to expose that upon which the assertion of a unitary discourse of the real gains its stature, and thus be able to begin to speak that which historically remains silent; to indicate that what is missed cannot be ‘re-placed’ as another discourse of method that says it is now ‘practice’; to indicate not merely that while what is missed is indeed missed by its objectival understanding — even as what is ‘radical’ poses as this space, or the revolution that is proposed by this space, this ‘missing’, this ‘indivisible remainder’ (Zizek) — and is indeed the ideology functioning as ideology, is the discourse ‘working’ (Heidegger, the Work of Art) as it is supposed to as the condition of reality as knowledge, but more significantly, that such ‘indivisible space’ is in the ‘pocket’ of real discourse, in one case as potential but in the other rather as completely missed; and this is to say, again, the rejection is the evidence of consciousness functioning to supply reality, of distancing the individual from its object through identity, consciousness ‘denying’ that the True Object is not just true-real.
While the conventional (real) discourse may evidence its own saturation of meaning in terminology and thereby be able to slice and mash, dissect and describe, deconstruct and recombine term-object singular identities so to bring about a sufficiently dense description of the picture of reality and to thereby gain purchase upon a new solution to the old, this method of process never gains its object beyond the mere Kantian intuition of true meaning gained by the terms that are poised in faith to avoid their own objectivity; at best, such a method succeeds in describing the ‘reality of the moment’. What this means is that the same discourse of reality that discounts any real ‘god’ through its argumentation is allowing for its ability to grant or convey truth by relying upon a transcendent yet unspeakable power that is denied in the asserted and apparent power of discourse to convey its truth (God does not exist/ there is no God and the atheist position in general). It thus becomes obvious why there have been arguments made as to a particular definition of ‘existence’ that excludes some ‘actuality’ of God, to justify why we can thus say ‘God does not exist’ and be truthful in as much as there is a ‘truth in God’. The ‘speculative’ only gains its (Aquinas) stature as such by virtue of the ‘practical’; by virtue of the speculative itself, it is not speculative, but rather indicates what is not practical except that it has to be distinguished because what is practical is ubiquitous to (common) sense, or for another word, reality. Hence, we can begin to speak again of — not merely duality, but more so, dual bases of power that do not combine but instead evidence the limitation of a discourse that proposes itself in the human act as the One omnipotent and ubiquitous truth.
One world is necessary. The problem is what this world is, but if we have more than one world then what is the ‘whole’? Many are already discounting such a question; so let Reality be said to account for the one world; for all the problems that arise whether mental, social, psychic, material, physical, etcetera, all the scenes and issues are dealt with through a reductive method that finds a solution for the question of what we are to do, so that every solution is a momentary manifestation that defines for humans their place of activity — this ‘one place’ where a reduction of meaningful categories amounts, is reality, and the argument that would attempt to displace or discount this proposal, a real argument. This necessary situation of humanity is thus contingency, every situation is contingent upon another situation. This place is ultimately a place that settles for consciousness its own operation in its operating. There is no manner of thinking upon things that can remove the fact of thinking about them (as far as we can think we know of thinking), so let us grant that to offer any notion whether subjective or objective or any of the proposed philosophical turns and solutions is always a notion of consciousness in the attempt to place itself in the real world; it is the same with thought. The only way to avoid this feature of consciousness is to deny this feature, and this is also a feature of consciousness; what is reductive, as to method, is based in denial, and the place where reduction occurs to find solution as to what to do is called reality. That method which relies upon such a denial of operation for the sake of the reliance is what we call conventional, since it is the appearance of the world that takes what is presented as the common arena of human effort for the sake of the One thing to be addressed and solved. Every proposal of how such reality is manifested is a discursive strategy for approach based upon meaning and significance. Hence, to argue that the world is constituted through objects, and only objects, is a particular solution for how consciousness has been placed and is being placed in the world for the moment. This argument then is ironic, for it begs its own question of how it is able to come to such a conclusion for all argument, which is to say, for all reality; it is the expression of contradiction as meaning, as opposed to contradiction indicating limit.
It is this feature of human process that now arrives in a necessary divergence. For within such a framing, which is a real historical discursive framing whereby various proposals have been offered and challenged through the method of determining truth by the criterion of contradiction, the world as we know it or have argued has brought us to the place where our ability to offer solution is seen to be merely a vanity, merely consciousness doing its universal operation — and this is denied. What has occurred here then is consciousness through its own function of creating meaning has come upon its own process as transparent, that is, the meaning is that it only makes meaning and this meaning has no true basis beyond the establishing of true objects (identity), regardless of any necessary objectival in-itself point of reference, and distanced itself from this meaning. This issue then is called the point of contention’, for the issue concerns not only reality and how it functions — the contradiction is overcome by faith –but also reality as such that it is distinguished now as another object in itself.
Reality is conventional; divergence ironic. The former sees progress instilled and innate in the meaning of every statement, whether it be for or against, the stasis of term-object identity in an historical temporal discursive movement of and toward the One truth, whether it proposes to be gainable or not (for the assertion that it cannot be gained is likewise an assertion upon the progressive nature and ability of humanity, that we have through trial and error found that this is the case). The latter sees the ‘control’ of terms, subjects and objects, to be in the terms and objects themselves, as objects in themselves. Hence we have (again, inevitably, perpetually), in consideration of the SRs, a dual divergence; Graham Harman who steps into the object (objects is all there is) finds a reality that though logically consistent is nevertheless somewhat difficult if not contrary to any common human sense, which is of course what he would find (what is an object divorced from a subject? What is a subject if it is only an object?). Yet he asserts such true object as actually and really true, as if he is privy to a more true reality that everyone should now understand (the ‘thought police’ assertion). Then we have aphilosophy, which upon reflection might be better termed as “philosophy-A”, as there is supposedly already a ‘philosophy-X’ which seems (maybe) already still conventional. Here discourse is all there is and because of this all terms, their meanings and or definitions, are objects. This latter does not privilege the subject, nor attempts to arrive at the object by denying the historical formulation of the subject, but instead speaks of effects of consciousness. On one hand, the effect of consciousness comfortably distanced from its own operations (in denial so it “Don’t Even Know I Am Lying”) so it can operate effectively with the tool of logic develops conventional reality in general as a primary base upon which the subsequent base may take form in the fantastical extreme of ‘logically real’ nonsense, for which we can probably begin see the evidence of faith at work (Speculative Realism, and Object Ontology). On the other hand, the effect of consciousness that compromises the distance consciousness would impose for itself in reality arrives with the meaning of contradiction as meaning (irony, and — wink, wink — philosophy-A). But nevertheless such Objects must necessarily exist given the conventional allowance for plausibility in negotiation coupled with the capitalized identity. One can only wonder if the people in Liberia who raided an Ebola treatment center based upon their belief that no such disease exists, that it is a Western capitalistic conspiracy, needed some thought police.
Yet I leave such real conventional possibilities to their proper domain; the ontological description of objects that are not merely terms, real objects, grants a description of the interrelating of terms as an objective field. Yet this field comes about in the holding out from the subject, because it will collapse in the subject.
I thereby suggest the divergence that has a more substantial propositional base, even if, indeed, such a proposition is admittedly not real. For what is collapsing is in the tension that develops by the holding apart that which is natively indigenous. When there is no tension, then the subject may be breached as to how the object manifests reality. Hence, the dual nature of the divergence of which we speak.
I agree with Graham Harman’s assessment of the Kantian failure, that Western philosophy is caught and spends its time now reiterating the same arguments, the faults and merits of ideas that stem from a human subject center attempting to mitigate an apparent gap between the cogito and the object. Divergence thus takes two forms. We argue that Harman and Miellasosux and the ‘speculative’ sort lack in their approach, i.e. they are found in what we see is the hard correlationalist limit, and it is this limit that justifies their route into the object through the conventional Sartean existential revolt (from the limit back into the limit), the (Kantian) subject and its route having been played out is now retreading its own ground through different terms, so invested in the state of reality conventional philosophy is, and they are in effect missing — or perhaps not missing it; this is the significance of the pocket veto — the fault of the object-term identity which is the Kantian thesis; which is to say, they flat out do not recognize it, in denial through plain ignorance or in denial in the face of the contradiction.
This situation unfolds in the following manner: They are either relying fully upon the true object of faith, and if so are at once accepting their (Kantian) intuitive faculty as a common faculty of human consciousness, and so read Kant’s ideas as a true (historical) object to be discerned and built upon in the progress of human knowledge, thereby missing the significant feature of at least “The Critique of Pure Reason”; or, they are being deceptive in that the intuition they have had is a particularly significant inspiration such that the degree of such inspiration would impose an offense upon the audience in which they engage, that is, the philosophical audience, by suggesting a privilege that is not available to everyone but which nevertheless they have due to the very intuition that is common among real humans, but ‘specialized’ in them. But the discourse of the Significant Event offers that to suggest that they are merely very educated or intelligent or have an otherwise unique view but without the intuited transcendental operation is to flat out deny the very aspect of their being human as being human; that is, unless they were indeed inspired by a transcendental and undisclosed aspect or influence. The progress that they thereby propose as a ‘new’ route upon the given discourse suggests that humanity might move out of a particular paradigm of thought, but not move out from being human, and thereby tells and reifies the conventional route: that discourse defines what and how human beings are as real human beings, and this is to say that somehow human beings are being not only influenced but indeed controlled by a power for which humans have no control except that they use discourse, and further this is to propose the greatest offense: such ‘special’ philosophers are especially privy to coming upon ‘inspired ideas’ (that are — nod, nod, wink, wink– not ‘transcendentally inspired’) that somehow allow them to gain purchase upon the center of power of discourse. This assertion through denial is exactly the Kantian proposal: that we can intuit an object’s truth due to the very nature of human consciousness being limited in its functioning. But the Speculative Realists deny this is true.
The problem of divergence remains as I have indicated; Harman and Miellassoux are still dealing with reality in reality. By my own definition, they are working along the conventional route, so we have then to distinguish what divergence means, and this is the work we have before us concerning the Significant Event. Obviously, The Speculative Realists’ divergence is from the type of philosophy just mentioned above. They diverge from ‘subject oriented’ to ‘object oriented’; this is plain. Yet the significance of their speculative divergence misses what should be seen as the true statement of Kant, to wit, there is no knowable object in-itself that can be gained outside of intuition and that to have achieved a ‘non-intuitive’ position one must be presented in a categorical imperative that then situates the ‘practical reason’ in a manner that is able to distinguish the two in a ‘non-practical’ way. In contrast, the overdetermined and common (mis-)interpretation of Kant allows for Kant’s real meaning that has been appropriated by Harman. Thus, to repeat, in so much as Harman, at least, concerns himself with the Object now, in the same way as described of Miellassoux in the previous segment, his (Harman) presentation seems to be and or otherwise must also be relying upon an undisclosed aspect (the state of categorical imperative that behaves so as to allow practical reason as a categorical precipitate, a hypothetical imperative) that informs his ability to offer a discussion about real-true objects, and so therefore can have no veracity so far as truth beyond what is real (realism), as he admits. But he denies Kant, and so either must derive the categorical and hypothetical reasons as further objects already true, that is, the facticity of their being a part of the philosophical series opens them to their possibility of being false, which is how he seems to see it; or, he is relying upon that very situation that Kant describes, and so is being dishonest. So we have argued that reality relies upon — reality is a function of consciousness, a thing, for the argument is of effects and not so much about describing what an ‘actual’ real object is; that is Harman’s job (or maybe all of conventional philosophy) — a distancing of consciousness from the object of its real involvement or consideration of reality. Harman denies the ‘subject’ philosophical rhetoric and uses another true object by which to gain his stature to be able to say that such subject-oriented ideas are done with; that is, he relies upon the truth of the series of discourse (the true object located of historical argument) to come to his divergence. If I have not been clear, this is saying that his first proposal is that only objects (an object oriented ontology) contain or reflect truth, and so he grants an unimpeachable premise that the historical series is true, by which to make his statement about objects, a statement that denies that the ability to know true objects can only be intuited. This is redundancy in its finest and the mark of the repetition of real argument; this is discursive slight of hand and is indicative of how Slavoj Zizek involves the 5 stages of grief (see a later segment). Thus, the discourse of the Significant Event suggests that Harman (and M) has enacted a ‘pocket veto’ that places the transcendent clause ‘in his pocket’, such that it is already ‘had’, and by this is able to venture out into the world an ‘inspired agent’ of transcendence, motivated by a unspoken of aspect that in other days and discourses would be called ‘God’.
Oh shit. I didn’t just say that. Wait wait wait — aren’t we attempting to remove the transcendent?
Harman’s only saving grace is then by the real divergent move. Two objects touch vicariously and in sincerity. He has thereby re-instated the identity of the basic duality in essential reality, a reality that includes the individual vicariously, that is to say, reality includes the individual in place of the human being; he closes the gap by exchanging real identical categorical imperatives. This is ironic: Harman is arguing a removal of the subject by placing it in the position of the object sincerely, truly, and thus is he able to describe the True Object of the Subject; that is, nothing that is attainable through real tangible sensibility, except real contingency (as an Object), which is a system that defines itself in such a way so as to exclude that which is ‘accidental’. This appears to be the weight of his whole argument (though the jury is still out). Hence, by contrast, what is attainable is to describe the subject of the object, and this (sorry to keep dangling the carrot) is to introduce the significant event.
The odd thing is that hardly anyone will be able to see themselves beyond the terms by which they identify themselves in reality and so they will miss their own veto — if they ever had one — and and the description of the significant event will likely be just as nonsensical, but even more so. Yet if you are ready for more then the fish might not have broken the line.
End Part 8.
* * *

It would be cool if a few people would comment.



Really End part 8.

The Impossible.  Part 1. 

The impossible can be discovered along many significant vectors of reality as limit. The particular discussion that contains or otherwise accounts for the various vectorial meanings is ironic; it is the event that begins the count, that can be said to to be a basis upon which a linking of meaningful terms is made that presents the truth. That by which irony is informed, due to its unknowable prior linkage, is impossible. What is possible is made upon the meaningful linking of the event which places it among other events in an eternal conventional relativity of True Objects. In reading this essay, one might understand that while it addresses a particular discourse, it explains many. When discovering conventional limit and the situation concerning reality, one thereby begins to understand what true agency can be in revealing reality’s counter-partial not real situations. * The search for truth through a negotiation of objects, or limits, establishes reality; if we are seeking a truth that is not negotiated then we must no longer attempt to discern what is more real. The assertion that there is some article of knowledge that is more real than another is of conventional faith, which, as we may have seen, does not find the truth, but only the True Object, the object of faith. For the conversation to mean anything beyond merely repeating what was before, it must be about effects. * I cannot deny that to believe that there was a man, who actually was the son of the most high and true god sent to earth, who actually existed as a human 2000 years ago, for whom the Gospels are a history of, is an act of faith. In fact, it is difficult to believe this, so to believe it must be a truly significant feat of faith. For me, it is absolutely incredible, and perhaps, I admit, this is exactly where I do not have faith, except that it is an article of a type of faith. Yet I can, in good faith, believe that it is possible to have faith in such an idea. Because I can have such a faith, I can also see that the faith in the article presents a dubious situation. My faith in the Idea of the idea is not troublesome, but the process of understanding the Idea can be. It is the one of this latter faith that has made a choice of a difficult path, as I said, to believe in something that by a certain standard is incredible; hence requiring the choice to have faith in it. The redundancy that is denied through the standard brings the nobility of requiring faith; it brings the incredible to its stature of needing faith, and a resultant choice. But by this same criterion, the incredible, I submit that there is an even more difficult article to choose to have faith in, since in order to have faith in this alternate article, the standard, one would have to choose to believe that he has no choice, for the standard is what grants the situation of choice, in that one has no choice in that he has choice, or must be choosing. The faith in the article that presents a situation of having no choice likewise then requires that the idea of faith be relinquished, since the act of faith itself is based in choosing to believe something incredible. Here then, we can come upon a duality that presents the incredible as something one must have faith in as opposed to that which one need not have faith in for it to be true, such as, everyday reality. In this way the object of faith is understood as exceptional to everyday reality, but the incredible is still possible. It may be just barely possible, but it is possible enough that faith is required to believe it; that is, it is still believable: The standard is given, does not require faith for it to be true, and the incredible requires faith. The significance here is that it, the situation, is not impossible, for it is the impossible that is truly difficult. Yet once what is really difficult to have faith in is realized for what it truely is, which is the standard, then what was once incredible no longer requires faith for it to be true – but also the reverse. This is to say, the standard that is true allows for the incredible that may be true through faith, but what is incredible through the terms of faith, the meaning of what can be incredible, is brought by the terms of the standard; hence, what is true regarding the incredible is nothing more than an extension of the standard, and thereby what is of the standard is likewise or consistently come upon by faith. This is the transitive set. The real difference allowed through the standard for the incredible is exactly of faith, but this, so far as the standard becomes true through faith, is a step into the impossible, the absurd, insanity. The common standard of reality is granted through faith; this is impossible. * To believe that humanity exists along some sort of continuous thread, that the past and future can be a part of this thread, and that human beings are set upon this thread with a certain fundamental condition that at once is of a same type, inherently and innately discrepant, ‘sinful’ to use a term, such that a figure was or is set upon or within this thread so as to draw all sinners unto itself as relief for the condition – which is to say, this first condition is but an ‘eternal’ condition, against which a second condition then also shows itself: that human beings are involved with a movement of progress that gains its quality upon the first condition, where the resistance to the first condition defines the situation of the second – this is a development upon the point of contention as I see it: the significant difference between what calls for faith, and what is truly impossible. Jesus can be viewed in the forgoing two ways against each of two conditions, and this gives a quadripartite; the eternal condition of duality and its reconciliation or removal, each applied to (A) and (B) below, disseminates as follows: A) Jesus the actual Son of God, actually manifest as an individual human being 2000 years ago. This figure is clamed to be able to absolve human beings who exist at all times subsequent to his moment, of their inherent sin. Jesus thus has eternal power despite the passage of time. The individual existing at any time always has the potential to access the eternal Jesus through choice. They become saved regardless of the actual historical condition of progress as it has moved away from Jesus; time reveals humanity dealing with Christ in history as it progresses to rebuke him until its greatest despair, when Jesus will return to save that humanity. The basic idea is that of a confused or aggravated individual extrapolated in history who comes to believe in Jesus and is thereby relieved of his aggravation. This aggravation can be called ‘sin’. B) The human being exists within no actual temporal sphere. The functioning of consciousness behaves so as to allow meaning of reality. Reality is thus not separate to what meaning is had of it. 2000 years ago is a situation of consciousness, a particular formation or construction of meaning by which other things have real relations; no 2000 years ago exists beyond the scheme of meaning that would understand it, and in the understanding of this condition as a mere condition, 2000 years ago is actually ‘happening’ now, in consciousness, as meaning. Jesus is the human being who has ‘awakened’ to his existence. Jesus thus is the figure representative that indicates in words the situation of the human being who likewise has come unto his existence of the eternal moment, as those who have likewise such knowledge ‘hear’ the words of eternity, that is, of describing the same atemporal condition. Once such words are heard, it is because no other meaning could have come forth from existence, and this is to say that one has no choice in the meaning which he has gained from the words. Yet, typically the individual of reality sees it through a lens of historical time that exists in actuality, one thing arising from another, contingent upon actual conditions of things moving in essential time. Ironically, in such a state, the individual is ‘aggravated’, is in ‘sin’ due to the mistaken ideas of reality, the limit that is the reasoned and knowable aspects of reality, so while it seeks really its own existence, it perpetually and continually puts it off in seeking into temporal things, thus creating the world, but also by mistaken default, creating the condition of being divided unto itself, this condition that is capable of arguing an actual Jesus individual God-human being that bridges the unassailable gap, the condition of (A) above. This dialectic brings us to a situation where one might say that these two versions are equal in effect, where both (A) and (B) can be understood to account for a lack, in (A) by Jesus, in (B) by the potential of knowledge, but I must say that where (B) appears as a more comprehensive account of what is represented, it also seems to bring a reasonable defaulting – in the extreme case – to (A), due to its similar limit. (B), though it may seem more appealing, does thus not seem to solve anything since it develops a polemic with (A), which, in the last, is merely repeating (A) in different terms. At last, then, (A) seems to me not to work; again, it is insoluble, for this reason: The effect (A) appears to reify and maintain the problem, since the individual is still left to his capacity or ability to believe, which then apparency compounds the problem because the believer still vacillates in moments of question, willingness, and perhaps sinfulness, basically over their own inadiquacy. And it seems even one so devout in his faith is only so through selective denial, who then gets angry at what offends his faith, and who cannot help but turn a blind eye to logic that would show him where his belief may be lacking. * What ‘Jesus’ (as I develop both possibilities, A and B above) accomplished might be described in this way: Below, items (1), (2), (3) present the possibility that what is impossible lays in an absolute polemical relation to what is possible, the principle of exclusion, or being a part; item (4) is thus impossible with reference to the first three, the principle of inclusion, or belonging: (1) The dual understanding of (A); (2) the dual understanding of (B); (3) the dual understanding of (A) against (B); (4) the understanding that includes these three possibilities. Which is to say: If, either, either A or B, or, either 1 or 2, then 4. In short, we have moved from the ‘either/or’ possibility into, what I call, the ‘if/then’. To explain; (A) is that of admitted faith that claims the actual Jesus as God Christ; (B) is that not admitted of faith that claims Jesus as part of the negotiation of reality; the true method of knowledge will bring understanding of truth. (1) is the duality inherent in the consequence of not having faith, i.e., going to hell, say; (2) is the duality inherent in the consequence of having faith, i.e., that we do live in a progressive temporal causality. (3) is the either/or condition that argues the veracity of either (A) or (B), which is really, (4) the inclusion of (A) in (B), which is the standard of non-philosophy as method. The problem lay in the situation of (3), which defines the polemic of faith and establishes the true within reality, the preliminary (4); reality, while admitting faith, does not require faith. Faith thus belongs to reality, but reality does not belong to faith. The event is reality and faith is included in what may constitute the event, or the count that was initiated as the event. But what we have in the method of non-philosophy is a restating, a repetition, of either/or. The methodological event of non-philosophy poses its limit in the Real even while Laruelle attempts to disperse the Real from its object; yet to distinguish what becomes the non-philosophical philosophical object, we should not propose a ‘one-in-one’ because then the ‘unilateral duality’ becomes an identifier of limit, of a knowable true object, another philosophical object – either that object or this object. This feature of non-philosophy evidences bad faith; thereby we can have his Gnostic base, as well as method. To assert or otherwise argue a Real overdetermines in the last instance the meaning of convention, which is, in the first, a progressing knowledge or order of true objects, which is, in the last, merely another assertion of faith, merely another repetition of ‘either A or B, and 4′, the eternal linking that is the critique by the differend, whereby no progress is made beyond (A,B). It is no wonder that Laruelle expounds upon a ‘Future Christ’. Yet, where non-philosophy presents and does not represent, there and only there is ‘if (A,B) then 4’, there is the impossible; here is aphilosophy. The object has become the occasion of the condition by which I can exist in reality. The argument for truth that seeks what is more real resides in the confines of which Jesus is part and only possibly significant. Here, the state of reality I call ‘convention’. The impossible move is to see that what is of choice (A,B), by virtue of the impossible, requires or is otherwise constituted by a faith that cannot but be situated in the way it is by the standard for it to present the object of faith, and in this, involves no choice. Yet if I have somehow chosen the impossible, then that by which I may not have chosen requires faith. Jesus, in this way, can be said to have achieved the impossible, but where this is possible, Jesus is not necessary. The irony cannot be overestimated. * But wait, there’s more! Always more – but nevermore.