Category Archives: the individual

Post-modernism’s Worth. 

When we are too close to an event, we talk about it as from a distance. That is, what we say is automatically distanced from the event, a maximum distance. The event is thus, by this occurrence, an object. As opposed to our psychotherapeutic model, the closer we are to an event, the more dishonest we are about its true bearings, that is, the truth of the matter, why it is that the (the wholeness of the) event has occurred the way it has. The impetus and the reaction can be come upon as an included item, a truth in-itself, only when we are distanced from the event. The truth of an object, as opposed to the True Object, can only be viewed in its truth from a distance. The equation is thus of inversion, of ratio.

Here then we may have a basis upon which to properly view foundational post-modern writers, namely, Derrida, Deleuze and Guittari, but others also.  To wit: Their descriptions were from a basis too close to the event, such that they attempted to quickly and finally establish a ground for the event; the event being thus so profound and significant, they were compelled to offer a reason.

They were not wrong, only rash. 

It is analogous to an explosion. We have now the data from the explosion, having encountered it ourselves, but also come across the initial first hand rationalization and fact crunching reports of the explosion itself – with that, subsequent explosions, and now the reports and experience of the aftermath(s) of explosions, we can now safely report upon the truth of the whole event. 

The Impossible.  Part 1. 

The impossible can be discovered along many significant vectors of reality as limit. The particular discussion that contains or otherwise accounts for the various vectorial meanings is ironic; it is the event that begins the count, that can be said to to be a basis upon which a linking of meaningful terms is made that presents the truth. That by which irony is informed, due to its unknowable prior linkage, is impossible. What is possible is made upon the meaningful linking of the event which places it among other events in an eternal conventional relativity of True Objects. In reading this essay, one might understand that while it addresses a particular discourse, it explains many. When discovering conventional limit and the situation concerning reality, one thereby begins to understand what true agency can be in revealing reality’s counter-partial not real situations. * The search for truth through a negotiation of objects, or limits, establishes reality; if we are seeking a truth that is not negotiated then we must no longer attempt to discern what is more real. The assertion that there is some article of knowledge that is more real than another is of conventional faith, which, as we may have seen, does not find the truth, but only the True Object, the object of faith. For the conversation to mean anything beyond merely repeating what was before, it must be about effects. * I cannot deny that to believe that there was a man, who actually was the son of the most high and true god sent to earth, who actually existed as a human 2000 years ago, for whom the Gospels are a history of, is an act of faith. In fact, it is difficult to believe this, so to believe it must be a truly significant feat of faith. For me, it is absolutely incredible, and perhaps, I admit, this is exactly where I do not have faith, except that it is an article of a type of faith. Yet I can, in good faith, believe that it is possible to have faith in such an idea. Because I can have such a faith, I can also see that the faith in the article presents a dubious situation. My faith in the Idea of the idea is not troublesome, but the process of understanding the Idea can be. It is the one of this latter faith that has made a choice of a difficult path, as I said, to believe in something that by a certain standard is incredible; hence requiring the choice to have faith in it. The redundancy that is denied through the standard brings the nobility of requiring faith; it brings the incredible to its stature of needing faith, and a resultant choice. But by this same criterion, the incredible, I submit that there is an even more difficult article to choose to have faith in, since in order to have faith in this alternate article, the standard, one would have to choose to believe that he has no choice, for the standard is what grants the situation of choice, in that one has no choice in that he has choice, or must be choosing. The faith in the article that presents a situation of having no choice likewise then requires that the idea of faith be relinquished, since the act of faith itself is based in choosing to believe something incredible. Here then, we can come upon a duality that presents the incredible as something one must have faith in as opposed to that which one need not have faith in for it to be true, such as, everyday reality. In this way the object of faith is understood as exceptional to everyday reality, but the incredible is still possible. It may be just barely possible, but it is possible enough that faith is required to believe it; that is, it is still believable: The standard is given, does not require faith for it to be true, and the incredible requires faith. The significance here is that it, the situation, is not impossible, for it is the impossible that is truly difficult. Yet once what is really difficult to have faith in is realized for what it truely is, which is the standard, then what was once incredible no longer requires faith for it to be true – but also the reverse. This is to say, the standard that is true allows for the incredible that may be true through faith, but what is incredible through the terms of faith, the meaning of what can be incredible, is brought by the terms of the standard; hence, what is true regarding the incredible is nothing more than an extension of the standard, and thereby what is of the standard is likewise or consistently come upon by faith. This is the transitive set. The real difference allowed through the standard for the incredible is exactly of faith, but this, so far as the standard becomes true through faith, is a step into the impossible, the absurd, insanity. The common standard of reality is granted through faith; this is impossible. * To believe that humanity exists along some sort of continuous thread, that the past and future can be a part of this thread, and that human beings are set upon this thread with a certain fundamental condition that at once is of a same type, inherently and innately discrepant, ‘sinful’ to use a term, such that a figure was or is set upon or within this thread so as to draw all sinners unto itself as relief for the condition – which is to say, this first condition is but an ‘eternal’ condition, against which a second condition then also shows itself: that human beings are involved with a movement of progress that gains its quality upon the first condition, where the resistance to the first condition defines the situation of the second – this is a development upon the point of contention as I see it: the significant difference between what calls for faith, and what is truly impossible. Jesus can be viewed in the forgoing two ways against each of two conditions, and this gives a quadripartite; the eternal condition of duality and its reconciliation or removal, each applied to (A) and (B) below, disseminates as follows: A) Jesus the actual Son of God, actually manifest as an individual human being 2000 years ago. This figure is clamed to be able to absolve human beings who exist at all times subsequent to his moment, of their inherent sin. Jesus thus has eternal power despite the passage of time. The individual existing at any time always has the potential to access the eternal Jesus through choice. They become saved regardless of the actual historical condition of progress as it has moved away from Jesus; time reveals humanity dealing with Christ in history as it progresses to rebuke him until its greatest despair, when Jesus will return to save that humanity. The basic idea is that of a confused or aggravated individual extrapolated in history who comes to believe in Jesus and is thereby relieved of his aggravation. This aggravation can be called ‘sin’. B) The human being exists within no actual temporal sphere. The functioning of consciousness behaves so as to allow meaning of reality. Reality is thus not separate to what meaning is had of it. 2000 years ago is a situation of consciousness, a particular formation or construction of meaning by which other things have real relations; no 2000 years ago exists beyond the scheme of meaning that would understand it, and in the understanding of this condition as a mere condition, 2000 years ago is actually ‘happening’ now, in consciousness, as meaning. Jesus is the human being who has ‘awakened’ to his existence. Jesus thus is the figure representative that indicates in words the situation of the human being who likewise has come unto his existence of the eternal moment, as those who have likewise such knowledge ‘hear’ the words of eternity, that is, of describing the same atemporal condition. Once such words are heard, it is because no other meaning could have come forth from existence, and this is to say that one has no choice in the meaning which he has gained from the words. Yet, typically the individual of reality sees it through a lens of historical time that exists in actuality, one thing arising from another, contingent upon actual conditions of things moving in essential time. Ironically, in such a state, the individual is ‘aggravated’, is in ‘sin’ due to the mistaken ideas of reality, the limit that is the reasoned and knowable aspects of reality, so while it seeks really its own existence, it perpetually and continually puts it off in seeking into temporal things, thus creating the world, but also by mistaken default, creating the condition of being divided unto itself, this condition that is capable of arguing an actual Jesus individual God-human being that bridges the unassailable gap, the condition of (A) above. This dialectic brings us to a situation where one might say that these two versions are equal in effect, where both (A) and (B) can be understood to account for a lack, in (A) by Jesus, in (B) by the potential of knowledge, but I must say that where (B) appears as a more comprehensive account of what is represented, it also seems to bring a reasonable defaulting – in the extreme case – to (A), due to its similar limit. (B), though it may seem more appealing, does thus not seem to solve anything since it develops a polemic with (A), which, in the last, is merely repeating (A) in different terms. At last, then, (A) seems to me not to work; again, it is insoluble, for this reason: The effect (A) appears to reify and maintain the problem, since the individual is still left to his capacity or ability to believe, which then apparency compounds the problem because the believer still vacillates in moments of question, willingness, and perhaps sinfulness, basically over their own inadiquacy. And it seems even one so devout in his faith is only so through selective denial, who then gets angry at what offends his faith, and who cannot help but turn a blind eye to logic that would show him where his belief may be lacking. * What ‘Jesus’ (as I develop both possibilities, A and B above) accomplished might be described in this way: Below, items (1), (2), (3) present the possibility that what is impossible lays in an absolute polemical relation to what is possible, the principle of exclusion, or being a part; item (4) is thus impossible with reference to the first three, the principle of inclusion, or belonging: (1) The dual understanding of (A); (2) the dual understanding of (B); (3) the dual understanding of (A) against (B); (4) the understanding that includes these three possibilities. Which is to say: If, either, either A or B, or, either 1 or 2, then 4. In short, we have moved from the ‘either/or’ possibility into, what I call, the ‘if/then’. To explain; (A) is that of admitted faith that claims the actual Jesus as God Christ; (B) is that not admitted of faith that claims Jesus as part of the negotiation of reality; the true method of knowledge will bring understanding of truth. (1) is the duality inherent in the consequence of not having faith, i.e., going to hell, say; (2) is the duality inherent in the consequence of having faith, i.e., that we do live in a progressive temporal causality. (3) is the either/or condition that argues the veracity of either (A) or (B), which is really, (4) the inclusion of (A) in (B), which is the standard of non-philosophy as method. The problem lay in the situation of (3), which defines the polemic of faith and establishes the true within reality, the preliminary (4); reality, while admitting faith, does not require faith. Faith thus belongs to reality, but reality does not belong to faith. The event is reality and faith is included in what may constitute the event, or the count that was initiated as the event. But what we have in the method of non-philosophy is a restating, a repetition, of either/or. The methodological event of non-philosophy poses its limit in the Real even while Laruelle attempts to disperse the Real from its object; yet to distinguish what becomes the non-philosophical philosophical object, we should not propose a ‘one-in-one’ because then the ‘unilateral duality’ becomes an identifier of limit, of a knowable true object, another philosophical object – either that object or this object. This feature of non-philosophy evidences bad faith; thereby we can have his Gnostic base, as well as method. To assert or otherwise argue a Real overdetermines in the last instance the meaning of convention, which is, in the first, a progressing knowledge or order of true objects, which is, in the last, merely another assertion of faith, merely another repetition of ‘either A or B, and 4′, the eternal linking that is the critique by the differend, whereby no progress is made beyond (A,B). It is no wonder that Laruelle expounds upon a ‘Future Christ’. Yet, where non-philosophy presents and does not represent, there and only there is ‘if (A,B) then 4’, there is the impossible; here is aphilosophy. The object has become the occasion of the condition by which I can exist in reality. The argument for truth that seeks what is more real resides in the confines of which Jesus is part and only possibly significant. Here, the state of reality I call ‘convention’. The impossible move is to see that what is of choice (A,B), by virtue of the impossible, requires or is otherwise constituted by a faith that cannot but be situated in the way it is by the standard for it to present the object of faith, and in this, involves no choice. Yet if I have somehow chosen the impossible, then that by which I may not have chosen requires faith. Jesus, in this way, can be said to have achieved the impossible, but where this is possible, Jesus is not necessary. The irony cannot be overestimated. * But wait, there’s more! Always more – but nevermore.

Repost: The Significant Event, part 1

[it appears that the most recent wordpress update has strung all the paragraph breaks together.  So its like one long run on paragraph now. But the *’s  do indicate a break.]

Significance. What we can call the Romance is based upon and or around what I call the significant experience, which falls well in line with Alain Badiou’s ‘Event’, what could then be called the significant event. The irony that surrounds this feature of being human concerns a confusion of the individual, between what arises of the pure multiple and such Event. This confusion is being worked out as we speak; its ways, immanent. Its formulation has been established by Badiou in the distinction pronounced by ‘void’ and ‘set’, but more particularly, more humanly, the pronunciation’s initial voice is heard through Francois Laruelle and non-philosophy, as this divergence, that which is signaled by irony, is located in the distinction that has found and described the motions of philosophy, what I feel is more correctly termed ‘conventional methodology’ or just ‘convention’. The distinctive move that has been signaled, as referenced here through philosophy, can be noticed lately in the works loosely coined as ‘existentialism’ and ‘post-modernism’, but most recently ‘speculative realism’; so appropriately begun in the real, taking reality ‘into’ its object for what it is and what possibility it holds, such speculation thus calls for its counterpart, as I frame, that is specifically not real, since it is this feature of and in response to the philosophical (sticking here with the non-philosophical designation) reality, that works to deny that which originates in the Event. The Romance is this evental feature of human experience by which we have the conventional historical designation of Romanticism or the Romantic Period or Era, and by which, so apropos to convention, we likewise have the real disclaimer that has reduced and conflated the period and human experience to one of mere caprice, of usual passionate undependability, fantasy and a specifically derogatory mode of irrationality that decries as it celebrates conventional methodology’s victory in placing the human so far from itself as the free individual for the purpose of maintaining the status quo of the teleo-ontological fortress of religio-ideological power. So compete in the assertion of itself, the conventional romantic designation flaunts its power through accentuating the discrepancy by calling what is Romantic ‘subjective’ diversity and uniqueness of individual creative and emotional freedom; though there may have been such an era, it was indeed because of the ubiquity of the true reality. We need not go into the exploitation and oppression that is the capitalization upon the discrepancy here, but suffice it to say that reality itself is romantic, whereas the Romance, a particular significant experience involving an actualization of relationship with the world, has been historically shanghaied into servitude and keelhauled under the dreadnought of historical progress — the now ‘fractalized’ Hagelian History the individualized romance of willful self determination upon the seas of manifest destiny. This is reality; it is not that people are or were having similar experiences — of the pure multiple they indeed do, and that within a particular universal horizon. It is more that such experience, by virtue of being human, may connote an individual of reality in the manner that is reducible in the same way that Badiou describes the situation of being and event, which is to say that the real individual misses the irony of Its existence for the sake of the True Object of its faith. This is not to disclaim in the effort to eject the human being from the helical oscillation upon which history makes its claim to progress, but rather to introduce to suggest that while progress is a situation of reality, the progress of reality is misconstrued in the conventional reckoning of history. * The significant event is singular, but the nature of its significance brings all subsequent experience under or within its scope; thus the attempt to explain what this experience is or was becomes not only an ironic experience but indeed irony, for the multiple by then necessarily falls into the originating experience and becomes a singular experience — though it ‘becomes’ only in as much as it is always becoming multiple and singular in the same move due to the originating experience informing all experience. So I repeat, this occurs in the explaining of the event, but not so much in the explaining what the event means or meant, again, because the explaining of the event cannot become dismissed, overcome or otherwise detach from what the event means as the event serves to give significance to the subsequent multiple that is real life or of lived experience, that falls back and or has fallen into singularity. Oddly, it is in the explaining of the meaning of the significant event that develops theory, rationalization (see below), as a proxy, as a way of distancing oneself from the Event because its significance as the Event, defies reality, and reality is where we all begin as an individual, our faith invested in reality. Hence we can speak of Soren Kierkegaard’s ‘sickness unto death’, ‘offense’ and ‘sin’. When one attempts to explain what the event means or from what it means or meant, then he becomes stuck in an eternal decision of how he might go about situating the meaning of what for real determinations is the eternal moment — a redundancy, a stalemate, where the ‘point of insertion’ into reality cannot be determined — that requires a type of break which will move the in-decision past its incubation into a specific topical discourse which then might become the identity of the individual. Yet the conventional methodologists will need no break for they are already invested by the break itself, that which is the offense in discrepancy, in the suture that is the effect of faith, which supplies the True Object and where discourse is about asserting proper meaning of that reality. Theirs has to do with the prevalent veto that is choice, in the particular presence that says ‘no’. That which requires a break is not the requirement for a ‘leap’ as Master Kierkegaard has termed, but rather its opposite; such a break relieves one of in-determination, necessity, which is to say, the relief is the contingency that is choice, whereas the leap is of necessity. By contrast, yet with consistency, what one could call a ‘pocket veto’ appears in the potential of the significant event to be able to make or be the qualifying break; the pocket veto appears as something one has available for choice, to use for the purpose of stopping the reduction that will bring meaning to the significance that is the eternal moment that thus necessitates the leap, and so be able to bring what is otherwise impossible into the discourse of reality despite it not being necessary. The conventional veto rallies against the Event, where as the pocket veto enacts the instrumentality of decision once the significant event has taken hold. For it is as if within the Romance of the significant event the person has ‘held out’ on it, as if carrying something in his pocket, that though the experience may be a motion of love, the question always remains: “Is this real?” But indeed, if this discourse is any indication, it is at least ironic, for the answer one finds reveals whether the veto was ever truly in the pocket or not. This then defines the paradigm of bad faith; that which was in good faith considering the other party was already compromised for what contingency may arise to change the stakes of the original deal. This essay concerns how the pocket veto allows for a way to describe the situation of the Event, as well as creating an opening to eventually describe the Romanitc Experience itself. For we have two situations of the event, but really three. One where no pocket veto is ever needed, having the tool of veto readily at hand, and one where a pocket veto may be applied. But these two situations then show that they still are dealing in reality with reality, as theory is the distancing of oneself from the experience. Yet this is not a necessary discounting. Being that there is a necessary principle at work, all elements of the universe must belong to that principle. What this principle is exactly is the discrepancy between contingent and necessary aspects as such, which is also the discrepancy between the object and the talk about it, as well as the relations of particular thoughts (see my earlier essays); Quentin Meillassoux, in his book, “After Finitude” does an excellent job at describing this situation, in particular as it has to do with the object itself. So in as much as these admitted operations indeed operate, it is no problem that two apparently distinct and even opposing routes based upon the same discursive substrate, the same ‘meaningful issue’, would co-operate in-dependently to reveal its object and even say different things from the same orientation. We have then the framework by which the dual nature of the discourse that has been called ‘philosophy’ may be apprehended. To bring in Alain Badiou’s formulations; on one hand, we have the philosophers of the multiple who are attempting to describe the One Reality of the True Object, so to speak, that I call ‘conventional methodologists’, and on the other we have the philosophers who are involved with the significant event. The conventionalists (Francois Laruelle’s philosophers, the ‘objectours’ of philosophy) we will leave to their ‘philosophy of…’ methods. For the philosophers (my use) of course, we need discover what might need a veto, and this concerns how irony might come about, and this concerns the significant event.  * What occurs in the significant romantic experience? A feeling of privilege and or secrecy upon intimate knowledge, one might even say a feeling toward a kind of esoteric mysticism; of being ‘let in’ to some profoundness; of being ‘allowed to make your acquaintance toward a loving relationship’. Now, when I say this, of what am I speaking? Am I not speaking of every possible experience? I am speaking of one particular experience, but in what way does it not speak of every experience? The profoundness of some ‘private’ experience, but also the common experience of the individual in reality; loving as an intimacy and loving as a basic position by which one ‘has’ an arena to act, whether one would call it ‘mystical’ is really a preference of the moment, yet in so much as we could say one ‘loves’ by virtue of the fact that there is a relationship that cannot be overturned, we can also say one has faith; in reality, here religion leads the way. So, In one move I have described the condition of the particular Event, while also describing all events, and as I attempt to put forth the unique situation the move presents the common situation, the humble and the willful. But what happens in this romance ? The sense of love remains but the feeling goes away, and then comes back, and then goes away. In the Romance it is called repetition; in reality it is called a number of things, a mundane repetition, psychological self fulfilling prophecy, incorrect appraisal of the situation, spiritual motion, karma, magic, physical resonance, coincidence; I could go on. What is occurring? Significance. The meaning of the event in reality. On one hand, the ‘setting’ of a pure multiple within the context of the pure multiple, sets of sets. A ‘cordoning off’ of meaning to sets of meaning allows for one event to have more or less significance than another, and thus have significance. One the other hand, the event of the significant romantic experience is being ‘found’ at particular moments of the multiple, which is to say, in reality. Reality can thereby be understood as a sequence or as the arena where significance occurs, but by this designation also as the ordination of fidelitous subsequence, or that which must be not real. For the conventional philosophers of the One Reality there are True Objects and the role of these philosophers is to be able to discern what the true nature of the ‘grand’ object called reality is. It does not matter if they suggest multiple realities or multiple universes or how they situate terms; their faith begins and ends in the True Object, in the absolutely particularized pure multiple that begins, progresses and culminates in real truth. These philosophers see theory as coming from or being about the true reality. Significance comes at moments of proper arrangement of objects, of particular situations of meaning, such as reading and studying and then coming upon an ‘ah ha!’ moment, and these significances as a matter of course are then coordinated into what is called theory, a willful assertion of appropriated facts about objects. Hence the philosophers of the significant event thus far deal in irony, but the issue overall has been the confusion that arises in the development of theory. To wit; the former philosophers are dealing with the true object and the latter are dealing with the significant experience. It is only now that the division that is just due is taking shape. Yet, as was just mentioned above and consistent with non-philosophy, the confusion has arisen because the philosophy of the true object is the ‘greater’ vehicle, it is the discourse of power, the discourse that stems from the One Reality, that is the designation of the ‘proper’ meaning of terms. This is historical, traditional, ideological and political as it has to do with a specific ontological and ethical horizon. Non-philosophy is a blatant announcement of the division and brings into relief what the post-modernists (Deluze, Derrida, Foucault, to name three biggies) could not bring to sway; to wit, their move was inherently conventional, that is, not so concerned with the Event itself as they were its meaning. They were still attempting to account for the significant event in the One reality, as the philosophy of the true object was not seen for its stature and unrelenting power; or, they capitulated to its power because they were already invested in it for human identity, they still thought reality could be changed into something less dishonest and more human, an offering and a withholding – which is to say now of something withheld, something not real – and at that because they were inspired; they could not introduce the significant event because the One reality demands that the significant event must fall under the domain of the pure multiple, and thus be not so significant — but at least it could be a type of psychological ‘malady’ or maybe ‘form’ if it were not posed with strategy, in tactical guise of particular manipulations of terms, in short, if it were not posed in theory. So we are lead to ask how it might be that someone so disturbed or ‘not living in reality’ came to have such an effect on real discourse? That such a person could have developed such a good theory? Hence, its significance. It is exactly this theory that does not hold water, for their theoretical position occurs only in conventional reality. Theory is supposed to be an argument, a proof for a proposal of truth, as the proposal is merely a part of coming to the truth of the True Object through negotiation; it is supposed to be a surmising of the facts in a proposal for their unitary meaning to be critiqued accorded to the relative information allotted to each critically thinking individual who are also involved in the common universal effort for the ‘whole’. Theory is not supposed to be a ‘costume’. So irony describes the situation of belonging instead of including by exclusion and confounds conventional reality. So it is that which is most honest is thus taken by convention with a pinch of salt, a skeptical eye suspecting bluff, and at times called out for its dishonesty, if not plain nonsense. if much of post-modernist theory is any indication – check out the post-modern generator website (if it still exists) – one can easily tell that conventional philosophers really had no clue what was being told. The meaning of ‘original’ post-modern/existentialist writers was taken most seriously in its capacity to hold an object for its truth, and soon enough the ‘theory’ that was being produced by the adherents of the proper method (Laruelle’s ‘philosophers’) based upon the significance that rides through conventional reality despite itself resounded with utter nonsense. This can be said to be due to the fact that there is indeed a discrepancy between what is real from what is true, that reality’s pure multiples are ‘really set’ upon a situation undisclosed to the situation of infinite sets, which should show, for conscious experience, the fidelity to the true object of coordinated sets that are romantic in various significant situations that I call conventional reality, distinct from the true fidelity that marks the void in and by ordinate subsequence, or, the significant event that I have called the Romance — but distinct in a non-philosophical manner, which Francios Laruelle has termed as a unilateral duality, one which includes and one which belongs. The almost polemical move of ‘speculative realism’ from what could be called traditional philosophy, as well as traditional philosophy itself, both occur in reality, about real objects, whereas what is ironic, or as indicative of the counter-partial move of what is not real, is the dual move from reality. Due to the necessity of the motion of contingency in reality, the speculative and the ironic appear to reveal a necessary element or feature that is unknown or at least uncomfortable to conventional reality. Irony upsets the endeavor for the True Object, so it is not difficult to see how conventional methodology would tend away from its tellings; it holds a tentative truce with irony, setting it to a type of spiritual psychology it doesn’t enjoy, one that brings it to have to assert is power for ubiquity, urgently revealing as it does so its nervousness steeped in bad faith. Yet while Speculative Realism announces its divergence from traditional philosophy, its way is still conventional, it is still attempting to alleviate the risk of exposure of the Romance by its resorting to what is romantic; hence it is ‘speculative’. Yet it is close; its difference lay in the significant event, and may yet be an indication of where or how such a pocket veto may come into play. * Significance occurs in three, what I shall call, venues. In my essay “the description of irony”, I discuss these but I will elaborate more here. Events can be significant. Getting married, having children, graduating from school, meeting someone, avoiding an accident, etc… Any event may have significance. Real experience is segregated into meaningful situations, each with more or less significance. Reality is a pure multiple of attainable sets, where any set can be divided into an infinite amount of sets, and any series of sets can be a set. Infinity likewise becomes a multiple that can be placed into sets of various sorts. Like a divine lotus flower, reality unfolds, emerges, arises and falls, like an active chaotic Mandelbrot set of fractal imagery. Most people have experience and understanding that can be described and explained analogous to this type of significance, to significance that can be described with reference to such chaos and complexity, as such simple and straightforward explanation can comprise and account for reality. But the ‘incorrection’ of this type of patterning of significance is found – if I may stay consistent with the Eastern theme I have touched upon here – in the assertion of will; so much that this very statement reveals its conventionality in double, in the same way the notion of karma is seen as meaning purpose, but one that arises as one asserts oneself, ones desire for things in the very event that arose due to choices made within an essentially free universe. Hence the difference between the event(s) of the pure multiple and the Event from which the multiple may arise in fidelity is one of significance. * In ‘The Analysis of the Mysterium’, chapter 5 of his book “The Idea of the Holy”, Rudolf Otto describes the situation: “Representations of spirits and similar conceptions are rather one and all early modes of ‘rationalizing’ a precedent experience…They are attempts…to guess the riddle it propounds, and their effect is at the same time always to weaken or deaden the experience itself. They are the source from which springs, not religion, but the rationalization of religion, which often ends by construing such a massive structure of theory and such a plausible fabric of interpretation, that the mystery is frankly excluded.” His point is to get to how it is that we come to a category of ‘holy’, but my take I think he missed. Here, the ‘precedent experience’ can be similar to an event, any event of experience, but here let’s say the significant event, the Romantic experience. We approach from a certain manner for discussion here: What is it? Otto would say that it is of the mysterium, of awe-fullness. So what is it? I say: it is only what becomes of the discourse that surrounds it, which is to say, itself is nothing. But it has significance. The significance leaves itself to the discourse about it such that itself indeed has significance, and this is to say, the event itself is denied for the sake of the discourse about it so much that the event is the discourse about it. This linking, this suturing, is of faith, conventional faith. Faith allows for the romance to take place, for significant events to arise. But here this is only to suggest that significance motivates the will.   Differentiated from common significance of events is the significant event. Here, what is significant does not resort to individuated, multiple events and remain local or in proximity to them, such as with a first kiss or a coincidence, where discourse would speak specifically about each event and their significances. Here when a significant moment arises it refers to the singular Event, such that each significance is so of and refers to the originating event. This is to say that each significance in reality calls forth the Event so that each event refers to the Event for its significant meaning. The singular becomes multiple so the multiple remains singular. As opposed to real experience that resides in the pure multiple and ‘seeks what it finds’ by including the void in its coordination of sets, the significant experience stems from the void and ‘begins the count’, or establishes the vector, the ordination of subsequence, because such event belongs to the void, and as Alain Badiou might put it, occurs in the evental horizon. Thus one can say that moments of significance should not have ‘more’ significance, but have the ‘same’ significance, each real significant event recalling the originating significance. Hence also, reality does ordain significant events such as birthdays and great holiday vacations, but such significance can be said to be relative to the Event as one knows which has the greater significance and what actually motivates, where the cardinal value arises as a denial of such relation through relative knowledge that we have called ‘correlationalism’, or what is constituted by the pure multiple of the real possibility of coordinated sets. Consistent with real transcendence, the cardinal indicates how value is situated and meaning finds form, and with a nod to Quentin Meillassoux, how reason itself relies and substantiates upon a stable yet undisclosed substrate, which I say is demanding of faith because it is the philosophical object, its objective, the ‘philosopher’s stone’ of reason, and which he says is the ‘necessitarian inference of probabilistic reasoning’ [QM; pg 97]. Again the irony resounds. The question has to do with this latter area of significance. We are talking about meaning. Significance concerns meaning. When we say that there is continuing significance as opposed to ‘another’ significant event, we are speaking to the meaning that continues through the various occasions, the various significant events. It is the same meaning in different contexts, showing itself, the same meaning, through different lenses. But usually the Event is not seen in this way; the ‘lenses’, the objects, are not seen as occasions of the Event, but rather as occasions that are ‘filling in’ the object, indicating a progress of knowledge that has to do with a greater knowledge of objects, which is to say, of reality. Recall the transcendent and empirical elements of reality; this latter viewing occurs in oscillating fashion, to the effect of significant revelatory experiences that are leading one along some purpose which is the simultaneous progress of the knowledge of the True Object and the individual of reality. The True Object and the individual are defined and specific elements of reality; they are identities in contrast (ala Martin Heidegger) to what is the same. They are ‘cordoned off’ in meaning to have real identity. In the same way, significance occurs. Such identities arise from effectively segregational meaning. In reality we build things and take them apart and find how they work and put them back together in different ways to find out what each identity is, and this process is cumulative and culminating such that typically, even when the significance continues through the multiple events, the Event is viewed as a segregate identity, that is, as above (Otto), the precedent experience is kept segregate by the virtue of the faith that is invested in the ability of the term to identify its object. This is why the Event becomes denied in reality; this accounts for why the Romance stays romantic, in the either/or condition, ala Soren Kierkegaard, instead of moving into the Romance that is marriage. It is the continuing significance that defines how reality is situated in truth, for now we are dealing with the individual for whom events have significance because of the originating Event. This corresponds the individual in reality who comes across the romantic experience. He draws from the mystery into a relationship that would destroy reality; this relationship (for now in speaking) is the Romance. In this real situation the individual is appraising the situation in real terms such that the Romance is such by virtue of an identity with which or whom the individual has a relationship with, but which he also seeks as to its reality. The first question is always, “Is this real?” But because of the initial investment in reality that every individual has, the question of truth is not distinct; the question of truth is a precipitate of the next question playing out in the activity that is real life, which is “what should I do?”, but then as the significance of the Event passes into the terms of reality that seek to bring the meaning of the Event into reality as purpose, again as Otto above, “the mystery is frankly excluded” and the significance of the experience itself falls away, or rather becomes real. It is then sought after and is found again as progress is the investment in objective identity. If the question “what should I do”, which connotes the meaning of the experience as purpose, is answered, then reality is saved, faith in the True Object is upheld in that the ‘mysterium’ has been solved as purpose. The significant event is set in context as ‘inspiration’, or for a probably better colloquialism, ‘spiritual experience’, but even if the inspiration denies the experience as spiritual, here inspiration itself saves reality. It is when no performable act is conveyed, and no purpose is able to be termed, that reality falters. Doubt is the operative mechanism here, for the present is only presented as ‘path’ in a retrospection that cannot project it out upon the future as ‘a path’ of inspiration; reality is changed. Hence, what I understand of the ‘pocket veto’ rings a particularly interesting note. The playing out of the question of reality brings the question of truth and grants thereby in relief the significance of the pocket veto. For we are not talking about the veto as it is held in the pocket; this is indeed the Romance in reality. We are now talking about the veto once it needs be played and if it can be or not. If it can be, then the mystery that has been frankly excluded is conveyed into reality intact as a real item for negotiation, as a proposal, a hypothesis, a theory, that moves reality in its progress as a significant object to be considered. Yet if the veto cannot be played – and this evidences a particular showing of a true polemic of power – then the mystery that is frankly excluded is indeed excluded in reality, which is to say, it is destroyed. And this mystery is exactly the transcendent. *



 END Part 1.


 I believe I should leave some bibliography, which will also do for part 2 and if there is a part 3; in fact it could probably serve as a seed biblio for what is to come. Martin Heidegger. Being and Time, and other essays of his. Alain Badiou. Being and Event. Quentin Meillassoux. Beyond Infinity Francios Laruelle. Principles of Non-Philosophy Rudolf Otto. The Idea of the Holy Soren Kierkegaard. The Sickness Unto Death, and, Fear and Trembling ** For a brief discussion about the Romantic Era – and as a bibliographic site: http://www.historyguide.org/intellect/lecture16a.html And thank you Dave at Inthesaltmine.com for our continuing interaction, and his coining of the idea of a ‘pocket veto’.

Intensionality

Contrary to Hersserl and those phenomenal agents, intension is not centered in some thoughtful subject; it is centered in the object. This is the essence of the meaning of multiplicity. There is no origination of thought in a central, unitive subject agent of transcedence. There is only the fullness of imminent existence taking place in an infinite mulitude of objects. 

The Matter At Hand, Part 1: Post-Modernism, Artificial Intelligence, the Conventional Limit, and Object Oriented Ontology.

From reading an essay a few days ago, I was reminded of The Postmodern Generator. You can go read a good essay at:
http://www.elsewhere.org/pomo/

Now when I say ‘good’ I mean it can make sense. If you have never heard of it, or didn’t read the very end of the page, the PM Generator is a program that generates essays. Click the link again and it will produce another one. They are completely false.

I was reminded of the PMG after reading a ‘actually legitimate’ essay that made a certain amount of sense but that I really could gain no baring upon what it was addressing or really saying. Of course, though, we must acknowledge that there are types of privileged discourse that have to do with production niches. Computer code may appear like nonsense to the layman, but the meaning of the code is easily identified to its object, whether it be origination, such as the direct meaning of commands and their ordering to the machine, or their destination, the effect or running operation of the code’s incorporation as an application. The ground and purpose of the code, though confusing to the layman, can be easily explained. Yet, in philosophy and theoretical discourse, we have a different situation. If I had gone into the essay (the ‘legitimate’ one I read) with a sense that it must have relevance and be based in a certain potential for truth, then I might have read it more than twice and made a good effort to find out what it meant, including following references to other essays that might be in its genre, and concluded that it had something significant to offer. But I didn’t. I saw — for sure after the second read — that, for one, it was purely privileged in its bearings, but privileged in a different way than computer programming; which is to say, the meaning and point it addresses is proposed and suspended in a cohortive discursive base that is taken as relevant merely because there are people in positions of authority and or respect who are speaking in such a way. But then also, for two, that not only was it probably important merely because certain people have developed an investment arena for meaning, but more so, the arena was merely that: The arena allowed for a fabrication (without grounding) to appear as if it had significance in deep human roots, socially ideological and or political, of a kind of substantial innately human kind and pertinence, and due to this fabrication of meaning caused a series of human efforts of various vectors (political, economical, ideological, artistic) to be based in the arena solely for the purpose of inflating the identity capital of the people involved in the fabrication of the arena. But it it is just this kind of insubstantial rhetoric that post-modernism allows to be true, for it makes itself true by it being a product of human sensibility, but of an insensible sensibility that is the egocentric transcendent that has gotten us exactly to the place of reasoning that sees world destructing activities, such as global warming or climate change, democratic-capitalistic support of aristocratic development, two-faced power structures that advocate equal access while being allowed for through an inherent subordination and oppression of designated marginalized segments of society, ideological disclaimers for ‘naturalized’ inequality and oppression, etcetera.

The point, I suppose, I am trying to make is that it is not that the PMG is writing nonsensical pieces of theory. The defenders of the significance of ‘real’ theory is the disclaimer that …” The Postmodernism Generator was written by Andrew C. Bulhak using the Dada Engine, a system for generating random text from recursive grammars, and modified very slightly by Josh Larios (this version, anyway. There are others out there).” They point at the ‘random’ and ‘recursive’ elements of the generation and exclude what other theory may be made by humans. And, this is not to say that human generated theory itself is also random and nonsensical at root. Maybe this is so, but then we have only enacted an eternal irony for which the argument is but a point of contention (perhaps a kind of ‘the’ point of contention whereby the individual is marked off to his her identity), and then one might be better suited to a religious monastery.

I am more concerned with how real theory is distinguished from PMG theory, because, for one, if we are indeed moving to the inception of a true artificial intelligence, we need encounter and identify the limits of human conscious effort and not only how human consciousness may operate as a real item, but also how this real item functions as a item of what is true of the universe in which reality is formed. We need encounter that aspect of being human that gains reality by its offense, that is, in the effort to create identity against the bare fact of its existence. We may have realized what it means to exist, but we have have not encountered how we react to such a sentence; we have only reacted to the truth, we have yet to reveal what occurs when such a moment of truth is come upon. If we allow ourselves as human beings to be able so easily fall prey to discursive ploys of fabricated meaning, should we not realize that an artificial intelligence will be able to notice this human tendency, this weak spot, and take advantage of the flaw in the fabric that is and has been causing our essential lack in potential? Should we think any less that an artificial intelligence of our own making will be an intelligence nonetheless not human intelligence ? The question must be: Can we program our lack as an inherent limit of artificial intelligence? Are we able to do this, or is the fact of the possibility of a true AI a harbinger an indication that our lack is indeed a lack of being human and not of our creations’ ? This is the issue of the point of contention: What is contingency and cause?

Because this is to say that the flaw is exactly the reassertion of essential Will that gains its force through meaning based in a universal maxim of segregation and the exploitation of blind spots inherent to such segregation, that this is a human mode, and that if a human as itself may see this flaw — shall we be so arrogant as to presume an intelligence of our making will necessarily be a human intelligence ? Indeed, would not an ‘artificial’ intelligence have at least an equal probability to have capacities that arise in the blind spot of human intelligence in so much as the likes of Graham Harman shine light into the regions of the universe that have intelligence (being) regardless of what human beings regard as such? The Frankenstein’s monster of human creation is not that humans let it get away from human control, but that humanity itself was already beyond its own control. Is not this the evidence that what we would consider an artificial intelligence actually more likely to be an intelligence that offends us, our ability to be sensible? Such that a true artificial intelligence would then actually be an intelligence that overlaps what is being (Dasein) as our mode of corresponding intelligence with what is intelligence proper, as modes of being of an actually more true universal reality? ‘Artificial intelligence’ thus might be that intelligence that evidences to us how our transcendental mode is actually merely one type of mode of being, A.I. then the revealing of the limit that is the transcendental thought by its actually arising partially within the (non-ethical) universal paradigm, straddling, if you will, the willed and the non-willed. Would human intelligence as a conventional red herring be able to stand up to a mode of intelligence that understands itself as a determined mode of activity, that is to say, determined by objects ? Nietchze might say that it should be able to.

For what are we seeing with the PMG? And what is the reaction against?

Shall we see in Part 2 ?

SE part 10ai, part B: The Revolution Will not be Televised (nor disseminated in virtual media or social networking sites).

I suppose the question left is a trick question because one cannot dismiss the link already established between philosophy and ideology and politics; there is indeed reality to be dealt with. The question behind philosophical learning has to do with if it has already been or is being dealt with by the historical discourse, if there is a progress of the human being itself, if the philosophical discourse is actually moving the individual human being to better ‘know thyself’, if a record of historical discourse allowing the human being a better purchase upon what it is to be a human being and what occurs in this process? Or, does conventional philosophy perpetually lure the human being away from itself? Or to be even more crass; Does the conventional route present a deception of itself, for itself, so that it can move upon a platform of substantial belief such that human beings are gaining some sort of solution? And then of course the pivotal issue of this forum: What is education?

The trick is seen inso much as such a question may be voiced from a valid position, because then the proof that would put philosophy in bed with politics and such, and thus deflate what otherwise would be a ‘good use’ for philosophy to a ‘well esteemed and well paid methods for engineering maintenance’ and would elevate the lowly conventionally methodological philosopher to have to drop his broom for a gun in the effort to defend that identity thus created by ideological faith — but this is reality. The trick in this discussing types or routes for learning is in so much as one sees that they are being deceived; a trick of mirrors; it is not that there is no mirror, but that the mirror into which philosophy most often looks shows its identical reflection, that is, the right hand in the reflection still is the right hand from the reference of the reflection; the left, the left…

The notice made by Negarestani (essay link in part A) might give rise to the construction of meaning that will show how the terms themselves allow only particular formations of concepts, that the structure of a given situation allows for and recalls to itself necessary arrangements of meaning and thus offers what might be called a ‘lexicontology’, amoung other transformations, a type of argument for determinism. Our situation thus asks into the excess, the ‘world’ that is the haphazard method of finding the necessary arrangements, what can be called the conventional bias. Notwithstanding this problem, his can be seen as further evidence of discourse coming to terms with itself, as the (engineering, of Negaresanti’s essay) discourse is seen as not arising from some unitive structure toward some systematic resolution (revolution), but rather that the structure is the object in correspondence with discourse at various functional junctures; a quite deconstructivist approach. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to see how such offer-recall of objects locates the imperative of faith to disjoin from the object and deny its recall (distance). Presently such an ontology is not part of the real discursive structure-function (it grants no reflection), but there again, the Significant Event suggests that in so much as we are already and always human, such an ontology would be merely another real scheme of faith, yet one which in respect of the position that would recognize such ontology would bring about a repetition of history, a reinstatement of beginning such that a much longer period of knowledge would have to be allowed to rebuild the subsequence of discourse to the point that such a repetition could be recognized. Of course, the usual arguments against determinism will always apply, for the significant feature of an effective ontology of determinism, one that functions as such, must relinquish the position that determinism proposes, which is also the relinquishing of its counter argument, contingency, which only happens in the conventional human reality; this is what is meant by, with Zizek for one, but others, forgetting, and its repercussions, a (re-)instatement of repetition (Kierkegaard), as well as the mistake denied of redundancy.

The purpose of any revolutionary discourse is to jolt the human being from its individual sleep of reactionary default. So, it may not be too far a stretch here to completely offend the reader by saying that the human being does not change through history, but reality does. The default linkage is that which informs the offense inherent to the rebuttal because the rejection stems from a particular direction, or vector, of linkage; the dismissal of such a statement comes from the individual that is invested in the state of reality determined by the term-object identity, where the subject is held against the object in a directional mode, subject-> object, as an imperative, the conventional method. For reality, where discourse is able to come about through the inversion of this relationship, there we have Harman’s Object Oriented Ontology, object->object, but where this is really a motion of object->subject, the situation implied of this essay, but ironically, of a determinism as determinism, the route that is always denied in effective reality despite its conventional appropriation. It is the Significant Event that allows for this effective determination.

*

Of the second type of student from Part A we mean to suggest that such humanity and the world is not questioned but is rather taken as a platform upon which to wonder and ask upon the objects of its view. Thus all discourses are merely information about objects, even as the object in question is the human being. Mythology and history offer stories of past humans and insights into the nature of humanity and what it means to be a human being. Scientific books tell of methods of analysis that were correct and incorrect, answers that were correct and incorrect and why they were so. The whole range of possible information grants this student a picture and a palette, and a canvas upon which she can create and add to the wondrous and vast compendium of personal, social, useful and not useful items of the human plate.

Tangental to such neutrality, the issue brought up in part A about the move students may make into gathering more discursive information indicates a particular priority of vector for knowledge. For the implication of such a movement does not necessitate any particular discourse to be revealing to the student, rather it presents the possible repercussions of the route. It is just as sensible, along these lines, that a person would venture into ‘spiritual’ discourses as well as strictly philosophical notions and begin to see the elements of those routes as truely true. For example; there are many many people who like to offer us a vision of ‘planes of existence’ where there is a ‘Godhead’ of consciousness, and this Godhead thus can be disseminated along certain logical lines to bring various states of Being that thus serve to explain the human participation in the universe. We might call this a type of New Age conflation of a further variety of philo-spiritual systems, one that arises from the ancient Hindu, Buddhist and or Kabalist ideas, but also modern theoretical physics. One could also read Alastair Crowley and describe the truth of how the universe disseminates along Magickal lines. Pagan or Wiccan cosmology offers a route as well to tell of the truth. Likewise, modern science offers its own meaning for its research in its own right, of non-locality and complexity and such, often removing from its discourse the spiritual voice but all the while telling us of this Truth of the universe and our true place in it. Philosophers, oddly enough, appear to be the most stubborn, for as soon as one brings of a term that has possibility to be unclear or is already attached to certain authorial matrices, such as ‘phenomenon’ and ‘discourse’ and ‘transcendence’, and ‘metaphysics’, these students will route the discussion to the potential of truth that such philosophical discourses hold, so when one speaks they must automatically resolve themselves by their speaking to ‘idealist’, ‘realist’, ‘materialist, etcetera… domains of truth that, as a part of the philosophical truth, are held in suspension for the discussion that arises simultaneously toward and upon the philosophical truth. But these are more than just speaking; somehow, for all such speakers, they appear to constitute The Actual Truth of the universe.

Here, though, we are addressing specifically philosophical truth, but through this discursive vehicle bringing into question all routes. But not that philosophy as a particular discursive arena thus amounts to The true reduction of all routes, but that any route, if viewed as a particular suspension of meaning as opposed to its being involved with terms that are understood as actually anchored of objective truth, may be reduced to any other route. This is the principle that all discourses are valid and hence contribute to the transformation of that principle; that individual discourses constitute the economy of discourses by which reality is manifested. Hence the query that brings the respective routes of the second and first student to the question of a particular vectorial move that conflates the two students to one route that then presents itself suspended (ironically) in particular assertions of truth: What is occurring that brings the student to assert a particular truth in opposition to another? And, what is that situation that is able to move through such anchored scaffolding to thus be able to make the correlation of all systems? Hence, the question that is brought by my sited essay above (by Negarestani): What is the function of the structure, and the structure of the function? This is not a suggestion to delve into subjective justification per say, but is rather addressing under what conditions does a unitary discourse of reality arise? What does such a unitary discourse as and in its unity suggest of reality?

I shall back up and elaborate, for the question of ideology has to do with that for which it does not account, or otherwise accounts for it by incorporating the (it’s) presented lack into its structure. From where, or how, does, the ideology of reality function as an incorporating structure?

This question involving the first student is: If the student were so interested in the question of existence and her presence on the scene and how the world might be or otherwise present itself, is the historical philosophical discourse necessary to her finding those things the traditional discourse ponders and proposes of questions and answers? This is to ask, is the conventional route the only route? To be more specific: Is it necessary to read Husserl to know about that of which phenomenology speaks? Of course, all those prideful philosophers will have a field day ripping apart this question so much that they will see such a question as hardly reflecting a knowledgable positions of the issue. They will bring such questions as “well, yes, because phenomenology was a system of thought coined by Husserl in which he said this and that and phrases things this and that way… so if anyone were to know about phenomenology, they would necessarily have to have read him or at least spoken to someone about his ideas”. And of course I would have to say that they completely used their over philosophical brain that processes given information to arrive at that answer, just like the second student I just mentioned.

So I shall reiterate: Is it necessary to have read Hesserl to come to a notion (very, very generally speaking) that all phenomena of the world arise in the subject? And again I can just hear it: “the only way one would know there was a subject in which phenomena arises in is to have knowledge of philosophical rhetoric”.

Am I making any head way here?

Again: If a person were so interested, could they come upon the meaning of Husserl’s founding premise without having to have read about it? And I am not asking if they could know that Husserl said this. Along this line, can a student understand Husserl without a primer, without the usual historical and academic philosophical contextual introduction? We suggest, contrary to the conventional assumption, that perhaps Husserl’s idea is not an idea that came about due to Husserl, but that such an idea is innate to the human experience given that one is motivated to plainly look.

Likewise; Is Kant’s notion that knowledge reflects of itself, an idea that can only be gained by knowledge of Kant?

Likewise; Is Fauerbach’s idea of an economy of human knowledge dependent upon Kant’s idea? Is any proposal of authors dependent upon the previous statements of other authors?

Likewise; Is Harman’s idea of Objects (Object Oriented Ontology) due to his pronouncing the idea, or is such an idea innate to reflective human experience? Is Miellassoux’s idea of an object that exists antecedent to the thought about it an idea that he and only he came up with? Was his idea dependent upon other authors’ proposals? Nevermind that if we say ‘yes’ we are setting aside the very method by which we insist upon questioning what the author is really saying.

So; If such ideas do indeed depend upon and are allowed to be generated because of previous authors’ proposals, then we have a proposal of a particular type of human reality. We have the conflation, but conventional discernment, of philosophy as a conspiratorial agent of political and ideological investment.

If not, then we have a completely different situation.

*

Part of the problem of the point of contention is that if we can say that authors are drawing upon ideas that are innate to the human being, then we can say that it is possible to point to specific notions of respective discourses, certain subsequent conclusions put forth by various authors based upon the innate factor or element, that do not reside innately to human reflection, that is, to all humans who may reflect, proposals that are particular to that author’s presence in the world or experience in knowledge and or their particular method of disseminating the innate experience of knowledge, articles that must be learned through the banking model. We can say that humans are capable of understanding the subsequent moves, but we are also saying that the subsequent moves are sufficient to the necessary premise, that if the premise is innate, we can thereby understand why or how the author might draw such subsequent conclusions, even we might see them as incorrect. It is by this maxim, this discrepancy that is the evidence supporting argument, i.e. I know what you mean here/ I don’t know what you mean there, or, I know what you mean, but the consequence is mis-drawn, is an indication of problem and elicits from this situation the aspect of the discourse on the Significant Event that we have called opacity, where the distinction put out upon the reality implied by discourse reveals faith and its operative mode of the veto, but specifically to those authors who appear to recognize the discrepancy, the pocket veto. Hence also, we set aside the question of conventional reality and its authors, for its method assumes and relies upon such opacity (argument; choice; veto), the space wherein arises impetus for real progress, and instead we address particular philosophical discourses that evidence opacity (the pocket veto) within itself as its presentation reveals opacity between what is innate or necessary, and what is hypothetical or contingent; for what is innate appears through all discourses in one way or another, through various shades and veils, screens and partitions, despite how ‘Pure Reason’ may be located in Kant to be a conventional Western philosophy property. Such propriety is entirely hypothetical and practical.

Now we can get to the clincher, the most offensive proposal of divergence, the caveat that would often buck the philosophical reader. We can also say that what is innate to the human being is only innate to those for whom it is innate. The problem is inherent to the proposal of divergence, for when this is mentioned within a treatise that is called philosophical, whatever the phrasing, the meaning will always be brought back to the conventional philosophical rhetoric, the meaning of meaning. One problem is in the use of the term ‘human being’, and this is used specifically to avoid the term ‘humanity’ for certain contexts. The individual, on the other hand, does refer specifically to the human being invested in reality. So it is that the distinction is commonly and en route seen to divide by which to implicate the whole, and, move for the whole by making distinctions by which the whole there comes. It is thereby (by this method) that divergence will not be understood, for when we speak of the human being we must be speaking of an individual, one that is a single member of a common whole, and a potential that thereby is available to the whole. In this case, if there is an idea that is innate of the human being, then we are also saying that any and every human being may have access to it. Yet, the question must be, if every human being has access to this innate idea, why do they not express as an idea innate to themselves that they apprehend this idea? But not only this; if there is an innate idea found merely through the looking at that which is innate to the human being, why do people require it being described by others for them to understand the innate idea? What is it about such innateness that is being aroused un-innately? Yet if such innateness is aroused by a sort of sympathy between (subject-)objects, such that perhaps a type of ‘resonance’ is occurring by which such latent idea thus is apprehended as innate, what is the situation where 1) only particular people are privy or have access to such discourses of the idea? And, 2) even if such discourses are available to people, most people do not or cannot apprehend them? And, 3) even if such discourses are supposed to be apprehended they are not viewed as have arisen innately, but rather comprehended as a unit of information that had not been there prior to the learning it, that is, the gaining of the piece of information that says it is innate amounts thus to it being innate as a price (distance; commodity) of definitional information?

The situation presented by these three instances, which occur at all times in nearly every place one can come across, thus must signal a divergent discourse, one that speaks of humanity but a specific humanity that apprehends the innate idea. We can no longer assume that any sort of revolutionary transformation can or will arise, (for the revolution has de facto already occurred) and neither, without a certain forlorn demeanor, can we settle to treat all production of discourse strictly like a work of art. The category of which we speak no longer compromises itself to a usurpation of multiple perceptions or interpretation of sets of sets, but even sets these conventional term-identities within a different categorical imperative. We thereby speak of divergence in its most full and true sense. This situation is similar, say, to people who know how to program computers. As an analogy; no one will suggest that the skills, language and let alone the perception upon computers that these people have automatically must be able to be reduced to the skills, language and perception of say the users of Microsoft Windows platform, that the programmers must reconcile their ‘computer programming world’, or the code or language they use and the perceptions of problems and solutions of computer programming, to the general user of Windows, the but neither must the Windows users be reconciled in their using to be automatically included in the programmers ‘world’. But this is exactly what is presumed of conventional philosophy for the category of philosophy as a single imperative within which all the -ism’s and -ologies arise. This is to say, that the significance of divergence does not reduce itself nor is required to reconcile itself to what is more real of reality, and, the discussion that considers these facets of knowledge of reality as an all inclusive meaning, while it may use the ‘results’ of such divergence for its varied purposes, likewise is incapable of addressing the divergent discourse beyond such addressing as being material of divergence (face to face).

The ramifications of discourse itself of attempting to describe and thus bring about such a reconciliation has a long history, indeed inscribes as it proscribes history, most significantly and poignantly in the rhetoric of revolution. But the fact remains that even the most recent conventional manifestations evidence the real attempt that still reifies and depends upon a discrepancy that is not being overcome. We propose that this is due to a confusion (mistake) that occurs in the effort to conflate what is inherently divided into a one reality, a confusion that persists due to the effort for reconciliation. The Significant Event thus describes how and why such an effort fails for reality, as well as describing how and why such real effort persists, and thereby exposes conventional philosophy as a play for importance of its namesake, for what could be better called, more legitimately, critical or political theory, cultural anthropology, critical psychology, or just plain ideological negotiation, or what might be for a more correctly identifying term, purely academic sets of conventional analytical methodology.

To put this in a conventional phrasing, “the revolution will not be televised”. The irony of divergence cannot be overestimated. Hence, for its weight in truth, we must discern such a divergent discourse that yet remains philosophical, as not real. There is no line being drawn here, the line is already drawn; reality will continue as it always does, conventionally.

SE Part 10a. Transformation and Conversion.

The Significant Event is to be distinguished from an event in reality. The Significant Event involves reality but never occurs in reality; it is the encountering of the point of contention. Significance itself may occur in reality as various events can begin a count of meaning in the arena of pure multiples (reality), from events such as stopping at a stop sign, to having a good workout, to screwing up a business contract, to receiving an award, texting “ball” instead of “call”, accidentally or purposefully injuring someone slightly or seriously, winning the state lottery, being injured, enacting some small altruistic kindness, or reading an essay. All such events may occur at times and have small or large, momentary or lasting impact. Yet to speak about the Significant Event becomes an ironic venture, bringing the proposal of said event to an end that speaks of the last thing it would seem to indicate and by this thereby becomes the first thing; at once included in a description of all events, as well describing how such events belong to what is truly significant, what occurs is that all things come to belong to the Significant Event.

In reality, argument and discussion in general are seen to exclude the position from which its point is made, that is, the position is taken to be the argument. The real method presents the position and the argument as identical, or part of the same identity, and by this method, the Significant Event is never encountered for what it suggests in argument and occurs thereby ‘outside’ the argument; it occurs as a transcending operation of the argument. This is to say that conventional real discourse includes a transcendent clause. The irony of this proposal is that on one hand it can be said to be describing all events in reality under a rubric of potential, and on the other, eliciting from itself a truly exceptional situation. Thus it would seem contradictory to suggest that the Significant Event is not a moment of transformation; such a moment of transformation is to have enacted a pocket veto. Transformation implicates the transcendental clause of conventional faith such that some sort of progress must likewise have occurred, such as the motion that is evident in the expression “now, I understand”. The irony is that if such transformation has occurred, then no transformation was needed for it to occur.

Irony evidences the containment of reality in a universal ontological horizon that cannot be and is never breached, that is, except in reality through the transcendental clause. Hence, ironically, to speak of divergence; and this is to say, that the pocket veto evidences a willingness, a choice of faith, to breach the real ontological horizon, or, the teleo-ontology of reality itself. (Aside: might we propose a contraction of teleo-ontology, if just for the sake of orthographic brevity, and offer the term ‘tontology’ ? Or would the irony of its homonymic similarity to ‘tautology’ be almost to much to bare?) The proposal of such a break, the discourse that issues from and or speaks around such a break as witnessed by various authors, spiritual or religious but specifically philosophical, thus can be a measure of the temporal progress of historicity, the fact or item that is history, unto its ontology (the scheme of meaning’s meaning). But of course, to be able to measure such a bias, we must be able to find a baseline by which the variables of discourse, the terms and phrases, may find their position in such an ontology, as well as what aspect of quality of such variables marks the bias. The degree or manner by which such discourse reifies or maintains the ontology we shall call ‘opacity‘, such that to the extent such discourse leads to and or finds a transparency of reality, and thereby argues what is more real — which is to say, a discourse that proposes to better describe the break as the experience compels one to inscribe its meaning into reality to argue what is more true of reality — there we might then find its opacity.

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The common rejection ( from part 8) found in reality against the proposal that everyone appropriates reality through a transcendent, develops into an intellectualized rebuttal. Where the common rejection occurs as a sort of ‘thoughtlessness’ of casual reading, or ‘regular everyday’ experience (what is that?), the more thought full rejection is established upon a well organized and recognized rhetoric. Of course, there is the common real religious or spiritual rejection that rejects that there should even be a rejection, since it is a very common idea that humans may lead spiritual lives and have some sort of contact and or understanding of some effective transcendent element in their lives, and that transformative experiences may occur along these lines. Again, we need not go much further in addressing this feature of human reality than to say that reality holds its potential in such a transcendent clause; the issue follows the same course so far laid in this essay, and proceeds likewise. The skeptics have a real argument to be made with the believers, and vice versa, as they are both subject to the description of the Significant Event. Though both see their activity involved with coming to terms with reality, nevertheless, both are in a process of reality coming to terms with the avoidance of what is not real.

Wait, the rejection might say, we have already delineated what can and might be meant by a transcendent. Foremost, we have elicited valid points to bring in at least an agnostic truth. Based upon the various manifestations of religious and cultural temperaments, the open and equal consideration of all such advocation of God or gods, spirits and such, the probability of the existence of any such God or gods, is equal to the probability that no such entities exist. What transcendent entity may exist tends toward the unknowable, and so we have only to judge upon social and cultural, and likewise materialist affects of such ideals. Likewise, transcendence falls into highly suspect forms; for one, the quality of transcendence as an experience falls often into forms of spirituality, as these tend to connote particular activities and discourses which likewise fall into the previous category. Such experiences, religious or otherwise, are common to humanity, yet are expressed and apprehended again against a common world of human activity wherein the criterion becomes the act, and the feeling of transcendence is a neurophysiological and psychological phenomenon that can be dealt with by science on one hand, and human psychological methods, such as occurs in the very human activity of camaraderie, understanding, consolation, sympathy, empathy and therapy. Even such experiential feelings can bring about drastic and strange events, the extreme examples found though motions of peace and violence, such as the trials and victories of Nelson Mandela, to religious fundamentalism, to that of the like of serial killer David Berkowitz, the ‘Son of Sam’, who said a dog told him to do it. Further, aside from all the subjective transcendent experiences, to say that something transcends various particular occasions, such as, the whole of humanity transcends the possibility of any human individual knowledge, or, adversity can be transcended, says nothing of any common human manner of appropriating the world except that the same forms of a term may be used to address various situations.

Here we have a usual real defense of what is true and real and a reiteration of the proper methodology for coming to such reality. And this is what we don’t want to hear, because it points directly at the reader, at the experience of the human being. It is as if to offer such a proposal that argues that the authors addressed in this essay are staking their claim upon the ability to intuit problems and solutions from what they had read of other philosophers joined with their general education and experience in life, is not merely silly and obvious — a truism — but indeed useless and unneeded. Nevertheless, the sentiment against such a statement, as the reader holds its own possibility sacrosanct and rallies her or his resources to keep that universal perception of a common humanity intact, to maintain the privilege of the reading and production of a subject viable in its appropriation of the object — such an assertion of sentiment appears, as well, overkill, reacting to the obviousness of the statement as one would respond to a threat, overestimating the meaning of the statement because the reporting of such material is felt to be a private matter — a private yet universal matter, perhaps like the reaction to a dissection of a cadaver, or surgical operation, or even a discussion about particular personal gastro-intestinal issues, is to many people — the imposition incurred as an offense to one’s essential being. It is no wonder that we can locate a particular manner of objective reckoning as conventional, based in an offense, and that, of faith. The reader is confronted with what philosophy says (of True Objects) against what it means. When we attempt to find and tell what the meaning means (what is meant from what is said), such as may be involved with the basis of many critiques and rebuttals of works, but also even some editorial summaries of works, as opposed to mere description of what is taking place, we are thereby saying something about what has been said, and where this is taken as an identity, enact a redundancy that is denied to produce conventional theory. We enact a distance between ‘meanings’, one meaning that identifies the Object and the other that identifies the meaning of the Object, and by this distance what is said enacts transcendence as a ‘hidden’ meaning of what is said by frankly excluding the experience, as well as enacting a proposal of method for how one is to attain the experience, such transcendence, which is for all purposes, a real transformation. This is the conventional method. Yet what is meant can be described (removed from its quality of presentation as a True Object) without enacting a distance, and this venture is ironic; it is offensive to one’s identity, or in other words, the identity of the One. So long as here remains a potential hidden in the proposition, we have an opaque position of argument.

So also it is in philosophical discourse that when a description is taken as what is being said of a True Object, as a meaning of the meaning of the Object, the description is taken as an argument instead of as a kind of forensic appraisal. The description is rebutted, and the argument that arises for a defense of the description to redress the rebuttal steps from its proper domain in the attempt to convince ‘its material’ of its veracity, which is quite noticeably silly if not plain non sequitur, but what occurs is no communication, or, the perpetuation of the real conventional methodology that posits transcendence as part of its route (en route). What occurs, or what should occur, is that the forensic description is left to its discipline describing the material, left not involved with the suggestion that the material is any different than what it is, which is the effort for meaning of the meaning of the True Object that is real.

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The effort of the contemporary ‘realist turn’, of the most recently notable ‘Speculative Realism’ (if ever there was) is based in a foreclosing of previous historical discursive misappropriation to a present asserted truth. We have already begun to address this redundancy earlier. But to reiterate, the motion that concerns us is how this is done; it is very simple: It ignores the presence of the human being on the scene for the sake of a manifestation of discourse; that is, it assumes a common humanity as a categorical imperative. But for its sake it does not take mere discourse, but rather adiscourse that is presumed to have a static or universal ability to reflect the same thing; its method as the only imperative and the only method argues itself as a truism, a distinction within itself that is moot. This discourse that is presumed as all powerful, omniscient and ubiquitous in its potential, is a particular scheme of meaning that contains and pronounces upon all real things, and by this presumption ‘realism’ is permitted to have credence for what reality is through a potential transformation, a conversion of terms; i.e. If all there is is reality, then reality is constituted by real things, objects, but in fact, True Objects. Idealism, on the other hand, proposes that there is a (encompassing or bigger) reality over (regular) reality for which reality needs be reconciled, as if reality needs to dispel an illusion it has formatted of itself. Hence we can begin to see how realism and idealism merely dance around the point of contention regardless of their arguments. The partitions that are erected are called a ‘turn’ because some phrases of discourse will be left going ‘straight’ in meaning with the ‘previous reality’, but also because the human being on the scene is ignored and already accounted for by its (the propositional arenas located by the ‘turns’) discourse, and the difference that is proposed to be reconciled is reinstated in the course of the encompassing real-true method. To be fair; realism may address what is ‘really real’, but it gets nowhere further than that. Hence, this really real discourse is based in the offense of identity that cannot achieve its transcendental clause, the ‘grand’ transformation that is the posed culmination inherent of real discourse; realism thereby puts the fault not upon their human effort, not upon willingness itself, but upon the discourse, ‘The’ discourse, such that one merely needs to find the fault of the past to argue and thus produce the ‘now more real’ reality. Hence the conventional discourse achieves its Object, real transformation, through denial.

There are repercussions of this type of move that will have to serve as a topic for a latter essay.

We propose a partition that is indeed a boundary, and this is the hard correlational limit. The boundary is marked by the Significant Event and is viable by the pocket veto, whereby this mark reveals the opacity evidenced in various real discourses. The pocket veto is a signal of faith that identity is being challenged, so the iteration of this Event, the discourse that follows from it, can be registered as to the opacity that manifests due to the limit that such faith has inscribed as real or in reality; the discourse can be viewed upon its opacity as to what we might call its ‘saturation’ of meaning. A saturated discourse can be open, such as seen with Francois Laruelle and non-philosophy, or maybe even Levi Bryant and his ‘machine-object’ (but I tend to think Bryant is a ‘nonphilosopher’- qualified but thus ‘non-qualified’), where distinct principles are defined so as to relieve its dictates from such principality, or it can be closed, such as occurs with religious dogma. Other various discourses are opaque by their evidencing various internal vectors of meaning that are open, for example discussion that follows along in ‘proper’ understanding of the discourse, and others that are closed discussion that is moot due to objections that show misunderstanding. Nevertheless, opacity can be a measure or an indicator that something is being withheld as well as what is being withheld due to the offense of the Significant Event upon faith. In all cases, what is being withheld is the transcendent factor involved with the assertion for real solution.

End part 10a.