Anslem’s Argument for the Proof of the Existence of God, the Disruption of Time, and the Categorization of Philosophical Behavior.

I seem to have found a significance for Anslem’s proof. It may be that it is not significance for whether God might exist, but, as I have said, significance for how I present ideas.

We will start with the rendition from Princeton’s site. I think they have a pretty good rendition there.

Without all the strict logical hoopla, I think the simple way to put Anslem’s idea is that God exists because we can think of It.

The significance of this notion appears to disrupt what we generally consider of time, it’s ‘natural and directional’ progress.

The Princeton site says that Anslem was addressing a particular issue that, actually, we still find totday in atheism. Basically, Anslem is confronting two ideas:

1.He understands the claim that God exists.
2.He does not believe that God exists.

Now, I have done only the most preliminary research into Anslem and his ideas. I am just taking the very popular simple version, and considering these two situations. There is no ‘hidden’; whatever Anslem’s results most probably are quite apparent, and the ones that are not – well, what point am I trying to make here? I have already said in my earlier post that there is no logical argument that sways me in any direction or causes me to believe something I didn’t before. So any extension of argument must be involving something else; perhaps I am attempting to get at what this something could be.

I think the main point Anslem makes is that, as Princeton puts it, this is an inherently unstable condition of being. What we might call the ‘founding essence’ can be understood to be responsible for this instability. Somewhat similar to a ‘thing-in-itself’, this founding essence would be a kind of gravity well, if you will, of mental activity. The instability arises because of the knowledge (the known-ness) of what something is able to be. The question arises: How can I know what something is if it doesn’t exist? The basic assumption in this question, what philosophers tend to lump into the category called ontology, is that existence is, that there is no need to discern what existence is because to argue for or against the being of existence does nothing to displace the argument except as much as it merely denies existence. The point of saying something exists thus should equate with what can be known, and so the instability of the situation is found in the human ability to choose on whether what exists is actually true. In this case, though, Anslem is dealing with the basis of all that exists as a category, namely, God; God, in this sense, as we cannot but apply our modern sense to consideration of it, is merely the name of the category that contains all that can exist as an active element, the element by which all else can be said to be. The extension in time to Heidegger’s ‘Being and Time’ can be understood as a factual description of this situation, and thus, rather than an opening up unto Being, ironically as a closing of Being unto itself and thus a factual description of what human beings do: The identification of the in-itself of human Being. More on that elsewhere.

The resolution that Anslem posits of this unstable situation occurs because of the foundational nature of the knowledge itself. In this Medieval Christian context (which I argue is still a modern context), the resolution (the clarity, the definition) that must be referred to must be understood in a context not so much of mind, but of the essential God-inundated mind that is able to uphold and entertain knowledge, which for our context might be the mind that exists. In short, the condition of knowledge is/was such that all things referred or otherwise are established in existence due to an absolute situation, a situation whereby all things gain their status in the universe, what we usually index by the idea of an absolute ethics, in a manner of speaking. In this condition it thus appears that a reflective mind will naturally be drawn into the the contradiction involved in making a choice as to the (true or false) existence of something that (already) exists (in essence), and will therefore correct (or become the correction) the instability by virtue of their own existence (in the absolute universe, or the universe that is indexed by absolution). The question of whether something actually, or physically, biologically exists, such as a race of human beings that live in the midieval antipodes, e2c1fd0e8fc468d9d55d018231578e47

unicorns, dragons, spirits, extraterrestrial aliens, etcetera, has no baring upon existence because of the absolute reference and access of mind to God (existence). What can be incorrect of knowledge as to what is true of existence finds its resolution in the posited (assumed) basis of existence. 

The Medieval as well as Modern mind is consistent in this ideal of progressive understanding of the universe. What is significant of this orientation upon progress is the mind’s innate access to what is true of the universe with reference to an assumed basis of that truth, what we can say is an assumption of stability unto which all knowledge will inevitably resolve; despite whether we posit that there is no actual resolution or that everything is flux, or whatever conditional conditions we define, the result of any positing is always toward ends, toward a resolution. Even if we say that the universe and the knowledge of that universe is completely and utterly contingent, this contingency must be absolute; hence we say that the effect of such terms within any scheme of knowledge or organization of definitions is what we can call a “founding term”. 

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Oddly enough, we are able to find purchase into understanding what human beings do by looking at what philosophy does. Not, as Graham Harman might have it, that everything we might do automatically falls into a subjective appropriation of semantics that defies our attempt to locate such philosophical behavior. Rather, at some point we should be able to locate a mark by which we are able to be dismissed from this correlational philosophy that wants to avoid any critical gaze upon its method.

Once we find this mark (which I do not go into here), we can extend this situation (of existence and deferment) to apply to everything that might exist: Within this situation, a person can understand and then decide upon it. There is no thing that escapes this formula, and Anslem is making an accusation about it: It is unstable, and it will eventually resolve itself to the conclusion that the thing in question exists, in his Medieval case, God, and in our Modern case, perhaps, the object of empirical physics.

The point he relies upon is the idea that God is the greatest being or thing that can exist, for, so long as we can conceive of something greater, then that is not God. Similarly, we can use this conversely and say that because we can conceive of ‘that which nothing is greater’, this greatest thing exists as a foundational ontological ground of Modern effort as well: The ‘greatest’ thing is the most substantial. 

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What interests me is that this simple notice occurred late in the 11th century. Here, already, is a situation made notice that no one noticed until very recently, like 10-20 years ago with the philosophers such as Alain Badou, Francois Laruelle, an then for the younger folks (of the time), of the Speculative Realist Conference. In particular, the idea is that there may be something that exists outside of our knowledge (not necessarily our ability to know), and as for in this situation, that which is greater than the greatest thing we can know. This category has brought modern philosophy (again) to consider things like voidnothingnesschaos and such things, and the corresponding ideal that whatever works to create identity is all good. But if we are honest, we might be able to glimpse the same ruminations of Scholasticism (St. Anslem is said to be one of the founders of the Medieval Scholasticism), occurring in our Modern philosophies, but under different terms. Indeed; I argue (along with Jean-Francois Lyotard apparently) elsewhere that Postmodern scholarship is really a religious apology for Modernity.

In this post I confront the veracity of some of our current philosophical modes and arguments by asking what seems to me to be a most obvious and significant question, a similar question that Graham Harman asks of Heidegger’s “tools“: Why did no-one  notice what Anslem had opened up until now, some 1000 years later? We are able to understand Anslem’s argument to this day; no one proposes that the thinkers 1000 years ago were any less astute than our thinkers today. Why is it only now that we are addressing the possibility of what might be ‘beyond’ or ‘at root but not part of’ (Badou’s consideration of set theory) knowledge? And then we might even ask more confounding question if we find that philosophers during the interim of the thousand years also considered the same question over and over. 

I submit for consideration that we have gotten not very far in philosophy. We might begin to understand the vastness of time and how slowly and incrementally human beings, as a group, accomplish knowledge, and how it is much more like a science than philosophers are capable of arguing. Indeed, if we think into this situation, we can then find often the situation that we have already come across elsewhere; namely, that on one hand philosophy is the way we situate the conditions of our times, how we work out logistical problems of being in a semantic world, and on the other, merely reflections of people (the authors) in-themselves. But if this is all philosophy does and is doing, then we also might see that we are actually merely re-contextualizing not what what has already been contextualized (as thus a re-contextualization), but in actually what we’ve already done, making the same arguments over and over but under different terms. We are reminded of Shakespeare’s “a rose by any other word…“.

Upon this conclusion, we are careful to not move too fast as we might then jump to the conclusion that such an idea should negate the ontological status of what I am calling conventional philosophy, as though such a proposal should then move beyond what we have and what we get through philosophical method. This is not the case. It seems near ridiculousness to figure that we can commandeer reality by a stroke of the pen (or a keystroke) except that we might be involved in such philosophical endorsement; we should then ask how is it that am I to get beyond it merely saying something in a particular manner? No. We cannot ‘turn’ the truth of the matter; we have but to see the power that is invested in the leviathan of religious interests, of maintaining a particular formation and method to know that, as the philosophers have argued, I cannot escape it unless I wish to perform some magic, perhaps some discursive slight of hand. We should ask if we can be done with all this trickery of the ontological police. Then, all we have to do is speak of facts instead of the essential Being of things, to speak teleologically instead of ontologically. We can argue the conditional nature of real essence for the rest of eternity and never get anywhere further than circling back and forth away from and back into Medieval type scholarship. And thats fine, and thats the point: This is the factual nature of reality, the impossible aspect of what we have to deal with in reality. Of course there will be those who will argue that what the philosophers are doing now days is not Scholasticism and who will produce all sorts of argumentative and ultimately circumstantial evidence to support their claim. Great! Perfect! Does this sway me to believe something that I don’t already know?  The proper response, in this case then, is that this is not a proposal toward any popular or social change, and in fact it has little to do with how political ideology might be at any moment; we can of course use it for such purposes (identifying our moment from the past conditional moments of history, for example, etcetera…), thats what Badiou and Zizek tell us…

We are not so much learning anything new as much as we are justifying our limited manner of Being in the world, and this is an end in itself that should be heeded but not as a call for change, as though we can somehow transcend what we are — we can only transcend was we identify with as political and ideological subjects. Rather, we should see this situation as a mark of what is true of being human, as a mark of significance, which is to say, a mark of fact. So another of my indictments of philosophy: Despite all the great discursive gymnastics and the twistings of subtle argumentative semantic juxtapositions, philosophy works to avoid having to look at itself as a human behavior. Conventional philosophy refuses to allow itself to be seen as an indicator of behavior, perpetually argues itself as an exceptional incarnation of divine intuition and inspiration, a blank spot of Being, and then uses this fact as a means to absorb all activity under its purview back into the real political and ideological limit — to say that this is all there is. I see the constant and basically automatic referral of all things ‘thought’ back into this kind of philosophical pond is self defeating to the effort of progress, even as progress itself is routed back into this (touted) ‘speculative’, or ‘realist’, or  ‘post-post-modern’ maxim. It is no wonder outside of capitalism is so difficult to think!

As Amoreinblog has argued somewhere, perhaps anthropology is the way out of this philosophical conundrum; despite all the philosophical misappropriations of ideas involved with the AIME (An Investigation into Modes of Existence) project of Bruno Latour (even by Latour himself, lol), his book can be read as an argument for the need to open up a space (perhaps, in his terms, create a pass) whereby we can avoid this modern philosophical whirlpool that we have been involved with for at least 1000 years. It seems that only now, with Postmodernism, but as of late Post-postmodnerism (must we find a Post-Post-Postmodernism also?) do we really get an idea, but also an actual way to understand and realize what human beings are doing.

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Time itself may be the issue that is involved with Modernity invading as it usurps all discourse into its machinery. The issue that opens up after Postmodernism (but is not itself Postmodern scholarship) is the break from Enlightenment Ontology. So it may not be so much that we have to philosophically get out of this temporal mode — that kind of move would be philosophy attempting to avoid itself through arguing itself out of itself, redundantly, establishing as it maintains reality for everyone. It may be as simple as admitting that there is no escaping the philosophical limit, and realizing a kind of anti-Husserlian manner: Of finding the independent object in the bare fact that we know that there is an independent object, and perhaps that we need not speculate about how it can be so in order for it to be so. Of course we can discuss how it can be so…and indeed we will, but that does not mean that we cannot stay where we are at and let the pagan-Christian rollercoaster come around again and again.

Maybe we need to make a clean break.

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The Modern of Post Modernism; The Anthropocene, Object Orientation and the Possibility of Ground.

 

I feel it is time to clear the air; the smoke of post-modernism still seems to linger. It is time we come to terms with what Post-Modernism means, what it meant, what it is.

There is no debate in this; any debate that would uphold a sort of PM catch-all has missed the issue. I think it is this apparent problem for which I address by suggesting a divergence is warranted.

Post modernism is a manner of dealing with reality where metanarratives fail. PM Is a response to the failure. But in that it is merely a response, it must itself be based in a metanarrative, albeit and however unsure and undisclosed as it may be. But we need no longer hesitate in this mire of indecision and doubt. Where the post-modern is indeed necessary, it often fails in that it wants to repeat itself, to reify itself, to eternalize itself; ironically, this is a Modern trait that Post-Modernism attempted to confront.

So it is we may see many authors attempting to place this indistinction, this temporal hesitation. This is where Bruno Latour attempts to make an opening: So the PM metanarrative, itself a kind of ‘unconsolidation’, might find the meaning of the void (but only void by virture of the Modern metanarrative, or the metanarrative that is modern) where by PM finds its ability to call into question metanarratives by allowing what has been silent to speak.

The task now is to find that narrative that accounts for the, now twice avoided, silence; which is to say, we need admit that we all have been colonized despite PM, that PM is was an ironic vehicle to establish and reify Modernity.

Perhaps an apparent geology, what mane are calling the ‘anthropocene’, will snap us out of the magical glamour of PM ironic transcendency, and stop fantasizing that ‘I’ have some sort of communion with ‘un-god’, some ‘extra universal’ situation. So we can get back to some sort of ground.

I have read and am somewhat familiar with 4 of the (in)famous PM authors; Michel Foucault, Jean Francios Leotard, Gilles Deleuze, and Jacques Derrida. Of Baudrillard Ive only read tiny bits here and there. Virillo ive not heard of. Of course, there are other PM authors that are not so famous that I have read, and even some that are not considered ‘post-modernist’ but yet are speaking of similar issues.

While i do like and understand these PM authors i have read, i also see that Lyotard was probaly the best at seeing through history. Foucault, oddly enough, was caught in a ‘vertical’ dynamic even as he posed a ‘horizon’, and Deluze was still too high, too near to the event to be able to see past self centrism. And also that at least Lyotard and Deleuze are mis-appropriated as they are mis-applied; this last is the issue Alain Badiou and Laruelle address, as well as Bruno Latour.

It is or should be a fact, by now, that the nature of humans is to have real worlds, or a Real world, as the case may be. The issue of all if not most of many of the Big Names, as well as many smaller names, of the past 200 year of philosophy, but maybe even longer, is the difference involved in what might be called ‘truth baring’, and ‘reality baring’ operations. Every great philosopher addresses this issue, but the issue of this issue is how the telling of the ‘first’ issue often finds itself awash in the second issue, the effect that Badou describes and addresses. Yet these authorial addressings, these worlds, are, in effect, metanarratives.

There is a disentanglement of philosophy that must occur if we are to even get anywhere, if we are to stop having ‘turns’ and ‘eras’ and such. But if we must swim in this pit of eternal denial, then we can say that in a certain sense the Post-modern wanted to propose some sort of new reality, but alas we find that PM was no different than the realities anywhere else or any time, and that this is the fault of the second appropriated issue. The difference lay only in the terms that are used. Derrida said good things about discursive limitation, what for other terms is indeed the Modern/Post-modern paradox, but he too was caught in a vertical situation likewise that inevitably puts him in a modern sorting, which is to say, of a metanarrative. As a witness to this paradox, Lyotard, I’d say, was closest: The ‘post’ thus was is not meant to be some temporal suggestion; more, it was is a description of a situation and its logical defaults based within the ‘modern’ discursive scheme. Yet, that people took and continue to take it as some sort of historical era or attitude, thus shows that mis-appropriation as mis-appropriation (denial as showing what is true) is of the issue of the second type.

I say PM is more about orientation upon objects than it is about some attitude or argumentative position. What I see of PM, and Lyotard specifically, is he was come upon by his experience, his metanarrative, of himself, and found, through an engagement with history, through what is already established for by to bring what is true and real unto a person, with the discourse of reality itself, that his metanarrative could not be justified by this real discourse; upon reflection he finds that what constitutes himself is different than what the metanarrative says of himself and what he should be. This his issue presented in his book “The Differend”. So, ironically, because of this situation, he saw that indeed the discourse by which he came (comes) to know himself is incommunicable, because he must use the discourse that is already there, and by this usage avoids that which he is trying to communicate. This juxtaposition of Being, thus allowed (s) him to bring a critique against the discourse that is not ‘hearing his case’, and thus calls this critique ‘post’ modern, because the real discourse is, or is seen as, ‘modern’ and the metanarrative that is incommensurate with this modern is thus post, or after, posterior. He thus finds this ‘modern’ reality involved with meta narratives (as he was involved) that are ineffective yet being used in a behavior as if they are effective, which is to say, communicating, and moves to expose this ‘human’ facet by (ironically) critiquing it; that is, not only critiquing the metanarrative by which he comes unto the world, but the idea of metanarrative itself. He there by opens the door to the removal of the subject, and the entrance on the scene of the Object, or what has been developed ‘post-post-modern’, SR and OOO and such.

The problem, though, is always the setting aside, forgetting, and then plain mis-appropriation of the ironic paradox. It is not so much that one needs to write with some subversive or double meaning, but that the irony of the situation by which one comes unto reality must remain intact. As even Nick Land seems to notice; one must come upon a certain type of knowledge that orients one upon what reality is, what the case of reality is, such that a critique of reality stems ultimately from an honest confrontation with that route by which one is coming upon that very reality. And this is to say, one confronts ‘the world’ by attacking the basis by which he or she has the world; to segregate the issue into some objective world and some subject-agent-operator is of the second type of issue.

This is the issue at hand, as well as the feature that distinguishes the reason why we need to ‘clean up’ philosophical discussion, as well why I advocate a kind of divergence.

 

Awareness: part 2

Some one posted a comment to this post of mine, to which I replied, but then I made it into a new posting.

You can check the comments of the original post  here: 

“We will find, inevitably, as a kind, that the only things that change are the objects of our view, and not any ‘essential mode’ of being human. Humans do not change; only its world changes. There is no’grasp’ that links these forms, but that of a present faith, a present sort of ideological religion.”

https://lancek4.wordpress.com/2016/01/12/awareness/

…and here’s my new post: 
Yes. That is one type of essential reduction . Thank you . The furthering question is what is happening that this is not apparent; that is, as it often has to be taught. And more: That it sometimes doesn’t have to be taught. 
The reason why I say ‘one type’ is because there is only a certain type of reasoning that would say that an experience has any essentially true relation to words, which is to say, terms. Where there is an essential linkage, there we find an essential agency, a sort of ‘central and foundational’ effect. But in truth, any word (term) can be found to uphold the same tenants of being. I can say ‘consciousness’, but any term could be used and find the same types of meaningful organization, a same typeof scheme. The example is the Copernican universe. It is not that the sun’really’ exists at the center of the solar system; this is just a mathematical convention that makes easy sense. In fact we could construct models that place any point-object in the universe at the center. Hence, this means that there are only objects. 
The problem with saying ‘consciousness’ and or ‘awareness’ is that one usually tends to associate these discursive foundations as meaning actually foundational and essential things. Hence they are directed toward more a ‘use’ and ‘practicality’ than what should be otherwise an actual truth. For people who need or want a way to mitigate the mental and emotional issues such as anger, fear, and general life difficulty. It is proper then that we can say they are Real,because reality has to do with essential practical linkages of meaning. 
But a more deeper sense finds that there was s no ‘foundational’ or central ‘thing’ that is ‘me’ or ‘my consciousness’ behaving in any way unto itself, that is, as a sort of ‘spiritual being’ that is sufficiently segregate from some world to be able to ‘have’ an effect upon or within some world.

The fact is s that in the consistency that is an unsegregated being, there is still the apparent world there, no matter how I might come to terms with it, no matter what experiences I have about some truth. Ina certain sense, this is what Samraj is saying about consiouness, but if we don’t stop there, we might find that it is not really consciousness at all. 
This then brckons an investigation beyond the mere phenomenon. Because now, all that is left, is being here now, and the doing of it. 
There is a return that occurs though. Once we get beyond that fantastic experience of some intervening deity, move past the awakening of the divine center, we are left with an experience that is somehow more than the experience, what can be said to ‘exceed’ what could considered human experience. 
But we must be careful here: What most often and typically occurs with this move of excess is an impossibility of meaningful reconciliation. Rather; usually all one is left with is a back pedaling to either (now) Real Things, aka empirical science , ‘speculative’ imagining, or a kind of spiritual fundamentalism. But both of these as part of the same move, or the move of the same, mere reenact the repetition of the terms of theoretical discourse, and will end again at the same points.
Hence, what is actually excessive is a kind of historicity where two routes of the knowing human being are exposed, two routes that do not reconcile in reality for a ‘more real’ or ‘more true’ truth.  

Comment on the comment of Tom Sparrow’s “The End of Phenomenology”. 

The New Realism is just that: A manner of justification for a new reality.  No big deal; its cool. I just wonder how critical they go. What is their purpose.  Well, an intro to Toms book goes like this:

           “In the 20th century, phenomenology promised a method that would get philosophy ‘back to the things themselves’. But phenomenology has always been haunted by the spectre of an anthropocentric antirealism.

Tom Sparrow shows how, in the 21st century, speculative realism aims to do what phenomenology could not: provide a philosophical method that disengages the human-centred approach to metaphysics in order to chronicle the complex realm of nonhuman reality.

Through a focused reading of the methodological statements and metaphysical commitments of key phenomenologists and speculative realists, Sparrow shows how speculative realism is replacing phenomenology as the beacon of realism in contemporary Continental philosophy.”

(From Edinborough University Press epub site) 

I cant help but wonder: if i was in advertizing, would i not say advertizing things? I mean, is the advertizer saying things about humans? More to my point, why do advertizers only say things about advertizing? I think most would say that the Ad-er say things about humans through looking at the fact of their Ad-er ness. 

So, what is the intro to this book saying? And in as much as it is being tallied as a Speculative Realist book, what is going on here? 

 “In the 20th century, phenomenology promised a method that would get philosophy ‘back to the things themselves’. But phenomenology has always been haunted by the spectre of an anthropocentric antirealism.”

Perhaps I am not well read, but the fact that such a statement has been made shows a particular orientation upon reality. This orientation sees itself as the last word in things because it falls within as it takes from the established manner of coming to truth: power in numbers and the generation of numbers through indoctrination; which is to say, conditioning through reward, the reward of towing the party line. Now, this is not to say it is a wrong route, merely that this is what the route, as a necessary mode, does: It argues against that for which which it cannot account. But more: Because most people cannot understand what is not already given them in advance, together they create a common state that justifies that inability; i.e. They form a ‘gang’ (lol), or, they form a group to enforce against what is offensive to the group. 

In this case, the blatant calm by which this statement is made exhibits the obviousness that is taken for granted; the group has such reach, a member of the group can say almost anything they want without fear of rebuttal because, again, in this case, all route for rebuttal is assumed as it is enforced.

“…phenomenology promised a method that would get philosophy back to the things in themselves. ” 

This statement shows that the author of it does not expect that the thing in itself is what is being proposed by the Speculative Realists. It suggests by its saying that somehow the SRs are saying something that moves beyond “the 20th century phenominalism”. In other words, the commentator (at least) is involved with seeing that terms have an ability to convey things that are actually true, but somehow never get to the thing in itself, and so the SRs are supposed to have given up on such phenominalist reckoning. 

Pause.

Does anyone else see the problem here? 

It is so annoyingly frustrating to have to wonder how SR could have ever gotten off the ground considering that the SRs are supposed to be so informed about philosophical ideas.  It seems blatantly obvious to me that these SRs are being deceptive in thier proposals. 

“… speculative realism aims to do what phenomenology could not: provide a philosophical method that disengages the human-centred approach to metaphysics in order to chronicle the complex realm of nonhuman reality.”

How is this possible? How is it possible to be human and not use a method that is human centered?

Does anyone else see the problem??? 

One of the problems is the SR occupy a space so privileged that they cannot and will not entertain critiques. 

The philosophical problem is that the reason why these SRs can be so confident in their speculations is because not only do they rely upon a critical post-modern maxim, that discourse determines as it reflects reality, but that this maxim is enforced. 

I don’t know about you, but there is nothing about discourse that I can see that anywhere determines what is real, except that there are these “philosophers” that say it’s does, and or use discourse in a manner that proposes to be determining reality differently that some proposed ‘before’. It is a hoax, a con perpetrated upon the world through a particular methodological assertion of power, for the purpose of allowing them thier position of power. 

The mode of these SRs is that they argue as they accept that the power is ubiquitous and thus no longer interesting to talk about. So great, as I said: The discourse that views the Ibjects from a one sided and obvious real orientation is necessary, yet also inherently avoids its counterpart because it is assumed to have been already addressed. But thier mistake is that phenominalism is taken to be that counterpart — but it is only the counterpart to what is Real because such Phenominalism likewise proposed upon what is Real, as what is real exists within a particular ideological horizon that is enforced against offense. In as much as the Realists make notice, they form a precipitate Invisible to their view. 

This is all to say that somehow there is a traditional interpretation of what philosophers were saying, that this interpretation is taught as toward and from a position of free thought. This confinment of teaching thus also produces a certain type of thought, a certain type of conclusion. Hence we can see that this statement (above) can make a proposal of method because itself is based in a particular methodological arena wherein types of method may be discerned. 

Yet, such as it is, this move of SR merely affirms that a divergent mode of philosophy has become necessary, and this is to say that contrary to the mode that says that discourse is intricately involved with the reality, the SR Reality is indeed also necessary, but in a manner that leaves at least some of their proposals, their route, exposed. 

Much of these Realist proposals are merely a philosophical fad likeclothes and music; this Realism is a career posing, a thinking for thoughts sake, art for the sake of the artist. Yet that there is clothes and music never changes; what people wear may say something of the time, it thus says something of reality, but then true to the above statement’s assertion of phenomenology, it also resists an “anti realism”. Yet it is the limit of traditional interpretation of phenomenology that indeed produced phenomenology, of Hursserl most probably, but the antirealism that has arisen by which our current Realism arises is an anti realism in the context of the phenominalist reduction — which posits itself by an anthropocentrism, I.e. By the limit that is the human centric universe. It is this interpretation that yields the Speculative Real route, but the route that is concerned only with what is real because what is real had been determined by the route to be the only sensible thing to be considered. 

These folks do not consider that it is the spot that is missed, that which is not real that allows for the platform by which an investigation into the object can even be considered viable. It is the nature of what is not real that allows for reality to be situated upon the object in itself unto itself, such that objects can be said to have reality unto themselves. 

It is through the phenomenon that what is real may be determined along a particular vector, but due to this, what is real is not the only vector.

Post-modernism’s Worth. 

When we are too close to an event, we talk about it as from a distance. That is, what we say is automatically distanced from the event, a maximum distance. The event is thus, by this occurrence, an object. As opposed to our psychotherapeutic model, the closer we are to an event, the more dishonest we are about its true bearings, that is, the truth of the matter, why it is that the (the wholeness of the) event has occurred the way it has. The impetus and the reaction can be come upon as an included item, a truth in-itself, only when we are distanced from the event. The truth of an object, as opposed to the True Object, can only be viewed in its truth from a distance. The equation is thus of inversion, of ratio.

Here then we may have a basis upon which to properly view foundational post-modern writers, namely, Derrida, Deleuze and Guittari, but others also.  To wit: Their descriptions were from a basis too close to the event, such that they attempted to quickly and finally establish a ground for the event; the event being thus so profound and significant, they were compelled to offer a reason.

They were not wrong, only rash. 

It is analogous to an explosion. We have now the data from the explosion, having encountered it ourselves, but also come across the initial first hand rationalization and fact crunching reports of the explosion itself – with that, subsequent explosions, and now the reports and experience of the aftermath(s) of explosions, we can now safely report upon the truth of the whole event. 

Repost: A little bit on Object Ontology.

Nonsense! Ridiculousness! The usual suspects rage.
So now we need to try and reel it in. If the fish has been snagged by the line, then we need to start to bring it back away from the fish of mere ideas, back from objectival discourse that sees authors and their ideas as True Things to be apprehended in their in-itself-ness, where the fish was swimming around looking for food and found it on the end of a hook and decided (whether it be of ‘natural’ instinct or not) to bite — we need to bring back the fish that has been snagged by the line.
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See that this is not a rebuttal of Object Oriented Ontology; rather the distinction that finds OOO accordant with the divergent move is an occasion to speak about the Significant Event. To say that our issue concerns one’s orientation upon the object, and to further delineate that reality concerns a faith in the True Object, is actually the converse of Harman’s Object Oriented Ontology, and not its ‘opposite’ that would be then the ‘subject orientation’ necessarily.
To explain: Our thesis involving the pocket veto has implicated the Speculative Realists as dealing with reality in reality. If we have not been explicit, theirs (but Graham Harman in particular) is concerned with closing the ‘gap’ that appears to separate the subject and object in an extended discursive analysis based in traditional Western Philosophy, the gap that appears poignantly with Kant; Harman speaks about “how two objects touch”. Yet we should see that the primary concern that appears shaded if not explicitly avoided there is how to bring the subject individual human being into direct relation (contact) with the object. Harman moves for a leveling of the playing field by categorizing all real things, including the human being, as objects. The notice enacted here is that there was a previous discursive situation that presented a conceptual structure for reality that allowed for the gap. Thus SR divergence in this first sense, a real divergence.
What we should then see is that it is the subject-centered ‘reason’, ala Quentin Miellassoux, by which we may come to an idea of how one in reality is oriented upon objects, because it is by such subjective centrality that objects may be presented as such. The issue is put forth in the essays of Constructive Undoing as having to do with subjects, human beings, that are oriented upon True Objects. This is to mean that the individual of reality sees and references itself by and through Objects, and because such Objects cannot be known in-themselves, i.e. known as True in the sense of giving to us information about them that has nothing to do with our (subjective) perceiving or comprehending them, neutral data, so to speak, their Truth, the Truth about objects that we take and behave with as if they indeed are absolutely True is an act of faith. Such it is that reality in itself is a manifestation of faith. Hence, a divergence in a second sense that distinguishes what is True from what is real, that is, what is ironic from the faith in the True Object.
As shown in part 7 of this essay, the significance which links these two senses of divergence is the show of power. Specifically, it is the basic real assumption of post, but at least, post-post modernist assertion, that discourse determines reality. We have outlined how Miellasoux frames this in his ‘Correlationalism’, the weak and the strong forms. What is divisive (if we can follow the same type of categorizing for divergence) in the weak sense, is that such reality, if we may use this in the strong as well as weak correlational sense, already assumes that discourse does indeed reside as the omnipotent power for reality, so much though, that it is assumed and proposed given to include even our ‘innermost’ person, the makings and structures of our thoughts, such that there is no human being that is not determined in its manifestation as well as its moves (read: choices, options for movement) by discourse, that indeed discourse had and has determined what reality is. It is by this correlation that we have discussed the ‘individual of reality’ that is the individual of faith in the the True Object, and have thereby offered the strong divergence that succeeds from what we have called the ‘hard’ correlational limit.
It is by this designation that we argue the SRs are dealing with reality in reality; they are subject to the hard correlational limit, and thereby diverge from the previous determination of reality, the ‘subject orientation’ to the proposed new determination, ‘object orientation’. Due to the hard correlationalist model, because they were are already invested in reality, where the weak and strong correlationalism functions, they were already dealing in their being oriented upon the True Object. Hence the irony involved with Harman, at least, noticing this limit and finding his vector back in the limit to find and discuss what this True Object is, how it manifests in reality as reality. He is discussing the ‘subject as object’ and the real ramifications of this move. So it is also that what he is finding and what he is saying evidences the significance of divergence; both its weak and strong moves evidence the pocket veto.
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We have come to an odd point that is in fact so odd that the fast reader might even miss it; I say ‘fast’ and immediately indicate the point of contention. Either this odd point is not so odd but is noticed as capable of being odd, or it is rejected. What is really odd though is if it has been rejected, we can account for it: the rejection is based in the assumption of (a prior posterior maxim, an experience of which is given prior to the experience) the real common humanity of individuals of whom the reader is part and in which the reader is invested through his her identity. The rejection is so commonplace of reality that the fast reader misses it, and often misses that a rejection has even been called for, and this is because the rejection is based in the maxim that all individual human beings have available the resource of intuition; so to say, as the previous segment Part 7, that Miellassoux has come by his argument by intuition is to say nothing more than he is a human being. Yes; this is true. But the point here, as we discuss the point of contention, is to say that which everyone assumes as true, out loud, to their face. It is to point to what it is we say is real and to elicit a reaction where what is revolutionary has been missed. The point is to expose that upon which the assertion of a unitary discourse of the real gains its stature, and thus be able to begin to speak that which historically remains silent; to indicate that what is missed cannot be ‘re-placed’ as another discourse of method that says it is now ‘practice’; to indicate not merely that while what is missed is indeed missed by its objectival understanding — even as what is ‘radical’ poses as this space, or the revolution that is proposed by this space, this ‘missing’, this ‘indivisible remainder’ (Zizek) — and is indeed the ideology functioning as ideology, is the discourse ‘working’ (Heidegger, the Work of Art) as it is supposed to as the condition of reality as knowledge, but more significantly, that such ‘indivisible space’ is in the ‘pocket’ of real discourse, in one case as potential but in the other rather as completely missed; and this is to say, again, the rejection is the evidence of consciousness functioning to supply reality, of distancing the individual from its object through identity, consciousness ‘denying’ that the True Object is not just true-real.
While the conventional (real) discourse may evidence its own saturation of meaning in terminology and thereby be able to slice and mash, dissect and describe, deconstruct and recombine term-object singular identities so to bring about a sufficiently dense description of the picture of reality and to thereby gain purchase upon a new solution to the old, this method of process never gains its object beyond the mere Kantian intuition of true meaning gained by the terms that are poised in faith to avoid their own objectivity; at best, such a method succeeds in describing the ‘reality of the moment’. What this means is that the same discourse of reality that discounts any real ‘god’ through its argumentation is allowing for its ability to grant or convey truth by relying upon a transcendent yet unspeakable power that is denied in the asserted and apparent power of discourse to convey its truth (God does not exist/ there is no God and the atheist position in general). It thus becomes obvious why there have been arguments made as to a particular definition of ‘existence’ that excludes some ‘actuality’ of God, to justify why we can thus say ‘God does not exist’ and be truthful in as much as there is a ‘truth in God’. The ‘speculative’ only gains its (Aquinas) stature as such by virtue of the ‘practical’; by virtue of the speculative itself, it is not speculative, but rather indicates what is not practical except that it has to be distinguished because what is practical is ubiquitous to (common) sense, or for another word, reality. Hence, we can begin to speak again of — not merely duality, but more so, dual bases of power that do not combine but instead evidence the limitation of a discourse that proposes itself in the human act as the One omnipotent and ubiquitous truth.
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One world is necessary. The problem is what this world is, but if we have more than one world then what is the ‘whole’? Many are already discounting such a question; so let Reality be said to account for the one world; for all the problems that arise whether mental, social, psychic, material, physical, etcetera, all the scenes and issues are dealt with through a reductive method that finds a solution for the question of what we are to do, so that every solution is a momentary manifestation that defines for humans their place of activity — this ‘one place’ where a reduction of meaningful categories amounts, is reality, and the argument that would attempt to displace or discount this proposal, a real argument. This necessary situation of humanity is thus contingency, every situation is contingent upon another situation. This place is ultimately a place that settles for consciousness its own operation in its operating. There is no manner of thinking upon things that can remove the fact of thinking about them (as far as we can think we know of thinking), so let us grant that to offer any notion whether subjective or objective or any of the proposed philosophical turns and solutions is always a notion of consciousness in the attempt to place itself in the real world; it is the same with thought. The only way to avoid this feature of consciousness is to deny this feature, and this is also a feature of consciousness; what is reductive, as to method, is based in denial, and the place where reduction occurs to find solution as to what to do is called reality. That method which relies upon such a denial of operation for the sake of the reliance is what we call conventional, since it is the appearance of the world that takes what is presented as the common arena of human effort for the sake of the One thing to be addressed and solved. Every proposal of how such reality is manifested is a discursive strategy for approach based upon meaning and significance. Hence, to argue that the world is constituted through objects, and only objects, is a particular solution for how consciousness has been placed and is being placed in the world for the moment. This argument then is ironic, for it begs its own question of how it is able to come to such a conclusion for all argument, which is to say, for all reality; it is the expression of contradiction as meaning, as opposed to contradiction indicating limit.
It is this feature of human process that now arrives in a necessary divergence. For within such a framing, which is a real historical discursive framing whereby various proposals have been offered and challenged through the method of determining truth by the criterion of contradiction, the world as we know it or have argued has brought us to the place where our ability to offer solution is seen to be merely a vanity, merely consciousness doing its universal operation — and this is denied. What has occurred here then is consciousness through its own function of creating meaning has come upon its own process as transparent, that is, the meaning is that it only makes meaning and this meaning has no true basis beyond the establishing of true objects (identity), regardless of any necessary objectival in-itself point of reference, and distanced itself from this meaning. This issue then is called the point of contention’, for the issue concerns not only reality and how it functions — the contradiction is overcome by faith –but also reality as such that it is distinguished now as another object in itself.
Reality is conventional; divergence ironic. The former sees progress instilled and innate in the meaning of every statement, whether it be for or against, the stasis of term-object identity in an historical temporal discursive movement of and toward the One truth, whether it proposes to be gainable or not (for the assertion that it cannot be gained is likewise an assertion upon the progressive nature and ability of humanity, that we have through trial and error found that this is the case). The latter sees the ‘control’ of terms, subjects and objects, to be in the terms and objects themselves, as objects in themselves. Hence we have (again, inevitably, perpetually), in consideration of the SRs, a dual divergence; Graham Harman who steps into the object (objects is all there is) finds a reality that though logically consistent is nevertheless somewhat difficult if not contrary to any common human sense, which is of course what he would find (what is an object divorced from a subject? What is a subject if it is only an object?). Yet he asserts such true object as actually and really true, as if he is privy to a more true reality that everyone should now understand (the ‘thought police’ assertion). Then we have aphilosophy, which upon reflection might be better termed as “philosophy-A”, as there is supposedly already a ‘philosophy-X’ which seems (maybe) already still conventional. Here discourse is all there is and because of this all terms, their meanings and or definitions, are objects. This latter does not privilege the subject, nor attempts to arrive at the object by denying the historical formulation of the subject, but instead speaks of effects of consciousness. On one hand, the effect of consciousness comfortably distanced from its own operations (in denial so it “Don’t Even Know I Am Lying”) so it can operate effectively with the tool of logic develops conventional reality in general as a primary base upon which the subsequent base may take form in the fantastical extreme of ‘logically real’ nonsense, for which we can probably begin see the evidence of faith at work (Speculative Realism, and Object Ontology). On the other hand, the effect of consciousness that compromises the distance consciousness would impose for itself in reality arrives with the meaning of contradiction as meaning (irony, and — wink, wink — philosophy-A). But nevertheless such Objects must necessarily exist given the conventional allowance for plausibility in negotiation coupled with the capitalized identity. One can only wonder if the people in Liberia who raided an Ebola treatment center based upon their belief that no such disease exists, that it is a Western capitalistic conspiracy, needed some thought police.
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Yet I leave such real conventional possibilities to their proper domain; the ontological description of objects that are not merely terms, real objects, grants a description of the interrelating of terms as an objective field. Yet this field comes about in the holding out from the subject, because it will collapse in the subject.
I thereby suggest the divergence that has a more substantial propositional base, even if, indeed, such a proposition is admittedly not real. For what is collapsing is in the tension that develops by the holding apart that which is natively indigenous. When there is no tension, then the subject may be breached as to how the object manifests reality. Hence, the dual nature of the divergence of which we speak.
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I agree with Graham Harman’s assessment of the Kantian failure, that Western philosophy is caught and spends its time now reiterating the same arguments, the faults and merits of ideas that stem from a human subject center attempting to mitigate an apparent gap between the cogito and the object. Divergence thus takes two forms. We argue that Harman and Miellasosux and the ‘speculative’ sort lack in their approach, i.e. they are found in what we see is the hard correlationalist limit, and it is this limit that justifies their route into the object through the conventional Sartean existential revolt (from the limit back into the limit), the (Kantian) subject and its route having been played out is now retreading its own ground through different terms, so invested in the state of reality conventional philosophy is, and they are in effect missing — or perhaps not missing it; this is the significance of the pocket veto — the fault of the object-term identity which is the Kantian thesis; which is to say, they flat out do not recognize it, in denial through plain ignorance or in denial in the face of the contradiction.
This situation unfolds in the following manner: They are either relying fully upon the true object of faith, and if so are at once accepting their (Kantian) intuitive faculty as a common faculty of human consciousness, and so read Kant’s ideas as a true (historical) object to be discerned and built upon in the progress of human knowledge, thereby missing the significant feature of at least “The Critique of Pure Reason”; or, they are being deceptive in that the intuition they have had is a particularly significant inspiration such that the degree of such inspiration would impose an offense upon the audience in which they engage, that is, the philosophical audience, by suggesting a privilege that is not available to everyone but which nevertheless they have due to the very intuition that is common among real humans, but ‘specialized’ in them. But the discourse of the Significant Event offers that to suggest that they are merely very educated or intelligent or have an otherwise unique view but without the intuited transcendental operation is to flat out deny the very aspect of their being human as being human; that is, unless they were indeed inspired by a transcendental and undisclosed aspect or influence. The progress that they thereby propose as a ‘new’ route upon the given discourse suggests that humanity might move out of a particular paradigm of thought, but not move out from being human, and thereby tells and reifies the conventional route: that discourse defines what and how human beings are as real human beings, and this is to say that somehow human beings are being not only influenced but indeed controlled by a power for which humans have no control except that they use discourse, and further this is to propose the greatest offense: such ‘special’ philosophers are especially privy to coming upon ‘inspired ideas’ (that are — nod, nod, wink, wink– not ‘transcendentally inspired’) that somehow allow them to gain purchase upon the center of power of discourse. This assertion through denial is exactly the Kantian proposal: that we can intuit an object’s truth due to the very nature of human consciousness being limited in its functioning. But the Speculative Realists deny this is true.
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The problem of divergence remains as I have indicated; Harman and Miellassoux are still dealing with reality in reality. By my own definition, they are working along the conventional route, so we have then to distinguish what divergence means, and this is the work we have before us concerning the Significant Event. Obviously, The Speculative Realists’ divergence is from the type of philosophy just mentioned above. They diverge from ‘subject oriented’ to ‘object oriented’; this is plain. Yet the significance of their speculative divergence misses what should be seen as the true statement of Kant, to wit, there is no knowable object in-itself that can be gained outside of intuition and that to have achieved a ‘non-intuitive’ position one must be presented in a categorical imperative that then situates the ‘practical reason’ in a manner that is able to distinguish the two in a ‘non-practical’ way. In contrast, the overdetermined and common (mis-)interpretation of Kant allows for Kant’s real meaning that has been appropriated by Harman. Thus, to repeat, in so much as Harman, at least, concerns himself with the Object now, in the same way as described of Miellassoux in the previous segment, his (Harman) presentation seems to be and or otherwise must also be relying upon an undisclosed aspect (the state of categorical imperative that behaves so as to allow practical reason as a categorical precipitate, a hypothetical imperative) that informs his ability to offer a discussion about real-true objects, and so therefore can have no veracity so far as truth beyond what is real (realism), as he admits. But he denies Kant, and so either must derive the categorical and hypothetical reasons as further objects already true, that is, the facticity of their being a part of the philosophical series opens them to their possibility of being false, which is how he seems to see it; or, he is relying upon that very situation that Kant describes, and so is being dishonest. So we have argued that reality relies upon — reality is a function of consciousness, a thing, for the argument is of effects and not so much about describing what an ‘actual’ real object is; that is Harman’s job (or maybe all of conventional philosophy) — a distancing of consciousness from the object of its real involvement or consideration of reality. Harman denies the ‘subject’ philosophical rhetoric and uses another true object by which to gain his stature to be able to say that such subject-oriented ideas are done with; that is, he relies upon the truth of the series of discourse (the true object located of historical argument) to come to his divergence. If I have not been clear, this is saying that his first proposal is that only objects (an object oriented ontology) contain or reflect truth, and so he grants an unimpeachable premise that the historical series is true, by which to make his statement about objects, a statement that denies that the ability to know true objects can only be intuited. This is redundancy in its finest and the mark of the repetition of real argument; this is discursive slight of hand and is indicative of how Slavoj Zizek involves the 5 stages of grief (see a later segment). Thus, the discourse of the Significant Event suggests that Harman (and M) has enacted a ‘pocket veto’ that places the transcendent clause ‘in his pocket’, such that it is already ‘had’, and by this is able to venture out into the world an ‘inspired agent’ of transcendence, motivated by a unspoken of aspect that in other days and discourses would be called ‘God’.
Oh shit. I didn’t just say that. Wait wait wait — aren’t we attempting to remove the transcendent?
Harman’s only saving grace is then by the real divergent move. Two objects touch vicariously and in sincerity. He has thereby re-instated the identity of the basic duality in essential reality, a reality that includes the individual vicariously, that is to say, reality includes the individual in place of the human being; he closes the gap by exchanging real identical categorical imperatives. This is ironic: Harman is arguing a removal of the subject by placing it in the position of the object sincerely, truly, and thus is he able to describe the True Object of the Subject; that is, nothing that is attainable through real tangible sensibility, except real contingency (as an Object), which is a system that defines itself in such a way so as to exclude that which is ‘accidental’. This appears to be the weight of his whole argument (though the jury is still out). Hence, by contrast, what is attainable is to describe the subject of the object, and this (sorry to keep dangling the carrot) is to introduce the significant event.
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The odd thing is that hardly anyone will be able to see themselves beyond the terms by which they identify themselves in reality and so they will miss their own veto — if they ever had one — and and the description of the significant event will likely be just as nonsensical, but even more so. Yet if you are ready for more then the fish might not have broken the line.
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End Part 8.
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It would be cool if a few people would comment.
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Really End part 8.

Repost: The Significant Event, part 1

[it appears that the most recent wordpress update has strung all the paragraph breaks together.  So its like one long run on paragraph now. But the *’s  do indicate a break.]

Significance. What we can call the Romance is based upon and or around what I call the significant experience, which falls well in line with Alain Badiou’s ‘Event’, what could then be called the significant event. The irony that surrounds this feature of being human concerns a confusion of the individual, between what arises of the pure multiple and such Event. This confusion is being worked out as we speak; its ways, immanent. Its formulation has been established by Badiou in the distinction pronounced by ‘void’ and ‘set’, but more particularly, more humanly, the pronunciation’s initial voice is heard through Francois Laruelle and non-philosophy, as this divergence, that which is signaled by irony, is located in the distinction that has found and described the motions of philosophy, what I feel is more correctly termed ‘conventional methodology’ or just ‘convention’. The distinctive move that has been signaled, as referenced here through philosophy, can be noticed lately in the works loosely coined as ‘existentialism’ and ‘post-modernism’, but most recently ‘speculative realism’; so appropriately begun in the real, taking reality ‘into’ its object for what it is and what possibility it holds, such speculation thus calls for its counterpart, as I frame, that is specifically not real, since it is this feature of and in response to the philosophical (sticking here with the non-philosophical designation) reality, that works to deny that which originates in the Event. The Romance is this evental feature of human experience by which we have the conventional historical designation of Romanticism or the Romantic Period or Era, and by which, so apropos to convention, we likewise have the real disclaimer that has reduced and conflated the period and human experience to one of mere caprice, of usual passionate undependability, fantasy and a specifically derogatory mode of irrationality that decries as it celebrates conventional methodology’s victory in placing the human so far from itself as the free individual for the purpose of maintaining the status quo of the teleo-ontological fortress of religio-ideological power. So compete in the assertion of itself, the conventional romantic designation flaunts its power through accentuating the discrepancy by calling what is Romantic ‘subjective’ diversity and uniqueness of individual creative and emotional freedom; though there may have been such an era, it was indeed because of the ubiquity of the true reality. We need not go into the exploitation and oppression that is the capitalization upon the discrepancy here, but suffice it to say that reality itself is romantic, whereas the Romance, a particular significant experience involving an actualization of relationship with the world, has been historically shanghaied into servitude and keelhauled under the dreadnought of historical progress — the now ‘fractalized’ Hagelian History the individualized romance of willful self determination upon the seas of manifest destiny. This is reality; it is not that people are or were having similar experiences — of the pure multiple they indeed do, and that within a particular universal horizon. It is more that such experience, by virtue of being human, may connote an individual of reality in the manner that is reducible in the same way that Badiou describes the situation of being and event, which is to say that the real individual misses the irony of Its existence for the sake of the True Object of its faith. This is not to disclaim in the effort to eject the human being from the helical oscillation upon which history makes its claim to progress, but rather to introduce to suggest that while progress is a situation of reality, the progress of reality is misconstrued in the conventional reckoning of history. * The significant event is singular, but the nature of its significance brings all subsequent experience under or within its scope; thus the attempt to explain what this experience is or was becomes not only an ironic experience but indeed irony, for the multiple by then necessarily falls into the originating experience and becomes a singular experience — though it ‘becomes’ only in as much as it is always becoming multiple and singular in the same move due to the originating experience informing all experience. So I repeat, this occurs in the explaining of the event, but not so much in the explaining what the event means or meant, again, because the explaining of the event cannot become dismissed, overcome or otherwise detach from what the event means as the event serves to give significance to the subsequent multiple that is real life or of lived experience, that falls back and or has fallen into singularity. Oddly, it is in the explaining of the meaning of the significant event that develops theory, rationalization (see below), as a proxy, as a way of distancing oneself from the Event because its significance as the Event, defies reality, and reality is where we all begin as an individual, our faith invested in reality. Hence we can speak of Soren Kierkegaard’s ‘sickness unto death’, ‘offense’ and ‘sin’. When one attempts to explain what the event means or from what it means or meant, then he becomes stuck in an eternal decision of how he might go about situating the meaning of what for real determinations is the eternal moment — a redundancy, a stalemate, where the ‘point of insertion’ into reality cannot be determined — that requires a type of break which will move the in-decision past its incubation into a specific topical discourse which then might become the identity of the individual. Yet the conventional methodologists will need no break for they are already invested by the break itself, that which is the offense in discrepancy, in the suture that is the effect of faith, which supplies the True Object and where discourse is about asserting proper meaning of that reality. Theirs has to do with the prevalent veto that is choice, in the particular presence that says ‘no’. That which requires a break is not the requirement for a ‘leap’ as Master Kierkegaard has termed, but rather its opposite; such a break relieves one of in-determination, necessity, which is to say, the relief is the contingency that is choice, whereas the leap is of necessity. By contrast, yet with consistency, what one could call a ‘pocket veto’ appears in the potential of the significant event to be able to make or be the qualifying break; the pocket veto appears as something one has available for choice, to use for the purpose of stopping the reduction that will bring meaning to the significance that is the eternal moment that thus necessitates the leap, and so be able to bring what is otherwise impossible into the discourse of reality despite it not being necessary. The conventional veto rallies against the Event, where as the pocket veto enacts the instrumentality of decision once the significant event has taken hold. For it is as if within the Romance of the significant event the person has ‘held out’ on it, as if carrying something in his pocket, that though the experience may be a motion of love, the question always remains: “Is this real?” But indeed, if this discourse is any indication, it is at least ironic, for the answer one finds reveals whether the veto was ever truly in the pocket or not. This then defines the paradigm of bad faith; that which was in good faith considering the other party was already compromised for what contingency may arise to change the stakes of the original deal. This essay concerns how the pocket veto allows for a way to describe the situation of the Event, as well as creating an opening to eventually describe the Romanitc Experience itself. For we have two situations of the event, but really three. One where no pocket veto is ever needed, having the tool of veto readily at hand, and one where a pocket veto may be applied. But these two situations then show that they still are dealing in reality with reality, as theory is the distancing of oneself from the experience. Yet this is not a necessary discounting. Being that there is a necessary principle at work, all elements of the universe must belong to that principle. What this principle is exactly is the discrepancy between contingent and necessary aspects as such, which is also the discrepancy between the object and the talk about it, as well as the relations of particular thoughts (see my earlier essays); Quentin Meillassoux, in his book, “After Finitude” does an excellent job at describing this situation, in particular as it has to do with the object itself. So in as much as these admitted operations indeed operate, it is no problem that two apparently distinct and even opposing routes based upon the same discursive substrate, the same ‘meaningful issue’, would co-operate in-dependently to reveal its object and even say different things from the same orientation. We have then the framework by which the dual nature of the discourse that has been called ‘philosophy’ may be apprehended. To bring in Alain Badiou’s formulations; on one hand, we have the philosophers of the multiple who are attempting to describe the One Reality of the True Object, so to speak, that I call ‘conventional methodologists’, and on the other we have the philosophers who are involved with the significant event. The conventionalists (Francois Laruelle’s philosophers, the ‘objectours’ of philosophy) we will leave to their ‘philosophy of…’ methods. For the philosophers (my use) of course, we need discover what might need a veto, and this concerns how irony might come about, and this concerns the significant event.  * What occurs in the significant romantic experience? A feeling of privilege and or secrecy upon intimate knowledge, one might even say a feeling toward a kind of esoteric mysticism; of being ‘let in’ to some profoundness; of being ‘allowed to make your acquaintance toward a loving relationship’. Now, when I say this, of what am I speaking? Am I not speaking of every possible experience? I am speaking of one particular experience, but in what way does it not speak of every experience? The profoundness of some ‘private’ experience, but also the common experience of the individual in reality; loving as an intimacy and loving as a basic position by which one ‘has’ an arena to act, whether one would call it ‘mystical’ is really a preference of the moment, yet in so much as we could say one ‘loves’ by virtue of the fact that there is a relationship that cannot be overturned, we can also say one has faith; in reality, here religion leads the way. So, In one move I have described the condition of the particular Event, while also describing all events, and as I attempt to put forth the unique situation the move presents the common situation, the humble and the willful. But what happens in this romance ? The sense of love remains but the feeling goes away, and then comes back, and then goes away. In the Romance it is called repetition; in reality it is called a number of things, a mundane repetition, psychological self fulfilling prophecy, incorrect appraisal of the situation, spiritual motion, karma, magic, physical resonance, coincidence; I could go on. What is occurring? Significance. The meaning of the event in reality. On one hand, the ‘setting’ of a pure multiple within the context of the pure multiple, sets of sets. A ‘cordoning off’ of meaning to sets of meaning allows for one event to have more or less significance than another, and thus have significance. One the other hand, the event of the significant romantic experience is being ‘found’ at particular moments of the multiple, which is to say, in reality. Reality can thereby be understood as a sequence or as the arena where significance occurs, but by this designation also as the ordination of fidelitous subsequence, or that which must be not real. For the conventional philosophers of the One Reality there are True Objects and the role of these philosophers is to be able to discern what the true nature of the ‘grand’ object called reality is. It does not matter if they suggest multiple realities or multiple universes or how they situate terms; their faith begins and ends in the True Object, in the absolutely particularized pure multiple that begins, progresses and culminates in real truth. These philosophers see theory as coming from or being about the true reality. Significance comes at moments of proper arrangement of objects, of particular situations of meaning, such as reading and studying and then coming upon an ‘ah ha!’ moment, and these significances as a matter of course are then coordinated into what is called theory, a willful assertion of appropriated facts about objects. Hence the philosophers of the significant event thus far deal in irony, but the issue overall has been the confusion that arises in the development of theory. To wit; the former philosophers are dealing with the true object and the latter are dealing with the significant experience. It is only now that the division that is just due is taking shape. Yet, as was just mentioned above and consistent with non-philosophy, the confusion has arisen because the philosophy of the true object is the ‘greater’ vehicle, it is the discourse of power, the discourse that stems from the One Reality, that is the designation of the ‘proper’ meaning of terms. This is historical, traditional, ideological and political as it has to do with a specific ontological and ethical horizon. Non-philosophy is a blatant announcement of the division and brings into relief what the post-modernists (Deluze, Derrida, Foucault, to name three biggies) could not bring to sway; to wit, their move was inherently conventional, that is, not so concerned with the Event itself as they were its meaning. They were still attempting to account for the significant event in the One reality, as the philosophy of the true object was not seen for its stature and unrelenting power; or, they capitulated to its power because they were already invested in it for human identity, they still thought reality could be changed into something less dishonest and more human, an offering and a withholding – which is to say now of something withheld, something not real – and at that because they were inspired; they could not introduce the significant event because the One reality demands that the significant event must fall under the domain of the pure multiple, and thus be not so significant — but at least it could be a type of psychological ‘malady’ or maybe ‘form’ if it were not posed with strategy, in tactical guise of particular manipulations of terms, in short, if it were not posed in theory. So we are lead to ask how it might be that someone so disturbed or ‘not living in reality’ came to have such an effect on real discourse? That such a person could have developed such a good theory? Hence, its significance. It is exactly this theory that does not hold water, for their theoretical position occurs only in conventional reality. Theory is supposed to be an argument, a proof for a proposal of truth, as the proposal is merely a part of coming to the truth of the True Object through negotiation; it is supposed to be a surmising of the facts in a proposal for their unitary meaning to be critiqued accorded to the relative information allotted to each critically thinking individual who are also involved in the common universal effort for the ‘whole’. Theory is not supposed to be a ‘costume’. So irony describes the situation of belonging instead of including by exclusion and confounds conventional reality. So it is that which is most honest is thus taken by convention with a pinch of salt, a skeptical eye suspecting bluff, and at times called out for its dishonesty, if not plain nonsense. if much of post-modernist theory is any indication – check out the post-modern generator website (if it still exists) – one can easily tell that conventional philosophers really had no clue what was being told. The meaning of ‘original’ post-modern/existentialist writers was taken most seriously in its capacity to hold an object for its truth, and soon enough the ‘theory’ that was being produced by the adherents of the proper method (Laruelle’s ‘philosophers’) based upon the significance that rides through conventional reality despite itself resounded with utter nonsense. This can be said to be due to the fact that there is indeed a discrepancy between what is real from what is true, that reality’s pure multiples are ‘really set’ upon a situation undisclosed to the situation of infinite sets, which should show, for conscious experience, the fidelity to the true object of coordinated sets that are romantic in various significant situations that I call conventional reality, distinct from the true fidelity that marks the void in and by ordinate subsequence, or, the significant event that I have called the Romance — but distinct in a non-philosophical manner, which Francios Laruelle has termed as a unilateral duality, one which includes and one which belongs. The almost polemical move of ‘speculative realism’ from what could be called traditional philosophy, as well as traditional philosophy itself, both occur in reality, about real objects, whereas what is ironic, or as indicative of the counter-partial move of what is not real, is the dual move from reality. Due to the necessity of the motion of contingency in reality, the speculative and the ironic appear to reveal a necessary element or feature that is unknown or at least uncomfortable to conventional reality. Irony upsets the endeavor for the True Object, so it is not difficult to see how conventional methodology would tend away from its tellings; it holds a tentative truce with irony, setting it to a type of spiritual psychology it doesn’t enjoy, one that brings it to have to assert is power for ubiquity, urgently revealing as it does so its nervousness steeped in bad faith. Yet while Speculative Realism announces its divergence from traditional philosophy, its way is still conventional, it is still attempting to alleviate the risk of exposure of the Romance by its resorting to what is romantic; hence it is ‘speculative’. Yet it is close; its difference lay in the significant event, and may yet be an indication of where or how such a pocket veto may come into play. * Significance occurs in three, what I shall call, venues. In my essay “the description of irony”, I discuss these but I will elaborate more here. Events can be significant. Getting married, having children, graduating from school, meeting someone, avoiding an accident, etc… Any event may have significance. Real experience is segregated into meaningful situations, each with more or less significance. Reality is a pure multiple of attainable sets, where any set can be divided into an infinite amount of sets, and any series of sets can be a set. Infinity likewise becomes a multiple that can be placed into sets of various sorts. Like a divine lotus flower, reality unfolds, emerges, arises and falls, like an active chaotic Mandelbrot set of fractal imagery. Most people have experience and understanding that can be described and explained analogous to this type of significance, to significance that can be described with reference to such chaos and complexity, as such simple and straightforward explanation can comprise and account for reality. But the ‘incorrection’ of this type of patterning of significance is found – if I may stay consistent with the Eastern theme I have touched upon here – in the assertion of will; so much that this very statement reveals its conventionality in double, in the same way the notion of karma is seen as meaning purpose, but one that arises as one asserts oneself, ones desire for things in the very event that arose due to choices made within an essentially free universe. Hence the difference between the event(s) of the pure multiple and the Event from which the multiple may arise in fidelity is one of significance. * In ‘The Analysis of the Mysterium’, chapter 5 of his book “The Idea of the Holy”, Rudolf Otto describes the situation: “Representations of spirits and similar conceptions are rather one and all early modes of ‘rationalizing’ a precedent experience…They are attempts…to guess the riddle it propounds, and their effect is at the same time always to weaken or deaden the experience itself. They are the source from which springs, not religion, but the rationalization of religion, which often ends by construing such a massive structure of theory and such a plausible fabric of interpretation, that the mystery is frankly excluded.” His point is to get to how it is that we come to a category of ‘holy’, but my take I think he missed. Here, the ‘precedent experience’ can be similar to an event, any event of experience, but here let’s say the significant event, the Romantic experience. We approach from a certain manner for discussion here: What is it? Otto would say that it is of the mysterium, of awe-fullness. So what is it? I say: it is only what becomes of the discourse that surrounds it, which is to say, itself is nothing. But it has significance. The significance leaves itself to the discourse about it such that itself indeed has significance, and this is to say, the event itself is denied for the sake of the discourse about it so much that the event is the discourse about it. This linking, this suturing, is of faith, conventional faith. Faith allows for the romance to take place, for significant events to arise. But here this is only to suggest that significance motivates the will.   Differentiated from common significance of events is the significant event. Here, what is significant does not resort to individuated, multiple events and remain local or in proximity to them, such as with a first kiss or a coincidence, where discourse would speak specifically about each event and their significances. Here when a significant moment arises it refers to the singular Event, such that each significance is so of and refers to the originating event. This is to say that each significance in reality calls forth the Event so that each event refers to the Event for its significant meaning. The singular becomes multiple so the multiple remains singular. As opposed to real experience that resides in the pure multiple and ‘seeks what it finds’ by including the void in its coordination of sets, the significant experience stems from the void and ‘begins the count’, or establishes the vector, the ordination of subsequence, because such event belongs to the void, and as Alain Badiou might put it, occurs in the evental horizon. Thus one can say that moments of significance should not have ‘more’ significance, but have the ‘same’ significance, each real significant event recalling the originating significance. Hence also, reality does ordain significant events such as birthdays and great holiday vacations, but such significance can be said to be relative to the Event as one knows which has the greater significance and what actually motivates, where the cardinal value arises as a denial of such relation through relative knowledge that we have called ‘correlationalism’, or what is constituted by the pure multiple of the real possibility of coordinated sets. Consistent with real transcendence, the cardinal indicates how value is situated and meaning finds form, and with a nod to Quentin Meillassoux, how reason itself relies and substantiates upon a stable yet undisclosed substrate, which I say is demanding of faith because it is the philosophical object, its objective, the ‘philosopher’s stone’ of reason, and which he says is the ‘necessitarian inference of probabilistic reasoning’ [QM; pg 97]. Again the irony resounds. The question has to do with this latter area of significance. We are talking about meaning. Significance concerns meaning. When we say that there is continuing significance as opposed to ‘another’ significant event, we are speaking to the meaning that continues through the various occasions, the various significant events. It is the same meaning in different contexts, showing itself, the same meaning, through different lenses. But usually the Event is not seen in this way; the ‘lenses’, the objects, are not seen as occasions of the Event, but rather as occasions that are ‘filling in’ the object, indicating a progress of knowledge that has to do with a greater knowledge of objects, which is to say, of reality. Recall the transcendent and empirical elements of reality; this latter viewing occurs in oscillating fashion, to the effect of significant revelatory experiences that are leading one along some purpose which is the simultaneous progress of the knowledge of the True Object and the individual of reality. The True Object and the individual are defined and specific elements of reality; they are identities in contrast (ala Martin Heidegger) to what is the same. They are ‘cordoned off’ in meaning to have real identity. In the same way, significance occurs. Such identities arise from effectively segregational meaning. In reality we build things and take them apart and find how they work and put them back together in different ways to find out what each identity is, and this process is cumulative and culminating such that typically, even when the significance continues through the multiple events, the Event is viewed as a segregate identity, that is, as above (Otto), the precedent experience is kept segregate by the virtue of the faith that is invested in the ability of the term to identify its object. This is why the Event becomes denied in reality; this accounts for why the Romance stays romantic, in the either/or condition, ala Soren Kierkegaard, instead of moving into the Romance that is marriage. It is the continuing significance that defines how reality is situated in truth, for now we are dealing with the individual for whom events have significance because of the originating Event. This corresponds the individual in reality who comes across the romantic experience. He draws from the mystery into a relationship that would destroy reality; this relationship (for now in speaking) is the Romance. In this real situation the individual is appraising the situation in real terms such that the Romance is such by virtue of an identity with which or whom the individual has a relationship with, but which he also seeks as to its reality. The first question is always, “Is this real?” But because of the initial investment in reality that every individual has, the question of truth is not distinct; the question of truth is a precipitate of the next question playing out in the activity that is real life, which is “what should I do?”, but then as the significance of the Event passes into the terms of reality that seek to bring the meaning of the Event into reality as purpose, again as Otto above, “the mystery is frankly excluded” and the significance of the experience itself falls away, or rather becomes real. It is then sought after and is found again as progress is the investment in objective identity. If the question “what should I do”, which connotes the meaning of the experience as purpose, is answered, then reality is saved, faith in the True Object is upheld in that the ‘mysterium’ has been solved as purpose. The significant event is set in context as ‘inspiration’, or for a probably better colloquialism, ‘spiritual experience’, but even if the inspiration denies the experience as spiritual, here inspiration itself saves reality. It is when no performable act is conveyed, and no purpose is able to be termed, that reality falters. Doubt is the operative mechanism here, for the present is only presented as ‘path’ in a retrospection that cannot project it out upon the future as ‘a path’ of inspiration; reality is changed. Hence, what I understand of the ‘pocket veto’ rings a particularly interesting note. The playing out of the question of reality brings the question of truth and grants thereby in relief the significance of the pocket veto. For we are not talking about the veto as it is held in the pocket; this is indeed the Romance in reality. We are now talking about the veto once it needs be played and if it can be or not. If it can be, then the mystery that has been frankly excluded is conveyed into reality intact as a real item for negotiation, as a proposal, a hypothesis, a theory, that moves reality in its progress as a significant object to be considered. Yet if the veto cannot be played – and this evidences a particular showing of a true polemic of power – then the mystery that is frankly excluded is indeed excluded in reality, which is to say, it is destroyed. And this mystery is exactly the transcendent. *



 END Part 1.


 I believe I should leave some bibliography, which will also do for part 2 and if there is a part 3; in fact it could probably serve as a seed biblio for what is to come. Martin Heidegger. Being and Time, and other essays of his. Alain Badiou. Being and Event. Quentin Meillassoux. Beyond Infinity Francios Laruelle. Principles of Non-Philosophy Rudolf Otto. The Idea of the Holy Soren Kierkegaard. The Sickness Unto Death, and, Fear and Trembling ** For a brief discussion about the Romantic Era – and as a bibliographic site: http://www.historyguide.org/intellect/lecture16a.html And thank you Dave at Inthesaltmine.com for our continuing interaction, and his coining of the idea of a ‘pocket veto’.

repost: Transformation and Conversion 

The Significant Event is to be distinguished from an event in reality. The Significant Event involves reality but never occurs in reality; it is the encountering of the point of contention. Significance itself may occur in reality as various events can begin a count of meaning in the arena of pure multiples (reality), from events such as stopping at a stop sign, to having a good workout, to screwing up a business contract, to receiving an award, texting “ball” instead of “call”, accidentally or purposefully injuring someone slightly or seriously, winning the state lottery, being injured, enacting some small altruistic kindness, or reading an essay. All such events may occur at times and have small or large, momentary or lasting impact. Yet to speak about the Significant Event becomes an ironic venture, bringing the proposal of said event to an end that speaks of the last thing it would seem to indicate and by this thereby becomes the first thing; at once included in a description of all events, as well describing how such events belong to what is truly significant, what occurs is that all things come to belong to the Significant Event. In reality, argument and discussion in general are seen to exclude the position from which its point is made, that is, the position is taken to be the argument. The real method presents the position and the argument as identical, or part of the same identity, and by this method, the Significant Event is never encountered for what it suggests in argument and occurs thereby ‘outside’ the argument; it occurs as a transcending operation of the argument. This is to say that conventional real discourse includes a transcendent clause. The irony of this proposal is that on one hand it can be said to be describing all events in reality under a rubric of potential, and on the other, eliciting from itself a truly exceptional situation. Thus it would seem contradictory to suggest that the Significant Event is not a moment of transformation; such a moment of transformation is to have enacted a pocket veto. Transformation implicates the transcendental clause of conventional faith such that some sort of progress must likewise have occurred, such as the motion that is evident in the expression “now, I understand”. The irony is that if such transformation has occurred, then no transformation was needed for it to occur. Irony evidences the containment of reality in a universal ontological horizon that cannot be and is never breached, that is, except in reality through the transcendental clause. Hence, ironically, to speak of divergence; and this is to say, that the pocket veto evidences a willingness, a choice of faith, to breach the real ontological horizon, or, the teleo-ontology of reality itself. (Aside: might we propose a contraction of teleo-ontology, if just for the sake of orthographic brevity, and offer the term ‘tontology’ ? Or would the irony of its homonymic similarity to ‘tautology’ be almost to much to bare?) The proposal of such a break, the discourse that issues from and or speaks around such a break as witnessed by various authors, spiritual or religious but specifically philosophical, thus can be a measure of the temporal progress of historicity, the fact or item that is history, unto its ontology (the scheme of meaning’s meaning). But of course, to be able to measure such a bias, we must be able to find a baseline by which the variables of discourse, the terms and phrases, may find their position in such an ontology, as well as what aspect of quality of such variables marks the bias. The degree or manner by which such discourse reifies or maintains the ontology we shall call ‘opacity‘, such that to the extent such discourse leads to and or finds a transparency of reality, and thereby argues what is more real — which is to say, a discourse that proposes to better describe the break as the experience compels one to inscribe its meaning into reality to argue what is more true of reality — there we might then find its opacity. * The common rejection ( from part 8) found in reality against the proposal that everyone appropriates reality through a transcendent, develops into an intellectualized rebuttal. Where the common rejection occurs as a sort of ‘thoughtlessness’ of casual reading, or ‘regular everyday’ experience (what is that?), the more thought full rejection is established upon a well organized and recognized rhetoric. Of course, there is the common real religious or spiritual rejection that rejects that there should even be a rejection, since it is a very common idea that humans may lead spiritual lives and have some sort of contact and or understanding of some effective transcendent element in their lives, and that transformative experiences may occur along these lines. Again, we need not go much further in addressing this feature of human reality than to say that reality holds its potential in such a transcendent clause; the issue follows the same course so far laid in this essay, and proceeds likewise. The skeptics have a real argument to be made with the believers, and vice versa, as they are both subject to the description of the Significant Event. Though both see their activity involved with coming to terms with reality, nevertheless, both are in a process of reality coming to terms with the avoidance of what is not real. Wait, the rejection might say, we have already delineated what can and might be meant by a transcendent. Foremost, we have elicited valid points to bring in at least an agnostic truth. Based upon the various manifestations of religious and cultural temperaments, the open and equal consideration of all such advocation of God or gods, spirits and such, the probability of the existence of any such God or gods, is equal to the probability that no such entities exist. What transcendent entity may exist tends toward the unknowable, and so we have only to judge upon social and cultural, and likewise materialist affects of such ideals. Likewise, transcendence falls into highly suspect forms; for one, the quality of transcendence as an experience falls often into forms of spirituality, as these tend to connote particular activities and discourses which likewise fall into the previous category. Such experiences, religious or otherwise, are common to humanity, yet are expressed and apprehended again against a common world of human activity wherein the criterion becomes the act, and the feeling of transcendence is a neurophysiological and psychological phenomenon that can be dealt with by science on one hand, and human psychological methods, such as occurs in the very human activity of camaraderie, understanding, consolation, sympathy, empathy and therapy. Even such experiential feelings can bring about drastic and strange events, the extreme examples found though motions of peace and violence, such as the trials and victories of Nelson Mandela, to religious fundamentalism, to that of the like of serial killer David Berkowitz, the ‘Son of Sam’, who said a dog told him to do it. Further, aside from all the subjective transcendent experiences, to say that something transcends various particular occasions, such as, the whole of humanity transcends the possibility of any human individual knowledge, or, adversity can be transcended, says nothing of any common human manner of appropriating the world except that the same forms of a term may be used to address various situations. Here we have a usual real defense of what is true and real and a reiteration of the proper methodology for coming to such reality. And this is what we don’t want to hear, because it points directly at the reader, at the experience of the human being. It is as if to offer such a proposal that argues that the authors addressed in this essay are staking their claim upon the ability to intuit problems and solutions from what they had read of other philosophers joined with their general education and experience in life, is not merely silly and obvious — a truism — but indeed useless and unneeded. Nevertheless, the sentiment against such a statement, as the reader holds its own possibility sacrosanct and rallies her or his resources to keep that universal perception of a common humanity intact, to maintain the privilege of the reading and production of a subject viable in its appropriation of the object — such an assertion of sentiment appears, as well, overkill, reacting to the obviousness of the statement as one would respond to a threat, overestimating the meaning of the statement because the reporting of such material is felt to be a private matter — a private yet universal matter, perhaps like the reaction to a dissection of a cadaver, or surgical operation, or even a discussion about particular personal gastro-intestinal issues, is to many people — the imposition incurred as an offense to one’s essential being. It is no wonder that we can locate a particular manner of objective reckoning as conventional, based in an offense, and that, of faith. The reader is confronted with what philosophy says (of True Objects) against what it means. When we attempt to find and tell what the meaning means (what is meant from what is said), such as may be involved with the basis of many critiques and rebuttals of works, but also even some editorial summaries of works, as opposed to mere description of what is taking place, we are thereby saying something about what has been said, and where this is taken as an identity, enact a redundancy that is denied to produce conventional theory. We enact a distance between ‘meanings’, one meaning that identifies the Object and the other that identifies the meaning of the Object, and by this distance what is said enacts transcendence as a ‘hidden’ meaning of what is said by frankly excluding the experience, as well as enacting a proposal of method for how one is to attain the experience, such transcendence, which is for all purposes, a real transformation. This is the conventional method. Yet what is meant can be described (removed from its quality of presentation as a True Object) without enacting a distance, and this venture is ironic; it is offensive to one’s identity, or in other words, the identity of the One. So long as here remains a potential hidden in the proposition, we have an opaque position of argument. So also it is in philosophical discourse that when a description is taken as what is being said of a True Object, as a meaning of the meaning of the Object, the description is taken as an argument instead of as a kind of forensic appraisal. The description is rebutted, and the argument that arises for a defense of the description to redress the rebuttal steps from its proper domain in the attempt to convince ‘its material’ of its veracity, which is quite noticeably silly if not plain non sequitur, but what occurs is no communication, or, the perpetuation of the real conventional methodology that posits transcendence as part of its route (en route). What occurs, or what should occur, is that the forensic description is left to its discipline describing the material, left not involved with the suggestion that the material is any different than what it is, which is the effort for meaning of the meaning of the True Object that is real. * The effort of the contemporary ‘realist turn’, of the most recently notable ‘Speculative Realism’ (if ever there was) is based in a foreclosing of previous historical discursive misappropriation to a present asserted truth. We have already begun to address this redundancy earlier. But to reiterate, the motion that concerns us is how this is done; it is very simple: It ignores the presence of the human being on the scene for the sake of a manifestation of discourse; that is, it assumes a common humanity as a categorical imperative. But for its sake it does not take mere discourse, but rather adiscourse that is presumed to have a static or universal ability to reflect the same thing; its method as the only imperative and the only method argues itself as a truism, a distinction within itself that is moot. This discourse that is presumed as all powerful, omniscient and ubiquitous in its potential, is a particular scheme of meaning that contains and pronounces upon all real things, and by this presumption ‘realism’ is permitted to have credence for what reality is through a potential transformation, a conversion of terms; i.e. If all there is is reality, then reality is constituted by real things, objects, but in fact, True Objects. Idealism, on the other hand, proposes that there is a (encompassing or bigger) reality over (regular) reality for which reality needs be reconciled, as if reality needs to dispel an illusion it has formatted of itself. Hence we can begin to see how realism and idealism merely dance around the point of contention regardless of their arguments. The partitions that are erected are called a ‘turn’ because some phrases of discourse will be left going ‘straight’ in meaning with the ‘previous reality’, but also because the human being on the scene is ignored and already accounted for by its (the propositional arenas located by the ‘turns’) discourse, and the difference that is proposed to be reconciled is reinstated in the course of the encompassing real-true method. To be fair; realism may address what is ‘really real’, but it gets nowhere further than that. Hence, this really real discourse is based in the offense of identity that cannot achieve its transcendental clause, the ‘grand’ transformation that is the posed culmination inherent of real discourse; realism thereby puts the fault not upon their human effort, not upon willingness itself, but upon the discourse, ‘The’ discourse, such that one merely needs to find the fault of the past to argue and thus produce the ‘now more real’ reality. Hence the conventional discourse achieves its Object, real transformation, through denial. There are repercussions of this type of move that will have to serve as a topic for a latter essay. We propose a partition that is indeed a boundary, and this is the hard correlational limit. The boundary is marked by the Significant Event and is viable by the pocket veto, whereby this mark reveals the opacity evidenced in various real discourses. The pocket veto is a signal of faith that identity is being challenged, so the iteration of this Event, the discourse that follows from it, can be registered as to the opacity that manifests due to the limit that such faith has inscribed as real or in reality; the discourse can be viewed upon its opacity as to what we might call its ‘saturation’ of meaning. A saturated discourse can be open, such as seen with Francois Laruelle and non-philosophy, or maybe even Levi Bryant and his ‘machine-object’ (but I tend to think Bryant is a ‘nonphilosopher’- qualified but thus ‘non-qualified’), where distinct principles are defined so as to relieve its dictates from such principality, or it can be closed, such as occurs with religious dogma. Other various discourses are opaque by their evidencing various internal vectors of meaning that are open, for example discussion that follows along in ‘proper’ understanding of the discourse, and others that are closed discussion that is moot due to objections that show misunderstanding. Nevertheless, opacity can be a measure or an indicator that something is being withheld as well as what is being withheld due to the offense of the Significant Event upon faith. In all cases, what is being withheld is the transcendent factor involved with the assertion for real solution. End part 10a.

The Matter At Hand, Part 2: The Mark of Faith — Object Oriented Philosophy, the ‘New’ Realisms and Post-Modernism.

“What happened ??”

*

In the event of reading an essay generated by the PMG, we have to think from the perspective of not knowing that it is a fake, keeping in mind that this program is admittedly old and stunted in its potential, but that it would be possible to write a more complex protocol that could generate more lengthy and involved syntactical and contextual structures that would ultimately be very difficult to discern as bogus. Under this presumption that we are indeed reading a piece of legitimate theory, we need only to understand the turn in thought that occurs upon being let into the joke, so to speak, and what that says not only of being human, but more, of thought itself, as well then what history is and means. This is because in this type of upsetting, the ground for our theoretical efforts is not so easily found, for often enough the ground itself is in question by the mode of offering of the theory.

Indeed, from this setting is elicited a mounting frustration resolved not by confronting the situation — the subsequent post-modern thought thought itself to confronting it — but by completely rejecting the whole of the line of thought that brought about the situation in first place (Object Oriented Philosophy, Speculative and the ‘new’ Realisms) loosely defined against history as Cartesian, Copernican or Kantian, and for our present situation as ‘phenominalist’ and its corresponding conventional paradox noticed by Quentin Miessalloux as correlationalism. The problem here in these latest proposals is that they cannot get beyond the problem so they reject it by sublating the problem as the impetus and catalyst by which such ‘new Realist’ positions may arise. In other words, they assert that the method must be applied in moderation and from there we might then be able to find a True basis, a ground, for real discourse. Moderation and mediation is thus the mode where reality is true — but hasn’t this been the maxim of all real conventionality, an assertion of revolutionary action based in a return to the norm, a reactionary move?? Are they really saying that The True Reality should be found through moderation ?? I want to say ‘yes’, but in response to what (really) does this ‘yes’ arise (can we be really honest) ? (Come on; are we allowed to be honest yet ? Well, maybe not yet. ) If indeed the answer is yes, then it is not too difficult a stretch to see the reinstatement of a metaphysical imperative, which is to say, for other terms, a manifest destiny, a providence that has encompassed the whole of humanity throughout history as it continues to do so at this very moment — but set aside in argument, the question of ‘God’ or ‘spirit’ being left now to the opinion of religion, the conventional reality of the pure multiple.

Note that it is absolutely ironic and consistent with the unbiased argument that the question of the philosophical revolution occurs and is answered in the setting aside of the question itself. This is the Speculative move. But the issue left is how and why this move came about, as well as how it continues to be a problem, because until then, we can only hope — but again, what is conventional faith ? This is then how we get to the significant philosophical issue, and the continuance of the status quo methodology is how we get to the necessity of revealing just what is entailed in the conventional reaction (denial).

*

These two sites (really, the one just links to the other) can serve as an example of how we react:

Zizuku: http://blog.talkingphilosophy.com/?p=219

http://alunsalt.com/2008/03/04/like-the-postmodernism-generator-but-funnier/

Consciousness is a funny thing; making meaning is all it does. No matter what one wants to make of it, the very making is meaning made. The question is always whether this meaning has any essential teleology; the stringing along or construing of meaning is the issue here. The conflation or association the site above has made between the PMG and the discourses if Slavoj Zizek is significant. Just as Alan Sokal helped to deflate the Post Modern bubble (a bubble, I might say, created by many accredited people who had no clue), the process of revealing how consciousness works, as opposed to merely riding upon reactionary theoretical tropes in the attempt to assert a more real reality and thereby create an identity, must evoke uncomfortable meanings, confronting and even breaching the fashionable trend of the day.

For what we are dealing with here is the maxim of operational consciousness: In the effort for the True Object (which is really itself) the individual takes True Objects as essentially separate universal entities as problematic items for the purpose of asserting the Truth of such entities to establish itself, the individual. This maxim is responsible for reality, as this phenomenon enacts a strange force that is the power of itself; the power of reality is that it allows for and or creates an arena in which real elements may interact in a real way. This is so true that it hardly need be stated, and when it is stated people roll their eyes because it sounds so ridiculous. Yet if it isn’t stated then people do not roll their eyes and can continue in plausible denial; it is after it is stated that real progress may occur, for until that point, it was only as an illusion of progress, as reality is never an illusion. For we are really dealing with me and you, and the object that allows for real determination of this distinction.

As to the blogger that came up with ‘Zizuku’ (so great!): In reality, therefore, an intelligent person may read Zizek and see a pattern to his rhetoric. Just as the PMG’s products are discounted against actual human agency, Zizek’s mode is discounted as a ridiculous game, but both which are seen to be included for ‘good’ human production of theory given that the limitations of their modes are identified, made into a real-true object, and now can be moved upon to actually yield ‘better’ theoretical productions. As I have said, the issue concerns how we distinguish between an essay that is basically a random assemblage of syntax that appears to make sense, and an actual researched and thought out humanly constructed meaningful assemblage of contextual significance? How do we reconcile ‘random’ through an ‘ordering’ of method, since the essays are generated along a specific path of commands (a program), using a specific pool of terms that are assembled based upon no apparent consideration of the various individual terms’ meanings? And as to Zizek in this regard; what does it mean that Zizek’s discursive performances can be discerned to a scheme (Zizuku)? How are these presentations related, what is being apprehended and comprehended, and how is this assessment a reaction?

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First, the PMG. So to back up a little bit, the point here is the ‘better’ productions. The problem the PMG revealed was that where discourse was at issue, deconstruction, the questioning of discursive authority, and hermeneutical analysis being operative, the post-modern ideal itself was taken in a mistaken mode, as indication of a further True Object that might be gained through such methods. The fact of the ability to program such a generator, nevermind Sokal’s ability to write a fake paper that was taken as legitimate post-modern theory, shows that the ‘program’ of human meaning itself taken as a route by which to construct and or reveal more meaning yields nonsense, but that the result of the nonsense, taken as a further product of its own method for meaning, yields the sense that such ‘low level’ meaning making is nonsense: This is thus the sense that comes from nonsense that makes the nonsense sensible. By a reduction of discourse to its own operational bases as a means to analyze its productions (deconstruction; hermeneutics) against the result of this process as an analysis, we get at a real outline of the situation handed to us: A real nonsensical meaning is essentially a baseline from which all other meaningful discourses may arise; this is what we can justifiably call ‘void’. Then the production of meaning that notices the nonsensical result: The real event that begins the count of the pure multiple. Hence, the PMG is the instrumental manifestation of the baseline for making meaning, and thus while it does show that the meaning we make might just as well be just as nonsensical, that we are also merely ordering machines without a basis where we can find the ‘order of the order’, the more significant meaning we get from this temporal marking of the parameters of knowledge is out of a type of Sartean revolt: We revolt from this abyss of free syntax back into the contextual limit. But more; once we fall back into the imperative for context, we see the contextual world as deriving from a necessary order that gives significantly meaningful order, or, orderly meaning: purpose, teleology. This is not a critique of the situation, as post-modern ideals would usually advocate (Zizek: the example somehow undermines the veracity of itself), but merely a stating of the fact of the matter.

In other words, the ideal that discourse is all there is yields (or has yielded) a Kantian intuited world where the products of the PM method arose due to the True Object that is the discourse and method, such that this True base thus necessarily yields a better more real Truth of the universe: This is the mark of conventional faith. The PM discourse itself as an arena arisen from the efforts of individuals attempting to establish their identity in a true reality ironically yielded a theoretical reality that came to be called out for its nonsensical rhetoric. The discursive arena itself supported a Truth that functioned to further a real theoretical validity. But this validity was soon revealed to be just that: theoretical but basically nonsense. Structurally sound and justified within a particular discursive cohortive arena by the fact of its placement within institutions of ‘higher learning’ (pun absolutely intended).

Thus our question that comes to bare on the situation: What grounds theory? The answer is ironic, but the irony is missed in most cases, typically, as evidenced by the past 200+/- years of philosophy. I need not rehash the essays of Constructive Undoing, but enough to say that language is supposed material of its own objective analysis, the object that is language as well as the object of its clausal reference, of its intent meaning; the irony being of a particularly Kantian problematic (extrapolated conventionally in the 200 year span) in so much as every object of this discursive case is taken to be or have been intuitively apprehended, which is to say, from the assumed transcendent affection. In this case, it is of no matter what ones logic or personal belief is because there is no theory that does not operate within knowledge and discourse.

So the question comes to be pivotal to how philosophical effort should proceed, and it is in response to this problem that Realist philosophies such a s Harman’s OOO arise; though i would hesitate to lump this ‘new’ effort into a common theme, the effort does arise in a common thread to the Significant Event as well to reflect upon the issue of this essay here, which is how consciousness functions when confronted with its own limit, and what that likewise means in (the production of) reality.

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Thus next up in part 3: What is the relationship between the products of the PMG and the rhetoric of Zizek?

Am I Beginning to Make Any Sense at All?

I agree with Malabou’s initial consideration. “Relinquishing transcendentalism”. How tentative. How civilized. But her approach, I must say, just like all subsequent considerations, asks good questions but then never quite gets to any answer what so ever more than a reiteration, a parroting of conventional method. In very short verse: this is correlationalism. The very moment of her critique is correlationalism in situ. The proposal of Miellassoux set as is it in play, as I have said, is prime occasion to speak of the Significant Event; those interested will have to wait for the book, since the development is much larger than the blog format.

Suffice it to get to the issue behind such proposition. We might consider what ‘throwing away the ladder’ means. I am sure there will be the usual preponderance who hang onto the ladder for the use of arguing what one means by throwing away the ladder. And they won’t even see the redundancy and ridiculousness of their position; how indeed they may have thrown away the ladder yet are telling us what Neitzche and so and so mean by this and how they thus might qualify to having already thrown away the ladder, and then give further reason why now having thrown away the ladder, so and so says this and so we argue this and that based upon the meaning of so and so, that we may present the problemitization of throwing away the ladder such that we can the grant our position such that we now are moving beyond the ladder or not.

This little dance reminds me of a jazz artist in the late 1980’s who put out a CD with liner notes that described and made an argument in a quite intellectual fashion, how Jazz is not an intellectual art form or musical expression. I love jazz, but I just had to laugh, and then listen to his non intellectual music that, in my opinion, had with so much obvious talent and expertise so little soul and depth, so much explicit expression and so little inuition and grasp of the reason why, at least I, listen to music.

I draw this analogy to philosophy. The death of philosophy is evidenced exactly in such philosophers talking about the possibility of philosophy relinquishing the transcendent, parting from Kant and such. Obviously the meaning of philosophy has taken a turn, and it hardly hinges upon relinquishing anything, but rather more a hanging on to the well established method working of social lubrication and conceptual capital to make a name and a living. So much for every hobby and career; rarely it seems, if never, do the users of ideas really take to heart what they are talking about or reading about, keeping all meaning at arms length for the sake of quick access and face.

So as I have said of Harman, we have to give these brain users a benefit of doubt, and grant that they do indeed feel and believe with a passion that their involvement and discussion are really involving a type of truth, a type of real working. So it is that we must locate such thinking people in an arena that takes quite seriously their deep ideas, and call it ‘reality’ as a place, space or position, and ‘conventional’ as a method fitting and no larger than the arena, the terms of which holding such a value for investment, the infinity of such an arena, calls to such thinkers to regard it as quite inescapable and indeed thus always accounting for every possibility in its potential; always climbing the ladder, they are, even as they talk about whether it might be thrown away or not.

It is good to be the straw man, because this particular kind of straw man is not allowed in the correlationalist cycle, for it indicts the conventional method, rather, it bases of method. For logic is not a tool; it does not show where truth is located. It is a vehicle, a route by which conclusions may be shown. The idea of a ‘hidden’ truth which by the tool of logic may uncover is a conventional trope, an ideological dogma. Along such conventional lines, such confrontation is rebutted by saying that it defines a nothing, a nihilism, which is why so many authors now are considering and defining what nihilism might ‘really’ mean.

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The post just before this one, here in Constructive Undoing, the “reblogg” post, is the example for which we say that we must destroy the transcendent. Miellassoux is being much too kind, much too diplomatic. The reason for this necessity is that the real conventional discourse relies upon the transcendent even as we might want to and in order to posit that we might get rid of it. And if anyone has been reading my blog, it is only in the act of blatant and obstinate denial that an arrangement of terms may effectively do anything, let alone now not have a transcendent involved in what reality may be. In fact, this is also why we must say that reality is the place where discourse determines what is true. We need not reiterate the past year of posts of Constructive Undoing. It is enough to use the “reblogg” to give a concrete and specific example of what it means to destroy the transcendent, what divergence means and why it is necessary. I’m not sure if this post will cover all that right now, but at least it will get to showing what we are up to by distinguishing ‘conventional methodology’.

Thus a throwing away of the ladder really evidences the problem I indicate by referring to the “Reblogg” post. Let’s look there now, the comments and discussion arena after the blog….Heres the link: http://darkecologies.com/2014/12/03/the-battle-in-philosophy-time-substance-and-the-void/

Ok, we’re back. Now keep in mind, I am not rebutting his essay for its content. In fact, D.E. rebukes me for not wanting to discuss within the parameters of what he has presented. Yet, we might say that part of the discussion of the Significant Event concedes the benefit of doubt to the argument in question, that for this case, the author of D.E. (Sorry man, I never got yer name) has indeed read the authors quite thoroughly and is fluent enough in the verses to bring to mind various quotes appropriate to the issue in question, and that such referencings likewise connote a good possible consideration of the matter. We concede that the opinion expressed is a valid opinion, in as much as it most probably sticks to the commonly recognized version of meaning, that this common reading thus laid admits various hazards, that these hazards will surly be rooted out, voiced and problematizing in various ways, etcetera.

My question is always: What does that mean? When I read his essay (as this is the example here), I have a pretty good idea of what he is saying, as well as the problem he suggests or implicates, as well as how an impetus for discussion has been set. Having a pretty good reading of the authors myself, I understand how the stage has been set, why the lights are faced here and there, the actors supposed to enter here, turn there, the music come in here. While I know the play, and the different showings and performances, and casts, that each is slightly different, with different stage sets, different colors, interpretations of phrasings, tempo, mood, timbre, etcetera — the play is the same play. It may be entertaining to see the play every year at different venues, but it always suggests the same meaning even while differing in reference to the moments in which I attend the showing, as my attendance and watching may have different significances to my regular life at the various times.

So it is that when I read philosophy, i am informed to meaning through the question of what does it mean, what is the author saying. Now, the problem I wish to shed light upon. In this effort for meaning, a reader inevitably comes to want to find out what is ‘really’ meant, and so dismisses the meaning that is gained in potential through definitional ‘gaps’ such that now the reader has to look for context that does not seem to appear in the present text, i.e., the reader needs to read other authors and see what they are saying, and so on. What this process amounts to is a storehouse of information that when drawn upon appears to be conveying deep significant meaning, but when stood back from, really just presents a bunch of terms that says nothing in particular; this type of discursive posturing that seems so profound by its educationally privileged layering is what I call metaphysical (in the bad way) because the level that is supposed of its definitional structure is supposed to get at some more real or more true meaning of the issue presented.

It is this kind of philosophical method that is correlational, that which relies upon a transcending aspect of discourse by which to assume or propose an actual truth of the situation. As we might see in D.E.’s talks on Zizek; Zizek himself talks in a way to show this very situation: that there is no subject that has any actual or substantial truth to it, but that we are viewing it in a particular way, in a particular fashion. This is what all the various Zizek talking abouts on this particular issue means: there is nothing there.

Now, philosophers will debate this, but the debate will be based upon the fact that obviously there is something ( but again Zizek accounts for this in various places also, but how he says it is less important that what he means; how he says it is just nice to look at). So the philosophers will bring in their storehouse of authorial knowledge to pose and discuss what Zizek may be saying and what then may be the actual truth of the matter. But never do they stand back and find out what it is such rhetoric actually means. The point which Zizek reiterates all over the place is that such rhetoric is nonsensical, that the discourse itself, a particular discourse that he references capitalistic, sees its elements as substantial capital, actual true real things that are negotiated. But the point I’m making is not to dispute what Zizek is saying; the points of Zizek will be pronounced in the Significant Event. The point I wish to expose is that the various arguments that would rebut or expound upon Zizek often miss what Zizek says over and over.

A most specific and pertinent example of the motion of conventional correlationalist philosophy occurs in relief through the exchange in the comments of D.E. of the link I gave, between him (her? Come to think of it, I don’t really know) and I.

Hopefully my distinction will be made more clear.

I use the term ‘True Object’ in my writings. This usage often gets the best objections in the form of it making no sense. My question is what sense is there not to be made? The philosophers (and I have encountered this over and over in many places) routinely bring argument against ‘truth’ and ‘object’, and are typically repulsed by ‘faith’, at various junctures. My proposal is of a simplicity that is completely missed by the conventionalists that I see is due to their investment in the storehouse of authorial knowledge. I am saying that reality is constituted of True Objects, objects that cannot but be helped to function in reality as true things. Like the car I drive down the road. There is a car. The question of what a car may ‘actually’ be as an object is of no concern; indeed I am, as I drive, driving a car down the road. The ideological or theoretical considerations do not come into play here; much like Harman’s Third Chair, but most like the ‘First’ chair, what ever may be the actual ‘car’ does not come into play in my driving down that road. The car is a True Object. To argue what the car may actually be is entirely a theoretical issue, but more, an issue that is entirely metaphysical, which is also to say, concerning what is more true or more real, which is for all other terms, concerning what is transcendent or for better terms, as a methodological reduction, concerning ‘The’ transcendent.

There is no theory that needs go into this, but the theory is already there in the various authors all over the place. Harman’s difference with Zizek, even as he may say he disagree with Zizek, is in as much as Harman is invested in the truth of the terms he is using, as his terms are stemming from a sort of essential relation of thing to thing (the ‘thing’ that is Harman, and the ‘thing’ that Harman is addressing: object -> object). As I have said, he must argue this because this argument then validates retroactively the position by which he attains his truth of reality. And this next is key to my proposal of the situation of the True Object: his difference with Zizek takes place in reality.

Once this situation is understood, then we can consider the meaning ala Miellassoux, correlationalism and transcendence. Then, once this situation takes hold, the question no longer concerns what the author means, for this routinely beckons conventional method back into its correlation of ideologically ordered (Foucault) and scaffolded (Wittgenstien) terms — and besides, we have already climbed the ladder of this meaning — but rather the question becomes: What does this situation mean? Hence, to question this situation stems from a position that is not real. The real ladder of meaning must be thrown away. The question comes to concern the Significant Event.

We can see this in action in the comments of the linked blog on Dark Ecologies. That the simplicity I propose is countered by recourse to an authorial bank (Freire) of knowledge. The conventional philosopher cannot understand what I am referring to because he is caught in the metaphysical correlational world of ‘real’ discursive method. Hence, divergence.

Again; this is not to say that D.E. essays do not present valid points, but rather that the meaning of the points are routinely missed for the sake of the correlationally (transcendentally) justified arguments that stem from an assertion of identity, from the equivocation of the object and the discourse (terms) about them — but not just any discourse; a particular discourse that can be associated, as Zizek does, with the capitalistic paradigm wherein True things exist because of the metaphysical discourse that supplies the ‘more true’ reason for its objectivity — as if I am not really driving a car down the road. The car is thus a True Object due to the insistence of the metaphysical support.

But to get back to Malabou; the question of ‘why’ should the transcendent be relinquished (I apologize; I have only listened to the first 20 minutes of her talk. My input may change when I hear the rest) is made nearly moot due to the understanding that comes through the simple understanding of what authors such as Badiou, Zizek, and Laruelle, (if not many, more; such as, Kant, Hume, Hegel, Faurbach, Spinoza, Kierkegaard, Nietchze, Wittgenstien, Heidegger, Sartre [my spelling is horrendous] and many, many more, whose names apologetically do not directly come to mind right now — oh, and if not Miellssoux, and Harman) are really saying. The difference between these varied authors concerns the awareness of the following: The transcendent must be destroyed because it is the transcendent that perpetuates the continuance of real confusion. We must not ‘relinquish’ it because, as Malabou also says, to relinquish is more like a kind parting, and such a codependent relationship will never kindly part ways.

“Should humanity be saved?” Laruelle has asked. I say: humanity should not be saved. Because, should humanity be saved it would not even know that it had already been saved, if indeed humanity should have been.