Crash Space and the Move to a ‘Science’ (of the Subject): To Ping or Not to Ping, Phenomenology and Observer Effects. REPOST

 

THREE POUND BRAIN Im finding has got some cool observations, often a manner of approach that seems insightful.

In the discussion of a philosophical scientism, the post below appears to me to indicate more a datum, a kind of data point, over a semantic content. If we hold to the idea that indeed we will be able to come upon a ‘phenomenological science’, so to speak (for lack of a term; maybe it is better voiced as a science of continental philosophy, science of the Subject, or a science of philosophy, or existential science) it will come when when the content of proposals does not fold back into itself to ask questions of its epistemological and ontological being. The problem we (as a kind of Western dominator-colonialist hegemonic discourse) have been dealing with for some time in philosophy is the problem of redundancy; that is, the recurrent check upon sovereign privilege. Yet we cannot escape the issue that surrounds the statement ‘for those who understand’, for, there is indeed an issue for those who understand, if you catch my drift*.

This is where this essay by THREE POUND BRAIN seems to have purchase. Quite compelling; these thinkers have conflated particular arms of the issue to further close the gap that occurs in the perpetual philosophical deferring of redundancy. The issue of what we are calling a science of the Subject (again, for lack of a better term), concerns our ability to dismiss ourselves from the semantic content of philosophical discourses: This only occurs for those ‘who understand’ the issue. The issue is, as I just said, the recurrent enfolding of meaning; this issue has to do with a kind of route where the thought is always extricating itself from the object of its proposal in the effort to find a more true thing of reality. So, if this be the real case, what is and has been occurring all through our history of critical thought, then what is it issue in our ‘science’ concerns an ability to be removed from that recurring redundancy.

The redundancy, the space of ‘naught’ that the redundancy covers, the ‘pass’ that maintains the current paradigm that situates ‘subject’ and ‘object’, is what the essay below calls a ‘crash space’, for another term, and aside from the struct Husserlisan phenomenological reduction, it takes a certain kind of understanding of the issue (this, itself another kind of redundancy) to see and accept the the Reduction is indeed a facet of everyday human life, over a particular methodological approach.

What we find, though, what inevitably is a part of the science that accepts instances of truth (objects) is that this essay below thus becomes another data point. In order to see this, we then need to understand what the traditional philosophical method does, and how it produces ‘Objects’, which is to say ‘ideological/mythological objects’, as opposed to witnessing and involving the manipulation of mere objects themselves.

We need notice that philosophical reduction can occur with any object, that the Phenomenologist reduction is not a particular meaning upon a particular clausal route, as if it occurs only when one thinks in a manner that Husserl denotes, describes or explains. In fact, any object may be looked into to find that its basis is naught; but this does not mean that it thus is a relative ideological manifestation, but more indeed that the ideological manifestation itself reduces to naught, that the route is incorrect in its maner of reckoning. Yet again, this does not mean that there is nothing ‘outside’ of whatever. This ‘nothing’ is the crash space. All discourses arise an an ideological mandate, as a intrinsic mythology, due to the substantiation of a single foundational fact, this fact being the uncontroversial term, the ‘given’ of the discussion.

It is here that Harman’s ‘over’ and ‘under’ determination becomes operative as relational analogous categories to describe what his occurring, again, not as substantial real components of objective quality. His arguments are against particular contexts, particular discursive ‘givens’ that he must confront as a member of the academy, for which he must produce content.

So also, we then see, as much as the essay below represents a datum over another semantic point of argument, it is because it takes another ‘given’ as a means to argue a particular point about what may be real; this time a sort of ‘brain’ or ‘physical operation’ of such real structure. The given of the physical brain producing experiences has allowed a view that sees itself as a partial manifestation of an impartial effect, and has understood that without such partiality (the partiality wherein what is impartial likewsie resides in meaning), ‘nothingness’ occurs in meaning and its corresponding ‘feeling’, which is the collaspe of knowledge into itself, collapsing upon itself. And, that this means only that when there is no view that there is no view; it does not mean that there being no view means that the world is the view. This fact reveals something about the nature of being human, and it is more than an existential nihilistic uselessness amd purposelessness.

Similar to Bruno Latour’s effort in AMIE to first identify the need for an opening, and then to allow for the facts that can be discerned because an opening has been allowed: So it is that we might begin to find these ‘givens’, and how they manifest discourse as proposing substantial content. These ‘givens’ as datum, rather than the argument upon what is reduced or produced from the discourses, which result in redundancy; seeing there discourses as results of a given situation, thereby grants us the data by which to discern our sought after science. The data will then be the content, but not in its argumentative capacity, but rather what it is doing. 

The example is, say, a chair. How much do you need to say in describeing a chair before I understand what you are talking about? Probably very little. Yet conventional philosophy says that you can never describe enough, and I will never realize what you are describing as a chair. It takes little more than this to realize that philosophy of this sort is based in a fantasy. So we might see that the idea behind these two aspects of the philosophical method is: Left only with a capacity to know, which is to say, if I already did not have a conception or idea of what a chiar is, and or I did not have recourse to a personal gesture from the first person toward the object in question at hand for reference, and or in some imaginary world where there might be a being or intelligent creature who is not human who has no access to a chair nor has ever experienced what a chair might be — in the condition of at least one of these three conditions, knowledge left to itself would never be able to convey the chair to another’s knowledge suffuciently to supply this other with ‘chairness’. Always there would be another question that would have to be qualified, and the answer to which that would fail to qualify exclusively what a chiar actually is.

Nevertheless: There is a chair right there and I do have recourse to many human aspects and relationships to be able to convey to me what a chair is sufficiently enough for me to not only use it functionally (to sit down on it), but as well to use it in communication on many levels. One might ask: What else is a chair then? Wee; it is more than ideology and political social justice, though these things are indeed necesaary and good (we should instead just call them what they are instead of lumping them into the category of ‘philsophy’.)

Conventional philsophy would have it that we have access to what the chair might actually be, but not only this. Conventional philosophy assumes as it is important that we not only acknolwege that the chair exists as ‘more than’ a chair, but also argues this importance. This is why modern conventional philosophy has been accused of being nothing less than sophistry. The aggravating issue has to be what happens when we notice what conventional philsophy is doing.

We notice that philosophy is arguing its own validity even in the face of the exposure that its validity is merely an argument. The idea is this: Do I have to argue that a chair is a chair for it to be a chair, or is it always already a chair? I would say that the chiar is a chair regardless of what I want to say about it, but that further I can say many things about a chair, but I dont have to argue its existence for me to be able to consider the many things about what a chair may be.

Now; when we look at philosophy and we realize what it is doing, what does that mean?

I say thay it means that we have found the object called philosophy despite its argument about how it cannot be found. I say that this object is conventional philosophy because most philosophers are so caught up in the method, the substance that is logic step 1, logic step 2, step 3…as of logic is more than merely a tool, that they are incapable of admitting that thier method has been identified, in fact, as an object. They will be completely mystified as to what I can possibly mean, and will use the method to prove to me I am wrong, that philosophy is not an object that can be found. Yet it is because I used no method to find it, I stick with what I am doing to call it philosophy, and distinguish the arguments of convetional philosophy as now a near empty set, an object whose content I may now use as data.

So we might continue along this idea: How much do I have to read of Emmanual Kant before I understand what he is talking about? I say not very much, because , just like the chair, once you understand what he is saying, you understand the object he is talking about. Likewsie; how much do I need to read of Hurserl? Quite soon in the reading of Husserl you see the object he is describing. What about Derrida? Delueze? Wittgestien? Hegel?

What happens when we admit the object they are talking about is indeed a common object, rather than a secret and deep, complex and elusive object? Answer: We can begin to address what these authors are saying as data, that is, as examples of what Subjects are doing with the common philosophical object. Relieved of psycholoigcal theological approximations that rely upon intuited transcedental subjective interpretations to manifest identity, we can thereby begin to view the human object, as opposed to having only the enfolded and redundant subjective interpretation of objects. Once we can begin to accumulate data on what the Subject is doing with the common philosophical object, we can begin to more fully understand what the human being is, and what it does.

 

The THREe POUND BRAIN essay evidences a certain cognition, a certain intentional acknowledgment of the issue, as well as intuiting what needs to occur. It seems that, at least here, THREE POUND BRAIN evidences a closer move toward this science.

 

 

* “The Moment of Decisive Significance: A Heresy” which will be out soon , fingers crossed , addresses these concerns, albeit in a non-conventional manner. The Revised edition has an added Preface, Preface to the Introduction, Forward and an Introduction, as well as an Author’s Note,  just to make sure everything is handled. 😄

REPOST:

 

JAMES XAVIER: Sam, what’s the range of human vision? SAM BRANT: Distance? JAMES XAVIER: No, wavelength. SAM BRANT: Between 4000 angstrom units and 7800 angstrom units.* You know that. JAMES XAVIER: Less than one-tenth of the actual wave spectrum. What could we really see if we had access to the other ninety-percent? Sam, we […]

via To Ping or Not to Ping: Physics, Phenomenology, and Observer Effects — Three Pound Brain

 

[NOTE: A variation of this comment about an essay posted in THREE POUND BRAIN forms part of the “Preface to the Intorduction” of the revised 1st edition of the book “Absolution“, that is called now: “The Moment of Decisive Significance: A Heresy“. It is copyright 2016 by Lance A. Kair.]

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