Category Archives: post-modern

Time is Longer That We Think..

If we think there was a post-modern era, and now we are in a another era, think again. While I have my difficulties with Bryant, he at least appears to engage with ideas and text in a manner that defies ‘temporal eras’. So again we have a further evidence of the need for a bifurcation, a divergence. In time we could say that there is was an era that can be identified by certain types, certain organizations of terms; yet of time we can say that post-modernism identifies, in the Lyotardian sense, a certain type that has nothing to do with objective-temporal eras.

If Byant’s post below is not a post-modern expression then I don’t know what is. Set me aside then because you are obviously, as I say, oriented upon a True Object in a manner that I see as contrary to the manner in which Bryant is engaging in his post. (I will never know what Bryant has to say about this, because i am beneath his consideration).  

In 20 some-odd years, we have not moved from Derrida and the other PMs; in 50 not a jot from Sarte or Lacan; in 100 years, not stepped on increment from Heidegger’s Dasein, in 200 years, not one minute from Hegel. What is new is interesting. What is not new is significant.

In contrast yet complicit with Latour: We are Still Modern.

Here is the evidence:

REPOST:

 

 

There is something unbearable about the Lacanian teaching; something that makes you want to turn away and flee, or at the very least forget. It is not his opaque style, though that style performs the very thesis he wishes to articulate. At its heart, the core Lacanian teaching is that there is no cure for […]

via The Ineluctable Tragedy of Existing — Larval Subjects .

The Modern of Post Modernism; The Anthropocene, Object Orientation and the Possibility of Ground.

 

I feel it is time to clear the air; the smoke of post-modernism still seems to linger. It is time we come to terms with what Post-Modernism means, what it meant, what it is.

There is no debate in this; any debate that would uphold a sort of PM catch-all has missed the issue. I think it is this apparent problem for which I address by suggesting a divergence is warranted.

Post modernism is a manner of dealing with reality where metanarratives fail. PM Is a response to the failure. But in that it is merely a response, it must itself be based in a metanarrative, albeit and however unsure and undisclosed as it may be. But we need no longer hesitate in this mire of indecision and doubt. Where the post-modern is indeed necessary, it often fails in that it wants to repeat itself, to reify itself, to eternalize itself; ironically, this is a Modern trait that Post-Modernism attempted to confront.

So it is we may see many authors attempting to place this indistinction, this temporal hesitation. This is where Bruno Latour attempts to make an opening: So the PM metanarrative, itself a kind of ‘unconsolidation’, might find the meaning of the void (but only void by virture of the Modern metanarrative, or the metanarrative that is modern) where by PM finds its ability to call into question metanarratives by allowing what has been silent to speak.

The task now is to find that narrative that accounts for the, now twice avoided, silence; which is to say, we need admit that we all have been colonized despite PM, that PM is was an ironic vehicle to establish and reify Modernity.

Perhaps an apparent geology, what mane are calling the ‘anthropocene’, will snap us out of the magical glamour of PM ironic transcendency, and stop fantasizing that ‘I’ have some sort of communion with ‘un-god’, some ‘extra universal’ situation. So we can get back to some sort of ground.

I have read and am somewhat familiar with 4 of the (in)famous PM authors; Michel Foucault, Jean Francios Leotard, Gilles Deleuze, and Jacques Derrida. Of Baudrillard Ive only read tiny bits here and there. Virillo ive not heard of. Of course, there are other PM authors that are not so famous that I have read, and even some that are not considered ‘post-modernist’ but yet are speaking of similar issues.

While i do like and understand these PM authors i have read, i also see that Lyotard was probaly the best at seeing through history. Foucault, oddly enough, was caught in a ‘vertical’ dynamic even as he posed a ‘horizon’, and Deluze was still too high, too near to the event to be able to see past self centrism. And also that at least Lyotard and Deleuze are mis-appropriated as they are mis-applied; this last is the issue Alain Badiou and Laruelle address, as well as Bruno Latour.

It is or should be a fact, by now, that the nature of humans is to have real worlds, or a Real world, as the case may be. The issue of all if not most of many of the Big Names, as well as many smaller names, of the past 200 year of philosophy, but maybe even longer, is the difference involved in what might be called ‘truth baring’, and ‘reality baring’ operations. Every great philosopher addresses this issue, but the issue of this issue is how the telling of the ‘first’ issue often finds itself awash in the second issue, the effect that Badou describes and addresses. Yet these authorial addressings, these worlds, are, in effect, metanarratives.

There is a disentanglement of philosophy that must occur if we are to even get anywhere, if we are to stop having ‘turns’ and ‘eras’ and such. But if we must swim in this pit of eternal denial, then we can say that in a certain sense the Post-modern wanted to propose some sort of new reality, but alas we find that PM was no different than the realities anywhere else or any time, and that this is the fault of the second appropriated issue. The difference lay only in the terms that are used. Derrida said good things about discursive limitation, what for other terms is indeed the Modern/Post-modern paradox, but he too was caught in a vertical situation likewise that inevitably puts him in a modern sorting, which is to say, of a metanarrative. As a witness to this paradox, Lyotard, I’d say, was closest: The ‘post’ thus was is not meant to be some temporal suggestion; more, it was is a description of a situation and its logical defaults based within the ‘modern’ discursive scheme. Yet, that people took and continue to take it as some sort of historical era or attitude, thus shows that mis-appropriation as mis-appropriation (denial as showing what is true) is of the issue of the second type.

I say PM is more about orientation upon objects than it is about some attitude or argumentative position. What I see of PM, and Lyotard specifically, is he was come upon by his experience, his metanarrative, of himself, and found, through an engagement with history, through what is already established for by to bring what is true and real unto a person, with the discourse of reality itself, that his metanarrative could not be justified by this real discourse; upon reflection he finds that what constitutes himself is different than what the metanarrative says of himself and what he should be. This his issue presented in his book “The Differend”. So, ironically, because of this situation, he saw that indeed the discourse by which he came (comes) to know himself is incommunicable, because he must use the discourse that is already there, and by this usage avoids that which he is trying to communicate. This juxtaposition of Being, thus allowed (s) him to bring a critique against the discourse that is not ‘hearing his case’, and thus calls this critique ‘post’ modern, because the real discourse is, or is seen as, ‘modern’ and the metanarrative that is incommensurate with this modern is thus post, or after, posterior. He thus finds this ‘modern’ reality involved with meta narratives (as he was involved) that are ineffective yet being used in a behavior as if they are effective, which is to say, communicating, and moves to expose this ‘human’ facet by (ironically) critiquing it; that is, not only critiquing the metanarrative by which he comes unto the world, but the idea of metanarrative itself. He there by opens the door to the removal of the subject, and the entrance on the scene of the Object, or what has been developed ‘post-post-modern’, SR and OOO and such.

The problem, though, is always the setting aside, forgetting, and then plain mis-appropriation of the ironic paradox. It is not so much that one needs to write with some subversive or double meaning, but that the irony of the situation by which one comes unto reality must remain intact. As even Nick Land seems to notice; one must come upon a certain type of knowledge that orients one upon what reality is, what the case of reality is, such that a critique of reality stems ultimately from an honest confrontation with that route by which one is coming upon that very reality. And this is to say, one confronts ‘the world’ by attacking the basis by which he or she has the world; to segregate the issue into some objective world and some subject-agent-operator is of the second type of issue.

This is the issue at hand, as well as the feature that distinguishes the reason why we need to ‘clean up’ philosophical discussion, as well why I advocate a kind of divergence.

 

Redrawing the Partition Whereby Philosophical Discourse Leads to Particular Decisions of Route. 

It is interesting to me the various places and occasions that move us to consider things and their lighting.  Here is one of those occasions:

NPR: Gender and Willingness to Compete.

Of course, this is a general overview presented in its brevity for the purpose of the general education of the reasonably intelligent. But nevertheless, what strikes me is that here again is a questioning that appears out of seemingly nowhere, that confronts the perceived natural order of things. This time, the manner by which we figure to find the best candidate performer of any situation, as well as what the best group of candidates means, and the the very functioning of real mechanisms, is brought to issue. But that is not what is particularly significant to me. What appears significant is not that the system is faulty; rather, it is that the way by which the system has been questioned does not open a new vector for discussion. In fact, it does more than bring the situation in to question; it suggests that there is a substantial lack involved in the situation as it is. If we have been following my ideas through this blog: It actually indicates a particular substance, an actual situation of position that is not able to be considered by the present route of real meaning, even while this route poses its total inclusion.

Now, for those so keen, it is difficult to miss the past 50 years of social justice that can be wrapped up in this situation. The too often misappropriated seminal essay by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s  on political representational voice, “Can the Subaltern Speak” begins to stir in memory. But the issue I notice on this pass is not a silence that has been left out due to the functioning of a systematic ideology of oppression; i do not propose a recinciliation of parties. So much of philosophy and critical thinking is dead set upon social justice that almost every contemporary philosopher must enjoin her ideas with political meaning, while missing the ‘subject-effect’. We are indeed still confined by the post-colonial/post-modern appropriation of social justice. Spivak’s critique begins to evoke an end, but it is an end that finds its beginning once the political subaltern has been ‘fully colonized’, or perhaps more politically correct phrasing “free”. For, in that great post-modern era, there was still a sort of idealism that felt somehow the colonial motion could be ‘dissolved’; dissolved indeed it was, but into its enforcer that we call ‘Capitalism’. But make no mistake: We all have been colonized, and most thoroughly. (Zizek: The most difficult thing is to imagine outside of capitalism.) The dream of Spivak and her bud Derrida (and the like) was more than that upon the finding of the question that opened the door to ‘nothing’ thus revealed in the destruction of the soveriegn Western Subject that a multiplicity of agents lay hidden in oppression, but that the universe was indeed constituted by this multiplicity, that freedom was in this release; dread for us to find that this was just a deception that functioned for the West to make everyone Subjects. 

Nevertheless; the bodies should be counted and ordered, and everyone has to first speak for this to happen, and there indeed is a value, and a goodness, in bodily freedom, even as it might be theoerticaly bound, (note the first paragraph of pg 68 in Spivak, on desire) Yet those kind of ideal appropriations came about and took place (to take place) in a moment when there was still a kind of exoticism hanging around the West; orientalism still colored the world through the shadow of European colonialism. It was the last age of magical thinking that still could go on with a certain aire of plausibility. Now, though we are still working out the finer details of how the ideals of equality, freedom and human opportunity should be applied, and magically adjusting reality in the processes, even while we try to stamp out the ignorance of at least blatant (if not institutional) racism and bigotry, it is not difficult to see that the World is indeed, and has become, The World in a proper objective sense; as they say, globalism is more than some big idea, media and technology allow us to have good neighbors 3000 and more miles away. It is (now really) a small world after all.

So when we now look at Jean Francios Lyotard’s ‘The Differend’, we might be able to begin to see it in its proper light, apart from the direct appropriations of feminism and race relations; this is to say that while we indeed do involve others in an ethically considerate reflection, we should maybe start, maybe begin to be able, to understand that a reflection never gets further than the view that beholds it – or more precisely, if we have been keeping up, that there are two routes such that there is one type of reflection that does get further than its view.

Consider this latest post in Dark Ecologies about Slavoj Zizek:

REPOST: Stranger in our Midst

The point that is made by Zizek, explained along a particular path in the link, is that the stranger is not someone we do not know. It is not the situation at hand that a stranger is someone foreign to us. Rather, it is that the stranger is the situation that we know all too well. It is not that we don’t know, for his example of the migrants in Europe, these strangers that are coming into our land; on the contrary, we know exactly who and what they are, and it is this kind of knowing that allows the EU to maintain the conditions of its situation as such. We are concerned that these people coming into our country will cause all sorts of catastrophic problems that could lead to the disintegration of the EU (will Britain pull out now? Germany?): Because the integration that is the EU is situated in the terms that tell us exactly what these strangers are, it is the contradiction inherent of the stranger confronting our boarders that frieghtens us and causes all sorts of stir. For example, it is not that migrants are raping our women; everyone is raping everyone all the time no matter what label we put on a group to justify our statistics. We integrate difference into our union by allowing for the stranger to act in strange (or deviant) ways, to thus confirm our boundaries and what we know (qualified by that “we don’t know”) as true.

Yet the significance I see, that which I have been let unto, is that it is in this knowing the stranger that also allows us to perpetually put off and defer what is really strange, what we might say is alien, to merely a stranger who comes in and disrupts everything and does heinous acts. What is alien is that which defies our sense of truth such that it remains invisible to our view. Effective as it may be, we routinely usurp the power of what may be alien through what means truth by virtue of what we see or are able to view, through what means truth allows us to see.

Before we get to this point, though, and as we remain in the political realm of social justice, and derive discourse from the paradigm of a particular vector cycle of meaning (correlational), there is what I have called a partition that allows for the correlational cycle to appear solute, to appear as though it addresses everything that can possibly be. By this partition, we have a position, identity, but it is an identity that is based in what Francios Laruelle might call a philosophical decision. It is this position, the placement of the partition in meaning that can define a paradigm, but also what we can call an intrinsic mythology, what I call, in short, a route of meaning, by which I may situate True Objects.

Yet, when we consider the studies from the first link that shows that women tend not to enter a competitive situation when they know it is competitive even when they will have excelled in the activity, we have an indication of a situation that is viewed as pervasive and ubiquitous as it is prosaic, a situation the meaning of which and the manner of which is commonplace and taken thereby as obviously true; for, a feminist need not be a woman as well as the statistics are speaking of gender. But not only this; usually such a kind of result that brings the question leaves us in a lurch wondering what might be the content of this hole that was created by the available question. Yet here we have also the indication that indeed we can identify the content of the the ‘subaltern’. But see; this is only similar to the colonial recordings of the colonized practices and beliefs, such as Nicholas Dirks notices in his book “Castes of Mind”. Here we do not have to wonder about what might truly be the content of such proscriptions and then wait for the subaltern colonized bodies to speak themselves. Here we know exactly what the content is, or at least that there is indeed a content we know of that we are merely denying. The difference lay, on one hand, in where we place the partition, but on the other, which way we look, in what direction, and how we see things, what i call orientation. Women, Indian-Asian, Native-American, Latino, and more  –indeed they were and are being denied by the practice of colonial oppression, but they were being denied as a practice or effect of or because of, not what the colonizer did not want to see, but exactly because of the colonizer could not see. In our present considerations we are not nullifying that there are still bodies that cannot be seen who need to find their voice; instead, we are saying that once the bodies are found and the voices heard then the political no longer is the ‘last frontier’, or to put it in specifically post-modern terms: The ‘fact’ that we might be confined and limited by discourse does not mean that the only recourse we have is to the political-ideological realm, nor to the philosophical iterations that serve to reify its domain; similar to what Mr. Vedantam suggests in the NPR story, such an automatic default is most probably a false choice, a recourse that is seen to be the only route due to the placement of the partition of meaning, but that indeed now we might be able to see that there is some content beyond the limit, and as such, the limit would be then proposing itself in denial of the content that lay beyond it.

Hence, I am also reminded of the situation in which I find myself, because somehow I don’t like to compete and routinely go around direct test comparisons of assets, even though I am a man and (i like to think) quite masculine to boot. It is this apparently auspicious combination of traits that then moves me to withdraw from competition while all the while working on subversive means to win. Like Captain James Kirk in the Kobayashi Maru:

Kobayashi Maru
2009 Kirk Cheats
In a way, I don’t like to lose, and because I found myself in a no win (post-modern white wash) situation, I realized that this could not be the absolute case. And in fact, the discourses that revolve around, through and every which way upon a political and ideological, as well as psychological, solution somehow left me out and is leaving me out. Not as a Spivakian subaltern with no voice, but some kind of different invisible content, noticed yet denied.

(Hey; wasn’t there a Vulcan officer in one of the Star Trek movies who was named “Spivak” ???)

Repost:One and Two: Politics, Governance, and Antagonism; and comment. 

First the repost: 

Perhaps it could be said that politics is that which occurs at that precise moment that we learn to count to Two.  If this were the case, then it would follow that not everything is political.  Everything can become political, but politics is something is something that must be made to be.  When is it […]

https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2016/02/10/one-and-two-politics-governance-and-antagonism/
Then the comment, which is an extension of my previous two postings:

Irony is…

…that God’s purpose is to bring about Its own destruction, evidently, obviously and finally. So that the world becomes the second thought. 

With reference to this repost, the shift we enact that defines the divergence is exactly the move that exposes the ‘second’ of the this repost’s essay, of the Zizek reference and the bunny-duck thing. The point is (the repost above, here) that there is this second world that is not recognized by the ‘one’ world. But indeed that argument falls at a crucial point: It is not just not recognized, but such a second is a second that is only theorized about for the purpose of maintaing the ‘one’ of the First but under different terms, as if it is not merely terms changing. 

Hence we have at least some evidence that the ‘one’ which is proposing toward the ‘second’ world is doing so as a sort of magic, a slight of hand: Established on a theoretical theorem that reality extends no further than discourse and that discourse is reality such that effecting discourse changes reality, the one world distracts attention from its target, which is the reification of the one world, by givng lip service to this theoretical second. 

But see; if we have been following my blog, my essays, we should glean that indeed discourse is all there is but it is ones orientation upon the terms that is at issue. The issue rests firmly in the assertion that there is one proper manner/method of appropriating discourse; what i call the conventional method.

Hence we must expose just how the conventional method maintains its power of truth in the face of its fallacy, and this is done by having that whichis second not by virtue of the oppressing assertion of discourse itself asserting its primacy in the place of the displaced one. Thereby does the destruction of God equate and show that the theoretical second is but an object of the transcendent clause, which is to say, a truth of reality established through faith. 

The second, while ressonant in the first, as we see in the essay about Barths comment on Romans, defies the first in its very nature, which can be said in this case to be discourse, but not merely some ‘flat’ discourse, rather what is now indicated by the meaning of two routes. 

The Fallacy of Realism.

(Da Sein and the Phenomenon, part 2)

If we pay attention, then we may notice that we have been deceived. But most do not notice. The distinction, then, is made between these two ‘awarenesses’, these two ‘knowledges’. So we have really three distinctions, three ‘modes’ evidenced in philosophical authorship.

One; of the deception. Denial that there is a possibility of various modes. This is denial as ignorance. This is no acknowledgment of any sort of some grand, real deception. Here reality is reality. There is no problem here. Reality offers the truth of all things possible to human understanding through the interaction of humanity in the universe. All possibility falls within reality.

Two: coming upon the deception and seeing it not as as absolute limit. This is denial
– either in knowing of the limit and revolting back from it, as an essential mandate of being.
– or, knowing of the limit and using that limit to actively create. This is denial in the deceptive sense.

Three: Knowing that the limit only concerns reality.

But see; this is not a description of a One ‘true’ situation. This is a description of three manners of appropriation. We are talking about how meaning functions, and not about some true-real reduction to some common humanity.

This proposal always reveals this triad. Those who see that all expression must reduce to a common human understanding, what we call and is the modern situation; those who have encountered a type of confrontation or awareness of the modern situation but who nevertheless consciously operate within it, the post postmodern situation; those who do not reside within the modern paradigm, those of the post-modern situation, of Da Sein.

Da Sein is not a description of some whole humanity, as if everyone, every human being somehow exists as a Da Sein. No; he is describing an exceptional situation. It is the subsequence that Heidegger had to defend against; but also the reason why his system did not work, and likewise why he though the German Nationalist Socialists were the way to go. Likewise, this is the reason why certain post postmoderns have to defend against being identified as Da Sein: Because they do not wish to have to confront the conventional subsequence, the conventional ignorance, that would (mis-)identify Da Sein as somehow having to do with Modern terror. Indeed, it still does, but under a different guise. Deception.

Post-modernism’s Worth. 

When we are too close to an event, we talk about it as from a distance. That is, what we say is automatically distanced from the event, a maximum distance. The event is thus, by this occurrence, an object. As opposed to our psychotherapeutic model, the closer we are to an event, the more dishonest we are about its true bearings, that is, the truth of the matter, why it is that the (the wholeness of the) event has occurred the way it has. The impetus and the reaction can be come upon as an included item, a truth in-itself, only when we are distanced from the event. The truth of an object, as opposed to the True Object, can only be viewed in its truth from a distance. The equation is thus of inversion, of ratio.

Here then we may have a basis upon which to properly view foundational post-modern writers, namely, Derrida, Deleuze and Guittari, but others also.  To wit: Their descriptions were from a basis too close to the event, such that they attempted to quickly and finally establish a ground for the event; the event being thus so profound and significant, they were compelled to offer a reason.

They were not wrong, only rash. 

It is analogous to an explosion. We have now the data from the explosion, having encountered it ourselves, but also come across the initial first hand rationalization and fact crunching reports of the explosion itself – with that, subsequent explosions, and now the reports and experience of the aftermath(s) of explosions, we can now safely report upon the truth of the whole event. 

The Matter At Hand, Part 2: The Mark of Faith — Object Oriented Philosophy, the ‘New’ Realisms and Post-Modernism.

“What happened ??”

*

In the event of reading an essay generated by the PMG, we have to think from the perspective of not knowing that it is a fake, keeping in mind that this program is admittedly old and stunted in its potential, but that it would be possible to write a more complex protocol that could generate more lengthy and involved syntactical and contextual structures that would ultimately be very difficult to discern as bogus. Under this presumption that we are indeed reading a piece of legitimate theory, we need only to understand the turn in thought that occurs upon being let into the joke, so to speak, and what that says not only of being human, but more, of thought itself, as well then what history is and means. This is because in this type of upsetting, the ground for our theoretical efforts is not so easily found, for often enough the ground itself is in question by the mode of offering of the theory.

Indeed, from this setting is elicited a mounting frustration resolved not by confronting the situation — the subsequent post-modern thought thought itself to confronting it — but by completely rejecting the whole of the line of thought that brought about the situation in first place (Object Oriented Philosophy, Speculative and the ‘new’ Realisms) loosely defined against history as Cartesian, Copernican or Kantian, and for our present situation as ‘phenominalist’ and its corresponding conventional paradox noticed by Quentin Miessalloux as correlationalism. The problem here in these latest proposals is that they cannot get beyond the problem so they reject it by sublating the problem as the impetus and catalyst by which such ‘new Realist’ positions may arise. In other words, they assert that the method must be applied in moderation and from there we might then be able to find a True basis, a ground, for real discourse. Moderation and mediation is thus the mode where reality is true — but hasn’t this been the maxim of all real conventionality, an assertion of revolutionary action based in a return to the norm, a reactionary move?? Are they really saying that The True Reality should be found through moderation ?? I want to say ‘yes’, but in response to what (really) does this ‘yes’ arise (can we be really honest) ? (Come on; are we allowed to be honest yet ? Well, maybe not yet. ) If indeed the answer is yes, then it is not too difficult a stretch to see the reinstatement of a metaphysical imperative, which is to say, for other terms, a manifest destiny, a providence that has encompassed the whole of humanity throughout history as it continues to do so at this very moment — but set aside in argument, the question of ‘God’ or ‘spirit’ being left now to the opinion of religion, the conventional reality of the pure multiple.

Note that it is absolutely ironic and consistent with the unbiased argument that the question of the philosophical revolution occurs and is answered in the setting aside of the question itself. This is the Speculative move. But the issue left is how and why this move came about, as well as how it continues to be a problem, because until then, we can only hope — but again, what is conventional faith ? This is then how we get to the significant philosophical issue, and the continuance of the status quo methodology is how we get to the necessity of revealing just what is entailed in the conventional reaction (denial).

*

These two sites (really, the one just links to the other) can serve as an example of how we react:

Zizuku: http://blog.talkingphilosophy.com/?p=219

http://alunsalt.com/2008/03/04/like-the-postmodernism-generator-but-funnier/

Consciousness is a funny thing; making meaning is all it does. No matter what one wants to make of it, the very making is meaning made. The question is always whether this meaning has any essential teleology; the stringing along or construing of meaning is the issue here. The conflation or association the site above has made between the PMG and the discourses if Slavoj Zizek is significant. Just as Alan Sokal helped to deflate the Post Modern bubble (a bubble, I might say, created by many accredited people who had no clue), the process of revealing how consciousness works, as opposed to merely riding upon reactionary theoretical tropes in the attempt to assert a more real reality and thereby create an identity, must evoke uncomfortable meanings, confronting and even breaching the fashionable trend of the day.

For what we are dealing with here is the maxim of operational consciousness: In the effort for the True Object (which is really itself) the individual takes True Objects as essentially separate universal entities as problematic items for the purpose of asserting the Truth of such entities to establish itself, the individual. This maxim is responsible for reality, as this phenomenon enacts a strange force that is the power of itself; the power of reality is that it allows for and or creates an arena in which real elements may interact in a real way. This is so true that it hardly need be stated, and when it is stated people roll their eyes because it sounds so ridiculous. Yet if it isn’t stated then people do not roll their eyes and can continue in plausible denial; it is after it is stated that real progress may occur, for until that point, it was only as an illusion of progress, as reality is never an illusion. For we are really dealing with me and you, and the object that allows for real determination of this distinction.

As to the blogger that came up with ‘Zizuku’ (so great!): In reality, therefore, an intelligent person may read Zizek and see a pattern to his rhetoric. Just as the PMG’s products are discounted against actual human agency, Zizek’s mode is discounted as a ridiculous game, but both which are seen to be included for ‘good’ human production of theory given that the limitations of their modes are identified, made into a real-true object, and now can be moved upon to actually yield ‘better’ theoretical productions. As I have said, the issue concerns how we distinguish between an essay that is basically a random assemblage of syntax that appears to make sense, and an actual researched and thought out humanly constructed meaningful assemblage of contextual significance? How do we reconcile ‘random’ through an ‘ordering’ of method, since the essays are generated along a specific path of commands (a program), using a specific pool of terms that are assembled based upon no apparent consideration of the various individual terms’ meanings? And as to Zizek in this regard; what does it mean that Zizek’s discursive performances can be discerned to a scheme (Zizuku)? How are these presentations related, what is being apprehended and comprehended, and how is this assessment a reaction?

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First, the PMG. So to back up a little bit, the point here is the ‘better’ productions. The problem the PMG revealed was that where discourse was at issue, deconstruction, the questioning of discursive authority, and hermeneutical analysis being operative, the post-modern ideal itself was taken in a mistaken mode, as indication of a further True Object that might be gained through such methods. The fact of the ability to program such a generator, nevermind Sokal’s ability to write a fake paper that was taken as legitimate post-modern theory, shows that the ‘program’ of human meaning itself taken as a route by which to construct and or reveal more meaning yields nonsense, but that the result of the nonsense, taken as a further product of its own method for meaning, yields the sense that such ‘low level’ meaning making is nonsense: This is thus the sense that comes from nonsense that makes the nonsense sensible. By a reduction of discourse to its own operational bases as a means to analyze its productions (deconstruction; hermeneutics) against the result of this process as an analysis, we get at a real outline of the situation handed to us: A real nonsensical meaning is essentially a baseline from which all other meaningful discourses may arise; this is what we can justifiably call ‘void’. Then the production of meaning that notices the nonsensical result: The real event that begins the count of the pure multiple. Hence, the PMG is the instrumental manifestation of the baseline for making meaning, and thus while it does show that the meaning we make might just as well be just as nonsensical, that we are also merely ordering machines without a basis where we can find the ‘order of the order’, the more significant meaning we get from this temporal marking of the parameters of knowledge is out of a type of Sartean revolt: We revolt from this abyss of free syntax back into the contextual limit. But more; once we fall back into the imperative for context, we see the contextual world as deriving from a necessary order that gives significantly meaningful order, or, orderly meaning: purpose, teleology. This is not a critique of the situation, as post-modern ideals would usually advocate (Zizek: the example somehow undermines the veracity of itself), but merely a stating of the fact of the matter.

In other words, the ideal that discourse is all there is yields (or has yielded) a Kantian intuited world where the products of the PM method arose due to the True Object that is the discourse and method, such that this True base thus necessarily yields a better more real Truth of the universe: This is the mark of conventional faith. The PM discourse itself as an arena arisen from the efforts of individuals attempting to establish their identity in a true reality ironically yielded a theoretical reality that came to be called out for its nonsensical rhetoric. The discursive arena itself supported a Truth that functioned to further a real theoretical validity. But this validity was soon revealed to be just that: theoretical but basically nonsense. Structurally sound and justified within a particular discursive cohortive arena by the fact of its placement within institutions of ‘higher learning’ (pun absolutely intended).

Thus our question that comes to bare on the situation: What grounds theory? The answer is ironic, but the irony is missed in most cases, typically, as evidenced by the past 200+/- years of philosophy. I need not rehash the essays of Constructive Undoing, but enough to say that language is supposed material of its own objective analysis, the object that is language as well as the object of its clausal reference, of its intent meaning; the irony being of a particularly Kantian problematic (extrapolated conventionally in the 200 year span) in so much as every object of this discursive case is taken to be or have been intuitively apprehended, which is to say, from the assumed transcendent affection. In this case, it is of no matter what ones logic or personal belief is because there is no theory that does not operate within knowledge and discourse.

So the question comes to be pivotal to how philosophical effort should proceed, and it is in response to this problem that Realist philosophies such a s Harman’s OOO arise; though i would hesitate to lump this ‘new’ effort into a common theme, the effort does arise in a common thread to the Significant Event as well to reflect upon the issue of this essay here, which is how consciousness functions when confronted with its own limit, and what that likewise means in (the production of) reality.

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Thus next up in part 3: What is the relationship between the products of the PMG and the rhetoric of Zizek?