Category Archives: Martin Heidegger

The Badlands (single 2017)

The Covert Sound Philosophy.

It is Covert: It is not readily available to view.

But, once it is viewed, then the Philosophy becomes obviously Sound.

It is a Covert Sound Philosophy.

It is a covert philosophy

It is a sound philosophy

It is a philosophy that arrives in sound, that is music, underneath what is overt.

“..but it was no cave we were in, it was indeed, the badlands…”

The wasteland grows; woe to him who hides wastelands within!”

Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche .

“These words in turn are supposed to be clarified by the statement: “Most thought-provoking in our thought-provoking time is that we are still not thinking.”

— Martin Heidegger.  “What is Called Thinking

Anslem’s Argument for the Proof of the Existence of God, the Disruption of Time, and the Categorization of Philosophical Behavior.

I seem to have found a significance for Anslem’s proof. It may be that it is not significance for whether God might exist, but, as I have said, significance for how I present ideas.

We will start with the rendition from Princeton’s site. I think they have a pretty good rendition there.

Without all the strict logical hoopla, I think the simple way to put Anslem’s idea is that God exists because we can think of It.

The significance of this notion appears to disrupt what we generally consider of time, it’s ‘natural and directional’ progress.

The Princeton site says that Anslem was addressing a particular issue that, actually, we still find totday in atheism. Basically, Anslem is confronting two ideas:

1.He understands the claim that God exists.
2.He does not believe that God exists.

Now, I have done only the most preliminary research into Anslem and his ideas. I am just taking the very popular simple version, and considering these two situations. There is no ‘hidden’; whatever Anslem’s results most probably are quite apparent, and the ones that are not – well, what point am I trying to make here? I have already said in my earlier post that there is no logical argument that sways me in any direction or causes me to believe something I didn’t before. So any extension of argument must be involving something else; perhaps I am attempting to get at what this something could be.

I think the main point Anslem makes is that, as Princeton puts it, this is an inherently unstable condition of being. What we might call the ‘founding essence’ can be understood to be responsible for this instability. Somewhat similar to a ‘thing-in-itself’, this founding essence would be a kind of gravity well, if you will, of mental activity. The instability arises because of the knowledge (the known-ness) of what something is able to be. The question arises: How can I know what something is if it doesn’t exist? The basic assumption in this question, what philosophers tend to lump into the category called ontology, is that existence is, that there is no need to discern what existence is because to argue for or against the being of existence does nothing to displace the argument except as much as it merely denies existence. The point of saying something exists thus should equate with what can be known, and so the instability of the situation is found in the human ability to choose on whether what exists is actually true. In this case, though, Anslem is dealing with the basis of all that exists as a category, namely, God; God, in this sense, as we cannot but apply our modern sense to consideration of it, is merely the name of the category that contains all that can exist as an active element, the element by which all else can be said to be. The extension in time to Heidegger’s ‘Being and Time’ can be understood as a factual description of this situation, and thus, rather than an opening up unto Being, ironically as a closing of Being unto itself and thus a factual description of what human beings do: The identification of the in-itself of human Being. More on that elsewhere.

The resolution that Anslem posits of this unstable situation occurs because of the foundational nature of the knowledge itself. In this Medieval Christian context (which I argue is still a modern context), the resolution (the clarity, the definition) that must be referred to must be understood in a context not so much of mind, but of the essential God-inundated mind that is able to uphold and entertain knowledge, which for our context might be the mind that exists. In short, the condition of knowledge is/was such that all things referred or otherwise are established in existence due to an absolute situation, a situation whereby all things gain their status in the universe, what we usually index by the idea of an absolute ethics, in a manner of speaking. In this condition it thus appears that a reflective mind will naturally be drawn into the the contradiction involved in making a choice as to the (true or false) existence of something that (already) exists (in essence), and will therefore correct (or become the correction) the instability by virtue of their own existence (in the absolute universe, or the universe that is indexed by absolution). The question of whether something actually, or physically, biologically exists, such as a race of human beings that live in the midieval antipodes, e2c1fd0e8fc468d9d55d018231578e47

unicorns, dragons, spirits, extraterrestrial aliens, etcetera, has no baring upon existence because of the absolute reference and access of mind to God (existence). What can be incorrect of knowledge as to what is true of existence finds its resolution in the posited (assumed) basis of existence. 

The Medieval as well as Modern mind is consistent in this ideal of progressive understanding of the universe. What is significant of this orientation upon progress is the mind’s innate access to what is true of the universe with reference to an assumed basis of that truth, what we can say is an assumption of stability unto which all knowledge will inevitably resolve; despite whether we posit that there is no actual resolution or that everything is flux, or whatever conditional conditions we define, the result of any positing is always toward ends, toward a resolution. Even if we say that the universe and the knowledge of that universe is completely and utterly contingent, this contingency must be absolute; hence we say that the effect of such terms within any scheme of knowledge or organization of definitions is what we can call a “founding term”. 

*

Oddly enough, we are able to find purchase into understanding what human beings do by looking at what philosophy does. Not, as Graham Harman might have it, that everything we might do automatically falls into a subjective appropriation of semantics that defies our attempt to locate such philosophical behavior. Rather, at some point we should be able to locate a mark by which we are able to be dismissed from this correlational philosophy that wants to avoid any critical gaze upon its method.

Once we find this mark (which I do not go into here), we can extend this situation (of existence and deferment) to apply to everything that might exist: Within this situation, a person can understand and then decide upon it. There is no thing that escapes this formula, and Anslem is making an accusation about it: It is unstable, and it will eventually resolve itself to the conclusion that the thing in question exists, in his Medieval case, God, and in our Modern case, perhaps, the object of empirical physics.

The point he relies upon is the idea that God is the greatest being or thing that can exist, for, so long as we can conceive of something greater, then that is not God. Similarly, we can use this conversely and say that because we can conceive of ‘that which nothing is greater’, this greatest thing exists as a foundational ontological ground of Modern effort as well: The ‘greatest’ thing is the most substantial. 

*

What interests me is that this simple notice occurred late in the 11th century. Here, already, is a situation made notice that no one noticed until very recently, like 10-20 years ago with the philosophers such as Alain Badou, Francois Laruelle, an then for the younger folks (of the time), of the Speculative Realist Conference. In particular, the idea is that there may be something that exists outside of our knowledge (not necessarily our ability to know), and as for in this situation, that which is greater than the greatest thing we can know. This category has brought modern philosophy (again) to consider things like voidnothingnesschaos and such things, and the corresponding ideal that whatever works to create identity is all good. But if we are honest, we might be able to glimpse the same ruminations of Scholasticism (St. Anslem is said to be one of the founders of the Medieval Scholasticism), occurring in our Modern philosophies, but under different terms. Indeed; I argue (along with Jean-Francois Lyotard apparently) elsewhere that Postmodern scholarship is really a religious apology for Modernity.

In this post I confront the veracity of some of our current philosophical modes and arguments by asking what seems to me to be a most obvious and significant question, a similar question that Graham Harman asks of Heidegger’s “tools“: Why did no-one  notice what Anslem had opened up until now, some 1000 years later? We are able to understand Anslem’s argument to this day; no one proposes that the thinkers 1000 years ago were any less astute than our thinkers today. Why is it only now that we are addressing the possibility of what might be ‘beyond’ or ‘at root but not part of’ (Badou’s consideration of set theory) knowledge? And then we might even ask more confounding question if we find that philosophers during the interim of the thousand years also considered the same question over and over. 

I submit for consideration that we have gotten not very far in philosophy. We might begin to understand the vastness of time and how slowly and incrementally human beings, as a group, accomplish knowledge, and how it is much more like a science than philosophers are capable of arguing. Indeed, if we think into this situation, we can then find often the situation that we have already come across elsewhere; namely, that on one hand philosophy is the way we situate the conditions of our times, how we work out logistical problems of being in a semantic world, and on the other, merely reflections of people (the authors) in-themselves. But if this is all philosophy does and is doing, then we also might see that we are actually merely re-contextualizing not what what has already been contextualized (as thus a re-contextualization), but in actually what we’ve already done, making the same arguments over and over but under different terms. We are reminded of Shakespeare’s “a rose by any other word…“.

Upon this conclusion, we are careful to not move too fast as we might then jump to the conclusion that such an idea should negate the ontological status of what I am calling conventional philosophy, as though such a proposal should then move beyond what we have and what we get through philosophical method. This is not the case. It seems near ridiculousness to figure that we can commandeer reality by a stroke of the pen (or a keystroke) except that we might be involved in such philosophical endorsement; we should then ask how is it that am I to get beyond it merely saying something in a particular manner? No. We cannot ‘turn’ the truth of the matter; we have but to see the power that is invested in the leviathan of religious interests, of maintaining a particular formation and method to know that, as the philosophers have argued, I cannot escape it unless I wish to perform some magic, perhaps some discursive slight of hand. We should ask if we can be done with all this trickery of the ontological police. Then, all we have to do is speak of facts instead of the essential Being of things, to speak teleologically instead of ontologically. We can argue the conditional nature of real essence for the rest of eternity and never get anywhere further than circling back and forth away from and back into Medieval type scholarship. And thats fine, and thats the point: This is the factual nature of reality, the impossible aspect of what we have to deal with in reality. Of course there will be those who will argue that what the philosophers are doing now days is not Scholasticism and who will produce all sorts of argumentative and ultimately circumstantial evidence to support their claim. Great! Perfect! Does this sway me to believe something that I don’t already know?  The proper response, in this case then, is that this is not a proposal toward any popular or social change, and in fact it has little to do with how political ideology might be at any moment; we can of course use it for such purposes (identifying our moment from the past conditional moments of history, for example, etcetera…), thats what Badiou and Zizek tell us…

We are not so much learning anything new as much as we are justifying our limited manner of Being in the world, and this is an end in itself that should be heeded but not as a call for change, as though we can somehow transcend what we are — we can only transcend was we identify with as political and ideological subjects. Rather, we should see this situation as a mark of what is true of being human, as a mark of significance, which is to say, a mark of fact. So another of my indictments of philosophy: Despite all the great discursive gymnastics and the twistings of subtle argumentative semantic juxtapositions, philosophy works to avoid having to look at itself as a human behavior. Conventional philosophy refuses to allow itself to be seen as an indicator of behavior, perpetually argues itself as an exceptional incarnation of divine intuition and inspiration, a blank spot of Being, and then uses this fact as a means to absorb all activity under its purview back into the real political and ideological limit — to say that this is all there is. I see the constant and basically automatic referral of all things ‘thought’ back into this kind of philosophical pond is self defeating to the effort of progress, even as progress itself is routed back into this (touted) ‘speculative’, or ‘realist’, or  ‘post-post-modern’ maxim. It is no wonder outside of capitalism is so difficult to think!

As Amoreinblog has argued somewhere, perhaps anthropology is the way out of this philosophical conundrum; despite all the philosophical misappropriations of ideas involved with the AIME (An Investigation into Modes of Existence) project of Bruno Latour (even by Latour himself, lol), his book can be read as an argument for the need to open up a space (perhaps, in his terms, create a pass) whereby we can avoid this modern philosophical whirlpool that we have been involved with for at least 1000 years. It seems that only now, with Postmodernism, but as of late Post-postmodnerism (must we find a Post-Post-Postmodernism also?) do we really get an idea, but also an actual way to understand and realize what human beings are doing.

*

Time itself may be the issue that is involved with Modernity invading as it usurps all discourse into its machinery. The issue that opens up after Postmodernism (but is not itself Postmodern scholarship) is the break from Enlightenment Ontology. So it may not be so much that we have to philosophically get out of this temporal mode — that kind of move would be philosophy attempting to avoid itself through arguing itself out of itself, redundantly, establishing as it maintains reality for everyone. It may be as simple as admitting that there is no escaping the philosophical limit, and realizing a kind of anti-Husserlian manner: Of finding the independent object in the bare fact that we know that there is an independent object, and perhaps that we need not speculate about how it can be so in order for it to be so. Of course we can discuss how it can be so…and indeed we will, but that does not mean that we cannot stay where we are at and let the pagan-Christian rollercoaster come around again and again.

Maybe we need to make a clean break.

…and sowing the seeds: Reply to Blake with draft excerpts from “The Second Moment”.

Reply to Terrence Blake’s recent post over at Agent Swarm:

As usual Terrence you pegged it. It’s strange how I view it and actually I can totally agree with you and yet somehow there’s something that I’m not agreeing with and really that has to do with my work, The strange situation that I find myself in reading you and is also what I’m trying to sort out. It’s actually really great.
For indeed I would say the same thing as you,  and add a few other authors to your list who really kind of saying the same thing. Yet I don’t think that Laruelle is merely repeating what these other people have repeated in a better way. I do not think that’s all that’s going on here. I would put it more in the framework of the question of why Laruelle appears in a religious context; as you kind of say his acolytes or his believers. Lol. I agree, yeah. I would say inasmuch as people are appropriating his discourses in such a way that it is organized around a proper ordering of his definitions, whether one would either believe or not believe, or that they would be ‘congregants’ or not, is a misappropriation of what Laruelle is really saying.

This further goes to my point about Laruelle himself, that he is missing the significance of what he saying (oddly enough,about the event, the object of the discourse) as a further dynamic in the whole discussion.

“…if we can talk about Kierkegaard or Nietzsche in the same or similar context, that they indeed mark sort of turning point, or at least a sort of speaking in a certain way about a certain particular thing, then it is because before this mark (that is such talk) people of such an experience, what I call the significant event, still felt or still thought in terms of a common human standard,  within  a stratified horizon of human experience where all human beings can participate in the same context of any world through the manipulations of discourse. I’m not sure what others may make of Laruelle’s ‘unilateral duality’, but to me such a term defies the stratification to which his ideas are typically applied. The idea that thus takes hold and thus usurps the meaning of Laruelle’s notions is that mode that says “if I can just explain it well enough, if I can shred up a given term into its proper real elements, if I can deconstruct a term so thoroughly that I can present it to anyone and they will understand, potentially” …(from “The Second Moment”)

This is the enterprise that you’re talking about, and indeed that’s exactly what Laruelle does, exactly the effort that he’s involved with, which is why I say he is in bad faith. For if we can take a certain lineage that involves those characters as you brought up, if not more and other ones, each of those authors attempts to situate a certain type of experience within a communication of discourse, and actually not only that, but each of them is putting it in such a way that it is clear to them, such that their project then extends into explaining to others in rebuttal and response what they already explained, yet ,in further differentiated terms as if they will somehow at some point be able to communicate what they’re really saying to these other people.

Think about phenomenology. Husserl, from what I gather, tried to put forth a science of phenomenology, and Heidegger had the same idea and difficulty with his students. You can also feel the frustration in Nietzsche’s writings and you can hear the despair in Kierkegaard. After Kierkegaard and Nietzsche pretty much that’s it. The rest of it is just a reiteration and a repetition by someone who is come upon a certain type of experience attempting to improve upon the initial explication or pronunciation of it…”

Strangely enough, the science that authors might propose seems untenable because of the very mode that they are caught in; which is to say, the mode of Enlightenment thinking, which is really evangelism under a philosophical guise. The science they ‘feel’ is untenable because they are involving ‘everyone’ in the possibility that ‘everyone’ does not as a free agent participate in. Just think if a molecular biologist had to get an OK from everyone who was involved, or who ‘proved themselves’ to be involved with biology: Nothing of molecular biology would have ever gotten anywhere since everyone thinks they know something of biology because they are ‘by definition’ a biological creature. The conventional philosophers tend to work upon a level that is supposing everyone and everything, metaphysically, but the fact is that they can never dismiss themselves sufficiently enough from their own thinking (and thus everyone else’s opinions as they are positioned upon a hierarchical transcendental scaffolding) to thereby gain an objective quality of being to thereby gain a single fact to base such a science upon,  and yet they suppose this of themselves and their ability at every turn. This is the significant issue: That they cannot allow for a humanity that is truly ‘different’; the very notion of difference becomes all too often merely an ideal notion of essential thought, as this is justified in the common thing that is the being of human. They cannot enact a science that they feel should be available precisely because they are involved in a failure to understand the mode by which they are being allowed to posit ‘being’: They are involved in an effective distance whereby they cannot ever philosophically approach the object that is human; they are ‘caught’, involved in, saturated by (if I may bring in Heidegger) the destitution that is their spirit…”

So what I see  in the period of time that goes between say the 1850s (though it  extends back further, its just at that time that a certain manner of appropriation of the object has arisen to discourse) up until now or until Laruelle, is we have the extension of the failure of the discourse that is attempting to explain a particular type of experience. And what this failure is, is involved with the religious type of orientation upon the world, which is to say that if I have (one person, i.e. the philosophical author) had this experience then everyone else should be able to understand it and should be able to realize the significance of this experience also because we are all human beings, common in the potential for communication. But what do we find in Nietzsche? Irritation and frustration at that no one can hear him. And what do we find in Lyotard? We have an evolved situation of the same experience. Here though, the Postmoderns have taken a different tact. They noticed a failure and so they use the failure as a means to establish a whole new manner of speaking about it, a different manner, so to speak. This is why postmodern is often associated with irony, because while they were sitting there talking about deconstructing everything and grammatology and such things, they are/were really trying to indicate the same thing that Nietzsche and Kierkegaard were indicating but couldn’t effectively communicate. So we have the postmodern admitting that there’s a failure in communication and making another whole  series of clausal structures based upon this different type of view of the same object.

So then what we have after the Postmoderns? We have another attempt, but this time the attempt is in the deconstruction itself. The ‘post-Postmoderns’, as I call them, Laruelle and Badiou at least, see the failure of the postmodern tact and so they think that they can improve upon what is occurred over the long +-200 year extension: If they can just deconstruct terms sufficiently enough. Laruelle is the most extreme example of this kind of  deconstruction in the sense of attempting to convey the object of knowledge that is been going on since before Kant, but just reached a certain type of saturation with Hegel and Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.

Badiou admits the total failure, and calls this failure, the object that is failed to be communicated, ‘void’. And yet because it is still there (being there) and the failure involves communication, as communication is taken still as upon a stratified human horizon, his tact is to posit how it is possible that it still arises ‘apparently somewhere’. So his sensibility is that the void erupts into multiplicity, because the problem seems to be that there is this single object that is being spoken about in a very specific manner that is somehow not being apprehended in its specificity.

In contrast, Laruelle still supposes to be able to deconstruct the term (object: terms are objects) sufficiently enough to be able to make a solute communication. But what we find is that he’s crossed the line. We find that in the attempt to deconstruct the term so thoroughly as to be able to communicate that object, that object is now apprehended as a religious type of assertion. So, instead of viewing the blowback of multiplicity, Laruelle sees that the problem lies in a prior decision of how objects are apprehended and or how people/human beings are oriented upon them for how they can be situated in reality. He blames the incongruity upon the fact that there is some other order through which objects are appropriated, that is interfering in the direct communication of this said object…”

Now for me, because I understand what the object is (the subject that is the object or purpose of the discourse) when I read these authors, there is no miscommunication about what they are saying. It is obvious to me; this is why I say all these such and such authors are really talking about the same thing, and it is why I understand the problem that they all face as well why it does not take very long to figure out and  understand the approach that they take…”

Laruelle’s ‘in the last instance’ is significant. Because somehow intuitively he knows or knew that this would be the last instance of the given of reality; that after his effort reality would precipitate out within this understanding such that it could be begun to be described as a religious institution itself (an actualized unilateral duality would begin to pronounce itself). But not just through his work; this is the long game…”

—-( Excerpts from the upcoming 2017-18  book tentatively called  “Darkness: The Second Moment of Decisive Significance”)

REPOST:

CLEARING THE GROUND (1): Laruelle’s rearview mirror

Laruelle: the mountain of jargon that gives birth to a mouse of common knowledge. One of the evolutions of my thought on this blog is the passage from a relatively favorable attitude to Laruelle to a great disappointment. This evolution stemmmed from my return to Laruelle, after having dismissed his non-philosophy as unworkable turgid repetition […]
https://terenceblake.wordpress.com/2016/09/18/clearing-the-ground-1-laruelles-rearview-mirror/

Gggh

Ghhhrkness

The Question: Of Darkness. 

The Question of Derrida’s Heidegger is ironically (as they even say) the question itself, which should not be generalized into a ‘common human sort of being’; that question is a response within the consistency that Derrida exposes as failing (decadence). Rather; the question voiced to its particularity that has been obscured  (darkened) by the ‘common’ is exactly coincidental with this moment of the post: “How is it possible that i knew Derrida’s and Hiedegger’s meaning before i had even read it ?”

This thus is an example of Bruno Latour’s opening (An Enquirey into Modes of Existence), that which has been allowed to be voiced.

For if you have been following from the last post, then you will see the obvious anticipation there of this next part of “Of Spirit” which i had never read or heard about until this moment:

There is an Ent­machtung (disempowerment) of spirit. It corresponds to this darkening of the world. It renders spirit destitute by depriving it of its power or its force (Macht), of its dynasty. I shall translate Entmachtung by “destitution” from now on, because spirit thereby loses a power which is not “natural.” Such a loss has noth­ing to do with animal benumbedness (dizziness; of having ambiguous ground for being). It is exactly at the moment when he is beginning to elucidate this destitution of spirit that Heidegger declares, in the passage cited just no that “animals have no world” (if humans are not spiritual entities, but not not spiritual)…

Time is Longer That We Think..

If we think there was a post-modern era, and now we are in a another era, think again. While I have my difficulties with Bryant, he at least appears to engage with ideas and text in a manner that defies ‘temporal eras’. So again we have a further evidence of the need for a bifurcation, a divergence. In time we could say that there is was an era that can be identified by certain types, certain organizations of terms; yet of time we can say that post-modernism identifies, in the Lyotardian sense, a certain type that has nothing to do with objective-temporal eras.

If Byant’s post below is not a post-modern expression then I don’t know what is. Set me aside then because you are obviously, as I say, oriented upon a True Object in a manner that I see as contrary to the manner in which Bryant is engaging in his post. (I will never know what Bryant has to say about this, because i am beneath his consideration).  

In 20 some-odd years, we have not moved from Derrida and the other PMs; in 50 not a jot from Sarte or Lacan; in 100 years, not stepped on increment from Heidegger’s Dasein, in 200 years, not one minute from Hegel. What is new is interesting. What is not new is significant.

In contrast yet complicit with Latour: We are Still Modern.

Here is the evidence:

REPOST:

 

 

There is something unbearable about the Lacanian teaching; something that makes you want to turn away and flee, or at the very least forget. It is not his opaque style, though that style performs the very thesis he wishes to articulate. At its heart, the core Lacanian teaching is that there is no cure for […]

via The Ineluctable Tragedy of Existing — Larval Subjects .

Love’s Kitchen and the Parallax View.

I guess this is the closest type of embed I can find.

While it seems somewhat contrary to have all my theoretical/critical posts and essays and then post these songs, such as the one below, the point will be similar to how Harman talks about Lovecraft, or Miellassoux uses Mallarme, or Hiedegger brings in Holderlin. The Covert Sound Philosophy will be shown to behave in the same manner, have the use as the same object that these authors have of their example artists. Yet not only will the Covert Sound be used, many other modern rock music will also be shown to function in the same manner for the Philosophical Hack, as Lovecraft, Marllarme and Holderlin does for those theorists just mentioned.

I am in an effort to describe the situation wherein these authors, and possibly other philosophers, gain their posture, the manner and or mechanism and or juxtaposition of aspects to there by gain the philosophical object, albeit, as a method of proposing philosophical ideas. Who knows if I will succeed in this grand endeavor, but we will see. At least I am fairly certain I will be able to grant a picture of a method to thereby at least call the method out as some sort of game, if not to all together discredit the ideas gained by such a method itself. It seems more consistent with the exposure, though, that the explication  of the situation will merely open the door for meaning that will allow the treatment of any occurrence or effect as nothing more than a game, and allow for an ethics based upon this maxim. In short, I mean to describe the mechanism of a particular parallax by exposing how such a view comes into play.

The song below, called “Love’s Kitchen”, is an example of a philosophical situation. The corpus of the Covert Sound Philosophy is one side of the situation, one view of the object, where the Philosophical Hack is the critical theory, the ‘philosophy proper’ of that same object.

I suppose I am beginning to present these views, these “examples of parallax” in order to bring a certain comfort, to arouse a certain familiarity of scene, to there by be able to then at some point in the elaboration of theory, move in by a type of retrogradation to thereby complete the object in-itself through the inclusion of the Covert Sound Philosophy. We will see  just how this plays out.

We should also notice or be aware that we should not jump to conclusions. There is indeed a type of music genre associated here in a particular manner that some may not appreciate aesthetically; it may not be the type of music they like. Well, Lovecraft is probably the only artist used by the above artists that I could even come close to enjoying, but I nevertheless can understand each of the authors’ correlative use of the art. In this same way, though, in as much a ‘Love’s Kitchen’ may betray a certain attitude or even bent or take upon life and world, it is, after all, merely  one artistic event of the situation, one momentary expression. The Covert Sound will also, though probably abrasive to those who would like to retain a certain ‘not love’ attitude, a certain ‘hard rock’ or ‘dark’, maybe ‘fuck you’ kind of attitude, explain how such moments likewise can be discerned in this parallax view put forth wherein “Love’s Kitchen” likewise hold a place. In short, I will describe the whole of theoretical-aesthetic world, whether it be based in reactionary fear, questioning despair, or accepting love; there will be no place for any individuated attitude to hide in aesthetics.

At least, this is what my big head is telling me; again, we will see how it actually presents itself.

 

In the mean time, please enjoy..

https://www.reverbnation.com/widget_code/html_widget/artist_723043?widget_id=55&pwc%5Bsong_ids%5D=25280959&context_type=song&pwc%5Bsize%5D=small&pwc%5Bbranded%5D=1

The Fallacy of Realism.

(Da Sein and the Phenomenon, part 2)

If we pay attention, then we may notice that we have been deceived. But most do not notice. The distinction, then, is made between these two ‘awarenesses’, these two ‘knowledges’. So we have really three distinctions, three ‘modes’ evidenced in philosophical authorship.

One; of the deception. Denial that there is a possibility of various modes. This is denial as ignorance. This is no acknowledgment of any sort of some grand, real deception. Here reality is reality. There is no problem here. Reality offers the truth of all things possible to human understanding through the interaction of humanity in the universe. All possibility falls within reality.

Two: coming upon the deception and seeing it not as as absolute limit. This is denial
– either in knowing of the limit and revolting back from it, as an essential mandate of being.
– or, knowing of the limit and using that limit to actively create. This is denial in the deceptive sense.

Three: Knowing that the limit only concerns reality.

But see; this is not a description of a One ‘true’ situation. This is a description of three manners of appropriation. We are talking about how meaning functions, and not about some true-real reduction to some common humanity.

This proposal always reveals this triad. Those who see that all expression must reduce to a common human understanding, what we call and is the modern situation; those who have encountered a type of confrontation or awareness of the modern situation but who nevertheless consciously operate within it, the post postmodern situation; those who do not reside within the modern paradigm, those of the post-modern situation, of Da Sein.

Da Sein is not a description of some whole humanity, as if everyone, every human being somehow exists as a Da Sein. No; he is describing an exceptional situation. It is the subsequence that Heidegger had to defend against; but also the reason why his system did not work, and likewise why he though the German Nationalist Socialists were the way to go. Likewise, this is the reason why certain post postmoderns have to defend against being identified as Da Sein: Because they do not wish to have to confront the conventional subsequence, the conventional ignorance, that would (mis-)identify Da Sein as somehow having to do with Modern terror. Indeed, it still does, but under a different guise. Deception.