Category Archives: Exhibition

the Divergent Proposal.

The other week I read a post that I believe was by Donna Haraway ( I could ne wrong) that was addressing something to the effect that was “the cresting and crashing of the Speculative Realism wave”, and again I was left in an odd sort of state. I don’t remember just what exactly her point was – probably due to the lurch I find myself in when I read about the philosophical turns and phases; but it doesn’t matter. The significance of coming across the essay has been an occasion to speak: What, exactly, ‘crested and crashed’?

The Entry into Discourse (the very first posting of Constructive Undoing) and the subsequent essays of the Direct Tangents concerned one thing: Why is Francois Laruelle using such complex and verbose language to express such a simple idea? Why did he have to have a “Dictionary of Non-Philosophy”? A better question now, one that goes to the point of this essay here, one that answers the obviousness of the mistake inherent of Haraway’s proclamation, is why would readers need such a dictionary?

It seems obvious that what prompted the Dictionary (of NP) is people did not understand what he was saying, or maybe that it was difficult to keep his definitions in order to be able to make sense of it, to thereby understand what he is saying. It is this that indicates that indeed a divergence in the estimation of occurrences is needed. My position has always been that I understood him at first read. Now, of course, those who need the Dictionary, those who in this specific case feel that NP is/was something really cool, but also those who delve and delineate and smash and ponder others’ ideas to get to what that other is actually saying, but as in this case with Laruelle, will say that I do not understand him. The same with Alain Badiou. I will not go into the whole of my dealings that are the first half of the Constructive Undoing posts; suffice it to say that no matter what I might say to paraphrase in the attempt to describe how I understand Laruelle, those so well read and versed in the Dictionary will always retort with the the definitions. In fact, they have learned the definitions so well (probably better than Laruelle himself) that they will string together Laruelle’s terms into sentences that propose to describe to me what he is saying, or what Non-Philosophy really is, or is really saying, to tell me how I am wrong in what I have gleaned and understand of Non-Philosophy. My question back is what exactly do these definitions they are flouting mean; just what are those definitions referring to? Invariably I get in response more of Laruelle’s Non-philosophical definitions. In other words, they offer me no substantial nor tangible meaning, no basis from which or for which the terms they are using have any meaning for me that says they understand what he is saying. They are incapable of telling me ‘straight’, for a colloquialism, but constantly refer to terms that have a meaning of which one needs to be informed as to a particular meaning that further has no meaning without again referencing terms that occur to meaning along a line a clausal order that lay, some how, outside regular experience. What they do use in place of this substance I seek, this relation to my direct and very real everyday experience, is more philosophical jargon, referencing various other philosophers as to their usage of terms that relate to Laruelle’s usage either through some academic and or traditional lineage, or philosophically historical lineage of ideas.

Their defense can come from an equivalence they see of their philosophy and physics. Specifically, they take the presentation of thesis measured against a common human’s informed ability to reason, as this ability is gained through the learning of just what it is to be informed to the issues of the reasoning. In short, it claims the same type of privilege that physicists claim. They call their philosophical ‘science’ metaphysics, as if to emphasize not only the ability of reason to create a path, as well as potential for development of a method, but also the ability to apprehend a truth, much like physics, that goes beyond, deeper or higher than pedestrian or regular everyday reasoning. The difference, though, between physics and metaphysics is that physics holds its claim as a science because it only gains and proceeds by what is offered of objects. The scientific tradition is verified due to its offering nothing, but only that which is offered to its method. The problem with the supposed philosophical science of metaphysics is located in the fact that what is offered to the supposed philosophical reason has no common object, but rather the assertion of such a common object occurs only within the assertion itself, of the supposed reason that is proposing to be come upon by what is offered of the common object. This is to say, there is no object that is offered to philosophy but what philosophy makes for itself. Whereas physics developed its method through response to what was and is given by the common object, philosophy problematizes this very same object through an assertion, but then justifies its method by avoiding this very fact, as if the object treated by physics and metaphysics is indeed the same object. This move is why we can attempt to identify what is or was ‘modern’; modernism has been identified as having to do or otherwise concerning a number of ideas that can tend to appear similar or of a common type. This type has been ‘of ends’, teleology, concerned with oneness, involved with meta-discourses that propose upon a proper and correct manner of the universe.

Yet, when we begin to look at philosophy we begin to see there is an insidious persistence about its presence on the scene, so to speak. For example, it is not difficult to see that any move that proposes to be done with such meta-discourses is itself an assertion toward an encompassing meta-discourse. What we can see, and say, then, is that the only thing that happened with the exposure of the ‘modern’ philosophical problem, in so much as this problem may have been already exposed, at that, by the post-modernists, is that we now have a situation of many people proposing meta-discourses who are hoping to propose the meta-discourse that ‘wins’. In short, we see that the post-modern proposals went heard but unapplied, unrecognized as to their meaning and or the origin of their meaning; rather, the application was upon a mistaken appropriation of the meaning. This is to say that despite the post-moderns’ supposedly exposing some ‘problem’ with some ‘previous manner’ of coming upon World, it appears that in response to this exposure, ‘philosophy’, or the designation of the operator of the modern philosophical metaphysical method, is still occurring, still behaving in the same manner only now ‘hiding’ it, or at least attempting to obscure the fact that indeed nothing has changed in how the modern philosophical method functions, and whether it is realized or not, the philosophical operator is still involved with the attempt to establish a true object through an investment in the fetishized commodity; which is to say, concerned with establishing identity through capital marketing. What we have now, of this situation, is what we may call a “pass”; part of our effort is to look into what is occurring with these ‘passes’. It is the description of the event of Being that even reveals Being unto itself, and the movement that occurs with the description in hand evidences such passes.

When one looks at this, it is not difficult to see that such ‘philosophers’ (the ones I’m in a discussion with, the ones who ‘know’ about Non-Philosophy, but also many modern philosophers) are lost in dialogue, what I’ve noticed has been categorized as an intellectualism. They are caught up in terms, in complex ideas, in historical schemes of sense, in lineages of meaning that are supposed and proposed to be talking about fundamental, basic and or essential ‘Truths’ of reality. In fact, when you discuss anything with such heady philosophers, it is rare that you can get them to admit anything that can relate to everyday experience. They are incapable of speaking to reality without recurring disclaimers and conditional terms on one hand, and then without constant referral to what other people think or have thought or said. This is the overt aspect of the conventional route. They are ready to announce their prodigious intellect and memory of various authors and their individual contributions and how these ideas relate to other authors and their ideas. Papers and book are written which are nothing more than comparisons, proposals of established and novel ways such ideas might intertwine and make distinction, which end in the authors offering their great syntheses of their opinion of what ideas might be better or worse, and or how various ideas might be applied to various social and political occurrences and events. This overt conventional manner is quite analytical as opposed to what has been coined as its philosophical counterpart, continental philosophy. Thus it is really the continental school that offers the greater obstacle to the overcoming of conventional route, for one’s interest is often insufficient to find what they are looking for in the continental library, especially if they are busy colliding ideas to see what comes out.

The question concerns the view by which such modern practices, as an embodiment of what is modern, are able to be questioned, since if we understand Zizek we should not be able to have such a view, that the view itself is a symptom of that which it is viewing. What we are seeing, though, or beginning to see, what the post-post moderns (Laruelle, Badiou; I feel Zizek and Latour deserve their own catagory) revealed by their descriptions, now that certain philosophers are offering their own estimation of what is ‘new’ (Brassier, Harman, Meillassoux, Bryant, to name a few) is that the historical traditional philosophical designations fail in their conventional estimations: That the speculative and practical designations fail, and are unsuited anymore to any precise discussion of what is occurring. The aggregate of philosophical wisdom has been reduced to a discursive fashion, of sorts, such that we need now diverge from the philosophical fad that obscures the truth of the matter as it asserts the proper manner of coming upon the situation by the mere over-concern (what has been called in certain circles overdetermination) that people have with establishing themselves as an identity. What we are calling out is just this reflexivity of the Zizek sort: Zizek should be properly classified with the identity he presents by the presentation of his ideas; namely, he argues the exact position he exhibits through his proposals, and that what is occurring is not as much what he proposes except in as much as he occupies a particular historical niche, so to speak, a historical position that coincides with the post-post-modern. It is once this is acknowledged that what is divergent can be revealed as to its own presence, which is to say, its own ontological basis. This is the difference that is always negated in the conventional determination, by its assertion of omniscience and omnipotence.

The essential question one needs ask is: What about such over-reaching philosophical assertions is apparent in my daily life?

Post-modernism’s Worth. 

When we are too close to an event, we talk about it as from a distance. That is, what we say is automatically distanced from the event, a maximum distance. The event is thus, by this occurrence, an object. As opposed to our psychotherapeutic model, the closer we are to an event, the more dishonest we are about its true bearings, that is, the truth of the matter, why it is that the (the wholeness of the) event has occurred the way it has. The impetus and the reaction can be come upon as an included item, a truth in-itself, only when we are distanced from the event. The truth of an object, as opposed to the True Object, can only be viewed in its truth from a distance. The equation is thus of inversion, of ratio.

Here then we may have a basis upon which to properly view foundational post-modern writers, namely, Derrida, Deleuze and Guittari, but others also.  To wit: Their descriptions were from a basis too close to the event, such that they attempted to quickly and finally establish a ground for the event; the event being thus so profound and significant, they were compelled to offer a reason.

They were not wrong, only rash. 

It is analogous to an explosion. We have now the data from the explosion, having encountered it ourselves, but also come across the initial first hand rationalization and fact crunching reports of the explosion itself – with that, subsequent explosions, and now the reports and experience of the aftermath(s) of explosions, we can now safely report upon the truth of the whole event. 

The End of the Preliminary Explorations and the Beginning of the Exposition of the Subject.

The irony cannot be over nor under determined.

*

It is not an easy thing to do, whenever, to throw away the ladder, but when the time comes, it turns out to be the easiest thing. I am sure Neitchze or Witgenstein had quite a different meaning than this amended version I am putting here, and the ‘passing over in silence’ offers obvious difference. But if one thinks about it, it is then not so different after all. N’s meaning always tends toward some ‘(non-) spiritual’, if you will, overcoming, some ‘inner to outer’ kind of deep superficiality as opposed to the superficial deep. Yet here we must come right out with it and be bold: Throw away the entirety of the philosophical library. That’s right I said it. Of course, though, this statement and call to action is ironic because I can only say it because I have read enough of it, and if one were to do it then they really needn’t my instruction; so the voicing is kind of useless. ‘Enough’ then becomes a highly suspect and enigmatic form because I don’t think I’ll ever get enough of it, but yet somehow I have had quite enough. It is the philosophical maxim that one can never read all the authors and their books so at some point one merely has to take a position and enter the conversation. That is what I have done with Constructive Undoing, as one can go look at the first post of mine; “Entry into Discourse”, I think it is called.

What we find there is an odd sort of invocation. One has to ask of it just what Is involved in the capitulation. Well, if we must be honest, then we can say that Zarathustra must come down from the mountain. But was he up there with all the worlds philosophy books? No, I would say. But yes, the meaning of all the reading could be said to beckon one away from the meaning gained as the reading. But all the same, the meaning gained had nothing to do with the particular philosophical ideas etched in symbols, but had everything to do with the meaning they contained; hence we throw away the ladder. Whether books or no books, the meaning gained was gained by the reading of them and not gained by reading them, but one could not have forgone the reading of them to know that the reading of them brings the throwing away of them.

The point is in the meaning of them, and not the cumulative amassing of particular strings of sayings. So I say that the more I reference and address the particular authors ideas, such as “…in the same way that So and So talks about idea~X, Heem and Haw has a similar idea with idea~O, and these may thus derive and support my idea M — as soon as I use that structure, I am asking everyone to agree with the method of amassing sayings and that this method is the meaning one is supposed to have as a method, as opposed to the gaining of meaning. It is due to this non sequitur meaning of what I see as philosophy to a particular methodology, that I address the throwing away of the ladder.

So it is by this throwing away the ladder I am enacting a couple things. For one, I am granting that what I am saying has already been said somewhere by someone or by a synthesized group of their respective sayings. I am figuring that if indeed I say something that sounds like or is a straight reiteration of something someone else said, then I grant that my idea was not a novel idea. Also, thus I am saying that once the situation has been understood, only certain necessary repercussions arise. These repercussions are the fidelitous suture of event to its subsequent multiple. This situation marks the necessity of throwing away the ladder, because once having understood, the rest follows without much effort; it is the effort of the hardest risk that brings such fidelity to the foreground. Likewise I am saying that the apparent repetition of my thought upon others is a philosophical issue, such that one should notice that the manner by which I proceed assumes as part and parcel that I am not plagiarizing other authors so much as I am conveying my piece of what cannot be plagiarized, as they did the same for their peices, and that the issue, as I just said, unfolds necessarily, each author being but a finite manifestation; just as one cannot read every and all items concerning a subject, one person likewise cannot write about and thus exhaust all the repercussions of what is basically an eternal situation. What is plagiarized is an ownership of phrasings, of ordinations of symbols; so I say that if the meaning I put forth sounds like other authors ideas, then I admit that either those other authors did indeed help me in my phrasings, and or such ideas are necessary to the eternal situation. It is thus that the situation of terms become marked, as well as the designation and construction of history, as well a pronunciation of the capitalistic investment.

Yet if what I say is indeed new, then this too is part of the philosophical issue.

Indeed, in the bibliography I will indeed site those authors and books that contribute to this philosophical enterprise, and even site specific verses, but I feel to note all the authors’ ideas that are reflected in my writing, i would end up footnoting every sentence, and every sentence upon that, such that I would be writing for eternity, in and as eternity, as my book would be essentially the whole of human writing bound by hypothetical hardcover. In essence, the conventional method of rigorous scholarly citation applied to my work would effectively necessitate the removal of my finitude; so it is that which necessitates my throwing away the ladder, and the concession that every philosophical argument that has been made is correct at least in its potential. Where I might rebut any particular argument that I may have not noticed, let it be known that I acknowledge the conventional propriety that may be or have been held such that they might get the street cred for their (now) rebutted and proposed incorrect proposal.

*

Having thus outlined the situation, that the ladder needs be used in order to throw it away, that the nature of the throwing away has thus been the problem, and that the authors are all correct and have valid points, we are left in this state where everything philosophical is gone anyways. I need not cite any authors because I have already said that my ideas are not new, and in so much as everything has been said I should have nothing to say. Thus we have the nihilism I’m starting to hear people have positions on. So what am I saying? Why am I still writing?

Hence I speak of divergence. Nihilism only arises against the conventional state, so no longer do I rise against it; it is useless to do so, it is nihilistic. Like Jello Biafra of infamed punk band Dead Kennedys said (I paraphrase): there is no effective change that occurs by going against the system; one must change the system from within the system. If I were to continue to rehash and cite and question and repose and rebut and cite, nothing will have occurred. In fact nothing indeed could occur; Badiou appears to call this the nihilistic ethical state [oh kay, here’s a cite: “Ethics”. Badiou], and it is not difficult to correlate Kiekegaard’s ‘ethical/universal’ here, and thus we have ended with the point at which divergence diverges: correlationalism. What confines this or defines this state is exactly the move for reconciliation of categorical imperatives, or rather, the reliance upon that which the categorical pure reason allows as then essential ethical categories; for if there is no choice, we have then the imperative situation. Yet likewise, where there is choice, it is imperative that we choose. This is the problematic that Kierkagaard addresses through all his works. It is the effort to reduce this situation to a solution that defines the correlational arena, and all Western philosophy (should I say to distinguish and say all continental philosophy ? But even the analytics are attempting a one reduction I think) since the Greeks has been the effort to reconcile this apparent difference. Judaism seems the only one that actually keeps that which is Cesar’s with Cesar, so to speak, keeping ‘God’ as entirely unknowable, and the practical manifestation and activity privy to this known-unknown unto itself as Law. But the discussion of religion will follow later.

That which breaks with this historical philosophical effort recognizes difference; not the difference that requires the different element to recognize the universal maxim that we should respect difference, which is the conventional correlational move, but rather the difference that realizes that this idea, or respect for the idea, does not contain that which is different.

By this initial distinction, we can begin to consider truth.

Am I Beginning to Make Any Sense at All?

I agree with Malabou’s initial consideration. “Relinquishing transcendentalism”. How tentative. How civilized. But her approach, I must say, just like all subsequent considerations, asks good questions but then never quite gets to any answer what so ever more than a reiteration, a parroting of conventional method. In very short verse: this is correlationalism. The very moment of her critique is correlationalism in situ. The proposal of Miellassoux set as is it in play, as I have said, is prime occasion to speak of the Significant Event; those interested will have to wait for the book, since the development is much larger than the blog format.

Suffice it to get to the issue behind such proposition. We might consider what ‘throwing away the ladder’ means. I am sure there will be the usual preponderance who hang onto the ladder for the use of arguing what one means by throwing away the ladder. And they won’t even see the redundancy and ridiculousness of their position; how indeed they may have thrown away the ladder yet are telling us what Neitzche and so and so mean by this and how they thus might qualify to having already thrown away the ladder, and then give further reason why now having thrown away the ladder, so and so says this and so we argue this and that based upon the meaning of so and so, that we may present the problemitization of throwing away the ladder such that we can the grant our position such that we now are moving beyond the ladder or not.

This little dance reminds me of a jazz artist in the late 1980’s who put out a CD with liner notes that described and made an argument in a quite intellectual fashion, how Jazz is not an intellectual art form or musical expression. I love jazz, but I just had to laugh, and then listen to his non intellectual music that, in my opinion, had with so much obvious talent and expertise so little soul and depth, so much explicit expression and so little inuition and grasp of the reason why, at least I, listen to music.

I draw this analogy to philosophy. The death of philosophy is evidenced exactly in such philosophers talking about the possibility of philosophy relinquishing the transcendent, parting from Kant and such. Obviously the meaning of philosophy has taken a turn, and it hardly hinges upon relinquishing anything, but rather more a hanging on to the well established method working of social lubrication and conceptual capital to make a name and a living. So much for every hobby and career; rarely it seems, if never, do the users of ideas really take to heart what they are talking about or reading about, keeping all meaning at arms length for the sake of quick access and face.

So as I have said of Harman, we have to give these brain users a benefit of doubt, and grant that they do indeed feel and believe with a passion that their involvement and discussion are really involving a type of truth, a type of real working. So it is that we must locate such thinking people in an arena that takes quite seriously their deep ideas, and call it ‘reality’ as a place, space or position, and ‘conventional’ as a method fitting and no larger than the arena, the terms of which holding such a value for investment, the infinity of such an arena, calls to such thinkers to regard it as quite inescapable and indeed thus always accounting for every possibility in its potential; always climbing the ladder, they are, even as they talk about whether it might be thrown away or not.

It is good to be the straw man, because this particular kind of straw man is not allowed in the correlationalist cycle, for it indicts the conventional method, rather, it bases of method. For logic is not a tool; it does not show where truth is located. It is a vehicle, a route by which conclusions may be shown. The idea of a ‘hidden’ truth which by the tool of logic may uncover is a conventional trope, an ideological dogma. Along such conventional lines, such confrontation is rebutted by saying that it defines a nothing, a nihilism, which is why so many authors now are considering and defining what nihilism might ‘really’ mean.

*

The post just before this one, here in Constructive Undoing, the “reblogg” post, is the example for which we say that we must destroy the transcendent. Miellassoux is being much too kind, much too diplomatic. The reason for this necessity is that the real conventional discourse relies upon the transcendent even as we might want to and in order to posit that we might get rid of it. And if anyone has been reading my blog, it is only in the act of blatant and obstinate denial that an arrangement of terms may effectively do anything, let alone now not have a transcendent involved in what reality may be. In fact, this is also why we must say that reality is the place where discourse determines what is true. We need not reiterate the past year of posts of Constructive Undoing. It is enough to use the “reblogg” to give a concrete and specific example of what it means to destroy the transcendent, what divergence means and why it is necessary. I’m not sure if this post will cover all that right now, but at least it will get to showing what we are up to by distinguishing ‘conventional methodology’.

Thus a throwing away of the ladder really evidences the problem I indicate by referring to the “Reblogg” post. Let’s look there now, the comments and discussion arena after the blog….Heres the link: http://darkecologies.com/2014/12/03/the-battle-in-philosophy-time-substance-and-the-void/

Ok, we’re back. Now keep in mind, I am not rebutting his essay for its content. In fact, D.E. rebukes me for not wanting to discuss within the parameters of what he has presented. Yet, we might say that part of the discussion of the Significant Event concedes the benefit of doubt to the argument in question, that for this case, the author of D.E. (Sorry man, I never got yer name) has indeed read the authors quite thoroughly and is fluent enough in the verses to bring to mind various quotes appropriate to the issue in question, and that such referencings likewise connote a good possible consideration of the matter. We concede that the opinion expressed is a valid opinion, in as much as it most probably sticks to the commonly recognized version of meaning, that this common reading thus laid admits various hazards, that these hazards will surly be rooted out, voiced and problematizing in various ways, etcetera.

My question is always: What does that mean? When I read his essay (as this is the example here), I have a pretty good idea of what he is saying, as well as the problem he suggests or implicates, as well as how an impetus for discussion has been set. Having a pretty good reading of the authors myself, I understand how the stage has been set, why the lights are faced here and there, the actors supposed to enter here, turn there, the music come in here. While I know the play, and the different showings and performances, and casts, that each is slightly different, with different stage sets, different colors, interpretations of phrasings, tempo, mood, timbre, etcetera — the play is the same play. It may be entertaining to see the play every year at different venues, but it always suggests the same meaning even while differing in reference to the moments in which I attend the showing, as my attendance and watching may have different significances to my regular life at the various times.

So it is that when I read philosophy, i am informed to meaning through the question of what does it mean, what is the author saying. Now, the problem I wish to shed light upon. In this effort for meaning, a reader inevitably comes to want to find out what is ‘really’ meant, and so dismisses the meaning that is gained in potential through definitional ‘gaps’ such that now the reader has to look for context that does not seem to appear in the present text, i.e., the reader needs to read other authors and see what they are saying, and so on. What this process amounts to is a storehouse of information that when drawn upon appears to be conveying deep significant meaning, but when stood back from, really just presents a bunch of terms that says nothing in particular; this type of discursive posturing that seems so profound by its educationally privileged layering is what I call metaphysical (in the bad way) because the level that is supposed of its definitional structure is supposed to get at some more real or more true meaning of the issue presented.

It is this kind of philosophical method that is correlational, that which relies upon a transcending aspect of discourse by which to assume or propose an actual truth of the situation. As we might see in D.E.’s talks on Zizek; Zizek himself talks in a way to show this very situation: that there is no subject that has any actual or substantial truth to it, but that we are viewing it in a particular way, in a particular fashion. This is what all the various Zizek talking abouts on this particular issue means: there is nothing there.

Now, philosophers will debate this, but the debate will be based upon the fact that obviously there is something ( but again Zizek accounts for this in various places also, but how he says it is less important that what he means; how he says it is just nice to look at). So the philosophers will bring in their storehouse of authorial knowledge to pose and discuss what Zizek may be saying and what then may be the actual truth of the matter. But never do they stand back and find out what it is such rhetoric actually means. The point which Zizek reiterates all over the place is that such rhetoric is nonsensical, that the discourse itself, a particular discourse that he references capitalistic, sees its elements as substantial capital, actual true real things that are negotiated. But the point I’m making is not to dispute what Zizek is saying; the points of Zizek will be pronounced in the Significant Event. The point I wish to expose is that the various arguments that would rebut or expound upon Zizek often miss what Zizek says over and over.

A most specific and pertinent example of the motion of conventional correlationalist philosophy occurs in relief through the exchange in the comments of D.E. of the link I gave, between him (her? Come to think of it, I don’t really know) and I.

Hopefully my distinction will be made more clear.

I use the term ‘True Object’ in my writings. This usage often gets the best objections in the form of it making no sense. My question is what sense is there not to be made? The philosophers (and I have encountered this over and over in many places) routinely bring argument against ‘truth’ and ‘object’, and are typically repulsed by ‘faith’, at various junctures. My proposal is of a simplicity that is completely missed by the conventionalists that I see is due to their investment in the storehouse of authorial knowledge. I am saying that reality is constituted of True Objects, objects that cannot but be helped to function in reality as true things. Like the car I drive down the road. There is a car. The question of what a car may ‘actually’ be as an object is of no concern; indeed I am, as I drive, driving a car down the road. The ideological or theoretical considerations do not come into play here; much like Harman’s Third Chair, but most like the ‘First’ chair, what ever may be the actual ‘car’ does not come into play in my driving down that road. The car is a True Object. To argue what the car may actually be is entirely a theoretical issue, but more, an issue that is entirely metaphysical, which is also to say, concerning what is more true or more real, which is for all other terms, concerning what is transcendent or for better terms, as a methodological reduction, concerning ‘The’ transcendent.

There is no theory that needs go into this, but the theory is already there in the various authors all over the place. Harman’s difference with Zizek, even as he may say he disagree with Zizek, is in as much as Harman is invested in the truth of the terms he is using, as his terms are stemming from a sort of essential relation of thing to thing (the ‘thing’ that is Harman, and the ‘thing’ that Harman is addressing: object -> object). As I have said, he must argue this because this argument then validates retroactively the position by which he attains his truth of reality. And this next is key to my proposal of the situation of the True Object: his difference with Zizek takes place in reality.

Once this situation is understood, then we can consider the meaning ala Miellassoux, correlationalism and transcendence. Then, once this situation takes hold, the question no longer concerns what the author means, for this routinely beckons conventional method back into its correlation of ideologically ordered (Foucault) and scaffolded (Wittgenstien) terms — and besides, we have already climbed the ladder of this meaning — but rather the question becomes: What does this situation mean? Hence, to question this situation stems from a position that is not real. The real ladder of meaning must be thrown away. The question comes to concern the Significant Event.

We can see this in action in the comments of the linked blog on Dark Ecologies. That the simplicity I propose is countered by recourse to an authorial bank (Freire) of knowledge. The conventional philosopher cannot understand what I am referring to because he is caught in the metaphysical correlational world of ‘real’ discursive method. Hence, divergence.

Again; this is not to say that D.E. essays do not present valid points, but rather that the meaning of the points are routinely missed for the sake of the correlationally (transcendentally) justified arguments that stem from an assertion of identity, from the equivocation of the object and the discourse (terms) about them — but not just any discourse; a particular discourse that can be associated, as Zizek does, with the capitalistic paradigm wherein True things exist because of the metaphysical discourse that supplies the ‘more true’ reason for its objectivity — as if I am not really driving a car down the road. The car is thus a True Object due to the insistence of the metaphysical support.

But to get back to Malabou; the question of ‘why’ should the transcendent be relinquished (I apologize; I have only listened to the first 20 minutes of her talk. My input may change when I hear the rest) is made nearly moot due to the understanding that comes through the simple understanding of what authors such as Badiou, Zizek, and Laruelle, (if not many, more; such as, Kant, Hume, Hegel, Faurbach, Spinoza, Kierkegaard, Nietchze, Wittgenstien, Heidegger, Sartre [my spelling is horrendous] and many, many more, whose names apologetically do not directly come to mind right now — oh, and if not Miellssoux, and Harman) are really saying. The difference between these varied authors concerns the awareness of the following: The transcendent must be destroyed because it is the transcendent that perpetuates the continuance of real confusion. We must not ‘relinquish’ it because, as Malabou also says, to relinquish is more like a kind parting, and such a codependent relationship will never kindly part ways.

“Should humanity be saved?” Laruelle has asked. I say: humanity should not be saved. Because, should humanity be saved it would not even know that it had already been saved, if indeed humanity should have been.

Some more Zizek and Harman bashing ( but not really).

Reply to Dark Ecologies. Pertinent to this ongoing Constructive Undoing.
Sorry for what appears to be an entering at mid context….

“The parallax view” (sorry; evidence of how long it’s been) I can’t find exact quotes (Zizek is soooo anecdotal, one almost has to wonder if he is really saying anything beyond a swirling of anecdotes. His theory draws from so many historical instances, when one reads “end times”, we can’t but ponder what end is occurring since this end or progression of end is strewn out over a hundred years, we have to ask then if all of ‘modern’ philosophy is really a constant and eternal reiteration of End.)
And, Admitting it has been a while for Parallax view, I could be constrewing something he never actually stated. It is around the slash-S, and petite a, and such formations. I’m pretty sure he never says “nil subject” but rather talks about how an investigation into the subject yields a field of objects, such that we get to nothing, at the ‘center’ but a space of nil.

But this is entirely and totally nonsense. Is he saying that the person who wrote Paralax View is not a person, a human being, and that really nothing wrote it such that there is not even a subject about what a parallax gap is? Of all his discursive maneuvers, he cannot describe himself out of the situation of nil such that his book might arise or has arisen, or never arises. Better: it is all nonsense, a position that must be said to arise from nothing, the void, but that it is seen by conventional reality as not having done so except as a discursive meaning which derives the contradiction just exhibited. And this is to say, that somehow he is seen to have said something significant about True Objects. As if what he is saying has anything to do with what he says, but that he said it. This is the issue of the void.

Harman, in the other hand, sees how such arisen discourses have done so many times, in fact all through philosophical history, but for his situation, everywhere, such that Heidegger becomes significant, as Daseins. Thus, “objects” (the conflation of which connotes nil-subjects) are withheld, but for Harman, withheld in so much as he must not speak of what is occurring, but rather he must withhold the event that thereby allows him to speak what manifests as the world of reality: True Objects that have something withheld. He must withhold the truth for the sake of the sensual, that which ‘makes sense’, sincerely and vicariously, because what he is putting forth as a proposal of truth, he already knows is not true.

Harman is thus rooted in deception, where Zizek is more honestly attempting to not withhold anything. Yet both are dealing with an identity that they cannot throw because of their investment in the real-true state of things. And this thus holds them up to a blind spot, since they must assert that the discourse they are using is dealing with all that may be true, but is really merely an ideological stage where they must withhold what is truly occurring.

… I understand this situation. But i see the issue as much more profound: there is a confusion that is perpetuated in philosophy; there are philosophers of the Event, and philosophers that address the True Object. And the problem arises in the effort that tries to reconcile them. But the problem persists because both see (or at least purport them to observations that evidence their viewing as so) their experiences as real. So, in reality there is a facade seen as substantial and a facade that is seen as processual, as these are viewed to identify actual real-true things, actual True Objects to be addressed and found in their trueness.

The discussion you bring up is real. But it Is capable of addressing only an incomplete issue, as the object of this issue is necessarily always partially withdrawn from the discussion. Hence, the partition of which I speak.

Harman and the True Object.

The question is no longer that of Being, for Heidegger has destroyed being, like a forensic analysis of material. Being was viable so long as there was a dialectic whereby reality could be based upon its one vision through the oscillating features held from one another, like a binary star. Hiedegger destroyed the dialectic (for conventional method), encompassing the description of how such an interaction takes place for reality, what the dialectic does, how it works, a description from a distance, in a nice neat package, defining the Trueness of the Object called Dasein, ready for distribution. Hence, the question anymore is not of being, but of truth. The issue with Graham Harman is that he stands upon the dialectic through setting aside the destruction of being, and thereby enacts a deception. He thereby may speak of other than human Daseins through the dialectical vehicle, all the while holding the dialectic out of sight, withdrawn as the Dasein by which other Daseins are possible is likewise set aside for the sake of proposing again a ‘new’ one reality where the dialectic is gone, and the subject likewise dead. He thereby may propose a new ontology of being: Object Ontology.

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I must admit, as a read more of Harman I am becoming increasingly disillusioned and bored; I tend to see the rise of Speculative Realism and then it’s Fizzle to have ran along these same lines as I am experiencing and discovering. And I must say that it is because of what has occurred, what was enticed early on as a sort of promise has lead to merely another philosophical system; quite boring, but even more irritating was that it seemed like Harman might be one to be able to pull it off, but then he comes up with another system that proposes a more real version of reality. So conventional; so regular, run of the mill. So it is, the reason for this motion of his that lead to a positing a more real system is explained by the essay of the Significant Event, that such deceptions can no longer stay viable; that is, except in so much as the deception is working, and where it succeeds is exactly in that audience where denial is operative. The deception works because the conventional method is already submerged and distanced in a self imposed deception: the term-object identity.

The boredom of Dasein explained by Harman is symptomatic of the reversal and contrivance we see in Harman’s Ontology. Admitting the short reading, the boredom of Being Dasein in need of some danger is at the heart of why Harman’s seem so boring: because the danger of Object Ontology comes in response to the boredom of being that is, in itself, a preliminary mood, that is, a mood that has not been allowed its maturation, has not been let to risk, and so discusses subsequence. Like a lacuna, this mood that Harman seems to understand is the offense that is the Ontology in its Ontological functioning. Harman is required for his Dasein of many colors to describe as enactment the results of having True Objects as the basis of a reality that is ubiquitous as it is total in its assertion of a universe of only objects. This is to say that he is arguing his identity, an identity that has arisen due to his investment in the State of reality. Here multiple Daseins exist as the evidence of the description of how it’s being is not presence, like an oxymoron, defies and contradicts its own meaning. Beings may exist with a certain facticity of ‘being there’ as an environmental inclusive state, but the being of Dasein thereby includes the fact of other Daseins within its own ‘there being facticity’. The implication here is the point of contention between eternity and progress, between what Badiou calls ‘immortal’ and ‘victim’; Harman is enacting his victimization. The dangerous move apparently seen by Harman is gained by his view of his Dasein as a meaning of meaning, as a Being that is exempt from the situation that Heidegger presents to mean Dasein. The meaning of Dasein for Harman is already a meaning represented as a object of Harman’s presentation. Harman apparently already was viewing the significance of Heidegger’s work as a significance fundamentally different than what the meaning of Dasein would entail, which is to say, the corpus that is the explanation of Dasein was already in the format of meaning that represents as a presentation the True Object (meaning of meaning) as an objective reflection, over the meaning that the corpus presents. Harman already was was viewing the world as a whole constituency of True Objects, already was his faith unquestioned, already his faith not doubted, his naïveté a sham before it could be authentic. Rather than the danger which is the being bored as the boredom that is being, Harman’s risk, what is dangerous for Harman, is by his faith, that his deception might be uncovered.

But in one manner of speaking, he need not be worried, because his faith is vindicated in the power that establishes reality, as he is invested in this reality, as he has faith in this power, he is justified. His risk is entirely of his faith.

Nevertheless, the boredom or disappointment comes because while his categories seem to really get at something, he leaves us flat in a world of intellectual ‘weirdness’; but the weirdness is barely interesting — or maybe as interesting as watching someone solve a Rubic’s cube. I know now that every time he preludes an idea with weird, it’s not going to be weird at all but rather mundane and obvious; but somehow I am sure that it is weird to a certain type of type of reader and author, and this type is probably one who is oriented upon the True Object. For a while I thought Graham was really following the philosophical maxim of looking to oneself, but it’s seems his route for this is more conventionally methodological than it is novel or introspective.

Yet, I should say that we must give Graham the benefit of doubt; I am sure that Graham indeed feels that he is looking to himself and not being conventional (why else would he say that ideas might be ‘new’?). And this is exactly where the discourse of the Significant Event gains its footing; because Graham can not see beyond his faith. Faith makes true. The discursive posturing may appear quite the feat of meaning, but philosophically speaking, while impressive, it risks little.

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Apology. Harman and The Facticity of the Event.

I apologize.

See that this blog is not so much an assertion of what I believe is so correct, but more a working space where I play with ways to situate discourse and test out the ideas they purport against what I am trying to say (which is why I would like feedback).

Strong words, dare I admit, of that last segment. In fact, I’m feeling I’m getting a little too defensive. The blog format is beginning to yield its limitations and I think I’m trying to plow through it, to demand upon…what? Ultimately, upon myself. Upon my silence. As if I can just yell loud enough I might break the partition. Very few people comment, and while these are valuable and appreciated, they do not constitute the attacks I seek. So I cannot but wonder if it is because I make no sense, or I make too much sense. I don’t know because few people have engaged.

And this blank brings me back to the impetus of this whole thing. To expose. All this so far has been and is preliminary, and I suppose I attempt to address the philosophers that see this foreplay argument and discussion as the primary issue, to get them to see it is really the result, the subsequence of the issue. That the re-present-ational edge of contemporary philosophy is really the dabbling in the whitewash, of subsequent issues.

As a side here, we might venture to suggest that what we have is a world that may be situated opposite to how university philosophy departments like to introduce existentialism. It may be not so much that there is a ‘real world’, and then, how Kiekegaard puts it, there might be a teleological suspension of this ethical real world; rather, we might see that it is the real world that is in suspension.

Thus I have said we recede. We have discussed what is subsequent first because it is represents the barrier to significance, and by approaching in this way come to the point of contention, thereby to be able to discuss what is first instead what is usually seen as last, as the object.

Thus also I have said we diverge from the (as Harman seems to suggest that Heidegger advocates) inadequate philosophical discourse of True Objects.

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The issue is one’s orientation upon the object.

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So I repeat myself because the format of the blog seems to lend itself to having to reiterate what has already been said in order to say something more. I feel a book is on its way.

As the previous segment: Harman wrote this synopsis of Heidegger, and he even admits in it that he thinks Heidegger is the greatest philosopher of our time. Now, if these statements are true, then we can say that Harman most probably not only understands Heidegger very well, but agrees with him in much of what he is saying, that is, Harman must also see that Heidegger is putting forth a description that is a good description of the issues, good, valid solutions to good and valid problems.

What I am saying is that if Harman does indeed reside well within the situation above there in the previous paragraph, then his first and second objections are forced, derivative not from Heidegger’s meaning; the objections are non sequitur to Heidegger’s ideas. Not ‘objections’ but completely estranged, fabricated. How is this? To put it in Heidegger’s terms, which Harman aptly explains (strangely enough) and to address his second objection: the facticity of being itself contains and accounts for change as part of its historical environment of facticity. If indeed the facticity for Harman is the arising of the question of change in his environment then it is exactly the occasion for which Harman is incorrect in his operation (see below).

Secondly, as to his first objection: Heidegger’s claim that there is only world when Dasein is present is really saying that such world, the work of objects, arise as such only with the instance of the human ‘being there’, that without Dasein, there is nothingness, which ironically is the ‘ground’ of the facticial event. Harman rejects this privilege and allows for the Dasein of podiums and fire and paper and such, but we could see that this rejection is based in the offense against the essential subject of a different privilege, of agency, the individual (see the next segment as well as previous post in the Significant Event). The question that must be asked then has to do with what facticity actually denotes, which then brings to the front the point of the issue with Harman; one of two situations must account for Harman’s mistaken digression from the philosopher he so thoroughly admires and understands:

Either,

1) Harman does not understand Heidegger for Heidegger’s meaning, and so is involved in the conventional mistake, as I offer the description by Lacan and Zizek (previous post of the Significant Event);

Or,

2) Harman does understand and so is contriving a position that blatantly ignores the meaning of the facticity of being, and so is being deceptive. This is to say one of the subsequent issues:

A). Harman is being deceptive as a strategy;

Or,

B). He is lying about his admiration for Heidegger and his scholarship is thereby called into question.

If indeed (1) is the answer, then it is easy to address Harman to the mistake as he is involved in the conventional faith in the True Object. If (2), then we have a marker of the pocket veto and evidence of the opacity of his proposals. (B) can be properly dismissed as a route back into (1).

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Next we will address next some particular Object Ontology ideas.