Anslem’s Argument for the Proof of the Existence of God, the Disruption of Time, and the Categorization of Philosophical Behavior.

I seem to have found a significance for Anslem’s proof. It may be that it is not significance for whether God might exist, but, as I have said, significance for how I present ideas.

We will start with the rendition from Princeton’s site. I think they have a pretty good rendition there.

Without all the strict logical hoopla, I think the simple way to put Anslem’s idea is that God exists because we can think of It.

The significance of this notion appears to disrupt what we generally consider of time, it’s ‘natural and directional’ progress.

The Princeton site says that Anslem was addressing a particular issue that, actually, we still find totday in atheism. Basically, Anslem is confronting two ideas:

1.He understands the claim that God exists.
2.He does not believe that God exists.

Now, I have done only the most preliminary research into Anslem and his ideas. I am just taking the very popular simple version, and considering these two situations. There is no ‘hidden’; whatever Anslem’s results most probably are quite apparent, and the ones that are not – well, what point am I trying to make here? I have already said in my earlier post that there is no logical argument that sways me in any direction or causes me to believe something I didn’t before. So any extension of argument must be involving something else; perhaps I am attempting to get at what this something could be.

I think the main point Anslem makes is that, as Princeton puts it, this is an inherently unstable condition of being. What we might call the ‘founding essence’ can be understood to be responsible for this instability. Somewhat similar to a ‘thing-in-itself’, this founding essence would be a kind of gravity well, if you will, of mental activity. The instability arises because of the knowledge (the known-ness) of what something is able to be. The question arises: How can I know what something is if it doesn’t exist? The basic assumption in this question, what philosophers tend to lump into the category called ontology, is that existence is, that there is no need to discern what existence is because to argue for or against the being of existence does nothing to displace the argument except as much as it merely denies existence. The point of saying something exists thus should equate with what can be known, and so the instability of the situation is found in the human ability to choose on whether what exists is actually true. In this case, though, Anslem is dealing with the basis of all that exists as a category, namely, God; God, in this sense, as we cannot but apply our modern sense to consideration of it, is merely the name of the category that contains all that can exist as an active element, the element by which all else can be said to be. The extension in time to Heidegger’s ‘Being and Time’ can be understood as a factual description of this situation, and thus, rather than an opening up unto Being, ironically as a closing of Being unto itself and thus a factual description of what human beings do: The identification of the in-itself of human Being. More on that elsewhere.

The resolution that Anslem posits of this unstable situation occurs because of the foundational nature of the knowledge itself. In this Medieval Christian context (which I argue is still a modern context), the resolution (the clarity, the definition) that must be referred to must be understood in a context not so much of mind, but of the essential God-inundated mind that is able to uphold and entertain knowledge, which for our context might be the mind that exists. In short, the condition of knowledge is/was such that all things referred or otherwise are established in existence due to an absolute situation, a situation whereby all things gain their status in the universe, what we usually index by the idea of an absolute ethics, in a manner of speaking. In this condition it thus appears that a reflective mind will naturally be drawn into the the contradiction involved in making a choice as to the (true or false) existence of something that (already) exists (in essence), and will therefore correct (or become the correction) the instability by virtue of their own existence (in the absolute universe, or the universe that is indexed by absolution). The question of whether something actually, or physically, biologically exists, such as a race of human beings that live in the midieval antipodes, e2c1fd0e8fc468d9d55d018231578e47

unicorns, dragons, spirits, extraterrestrial aliens, etcetera, has no baring upon existence because of the absolute reference and access of mind to God (existence). What can be incorrect of knowledge as to what is true of existence finds its resolution in the posited (assumed) basis of existence. 

The Medieval as well as Modern mind is consistent in this ideal of progressive understanding of the universe. What is significant of this orientation upon progress is the mind’s innate access to what is true of the universe with reference to an assumed basis of that truth, what we can say is an assumption of stability unto which all knowledge will inevitably resolve; despite whether we posit that there is no actual resolution or that everything is flux, or whatever conditional conditions we define, the result of any positing is always toward ends, toward a resolution. Even if we say that the universe and the knowledge of that universe is completely and utterly contingent, this contingency must be absolute; hence we say that the effect of such terms within any scheme of knowledge or organization of definitions is what we can call a “founding term”. 

*

Oddly enough, we are able to find purchase into understanding what human beings do by looking at what philosophy does. Not, as Graham Harman might have it, that everything we might do automatically falls into a subjective appropriation of semantics that defies our attempt to locate such philosophical behavior. Rather, at some point we should be able to locate a mark by which we are able to be dismissed from this correlational philosophy that wants to avoid any critical gaze upon its method.

Once we find this mark (which I do not go into here), we can extend this situation (of existence and deferment) to apply to everything that might exist: Within this situation, a person can understand and then decide upon it. There is no thing that escapes this formula, and Anslem is making an accusation about it: It is unstable, and it will eventually resolve itself to the conclusion that the thing in question exists, in his Medieval case, God, and in our Modern case, perhaps, the object of empirical physics.

The point he relies upon is the idea that God is the greatest being or thing that can exist, for, so long as we can conceive of something greater, then that is not God. Similarly, we can use this conversely and say that because we can conceive of ‘that which nothing is greater’, this greatest thing exists as a foundational ontological ground of Modern effort as well: The ‘greatest’ thing is the most substantial. 

*

What interests me is that this simple notice occurred late in the 11th century. Here, already, is a situation made notice that no one noticed until very recently, like 10-20 years ago with the philosophers such as Alain Badou, Francois Laruelle, an then for the younger folks (of the time), of the Speculative Realist Conference. In particular, the idea is that there may be something that exists outside of our knowledge (not necessarily our ability to know), and as for in this situation, that which is greater than the greatest thing we can know. This category has brought modern philosophy (again) to consider things like voidnothingnesschaos and such things, and the corresponding ideal that whatever works to create identity is all good. But if we are honest, we might be able to glimpse the same ruminations of Scholasticism (St. Anslem is said to be one of the founders of the Medieval Scholasticism), occurring in our Modern philosophies, but under different terms. Indeed; I argue (along with Jean-Francois Lyotard apparently) elsewhere that Postmodern scholarship is really a religious apology for Modernity.

In this post I confront the veracity of some of our current philosophical modes and arguments by asking what seems to me to be a most obvious and significant question, a similar question that Graham Harman asks of Heidegger’s “tools“: Why did no-one  notice what Anslem had opened up until now, some 1000 years later? We are able to understand Anslem’s argument to this day; no one proposes that the thinkers 1000 years ago were any less astute than our thinkers today. Why is it only now that we are addressing the possibility of what might be ‘beyond’ or ‘at root but not part of’ (Badou’s consideration of set theory) knowledge? And then we might even ask more confounding question if we find that philosophers during the interim of the thousand years also considered the same question over and over. 

I submit for consideration that we have gotten not very far in philosophy. We might begin to understand the vastness of time and how slowly and incrementally human beings, as a group, accomplish knowledge, and how it is much more like a science than philosophers are capable of arguing. Indeed, if we think into this situation, we can then find often the situation that we have already come across elsewhere; namely, that on one hand philosophy is the way we situate the conditions of our times, how we work out logistical problems of being in a semantic world, and on the other, merely reflections of people (the authors) in-themselves. But if this is all philosophy does and is doing, then we also might see that we are actually merely re-contextualizing not what what has already been contextualized (as thus a re-contextualization), but in actually what we’ve already done, making the same arguments over and over but under different terms. We are reminded of Shakespeare’s “a rose by any other word…“.

Upon this conclusion, we are careful to not move too fast as we might then jump to the conclusion that such an idea should negate the ontological status of what I am calling conventional philosophy, as though such a proposal should then move beyond what we have and what we get through philosophical method. This is not the case. It seems near ridiculousness to figure that we can commandeer reality by a stroke of the pen (or a keystroke) except that we might be involved in such philosophical endorsement; we should then ask how is it that am I to get beyond it merely saying something in a particular manner? No. We cannot ‘turn’ the truth of the matter; we have but to see the power that is invested in the leviathan of religious interests, of maintaining a particular formation and method to know that, as the philosophers have argued, I cannot escape it unless I wish to perform some magic, perhaps some discursive slight of hand. We should ask if we can be done with all this trickery of the ontological police. Then, all we have to do is speak of facts instead of the essential Being of things, to speak teleologically instead of ontologically. We can argue the conditional nature of real essence for the rest of eternity and never get anywhere further than circling back and forth away from and back into Medieval type scholarship. And thats fine, and thats the point: This is the factual nature of reality, the impossible aspect of what we have to deal with in reality. Of course there will be those who will argue that what the philosophers are doing now days is not Scholasticism and who will produce all sorts of argumentative and ultimately circumstantial evidence to support their claim. Great! Perfect! Does this sway me to believe something that I don’t already know?  The proper response, in this case then, is that this is not a proposal toward any popular or social change, and in fact it has little to do with how political ideology might be at any moment; we can of course use it for such purposes (identifying our moment from the past conditional moments of history, for example, etcetera…), thats what Badiou and Zizek tell us…

We are not so much learning anything new as much as we are justifying our limited manner of Being in the world, and this is an end in itself that should be heeded but not as a call for change, as though we can somehow transcend what we are — we can only transcend was we identify with as political and ideological subjects. Rather, we should see this situation as a mark of what is true of being human, as a mark of significance, which is to say, a mark of fact. So another of my indictments of philosophy: Despite all the great discursive gymnastics and the twistings of subtle argumentative semantic juxtapositions, philosophy works to avoid having to look at itself as a human behavior. Conventional philosophy refuses to allow itself to be seen as an indicator of behavior, perpetually argues itself as an exceptional incarnation of divine intuition and inspiration, a blank spot of Being, and then uses this fact as a means to absorb all activity under its purview back into the real political and ideological limit — to say that this is all there is. I see the constant and basically automatic referral of all things ‘thought’ back into this kind of philosophical pond is self defeating to the effort of progress, even as progress itself is routed back into this (touted) ‘speculative’, or ‘realist’, or  ‘post-post-modern’ maxim. It is no wonder outside of capitalism is so difficult to think!

As Amoreinblog has argued somewhere, perhaps anthropology is the way out of this philosophical conundrum; despite all the philosophical misappropriations of ideas involved with the AIME (An Investigation into Modes of Existence) project of Bruno Latour (even by Latour himself, lol), his book can be read as an argument for the need to open up a space (perhaps, in his terms, create a pass) whereby we can avoid this modern philosophical whirlpool that we have been involved with for at least 1000 years. It seems that only now, with Postmodernism, but as of late Post-postmodnerism (must we find a Post-Post-Postmodernism also?) do we really get an idea, but also an actual way to understand and realize what human beings are doing.

*

Time itself may be the issue that is involved with Modernity invading as it usurps all discourse into its machinery. The issue that opens up after Postmodernism (but is not itself Postmodern scholarship) is the break from Enlightenment Ontology. So it may not be so much that we have to philosophically get out of this temporal mode — that kind of move would be philosophy attempting to avoid itself through arguing itself out of itself, redundantly, establishing as it maintains reality for everyone. It may be as simple as admitting that there is no escaping the philosophical limit, and realizing a kind of anti-Husserlian manner: Of finding the independent object in the bare fact that we know that there is an independent object, and perhaps that we need not speculate about how it can be so in order for it to be so. Of course we can discuss how it can be so…and indeed we will, but that does not mean that we cannot stay where we are at and let the pagan-Christian rollercoaster come around again and again.

Maybe we need to make a clean break.

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Science and Philosophy; or, Toward a Philosophical Science, or, a Science of Philosophy.

Its happening.

Do scientists argue over facts? If they agree on a subject, such as water, an instrument and its calibration, such as a thermometer, do they then argue that water does not freeze at zero degrees Fahrenheit ? No they do not. They agree on a particular factual method, factual in what they treat, and factual in the results. The scientists do not argue over the results; they test the results by redoing the experiment. This is the scientific method. Through repeating the same experiment under the same conditions, routine outcomes become established as facts, also. Hence, we have the fact of the water, there, that is not disputed; we have the instruments, which also are developed and constructed by rigorous method (based upon given factual items), that are not disputed (in principle; one may argue with the construction or calibration of the instrument), and we have the method, which again, has been developed through trial and error, itself become a ‘factual’ basis of method which is applied to facts, which then yields more facts. None of this is ontologically questioned; the Being of the facts are questioned through the tests of method, but the initial fact, say, of dirt, is not questioned. It is not too obtuse to say that the science is, at root, based upon facts that are not questioned, to there by have a manner to locate other facts that is questioned upon the initial assumption of factuality. It is ontologically cyclical, complete in its bearings.

But this does not mean that we do not question all aspects of it; it only means that the criterion by which we are able to question science is, itself, based upon facts that are not questioned, but to unquestioned facts that are transcendent to the objectival situation in question.

Philosophy is the exception that proves the rule of science; it is, itself, the counterweight of the clockwork of science. Philosophy (at this moment, we will take ‘philosophy’ as the common sort, what everyone agrees upon as philosophy before they begin to philosophize about it) takes the opposite tack; philosophy assumes as a pedagogical platform, takes as given the ability of the human being to grasp transcendental truths and bring them into play; it does not admit transcendental truths. Its circularity is not recognized or used. It posits itself in its position and attitude of participation, as exceptional in an essential sense; it argues this position as it then uses it to bring in all sort of reasons why its situation and approach trumps all others. Its approach is a necessary counterweight to science, and its offerings (common, or conventional philosophy) always stay close to the science of the day (including politics and ideology). This kind of philosophy is necessary because it cannot see itself outside of its transcendental domain granted by the natural sciences. Where the natural sciences take what is given within a circular mode of fact, philosophy takes what is given as a linear mode of uncertainty; the two correspond with each other in the manner that we distinguish as modern: Conventional philosophy is the religious part of the reality whose counterpart is science of nature.

Bruno Latour instinctually (but not objectivally) has noticed this, so that his investigations show that within this circle of science-philosophy, Latour being more philosophically oriented than scientific, we still need an ‘out’ this phenomenon he calls a pass(a philosophical ‘transcendental’ pass: a pass that avoids having to notice its transcendental basis), by which to perpetuate the modern paradigm of factual progress.

All is Vanity, for Real…Kant, Latour and the Pass, part 2.

220px-allisvanity

Ok; here is the post I meant to put:

So we come to Bruno Latour, and his notion of the pass. What is it that allows for the repetition whereby self-fulfillment is denied? This is the question of ‘what happened’. We will never get to answer the question of what ‘is happening’ until we answer the question of ‘what happened’. This is because if we do not find out what happened, then it will happen again. We are then keen to Kierkegaard’s “Repetition”, for the question that most everyone wants to answer is the subsequent question, the question of Being, “What is happening”, why is there what is and not what is not? This question, though, denies its own bases and so asks upon itself without ever even looking for, let alone being able to see, what it lacks. What ontology always finds then is itself, or an other (an other and self are constituents of the real state). All is indeed vanity.

Further; philosophy as an ontological practice cannot escape the political, ideological and in general social dynamics. It is a simple thing to see the reason why I call such conventional philosophical method real. What is real is what is happening. But because thinkers, as opposed to Beings, but consistent with being real, take the products of themsleves as indication of the potential involved with other beings, and take this as evidence of not a whole, but actually The only whole, they thus always (1) take everything real as a product of some sort, be-caused of some thing or other, and (2) take as an automatic demand upon all things within their field their proof toward what is happening, and this, even to the extent that they demand that the question of ‘what happened’ must conform to the state of Being that is happening.

*

Bruno Latour begins his book “An Inquiry into Modes of Existence” with a description of what a pass is with an analogy. I don’t have the book right with me, but he writes about a mountain trail or path that goes from the base to its peak. Note that I will not here follow his description exactly; I am not putting forth a strict analysis of his book and what it means in this post. It is enough that he came up with a pretty good analogy, a good term that can indicate the issue and the way it is dealt with. What is significant with Latour, at least in his AMIE project , is that he sees the need for an opening. It is clear from visiting his webpage that he understands the problem of a multi-vocalized reality similar to the type that Lyotard suggested in the conditions of the post-modern moment . Namely, the problem of communication between worlds. The salient question of every significant philosopher worth considering is “Is communication taking place?” For it is from this pivotal question that the world manifests in its ways.

So, if we can understand what this question means, which is to say, if communication has taken place through this one phrase, then we have found a common pass (a given ontological base). It doesn’t really matter too much if we identify it with Latour’s scheme (supposedly he describes 15 types of passes, 15 ‘modes of existence’; hence the book’s title “Inquiry into Modes of Existence”). What is significant is that he saw the need not so much for another reconciliation, not another philosophical reduction to some essential truth for which the author is trying to gain traction for through their communion with the intuition god, but rather some way to relieve the reduction from being the responsibility of one authors’ intuitive argumentative assertion. What is significant is that he sees that the method is at issue, the philosophical reductive method and its associated (and invisible) givens are at issue, and that the only way to get past this method is to somehow poke a hole in it! Instead of giving into the nihilism that arises in conventional minds, we need to create an opening whereby people can begin to communicate.

In my upcoming book, we might get into the complicity of needs that relates François Laruelle and Bruno Latour’s works; I am getting off the track of this post. The upcoming book probably will answer all the stray ponderings and vectored analyses.

For now, it is enough to understand the simplicity of the idea. First off, ontological foundations must be admitted given. If a traveler does not admit to an already given ontological truth that has already been explored, then the significance of the pass will make no sense; the trail will be missed and avoided. In order to pass, we must set aside the want to apply redundant deconstructivist techniques to every clause. This is because only once we understand the ontological foundations of existence, only once we admit to that truth, can we begin to see the passes. While I see really only one effective pass, Latour sees this pass as expressed in different ways.

The first kind of pass (probably not in the same order or number that Latour notes) is just this: Where a particular methodological application accounts for all that is allowed, a pass has occurred in the scheme of meaning that accounts for real estimations. We might even call this kind of pass a ‘given’, because it functions to allow reasoning to grant reality despite the problem it poses upon that reason to attach to real things. For example: If there is a question of the truth of Being, for which a particular formula answers this question, whether is be God, or whether it be a series of philosophical arguments, such as Deleuze’s Rhizomes, or various ‘arrived-at’ states or situations that we can associate with metaphorical ‘plateaus’ – where such an explanation of what is happening routes all occurrence back into its logic or reasoning such that every event is account for or deflected within that scheme, a pass has occurred to ‘miss’ the meaning of an alternate suggestion. The person effectivly ‘passes over’ the situation where someone is expressing a different reality because everything is making sense to the logic of the first person’s ‘total’ explanation of the situation. This is the post-modern condition.

But lets back up. Latour uses the analogy of a mountain pass. The meaning of the forgoing paragraph is that first we have to admit that there is a mountain in front of us. I show you a mountain and say that we are going to hike that mountain, and I start to walk. But you don’t move; you stand there pondering whether or not there is indeed a mountain. I tell you to come on, lets go, there are great views at the top of this mountain. But you stand there and reflect upon the possible aesthetics involved in being at the top of an epistemoloigcal situation that we cant agree upon.

This is the very problem we face when a philosopher will not admit ontological foundations as true. But I am not going to go into all the ramifications of this discussion here.

Again, enough to say that Latour’s analogy is of a mountain and a way to hike to the top. There are all sorts of dangers on this trail though. We will have to cross some fast streams and climb some crazy rocks, some steep terrain, but it is navigable, we just have to follow the route.

Now; the problems that Latour comes across and discusses in his book are due to the issues of this same type; he is still justifying the situation ontologically and thus has to address, and or finds, 15 types of passes that represent 15 types of manners or ‘modes’ that account for reality for the various types of people (various people use various modes so reality stays ‘whole’ –for those of the particular modes). This is why his gets sticky; because as soon as he attempts to justify something that is passing ontological constructions, he then has to use a pass that somehow avoids any of the passes he lists, or incorporates. Ironically, the need he notices gets set aside as another ‘religious’ dogma, another philosophical reductive scheme, accepted by some and rejected by others.

The point that he himself misses (and we will discuss somewhere the duplicity involved with conventional significance) is that in order to be able to see a pass one has to admit that ontological justifications rely themselves upon a pass. Simply speaking, Latour is attempting to answer a teleological question through ontological justifications.

Another kind of pass, a good one, and I think one of the first passes that Latour notes, is: Say we have a map of the mountain and the route leading up to the top. We mark our progress along the trail by markers in the map that indicate, like ‘when you get to a big dead oak jetting out of a rock, then you go east for two miles until…’ or symbols or pictures that say just as much. How are we able to transpose or translate the actual mountain to the map of it or vice-versa? The map itself looks nothing like the mountain, and in fact is nothing like the mountain. Yet there is some sort of resemblance between the two, and indeed, provided that something has not happened to have changed or altered the actual physical landmarks that the map notes, we are able to stick to the directions on the map and get to the top. In this kind of transferal there is a pass enacted in our understanding of reality. While I am not here addressing all the peculiarities of the situation, it is a simple thing to see that there is an obstruction in the actual Being of things to get around or past, and this can be analogous to two Beings attempting to communicate. In order for us to be able to follow the map of the course up the mountain, there has to be a sort of pass that allows us to ignore the problem that occurs in between the actual physical mountain and the small paper drawing of symbols that describe how to get up the mountain. This pass thus marks a particular manner of coming upon reality, a particular ‘mode of existing’.

The significant point, though, of noticing this situation is that in order to get beyond the dead end that is the modern-post-modern obstruction where no communication takes place (again: what do I mean by this? Read my past posts and my books to find out!, (and maybe check out some killer tunes to boot!)) is that an opening is needed through which people can be free to describe, what frankly amounts to, the ‘insane realties’ that actually occur in the meaningful life, but without fear of judgment of reprisal. Yet, this is not so much some sort of auto-biographical non-fiction or something, nor some authorial-fantasy of artistic license. It is more a manner by which we might be able to find out some facts about what reality really is.

At least, this is the idea behind Latour’s vision.

While I do enjoy the idea and see the need for a pass, I am not so optimistic as Latour.

Philosophy, Colonialism and Partition.

Perhaps the title should have included “non-philosophy”. lol

This talk concerns the opening whereby philosophy is indicated to its method through the ending that supersedes its domain. Specifically, and in the context of Francois Laruelle’s “Christo-fiction“, that which supersedes any conventional appropriation is the quantum. In particular, there is no philosophical posture that is able to bring any feasible critique against its own effective omniscience, omnipotence and proposed as assumed omnipresence. The indictment is made unto its method, which is the argumentative method that is made by agents of transcendence. This alternate posture is thus outside of (conventional) philosophy’s purview, since its route is one of scientific verification over the conventional argumentative method. This alternative method is thus of allowing for a particular framework in which philosophical experiments are allowed, but it no longer includes the framework within its domain of critique.

But we are only at the very preliminary stages of this work; we are in the long game. This talk is an attempt to lay the theoretical groundwork (the breaking of ground has already occurred with the likes of Laruelle, Badiou, Zizek and Latour, to mention only the few still living), to describe some of the conditions by which such a foundation is needed and will be laid. It departs, albeit significantly, with the recurrence embedded in the conventional method’s approach, whereby human beings have access to resources that while arising from some ‘unknown’ source (immanence, transcendence, biology, neurology, evolution, creation, or whatever…), a source that is never found but at all times presents itself within the discourse that proposes to be ‘finding it’ through the conventional method of delegated agents (what I say are ‘agents of transcendence’), nevertheless still function effectively to supply a true reality, elements of which I call ‘True Objects’; the delegation process instigated by humans is at all times assumed to have the support of providence, regardless of what people might assert as the discursive conditions of such providence (such argumentative establishments are redundant).

This alternative route, in its beginnings, is involved with the effort thereby of verification. Currently, seeing that the conventional philosophical method works to obscure facts, we are involved with creating an opening whereby the facts may be noted, upon which such a scientific method may be laid. The only way forward in the effort, it appears, is through the enactment of a partition.

 (I just noticed that it cut off about the last six minutes of the talk. Sorry). 

Philosophy, Colonialism and Partition.

The first Webcast of the Philosophical Hack

Crash Space and the Move to a ‘Science’ (of the Subject): To Ping or Not to Ping, Phenomenology and Observer Effects. REPOST

 

THREE POUND BRAIN Im finding has got some cool observations, often a manner of approach that seems insightful.

In the discussion of a philosophical scientism, the post below appears to me to indicate more a datum, a kind of data point, over a semantic content. If we hold to the idea that indeed we will be able to come upon a ‘phenomenological science’, so to speak (for lack of a term; maybe it is better voiced as a science of continental philosophy, science of the Subject, or a science of philosophy, or existential science) it will come when when the content of proposals does not fold back into itself to ask questions of its epistemological and ontological being. The problem we (as a kind of Western dominator-colonialist hegemonic discourse) have been dealing with for some time in philosophy is the problem of redundancy; that is, the recurrent check upon sovereign privilege. Yet we cannot escape the issue that surrounds the statement ‘for those who understand’, for, there is indeed an issue for those who understand, if you catch my drift*.

This is where this essay by THREE POUND BRAIN seems to have purchase. Quite compelling; these thinkers have conflated particular arms of the issue to further close the gap that occurs in the perpetual philosophical deferring of redundancy. The issue of what we are calling a science of the Subject (again, for lack of a better term), concerns our ability to dismiss ourselves from the semantic content of philosophical discourses: This only occurs for those ‘who understand’ the issue. The issue is, as I just said, the recurrent enfolding of meaning; this issue has to do with a kind of route where the thought is always extricating itself from the object of its proposal in the effort to find a more true thing of reality. So, if this be the real case, what is and has been occurring all through our history of critical thought, then what is it issue in our ‘science’ concerns an ability to be removed from that recurring redundancy.

The redundancy, the space of ‘naught’ that the redundancy covers, the ‘pass’ that maintains the current paradigm that situates ‘subject’ and ‘object’, is what the essay below calls a ‘crash space’, for another term, and aside from the struct Husserlisan phenomenological reduction, it takes a certain kind of understanding of the issue (this, itself another kind of redundancy) to see and accept the the Reduction is indeed a facet of everyday human life, over a particular methodological approach.

What we find, though, what inevitably is a part of the science that accepts instances of truth (objects) is that this essay below thus becomes another data point. In order to see this, we then need to understand what the traditional philosophical method does, and how it produces ‘Objects’, which is to say ‘ideological/mythological objects’, as opposed to witnessing and involving the manipulation of mere objects themselves.

We need notice that philosophical reduction can occur with any object, that the Phenomenologist reduction is not a particular meaning upon a particular clausal route, as if it occurs only when one thinks in a manner that Husserl denotes, describes or explains. In fact, any object may be looked into to find that its basis is naught; but this does not mean that it thus is a relative ideological manifestation, but more indeed that the ideological manifestation itself reduces to naught, that the route is incorrect in its maner of reckoning. Yet again, this does not mean that there is nothing ‘outside’ of whatever. This ‘nothing’ is the crash space. All discourses arise an an ideological mandate, as a intrinsic mythology, due to the substantiation of a single foundational fact, this fact being the uncontroversial term, the ‘given’ of the discussion.

It is here that Harman’s ‘over’ and ‘under’ determination becomes operative as relational analogous categories to describe what his occurring, again, not as substantial real components of objective quality. His arguments are against particular contexts, particular discursive ‘givens’ that he must confront as a member of the academy, for which he must produce content.

So also, we then see, as much as the essay below represents a datum over another semantic point of argument, it is because it takes another ‘given’ as a means to argue a particular point about what may be real; this time a sort of ‘brain’ or ‘physical operation’ of such real structure. The given of the physical brain producing experiences has allowed a view that sees itself as a partial manifestation of an impartial effect, and has understood that without such partiality (the partiality wherein what is impartial likewsie resides in meaning), ‘nothingness’ occurs in meaning and its corresponding ‘feeling’, which is the collaspe of knowledge into itself, collapsing upon itself. And, that this means only that when there is no view that there is no view; it does not mean that there being no view means that the world is the view. This fact reveals something about the nature of being human, and it is more than an existential nihilistic uselessness amd purposelessness.

Similar to Bruno Latour’s effort in AMIE to first identify the need for an opening, and then to allow for the facts that can be discerned because an opening has been allowed: So it is that we might begin to find these ‘givens’, and how they manifest discourse as proposing substantial content. These ‘givens’ as datum, rather than the argument upon what is reduced or produced from the discourses, which result in redundancy; seeing there discourses as results of a given situation, thereby grants us the data by which to discern our sought after science. The data will then be the content, but not in its argumentative capacity, but rather what it is doing. 

The example is, say, a chair. How much do you need to say in describeing a chair before I understand what you are talking about? Probably very little. Yet conventional philosophy says that you can never describe enough, and I will never realize what you are describing as a chair. It takes little more than this to realize that philosophy of this sort is based in a fantasy. So we might see that the idea behind these two aspects of the philosophical method is: Left only with a capacity to know, which is to say, if I already did not have a conception or idea of what a chiar is, and or I did not have recourse to a personal gesture from the first person toward the object in question at hand for reference, and or in some imaginary world where there might be a being or intelligent creature who is not human who has no access to a chair nor has ever experienced what a chair might be — in the condition of at least one of these three conditions, knowledge left to itself would never be able to convey the chair to another’s knowledge suffuciently to supply this other with ‘chairness’. Always there would be another question that would have to be qualified, and the answer to which that would fail to qualify exclusively what a chiar actually is.

Nevertheless: There is a chair right there and I do have recourse to many human aspects and relationships to be able to convey to me what a chair is sufficiently enough for me to not only use it functionally (to sit down on it), but as well to use it in communication on many levels. One might ask: What else is a chair then? Wee; it is more than ideology and political social justice, though these things are indeed necesaary and good (we should instead just call them what they are instead of lumping them into the category of ‘philsophy’.)

Conventional philsophy would have it that we have access to what the chair might actually be, but not only this. Conventional philosophy assumes as it is important that we not only acknolwege that the chair exists as ‘more than’ a chair, but also argues this importance. This is why modern conventional philosophy has been accused of being nothing less than sophistry. The aggravating issue has to be what happens when we notice what conventional philsophy is doing.

We notice that philosophy is arguing its own validity even in the face of the exposure that its validity is merely an argument. The idea is this: Do I have to argue that a chair is a chair for it to be a chair, or is it always already a chair? I would say that the chiar is a chair regardless of what I want to say about it, but that further I can say many things about a chair, but I dont have to argue its existence for me to be able to consider the many things about what a chair may be.

Now; when we look at philosophy and we realize what it is doing, what does that mean?

I say thay it means that we have found the object called philosophy despite its argument about how it cannot be found. I say that this object is conventional philosophy because most philosophers are so caught up in the method, the substance that is logic step 1, logic step 2, step 3…as of logic is more than merely a tool, that they are incapable of admitting that thier method has been identified, in fact, as an object. They will be completely mystified as to what I can possibly mean, and will use the method to prove to me I am wrong, that philosophy is not an object that can be found. Yet it is because I used no method to find it, I stick with what I am doing to call it philosophy, and distinguish the arguments of convetional philosophy as now a near empty set, an object whose content I may now use as data.

So we might continue along this idea: How much do I have to read of Emmanual Kant before I understand what he is talking about? I say not very much, because , just like the chair, once you understand what he is saying, you understand the object he is talking about. Likewsie; how much do I need to read of Hurserl? Quite soon in the reading of Husserl you see the object he is describing. What about Derrida? Delueze? Wittgestien? Hegel?

What happens when we admit the object they are talking about is indeed a common object, rather than a secret and deep, complex and elusive object? Answer: We can begin to address what these authors are saying as data, that is, as examples of what Subjects are doing with the common philosophical object. Relieved of psycholoigcal theological approximations that rely upon intuited transcedental subjective interpretations to manifest identity, we can thereby begin to view the human object, as opposed to having only the enfolded and redundant subjective interpretation of objects. Once we can begin to accumulate data on what the Subject is doing with the common philosophical object, we can begin to more fully understand what the human being is, and what it does.

 

The THREe POUND BRAIN essay evidences a certain cognition, a certain intentional acknowledgment of the issue, as well as intuiting what needs to occur. It seems that, at least here, THREE POUND BRAIN evidences a closer move toward this science.

 

 

* “The Moment of Decisive Significance: A Heresy” which will be out soon , fingers crossed , addresses these concerns, albeit in a non-conventional manner. The Revised edition has an added Preface, Preface to the Introduction, Forward and an Introduction, as well as an Author’s Note,  just to make sure everything is handled. 😄

REPOST:

 

JAMES XAVIER: Sam, what’s the range of human vision? SAM BRANT: Distance? JAMES XAVIER: No, wavelength. SAM BRANT: Between 4000 angstrom units and 7800 angstrom units.* You know that. JAMES XAVIER: Less than one-tenth of the actual wave spectrum. What could we really see if we had access to the other ninety-percent? Sam, we […]

via To Ping or Not to Ping: Physics, Phenomenology, and Observer Effects — Three Pound Brain

 

[NOTE: A variation of this comment about an essay posted in THREE POUND BRAIN forms part of the “Preface to the Intorduction” of the revised 1st edition of the book “Absolution“, that is called now: “The Moment of Decisive Significance: A Heresy“. It is copyright 2016 by Lance A. Kair.]

An Brief Heretical Outline of Our Current Situation: Phenomenology and Scientism.

Here is an end note from my upcoming book.

I have changed the title to “The Moment of Decisive Significance: A Heresy“.

This is a book of blatant confrontation and direct exposure, and not of spirituality or self help.

BTW: One of my ex-professors read a small bit of my unedited copy and replied to me: “It appears that you have written a self-help book, and being as I am not very interested in self-help, I probably won’t read the rest.”  Talk about pompousness and presumptive privilege. He was even a religious studies philosophy professor. Yes, its is an object oriented view through the Gospels, but Fuck man. I hope all you people are not as myopic and dense as he is. Funny I used to have respect for him. I can’t even imagine Where he would have come up with such an idea. I guess its because my ideas are So offensive (correctly framed 😛) that was the only way he could come to terms with what I am saying.

But hey; Ive said I appreciate any feedback. He gave me his feedback. And I think his ’emeritus’ title is undeserved. So there.

 From what I have experienced in my 3 so years of blogging, I am skeptical of academic presumptiveness and pompousness, and Dr.– just topped it off. So if you are an academic, and honest, please take my occasionsal discursive promiscuity and crass lip with a hint a compassion and understanding. I am most probably not talking about you, and even as I might overgeneralize and say ‘academic’, I do have respect for many scholars.

I am honest and often naive; but fool me once, shame on me…   
“note 129.

The ‘historical moment’ of Jesus is intended to reference the facticity of history over the negotiated interpretation of it. The difference is found when we consider that we have yet to exhaust the phenomenonalist intension ( in a general sense meaning ‘centrist subject’);  the conventional method of finding truth that is likewise involved with an establishment of identity is problematic. This is why there is and has been an issue with some ‘continental philosophers’ suggesting their ideas might denote a kind of science, or that we might be able to develop some sort of a phenomenologist scientism, if you will. What we might call a ‘pure’ method of science is one that moves in laborious increments punctuated by momentous insights that cannot be anticipated, not only around perhaps a single scientist with a purpose in mind, or an aspect to investigate, but through all the multitudinous scientists likewise working on often tiny aspects of the same issue. While one could argue there is a kind of concern for identity in every person (as well as a subjective bias such as Bruno Latour proposes to have uncovered), the science itself, for the hard core scientist, is what is important and drives the effort.
Admittedly, this might be a bit deluded in ideal, but if we are going to apply a philosophical reduction here likewise (not necessarily a phenomenologist reduction), then we would have to ask how even science itself, the proper science of physical mechanics and such, functions in the way it does for accomplishments. Of course we cannot completely dismiss real subjective ‘interference’ with objectivity, but the issue here is not about absolutes. This issue concerns methods. The issue concerns the real cohesion of disparate situations. What we are calling ‘conventional method’ is meant to specifically draw our attention to philosophy and its domain; we suggest that there is a type of real endeavor that works to draw all things unto itself, to reconciliation, and this is the motion of identity, of real objects. This motion for the human being is thus involved with what we usually call subjectivity but is really more an indication of ‘being value’. In other words, this translates for the human being into having ‘self-worth’ or even ‘relevancy’ or ‘importance’; we might even say that there is a libidinal drive for identity, and this is indeed part of the constitution of reality.

So it is that in reality, the conventional method misses vital components of truth for the sake of identity and even argues identity as a ubiquitous feature of what might possibly be true; conventional method draws all things unto itself and then argues its truth as if it is the only truth possible. And this is to say that even allowing for the possibility of more than one truth is indeed a move of this drawing toward unity. It is a unitive proposal to say that there is more than one reality. This is, in itself, a phenomenalist move. The point here, though, as I have said, is that such a method is completely incapable of entertaining that which lay outside is purview, but this does not mean that there is ‘nothing’ that it does not address or is capable of addressing; rather, this is to say that reality is the negotiation of terms and thus the historicity can never be contemplated by the conventional method due to its foundation is what is real. Conventional method is thereby centered around a subjective interpretation of what is occurring and the negotiation of these relative subjective agents. Also, again; this is not to say that somehow it is incorrect, but only that this is the way it behaves, this is the true description of how real philosophical negotiation occurs.

Thus when we speak of the ‘historical moment’ of Jesus, we mean to refer to that fact not negotiated. Here then, we can only be speaking from the historical motion itself; and this is to say that in this particular historical moment, the event of the minimal human experience is seen to involve ‘God’ as this universal and basic form can be communicated across disparate arenas, which we are finding through our venture through the Gospels here, are two different teleological fields, as we say, two routes of coming upon the object. The historical moment of Jesus is that moment wherein there is only a real human experience, a one common ontological arena, such that what is definitively and absolutely two teleological bases is understood as implicating a further unity, at that, as ‘secret’ or ‘spiritual’ unity, as if a real ontology necessarily, automatically, axiomatically and omnipresently involves the totality of all things.
The problem then of the usual conventional philosophical route is that because it is incapable of allowing for anything that is not determined in subjective negotiation, when the logic of the ends of discourse is presented in history, it is understood as such rather than experienced; which is to say there are two types of what is called ‘experience’ that are proposed to equate to meaning the same thing. What is understood through philosophical proposal is viewed the same thing as what is posed in philosophical proposal. The ‘ends’ is viewed upon as a logical conclusion based upon the subjective center of thought ‘thinking and considering’ such logical pathways. This is to say that despite what definitions might arise to say reality is this-and-that different than before or what another definition might have proposed, still the thinker is thinking these things through, considering various discursive designations from a central and prioritized Self, consciousness, or subjective agency. Even if we were to somehow logically crawl step by step to be able to say “From dog flower spichz consliger fghkioh tomorrowpd cloud ring flies to refridgerator” and mean something significant, the metaleptical slide that has occurred to be able to have that clausal phrase mean something meaningful gets nowhere further that the sentences we are using at this moment to convey an idea. And this is to say that the human being will always be a human being despite what clausal structure we set upon it. The political and ideological structure may change, but the question is always how we were able to develop a global society out of different ‘humanities’ speaking different languages who all have different terms and even grammars that order various ‘realities’ if we were not all human?

The conventional philosophical method has thus ‘skipped’ (what Latour might call a pass) the end of phenomenology through the application of logic upon it to thereby posit by a sort of reasoning that we should move to consider something else besides the dead end phenomenological reduction. This is because the conventional method requires novel ideas. But these very ideas are based into the phenomenologist move, as we said above, these ideas are based in the reduction, in drawing all meaning unto a centrist occasion. Hence phenomenology has not ended but was merely passed over for the sake of establishing another real identity. It matters little if anyone prescribes to Hursserl’s method or moves along his methodological pathway to a particular (non?) definitional ‘experience’ because when it comes down to it, this kind of method or attitude upon definitional paths, merely yields another definitional situation (that here we can call the ‘phenomenological reduction’); an individual moving along Husserl’s clausal path to his meaning avoids the path that is already being allowed for the ability to even take his path to any meaning, whether it agrees with him or not.

 

The point here is that while conventional philosophy would sooner not have to argue over how identity is a feature that must be dealt with in reality at all times, and as well not have to expose the weak point of the platform by which the institution continues, the whole platform that is taken as a necessary condition of real negotiation has already been argued and found lacking. But where these arguments have occurred, they are taken in stride to merely be another part of the negotiating of the ubiquitous ever-presence. In order to come to terms with what is actually occurring, conventional method must be set aside as a feature of a kind of functioning of human consciousness. When this happens, or may be seen to be possible, we begin to see how scientism might become viable, but the only way is to disregard what the conventional method has to say about it, but more, that whatever it has to say about the analysis based upon this view, is itself more evidence of what consciousness does.”

–from “The Moment of Decisive Significance: A Heresy” C. 2016. Lance A Kair.


 

AUTHOR’s COMMENT ON THE NOTE: The opening to the discussion of what consciousness is actually doing, as opposed to the discussion of what consciousness gives to be considered, is made by fully acknowledging that the phenomenological occasion is a capitalistic subjective identity that does not account for the totality of human existence, that what its gives is a religious foundation for Being. It is an effective theological directive. What occurs outside this capitalistic determination is a situation that threatens identity; it is a heresy. Thus, somehow, the opening will be made for those to whom that threat is of no concern.  This is the proposal upon which a science of human consciousness seems must be based.

But we will see what occurs.

A Brief Outline of the Bases of Object Orientation.

I find often that philosophers love to complicate everything and then turn around and tell you its simple, and then write a paper that uses all sorts of jargon. 😉

I think many philosophers dont even know any more wtf they are talking about.

One might want to say or think that object orientation came about due to various really in depth analyses of philosophical texts. They are wrong.

And this is not ‘realist’ or OOO. It is merely sensible given the matter at hand.

Here is a very unconventional talk, presented in a quite rebelious, anti establishment manner, about not only the reasoning behind object orientation, but also how object orientation diverges from the conventional philosophical reckoning.

(Please bare with the slow start.) 

Time is Longer That We Think..

If we think there was a post-modern era, and now we are in a another era, think again. While I have my difficulties with Bryant, he at least appears to engage with ideas and text in a manner that defies ‘temporal eras’. So again we have a further evidence of the need for a bifurcation, a divergence. In time we could say that there is was an era that can be identified by certain types, certain organizations of terms; yet of time we can say that post-modernism identifies, in the Lyotardian sense, a certain type that has nothing to do with objective-temporal eras.

If Byant’s post below is not a post-modern expression then I don’t know what is. Set me aside then because you are obviously, as I say, oriented upon a True Object in a manner that I see as contrary to the manner in which Bryant is engaging in his post. (I will never know what Bryant has to say about this, because i am beneath his consideration).  

In 20 some-odd years, we have not moved from Derrida and the other PMs; in 50 not a jot from Sarte or Lacan; in 100 years, not stepped on increment from Heidegger’s Dasein, in 200 years, not one minute from Hegel. What is new is interesting. What is not new is significant.

In contrast yet complicit with Latour: We are Still Modern.

Here is the evidence:

REPOST:

 

 

There is something unbearable about the Lacanian teaching; something that makes you want to turn away and flee, or at the very least forget. It is not his opaque style, though that style performs the very thesis he wishes to articulate. At its heart, the core Lacanian teaching is that there is no cure for […]

via The Ineluctable Tragedy of Existing — Larval Subjects .

The Modern of Post Modernism; The Anthropocene, Object Orientation and the Possibility of Ground.

 

I feel it is time to clear the air; the smoke of post-modernism still seems to linger. It is time we come to terms with what Post-Modernism means, what it meant, what it is.

There is no debate in this; any debate that would uphold a sort of PM catch-all has missed the issue. I think it is this apparent problem for which I address by suggesting a divergence is warranted.

Post modernism is a manner of dealing with reality where metanarratives fail. PM Is a response to the failure. But in that it is merely a response, it must itself be based in a metanarrative, albeit and however unsure and undisclosed as it may be. But we need no longer hesitate in this mire of indecision and doubt. Where the post-modern is indeed necessary, it often fails in that it wants to repeat itself, to reify itself, to eternalize itself; ironically, this is a Modern trait that Post-Modernism attempted to confront.

So it is we may see many authors attempting to place this indistinction, this temporal hesitation. This is where Bruno Latour attempts to make an opening: So the PM metanarrative, itself a kind of ‘unconsolidation’, might find the meaning of the void (but only void by virture of the Modern metanarrative, or the metanarrative that is modern) where by PM finds its ability to call into question metanarratives by allowing what has been silent to speak.

The task now is to find that narrative that accounts for the, now twice avoided, silence; which is to say, we need admit that we all have been colonized despite PM, that PM is was an ironic vehicle to establish and reify Modernity.

Perhaps an apparent geology, what mane are calling the ‘anthropocene’, will snap us out of the magical glamour of PM ironic transcendency, and stop fantasizing that ‘I’ have some sort of communion with ‘un-god’, some ‘extra universal’ situation. So we can get back to some sort of ground.

I have read and am somewhat familiar with 4 of the (in)famous PM authors; Michel Foucault, Jean Francios Leotard, Gilles Deleuze, and Jacques Derrida. Of Baudrillard Ive only read tiny bits here and there. Virillo ive not heard of. Of course, there are other PM authors that are not so famous that I have read, and even some that are not considered ‘post-modernist’ but yet are speaking of similar issues.

While i do like and understand these PM authors i have read, i also see that Lyotard was probaly the best at seeing through history. Foucault, oddly enough, was caught in a ‘vertical’ dynamic even as he posed a ‘horizon’, and Deluze was still too high, too near to the event to be able to see past self centrism. And also that at least Lyotard and Deleuze are mis-appropriated as they are mis-applied; this last is the issue Alain Badiou and Laruelle address, as well as Bruno Latour.

It is or should be a fact, by now, that the nature of humans is to have real worlds, or a Real world, as the case may be. The issue of all if not most of many of the Big Names, as well as many smaller names, of the past 200 year of philosophy, but maybe even longer, is the difference involved in what might be called ‘truth baring’, and ‘reality baring’ operations. Every great philosopher addresses this issue, but the issue of this issue is how the telling of the ‘first’ issue often finds itself awash in the second issue, the effect that Badou describes and addresses. Yet these authorial addressings, these worlds, are, in effect, metanarratives.

There is a disentanglement of philosophy that must occur if we are to even get anywhere, if we are to stop having ‘turns’ and ‘eras’ and such. But if we must swim in this pit of eternal denial, then we can say that in a certain sense the Post-modern wanted to propose some sort of new reality, but alas we find that PM was no different than the realities anywhere else or any time, and that this is the fault of the second appropriated issue. The difference lay only in the terms that are used. Derrida said good things about discursive limitation, what for other terms is indeed the Modern/Post-modern paradox, but he too was caught in a vertical situation likewise that inevitably puts him in a modern sorting, which is to say, of a metanarrative. As a witness to this paradox, Lyotard, I’d say, was closest: The ‘post’ thus was is not meant to be some temporal suggestion; more, it was is a description of a situation and its logical defaults based within the ‘modern’ discursive scheme. Yet, that people took and continue to take it as some sort of historical era or attitude, thus shows that mis-appropriation as mis-appropriation (denial as showing what is true) is of the issue of the second type.

I say PM is more about orientation upon objects than it is about some attitude or argumentative position. What I see of PM, and Lyotard specifically, is he was come upon by his experience, his metanarrative, of himself, and found, through an engagement with history, through what is already established for by to bring what is true and real unto a person, with the discourse of reality itself, that his metanarrative could not be justified by this real discourse; upon reflection he finds that what constitutes himself is different than what the metanarrative says of himself and what he should be. This his issue presented in his book “The Differend”. So, ironically, because of this situation, he saw that indeed the discourse by which he came (comes) to know himself is incommunicable, because he must use the discourse that is already there, and by this usage avoids that which he is trying to communicate. This juxtaposition of Being, thus allowed (s) him to bring a critique against the discourse that is not ‘hearing his case’, and thus calls this critique ‘post’ modern, because the real discourse is, or is seen as, ‘modern’ and the metanarrative that is incommensurate with this modern is thus post, or after, posterior. He thus finds this ‘modern’ reality involved with meta narratives (as he was involved) that are ineffective yet being used in a behavior as if they are effective, which is to say, communicating, and moves to expose this ‘human’ facet by (ironically) critiquing it; that is, not only critiquing the metanarrative by which he comes unto the world, but the idea of metanarrative itself. He there by opens the door to the removal of the subject, and the entrance on the scene of the Object, or what has been developed ‘post-post-modern’, SR and OOO and such.

The problem, though, is always the setting aside, forgetting, and then plain mis-appropriation of the ironic paradox. It is not so much that one needs to write with some subversive or double meaning, but that the irony of the situation by which one comes unto reality must remain intact. As even Nick Land seems to notice; one must come upon a certain type of knowledge that orients one upon what reality is, what the case of reality is, such that a critique of reality stems ultimately from an honest confrontation with that route by which one is coming upon that very reality. And this is to say, one confronts ‘the world’ by attacking the basis by which he or she has the world; to segregate the issue into some objective world and some subject-agent-operator is of the second type of issue.

This is the issue at hand, as well as the feature that distinguishes the reason why we need to ‘clean up’ philosophical discussion, as well why I advocate a kind of divergence.

 

The Role of the Hermit.

The hermit is a conventional scapegoat. The categorization imposed upon a person allows the conventionally faithful their comfort in reality.

“…the act of insaturation has to provide the opportunity to encounter beings capable of worrying you. Beings whose ontological status is still open but are nevertheless capable of making you do something, of unsettling you…Beings that have that have their own resources.” (Bruno Latour. The Inquiry into Modes of Existence. c.2013. Harvard. Pg 161)

In the pervious post I indicated that I am not advocating or implying a withdraw that could indicate a hermit or an ascetic in the conventional sense. In fact, I go so far as to imply that there is no longer a possibility of such a place, such a status.

While I will at some point show how Latour operates along a particular vector, within a particular orientation upon objects, for now we can begin to see that the operator stays there, where she is ontologically, part in reality yet part not real, insaturated in the conventional assertion of ubiquity, omnipresence and omnipotence. We can begin to understand how I might frame reality as conventional and at that established in faith. For what is unsettling of insaturation is indeed the element of offense that allows for conventional faith to operate, for the conventional route to have credence; Latour says as much but indeed sees his orientation as the only viable route. (More on that later). 

What is still shoved into that outside and marginal (read: unimportant) position, called the hermit and the ascetic, is indeed that which remains to be heard.  But only by those who have ears….

“…Beings who-…keep on standing there, uneasy, at the crossing.”(Ibid. pg 162)