The Latest in Human Ingenuity. 

In the real world of negotiation and mediation we just can’t introduce something with good intentions without having devastating bad results.  I’d say that is a damn good synopsis of the human condition. Think about every good thing in your life and then think about how much bad things you deny in order to have this good attitude up on life. I would bet there is an overwhelming amount of bad things in the world. That’s why we have to focus on the good things. That’s why we have to have fenced off neighborhoods and H OA’s. We have to institutionalize what is good and focus our vision on what is good. And then will let the fallout just happen — to someone else. 

Lol. 

Anyways. I’m not entirely sure why we need better pain medication. I mean granted we don’t want to be back in the Civil War times where you have to amputate someone’s leg or pull pull it out of someone’s gut with no anesthesia at all. But nowadays there are so many things that qualify as pain it seems it is merely correspondence with the need for more types of medication that takes care of pain. 

I think it would be interesting if someone did that sort of study to classify all the various types of feelings that people have that they want to call pain. I bet we would find that there’s really a extremely small amount of sensory experience that his actual pain that any sort of medication can really deal with, and that the rest of the stuff we call pain is really just based on this fundamental problem solution attitude upon life when we’re always addressing problems with solutions that are proposing to anticipate new problems even while their applied to pass problems.  Problem problem problem narrow your vision focus clearly on the good things fence off all bad things from the goodness. I bet most of what we call pain is just maladaption, variations of traditional and familial manners of dealing with what is proposed as a righteous life. The perpetuation of sickness where is otherwise there would be health. 

OK im preaching and I’m way too sarcastic; anyways here’s a repost: 

Horse tranquilizers in a deadly chemical zoo: The newest theat to America’s opioid crisis

When it comes to new “miracle” drugs, all that glitters is NOT gold. Drugs that can induce addiction usually turn out to cause more harm than good.  Scientists are constantly synthesizing new and powerful substances capable of altering the way our central nervous systems function. Yes, there are obviously benefits and a potential upside to these new drugs – but there […]
http://youreworththefight.com/2016/10/03/elephant-tranquilizers-a-new-threat-in-americas-deadly-opioid-crisis/

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…and sowing the seeds: Reply to Blake with draft excerpts from “The Second Moment”.

Reply to Terrence Blake’s recent post over at Agent Swarm:

As usual Terrence you pegged it. It’s strange how I view it and actually I can totally agree with you and yet somehow there’s something that I’m not agreeing with and really that has to do with my work, The strange situation that I find myself in reading you and is also what I’m trying to sort out. It’s actually really great.
For indeed I would say the same thing as you,  and add a few other authors to your list who really kind of saying the same thing. Yet I don’t think that Laruelle is merely repeating what these other people have repeated in a better way. I do not think that’s all that’s going on here. I would put it more in the framework of the question of why Laruelle appears in a religious context; as you kind of say his acolytes or his believers. Lol. I agree, yeah. I would say inasmuch as people are appropriating his discourses in such a way that it is organized around a proper ordering of his definitions, whether one would either believe or not believe, or that they would be ‘congregants’ or not, is a misappropriation of what Laruelle is really saying.

This further goes to my point about Laruelle himself, that he is missing the significance of what he saying (oddly enough,about the event, the object of the discourse) as a further dynamic in the whole discussion.

“…if we can talk about Kierkegaard or Nietzsche in the same or similar context, that they indeed mark sort of turning point, or at least a sort of speaking in a certain way about a certain particular thing, then it is because before this mark (that is such talk) people of such an experience, what I call the significant event, still felt or still thought in terms of a common human standard,  within  a stratified horizon of human experience where all human beings can participate in the same context of any world through the manipulations of discourse. I’m not sure what others may make of Laruelle’s ‘unilateral duality’, but to me such a term defies the stratification to which his ideas are typically applied. The idea that thus takes hold and thus usurps the meaning of Laruelle’s notions is that mode that says “if I can just explain it well enough, if I can shred up a given term into its proper real elements, if I can deconstruct a term so thoroughly that I can present it to anyone and they will understand, potentially” …(from “The Second Moment”)

This is the enterprise that you’re talking about, and indeed that’s exactly what Laruelle does, exactly the effort that he’s involved with, which is why I say he is in bad faith. For if we can take a certain lineage that involves those characters as you brought up, if not more and other ones, each of those authors attempts to situate a certain type of experience within a communication of discourse, and actually not only that, but each of them is putting it in such a way that it is clear to them, such that their project then extends into explaining to others in rebuttal and response what they already explained, yet ,in further differentiated terms as if they will somehow at some point be able to communicate what they’re really saying to these other people.

Think about phenomenology. Husserl, from what I gather, tried to put forth a science of phenomenology, and Heidegger had the same idea and difficulty with his students. You can also feel the frustration in Nietzsche’s writings and you can hear the despair in Kierkegaard. After Kierkegaard and Nietzsche pretty much that’s it. The rest of it is just a reiteration and a repetition by someone who is come upon a certain type of experience attempting to improve upon the initial explication or pronunciation of it…”

Strangely enough, the science that authors might propose seems untenable because of the very mode that they are caught in; which is to say, the mode of Enlightenment thinking, which is really evangelism under a philosophical guise. The science they ‘feel’ is untenable because they are involving ‘everyone’ in the possibility that ‘everyone’ does not as a free agent participate in. Just think if a molecular biologist had to get an OK from everyone who was involved, or who ‘proved themselves’ to be involved with biology: Nothing of molecular biology would have ever gotten anywhere since everyone thinks they know something of biology because they are ‘by definition’ a biological creature. The conventional philosophers tend to work upon a level that is supposing everyone and everything, metaphysically, but the fact is that they can never dismiss themselves sufficiently enough from their own thinking (and thus everyone else’s opinions as they are positioned upon a hierarchical transcendental scaffolding) to thereby gain an objective quality of being to thereby gain a single fact to base such a science upon,  and yet they suppose this of themselves and their ability at every turn. This is the significant issue: That they cannot allow for a humanity that is truly ‘different’; the very notion of difference becomes all too often merely an ideal notion of essential thought, as this is justified in the common thing that is the being of human. They cannot enact a science that they feel should be available precisely because they are involved in a failure to understand the mode by which they are being allowed to posit ‘being’: They are involved in an effective distance whereby they cannot ever philosophically approach the object that is human; they are ‘caught’, involved in, saturated by (if I may bring in Heidegger) the destitution that is their spirit…”

So what I see  in the period of time that goes between say the 1850s (though it  extends back further, its just at that time that a certain manner of appropriation of the object has arisen to discourse) up until now or until Laruelle, is we have the extension of the failure of the discourse that is attempting to explain a particular type of experience. And what this failure is, is involved with the religious type of orientation upon the world, which is to say that if I have (one person, i.e. the philosophical author) had this experience then everyone else should be able to understand it and should be able to realize the significance of this experience also because we are all human beings, common in the potential for communication. But what do we find in Nietzsche? Irritation and frustration at that no one can hear him. And what do we find in Lyotard? We have an evolved situation of the same experience. Here though, the Postmoderns have taken a different tact. They noticed a failure and so they use the failure as a means to establish a whole new manner of speaking about it, a different manner, so to speak. This is why postmodern is often associated with irony, because while they were sitting there talking about deconstructing everything and grammatology and such things, they are/were really trying to indicate the same thing that Nietzsche and Kierkegaard were indicating but couldn’t effectively communicate. So we have the postmodern admitting that there’s a failure in communication and making another whole  series of clausal structures based upon this different type of view of the same object.

So then what we have after the Postmoderns? We have another attempt, but this time the attempt is in the deconstruction itself. The ‘post-Postmoderns’, as I call them, Laruelle and Badiou at least, see the failure of the postmodern tact and so they think that they can improve upon what is occurred over the long +-200 year extension: If they can just deconstruct terms sufficiently enough. Laruelle is the most extreme example of this kind of  deconstruction in the sense of attempting to convey the object of knowledge that is been going on since before Kant, but just reached a certain type of saturation with Hegel and Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.

Badiou admits the total failure, and calls this failure, the object that is failed to be communicated, ‘void’. And yet because it is still there (being there) and the failure involves communication, as communication is taken still as upon a stratified human horizon, his tact is to posit how it is possible that it still arises ‘apparently somewhere’. So his sensibility is that the void erupts into multiplicity, because the problem seems to be that there is this single object that is being spoken about in a very specific manner that is somehow not being apprehended in its specificity.

In contrast, Laruelle still supposes to be able to deconstruct the term (object: terms are objects) sufficiently enough to be able to make a solute communication. But what we find is that he’s crossed the line. We find that in the attempt to deconstruct the term so thoroughly as to be able to communicate that object, that object is now apprehended as a religious type of assertion. So, instead of viewing the blowback of multiplicity, Laruelle sees that the problem lies in a prior decision of how objects are apprehended and or how people/human beings are oriented upon them for how they can be situated in reality. He blames the incongruity upon the fact that there is some other order through which objects are appropriated, that is interfering in the direct communication of this said object…”

Now for me, because I understand what the object is (the subject that is the object or purpose of the discourse) when I read these authors, there is no miscommunication about what they are saying. It is obvious to me; this is why I say all these such and such authors are really talking about the same thing, and it is why I understand the problem that they all face as well why it does not take very long to figure out and  understand the approach that they take…”

Laruelle’s ‘in the last instance’ is significant. Because somehow intuitively he knows or knew that this would be the last instance of the given of reality; that after his effort reality would precipitate out within this understanding such that it could be begun to be described as a religious institution itself (an actualized unilateral duality would begin to pronounce itself). But not just through his work; this is the long game…”

—-( Excerpts from the upcoming 2017-18  book tentatively called  “Darkness: The Second Moment of Decisive Significance”)

REPOST:

CLEARING THE GROUND (1): Laruelle’s rearview mirror

Laruelle: the mountain of jargon that gives birth to a mouse of common knowledge. One of the evolutions of my thought on this blog is the passage from a relatively favorable attitude to Laruelle to a great disappointment. This evolution stemmmed from my return to Laruelle, after having dismissed his non-philosophy as unworkable turgid repetition […]
https://terenceblake.wordpress.com/2016/09/18/clearing-the-ground-1-laruelles-rearview-mirror/

Gggh

Ghhhrkness

A Story.

Dave at Big Story Guide is always wanting me to put my critical ideas in a story form.

Well, here’s one for Dave that concerns my earlier post about irony:

 

First, irony. In short: The last thing one would expect. There are mundane comic kind of ironies, and then there also stretches a kind of ‘cosmic’ irony. This last is sort of like the distance that people will ask of us from seemingly aggravating events; like, God is laughing at our frustration, that we need to repose in God and know God has the plan.

The irony that Gods purpose is to bring about its own destruction is of this later type: The purpose is to filter out the riff raff; but that will not happen through any sort of human negotiation or pondering decision:

 

But you want a story.

 

I suppose a good story would start with, say, Juan. He fears and loves God; he believes in Jesus. This is so much that case that all his prayers begin and end with ‘thy will be done’. After a time, or at some time, he begins to see God working in his life. Events unfold in a manner that makes sense to Juan, that God is indeed involved in his life, that indeed he has a relationship with God and Jesus.

 

Then something terrible happens that shakes his faith. He falls to the ground one night after many nights of being incapable of coming to terms with what happened; how God could, after all this time of being with Juan, of showing him the right and the wrong, of placing fortune and consequence in places throughout his  meaningful and faithful experience – how could God allow something to happen that is so terrible, so inconsistent with the relationship, so seemingly random.

So Juan falls to his knees one night in desperation, in failure to reconcile an apparent disruption in his faith. And in complete supplication, asks God to show him the truth.

God then takes Juan out into the wilderness and sends a demon. Juan is quite astonished and doubtful, but likewise is he kinda pissed at God. The demon says, “if you have such faith, then you will want food and it will be given to you. Follow me.” Juan is hungry and follows the demon and the demon feeds him when he is hungry. But then after a while, Juan has fallen far behind, and is beginning to wonder if being fed is so miraculous.

The demon notices Juan and looks back and says “It looks like the food is not fueling your faith well enough; you can hardly keep up!”

And Juan replies, “You’re kinda boring though. There are much more interesting things off the side of the road.”

“Are you coming or what?”

“Why would I want to?”

“You are the one with so much faith.”

And Juan remembers why he is here, and catches up with the demon.

After sometime in the wilderness, they reach a large town, and as they approach the center, any people look at Juan and are amazed at the site. He is dirty, skinny, and sunburned. Many go to help him, asking “What happened to you?”

“A demon lead me into the wilderness. Ive been walking there for about a month.”

They are even more astonished. “How on earth did you survive? There is no streams or food; when was the last time you ate?”

And the demon said to Juan, “These people like you. You can use this to you advantage. Don’t say anything about me and you will become great.”

So Juan said, “God fed my thirst.” And the people where humbled and sympathetic, that he would emerge from the desert almost dead and speak of God. They figured something terrible must have happened that he would’t speak of.

From then on, it got around town that Juan had survived a month in the desert with no food or water for a month. Everyone came to hear what he had to say. All he said was “God told me to go, so I went, and now Im here.” But all the people heard and saw was a naïve and perhaps zealous, disturbed, or maybe foolhardy and adventurous boy, so they had mercy on him, and they restored him to health and he lived happily every after.

So it was that after many years, When Juan was old and fat, with a big house and  many grand children that the demon returned. “Where is your faith now, Juan?”

And Juan recognized the demon and told him, “I have no faith. I had a crazy idea because I was pissed, to take off into the wilderness and forsake my family and friends. I almost died because I wasn’t really eating or drinking anything. Luckily I came upon this town and some people nursed me to health. There was this chick who thought I was cute. I am honest so a store owner showed me his trade. The rest is history. Faith; shmaithe.”

The the demon stood back and in a gleam of light, the glamour and deception of the demon was cast off, and God stood before Juan, and said:

“You wanted me to show you the truth.”

 

Repost:One and Two: Politics, Governance, and Antagonism; and comment. 

First the repost: 

Perhaps it could be said that politics is that which occurs at that precise moment that we learn to count to Two.  If this were the case, then it would follow that not everything is political.  Everything can become political, but politics is something is something that must be made to be.  When is it […]

https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2016/02/10/one-and-two-politics-governance-and-antagonism/
Then the comment, which is an extension of my previous two postings:

Irony is…

…that God’s purpose is to bring about Its own destruction, evidently, obviously and finally. So that the world becomes the second thought. 

With reference to this repost, the shift we enact that defines the divergence is exactly the move that exposes the ‘second’ of the this repost’s essay, of the Zizek reference and the bunny-duck thing. The point is (the repost above, here) that there is this second world that is not recognized by the ‘one’ world. But indeed that argument falls at a crucial point: It is not just not recognized, but such a second is a second that is only theorized about for the purpose of maintaing the ‘one’ of the First but under different terms, as if it is not merely terms changing. 

Hence we have at least some evidence that the ‘one’ which is proposing toward the ‘second’ world is doing so as a sort of magic, a slight of hand: Established on a theoretical theorem that reality extends no further than discourse and that discourse is reality such that effecting discourse changes reality, the one world distracts attention from its target, which is the reification of the one world, by givng lip service to this theoretical second. 

But see; if we have been following my blog, my essays, we should glean that indeed discourse is all there is but it is ones orientation upon the terms that is at issue. The issue rests firmly in the assertion that there is one proper manner/method of appropriating discourse; what i call the conventional method.

Hence we must expose just how the conventional method maintains its power of truth in the face of its fallacy, and this is done by having that whichis second not by virtue of the oppressing assertion of discourse itself asserting its primacy in the place of the displaced one. Thereby does the destruction of God equate and show that the theoretical second is but an object of the transcendent clause, which is to say, a truth of reality established through faith. 

The second, while ressonant in the first, as we see in the essay about Barths comment on Romans, defies the first in its very nature, which can be said in this case to be discourse, but not merely some ‘flat’ discourse, rather what is now indicated by the meaning of two routes. 

Post-modernism’s Worth. 

When we are too close to an event, we talk about it as from a distance. That is, what we say is automatically distanced from the event, a maximum distance. The event is thus, by this occurrence, an object. As opposed to our psychotherapeutic model, the closer we are to an event, the more dishonest we are about its true bearings, that is, the truth of the matter, why it is that the (the wholeness of the) event has occurred the way it has. The impetus and the reaction can be come upon as an included item, a truth in-itself, only when we are distanced from the event. The truth of an object, as opposed to the True Object, can only be viewed in its truth from a distance. The equation is thus of inversion, of ratio.

Here then we may have a basis upon which to properly view foundational post-modern writers, namely, Derrida, Deleuze and Guittari, but others also.  To wit: Their descriptions were from a basis too close to the event, such that they attempted to quickly and finally establish a ground for the event; the event being thus so profound and significant, they were compelled to offer a reason.

They were not wrong, only rash. 

It is analogous to an explosion. We have now the data from the explosion, having encountered it ourselves, but also come across the initial first hand rationalization and fact crunching reports of the explosion itself – with that, subsequent explosions, and now the reports and experience of the aftermath(s) of explosions, we can now safely report upon the truth of the whole event. 

another anti-OOO article from Andrew Cole

A serious critique: Object Oriented Ontology is a term that poses that such an idea did not arise from a transcendent inspiration. It turns the transcendent into a common universal element such that thus all Objects rely upon such ‘intensionality’ and thus by thier operation(s) nullify that any such transcendent might be inspiring the Object to make it phenomenal. Since Objects are now the ‘withdrawn’ tool of another Object in the real universe.

The system OOO as a system completely argues that it arose due to its own ability or capacity to inuit the trascendental In itself Object: ie. Phenomenalism denied.

But, this is not so much a critique as it is a stating of facts.  

Object-Oriented Philosophy

HERE. Cole wrote one in 2013, I believe, but it was mostly an attack on those of his fellow medievalists who have taken a liking to OOO.

This one’s a bit more acerbic, and aimed directly at me. (What is it with Duke Ph.D.’s and OOO? Galloway came out of Durham as well.)

In case I have the opportunity to write a full response somewhere, I won’t write a long one here, but will just make a few brief points.

•Cole takes the line that although Speculative Realism thinks Kant is a “moron” (his word), Kant actually discovered all of the insights of Speculative Realism before we did.

•This claim has been answered many times, in print and in the blogosophere. Kant is certainly not a moron. I’d probably rank him just behind Aristotle/Plato or Plato/Aristotle as the third greatest philosopher in the West, and I’ve said in print that…

View original post 434 more words

Repost: The Significant Event, part 1

[it appears that the most recent wordpress update has strung all the paragraph breaks together.  So its like one long run on paragraph now. But the *’s  do indicate a break.]

Significance. What we can call the Romance is based upon and or around what I call the significant experience, which falls well in line with Alain Badiou’s ‘Event’, what could then be called the significant event. The irony that surrounds this feature of being human concerns a confusion of the individual, between what arises of the pure multiple and such Event. This confusion is being worked out as we speak; its ways, immanent. Its formulation has been established by Badiou in the distinction pronounced by ‘void’ and ‘set’, but more particularly, more humanly, the pronunciation’s initial voice is heard through Francois Laruelle and non-philosophy, as this divergence, that which is signaled by irony, is located in the distinction that has found and described the motions of philosophy, what I feel is more correctly termed ‘conventional methodology’ or just ‘convention’. The distinctive move that has been signaled, as referenced here through philosophy, can be noticed lately in the works loosely coined as ‘existentialism’ and ‘post-modernism’, but most recently ‘speculative realism’; so appropriately begun in the real, taking reality ‘into’ its object for what it is and what possibility it holds, such speculation thus calls for its counterpart, as I frame, that is specifically not real, since it is this feature of and in response to the philosophical (sticking here with the non-philosophical designation) reality, that works to deny that which originates in the Event. The Romance is this evental feature of human experience by which we have the conventional historical designation of Romanticism or the Romantic Period or Era, and by which, so apropos to convention, we likewise have the real disclaimer that has reduced and conflated the period and human experience to one of mere caprice, of usual passionate undependability, fantasy and a specifically derogatory mode of irrationality that decries as it celebrates conventional methodology’s victory in placing the human so far from itself as the free individual for the purpose of maintaining the status quo of the teleo-ontological fortress of religio-ideological power. So compete in the assertion of itself, the conventional romantic designation flaunts its power through accentuating the discrepancy by calling what is Romantic ‘subjective’ diversity and uniqueness of individual creative and emotional freedom; though there may have been such an era, it was indeed because of the ubiquity of the true reality. We need not go into the exploitation and oppression that is the capitalization upon the discrepancy here, but suffice it to say that reality itself is romantic, whereas the Romance, a particular significant experience involving an actualization of relationship with the world, has been historically shanghaied into servitude and keelhauled under the dreadnought of historical progress — the now ‘fractalized’ Hagelian History the individualized romance of willful self determination upon the seas of manifest destiny. This is reality; it is not that people are or were having similar experiences — of the pure multiple they indeed do, and that within a particular universal horizon. It is more that such experience, by virtue of being human, may connote an individual of reality in the manner that is reducible in the same way that Badiou describes the situation of being and event, which is to say that the real individual misses the irony of Its existence for the sake of the True Object of its faith. This is not to disclaim in the effort to eject the human being from the helical oscillation upon which history makes its claim to progress, but rather to introduce to suggest that while progress is a situation of reality, the progress of reality is misconstrued in the conventional reckoning of history. * The significant event is singular, but the nature of its significance brings all subsequent experience under or within its scope; thus the attempt to explain what this experience is or was becomes not only an ironic experience but indeed irony, for the multiple by then necessarily falls into the originating experience and becomes a singular experience — though it ‘becomes’ only in as much as it is always becoming multiple and singular in the same move due to the originating experience informing all experience. So I repeat, this occurs in the explaining of the event, but not so much in the explaining what the event means or meant, again, because the explaining of the event cannot become dismissed, overcome or otherwise detach from what the event means as the event serves to give significance to the subsequent multiple that is real life or of lived experience, that falls back and or has fallen into singularity. Oddly, it is in the explaining of the meaning of the significant event that develops theory, rationalization (see below), as a proxy, as a way of distancing oneself from the Event because its significance as the Event, defies reality, and reality is where we all begin as an individual, our faith invested in reality. Hence we can speak of Soren Kierkegaard’s ‘sickness unto death’, ‘offense’ and ‘sin’. When one attempts to explain what the event means or from what it means or meant, then he becomes stuck in an eternal decision of how he might go about situating the meaning of what for real determinations is the eternal moment — a redundancy, a stalemate, where the ‘point of insertion’ into reality cannot be determined — that requires a type of break which will move the in-decision past its incubation into a specific topical discourse which then might become the identity of the individual. Yet the conventional methodologists will need no break for they are already invested by the break itself, that which is the offense in discrepancy, in the suture that is the effect of faith, which supplies the True Object and where discourse is about asserting proper meaning of that reality. Theirs has to do with the prevalent veto that is choice, in the particular presence that says ‘no’. That which requires a break is not the requirement for a ‘leap’ as Master Kierkegaard has termed, but rather its opposite; such a break relieves one of in-determination, necessity, which is to say, the relief is the contingency that is choice, whereas the leap is of necessity. By contrast, yet with consistency, what one could call a ‘pocket veto’ appears in the potential of the significant event to be able to make or be the qualifying break; the pocket veto appears as something one has available for choice, to use for the purpose of stopping the reduction that will bring meaning to the significance that is the eternal moment that thus necessitates the leap, and so be able to bring what is otherwise impossible into the discourse of reality despite it not being necessary. The conventional veto rallies against the Event, where as the pocket veto enacts the instrumentality of decision once the significant event has taken hold. For it is as if within the Romance of the significant event the person has ‘held out’ on it, as if carrying something in his pocket, that though the experience may be a motion of love, the question always remains: “Is this real?” But indeed, if this discourse is any indication, it is at least ironic, for the answer one finds reveals whether the veto was ever truly in the pocket or not. This then defines the paradigm of bad faith; that which was in good faith considering the other party was already compromised for what contingency may arise to change the stakes of the original deal. This essay concerns how the pocket veto allows for a way to describe the situation of the Event, as well as creating an opening to eventually describe the Romanitc Experience itself. For we have two situations of the event, but really three. One where no pocket veto is ever needed, having the tool of veto readily at hand, and one where a pocket veto may be applied. But these two situations then show that they still are dealing in reality with reality, as theory is the distancing of oneself from the experience. Yet this is not a necessary discounting. Being that there is a necessary principle at work, all elements of the universe must belong to that principle. What this principle is exactly is the discrepancy between contingent and necessary aspects as such, which is also the discrepancy between the object and the talk about it, as well as the relations of particular thoughts (see my earlier essays); Quentin Meillassoux, in his book, “After Finitude” does an excellent job at describing this situation, in particular as it has to do with the object itself. So in as much as these admitted operations indeed operate, it is no problem that two apparently distinct and even opposing routes based upon the same discursive substrate, the same ‘meaningful issue’, would co-operate in-dependently to reveal its object and even say different things from the same orientation. We have then the framework by which the dual nature of the discourse that has been called ‘philosophy’ may be apprehended. To bring in Alain Badiou’s formulations; on one hand, we have the philosophers of the multiple who are attempting to describe the One Reality of the True Object, so to speak, that I call ‘conventional methodologists’, and on the other we have the philosophers who are involved with the significant event. The conventionalists (Francois Laruelle’s philosophers, the ‘objectours’ of philosophy) we will leave to their ‘philosophy of…’ methods. For the philosophers (my use) of course, we need discover what might need a veto, and this concerns how irony might come about, and this concerns the significant event.  * What occurs in the significant romantic experience? A feeling of privilege and or secrecy upon intimate knowledge, one might even say a feeling toward a kind of esoteric mysticism; of being ‘let in’ to some profoundness; of being ‘allowed to make your acquaintance toward a loving relationship’. Now, when I say this, of what am I speaking? Am I not speaking of every possible experience? I am speaking of one particular experience, but in what way does it not speak of every experience? The profoundness of some ‘private’ experience, but also the common experience of the individual in reality; loving as an intimacy and loving as a basic position by which one ‘has’ an arena to act, whether one would call it ‘mystical’ is really a preference of the moment, yet in so much as we could say one ‘loves’ by virtue of the fact that there is a relationship that cannot be overturned, we can also say one has faith; in reality, here religion leads the way. So, In one move I have described the condition of the particular Event, while also describing all events, and as I attempt to put forth the unique situation the move presents the common situation, the humble and the willful. But what happens in this romance ? The sense of love remains but the feeling goes away, and then comes back, and then goes away. In the Romance it is called repetition; in reality it is called a number of things, a mundane repetition, psychological self fulfilling prophecy, incorrect appraisal of the situation, spiritual motion, karma, magic, physical resonance, coincidence; I could go on. What is occurring? Significance. The meaning of the event in reality. On one hand, the ‘setting’ of a pure multiple within the context of the pure multiple, sets of sets. A ‘cordoning off’ of meaning to sets of meaning allows for one event to have more or less significance than another, and thus have significance. One the other hand, the event of the significant romantic experience is being ‘found’ at particular moments of the multiple, which is to say, in reality. Reality can thereby be understood as a sequence or as the arena where significance occurs, but by this designation also as the ordination of fidelitous subsequence, or that which must be not real. For the conventional philosophers of the One Reality there are True Objects and the role of these philosophers is to be able to discern what the true nature of the ‘grand’ object called reality is. It does not matter if they suggest multiple realities or multiple universes or how they situate terms; their faith begins and ends in the True Object, in the absolutely particularized pure multiple that begins, progresses and culminates in real truth. These philosophers see theory as coming from or being about the true reality. Significance comes at moments of proper arrangement of objects, of particular situations of meaning, such as reading and studying and then coming upon an ‘ah ha!’ moment, and these significances as a matter of course are then coordinated into what is called theory, a willful assertion of appropriated facts about objects. Hence the philosophers of the significant event thus far deal in irony, but the issue overall has been the confusion that arises in the development of theory. To wit; the former philosophers are dealing with the true object and the latter are dealing with the significant experience. It is only now that the division that is just due is taking shape. Yet, as was just mentioned above and consistent with non-philosophy, the confusion has arisen because the philosophy of the true object is the ‘greater’ vehicle, it is the discourse of power, the discourse that stems from the One Reality, that is the designation of the ‘proper’ meaning of terms. This is historical, traditional, ideological and political as it has to do with a specific ontological and ethical horizon. Non-philosophy is a blatant announcement of the division and brings into relief what the post-modernists (Deluze, Derrida, Foucault, to name three biggies) could not bring to sway; to wit, their move was inherently conventional, that is, not so concerned with the Event itself as they were its meaning. They were still attempting to account for the significant event in the One reality, as the philosophy of the true object was not seen for its stature and unrelenting power; or, they capitulated to its power because they were already invested in it for human identity, they still thought reality could be changed into something less dishonest and more human, an offering and a withholding – which is to say now of something withheld, something not real – and at that because they were inspired; they could not introduce the significant event because the One reality demands that the significant event must fall under the domain of the pure multiple, and thus be not so significant — but at least it could be a type of psychological ‘malady’ or maybe ‘form’ if it were not posed with strategy, in tactical guise of particular manipulations of terms, in short, if it were not posed in theory. So we are lead to ask how it might be that someone so disturbed or ‘not living in reality’ came to have such an effect on real discourse? That such a person could have developed such a good theory? Hence, its significance. It is exactly this theory that does not hold water, for their theoretical position occurs only in conventional reality. Theory is supposed to be an argument, a proof for a proposal of truth, as the proposal is merely a part of coming to the truth of the True Object through negotiation; it is supposed to be a surmising of the facts in a proposal for their unitary meaning to be critiqued accorded to the relative information allotted to each critically thinking individual who are also involved in the common universal effort for the ‘whole’. Theory is not supposed to be a ‘costume’. So irony describes the situation of belonging instead of including by exclusion and confounds conventional reality. So it is that which is most honest is thus taken by convention with a pinch of salt, a skeptical eye suspecting bluff, and at times called out for its dishonesty, if not plain nonsense. if much of post-modernist theory is any indication – check out the post-modern generator website (if it still exists) – one can easily tell that conventional philosophers really had no clue what was being told. The meaning of ‘original’ post-modern/existentialist writers was taken most seriously in its capacity to hold an object for its truth, and soon enough the ‘theory’ that was being produced by the adherents of the proper method (Laruelle’s ‘philosophers’) based upon the significance that rides through conventional reality despite itself resounded with utter nonsense. This can be said to be due to the fact that there is indeed a discrepancy between what is real from what is true, that reality’s pure multiples are ‘really set’ upon a situation undisclosed to the situation of infinite sets, which should show, for conscious experience, the fidelity to the true object of coordinated sets that are romantic in various significant situations that I call conventional reality, distinct from the true fidelity that marks the void in and by ordinate subsequence, or, the significant event that I have called the Romance — but distinct in a non-philosophical manner, which Francios Laruelle has termed as a unilateral duality, one which includes and one which belongs. The almost polemical move of ‘speculative realism’ from what could be called traditional philosophy, as well as traditional philosophy itself, both occur in reality, about real objects, whereas what is ironic, or as indicative of the counter-partial move of what is not real, is the dual move from reality. Due to the necessity of the motion of contingency in reality, the speculative and the ironic appear to reveal a necessary element or feature that is unknown or at least uncomfortable to conventional reality. Irony upsets the endeavor for the True Object, so it is not difficult to see how conventional methodology would tend away from its tellings; it holds a tentative truce with irony, setting it to a type of spiritual psychology it doesn’t enjoy, one that brings it to have to assert is power for ubiquity, urgently revealing as it does so its nervousness steeped in bad faith. Yet while Speculative Realism announces its divergence from traditional philosophy, its way is still conventional, it is still attempting to alleviate the risk of exposure of the Romance by its resorting to what is romantic; hence it is ‘speculative’. Yet it is close; its difference lay in the significant event, and may yet be an indication of where or how such a pocket veto may come into play. * Significance occurs in three, what I shall call, venues. In my essay “the description of irony”, I discuss these but I will elaborate more here. Events can be significant. Getting married, having children, graduating from school, meeting someone, avoiding an accident, etc… Any event may have significance. Real experience is segregated into meaningful situations, each with more or less significance. Reality is a pure multiple of attainable sets, where any set can be divided into an infinite amount of sets, and any series of sets can be a set. Infinity likewise becomes a multiple that can be placed into sets of various sorts. Like a divine lotus flower, reality unfolds, emerges, arises and falls, like an active chaotic Mandelbrot set of fractal imagery. Most people have experience and understanding that can be described and explained analogous to this type of significance, to significance that can be described with reference to such chaos and complexity, as such simple and straightforward explanation can comprise and account for reality. But the ‘incorrection’ of this type of patterning of significance is found – if I may stay consistent with the Eastern theme I have touched upon here – in the assertion of will; so much that this very statement reveals its conventionality in double, in the same way the notion of karma is seen as meaning purpose, but one that arises as one asserts oneself, ones desire for things in the very event that arose due to choices made within an essentially free universe. Hence the difference between the event(s) of the pure multiple and the Event from which the multiple may arise in fidelity is one of significance. * In ‘The Analysis of the Mysterium’, chapter 5 of his book “The Idea of the Holy”, Rudolf Otto describes the situation: “Representations of spirits and similar conceptions are rather one and all early modes of ‘rationalizing’ a precedent experience…They are attempts…to guess the riddle it propounds, and their effect is at the same time always to weaken or deaden the experience itself. They are the source from which springs, not religion, but the rationalization of religion, which often ends by construing such a massive structure of theory and such a plausible fabric of interpretation, that the mystery is frankly excluded.” His point is to get to how it is that we come to a category of ‘holy’, but my take I think he missed. Here, the ‘precedent experience’ can be similar to an event, any event of experience, but here let’s say the significant event, the Romantic experience. We approach from a certain manner for discussion here: What is it? Otto would say that it is of the mysterium, of awe-fullness. So what is it? I say: it is only what becomes of the discourse that surrounds it, which is to say, itself is nothing. But it has significance. The significance leaves itself to the discourse about it such that itself indeed has significance, and this is to say, the event itself is denied for the sake of the discourse about it so much that the event is the discourse about it. This linking, this suturing, is of faith, conventional faith. Faith allows for the romance to take place, for significant events to arise. But here this is only to suggest that significance motivates the will.   Differentiated from common significance of events is the significant event. Here, what is significant does not resort to individuated, multiple events and remain local or in proximity to them, such as with a first kiss or a coincidence, where discourse would speak specifically about each event and their significances. Here when a significant moment arises it refers to the singular Event, such that each significance is so of and refers to the originating event. This is to say that each significance in reality calls forth the Event so that each event refers to the Event for its significant meaning. The singular becomes multiple so the multiple remains singular. As opposed to real experience that resides in the pure multiple and ‘seeks what it finds’ by including the void in its coordination of sets, the significant experience stems from the void and ‘begins the count’, or establishes the vector, the ordination of subsequence, because such event belongs to the void, and as Alain Badiou might put it, occurs in the evental horizon. Thus one can say that moments of significance should not have ‘more’ significance, but have the ‘same’ significance, each real significant event recalling the originating significance. Hence also, reality does ordain significant events such as birthdays and great holiday vacations, but such significance can be said to be relative to the Event as one knows which has the greater significance and what actually motivates, where the cardinal value arises as a denial of such relation through relative knowledge that we have called ‘correlationalism’, or what is constituted by the pure multiple of the real possibility of coordinated sets. Consistent with real transcendence, the cardinal indicates how value is situated and meaning finds form, and with a nod to Quentin Meillassoux, how reason itself relies and substantiates upon a stable yet undisclosed substrate, which I say is demanding of faith because it is the philosophical object, its objective, the ‘philosopher’s stone’ of reason, and which he says is the ‘necessitarian inference of probabilistic reasoning’ [QM; pg 97]. Again the irony resounds. The question has to do with this latter area of significance. We are talking about meaning. Significance concerns meaning. When we say that there is continuing significance as opposed to ‘another’ significant event, we are speaking to the meaning that continues through the various occasions, the various significant events. It is the same meaning in different contexts, showing itself, the same meaning, through different lenses. But usually the Event is not seen in this way; the ‘lenses’, the objects, are not seen as occasions of the Event, but rather as occasions that are ‘filling in’ the object, indicating a progress of knowledge that has to do with a greater knowledge of objects, which is to say, of reality. Recall the transcendent and empirical elements of reality; this latter viewing occurs in oscillating fashion, to the effect of significant revelatory experiences that are leading one along some purpose which is the simultaneous progress of the knowledge of the True Object and the individual of reality. The True Object and the individual are defined and specific elements of reality; they are identities in contrast (ala Martin Heidegger) to what is the same. They are ‘cordoned off’ in meaning to have real identity. In the same way, significance occurs. Such identities arise from effectively segregational meaning. In reality we build things and take them apart and find how they work and put them back together in different ways to find out what each identity is, and this process is cumulative and culminating such that typically, even when the significance continues through the multiple events, the Event is viewed as a segregate identity, that is, as above (Otto), the precedent experience is kept segregate by the virtue of the faith that is invested in the ability of the term to identify its object. This is why the Event becomes denied in reality; this accounts for why the Romance stays romantic, in the either/or condition, ala Soren Kierkegaard, instead of moving into the Romance that is marriage. It is the continuing significance that defines how reality is situated in truth, for now we are dealing with the individual for whom events have significance because of the originating Event. This corresponds the individual in reality who comes across the romantic experience. He draws from the mystery into a relationship that would destroy reality; this relationship (for now in speaking) is the Romance. In this real situation the individual is appraising the situation in real terms such that the Romance is such by virtue of an identity with which or whom the individual has a relationship with, but which he also seeks as to its reality. The first question is always, “Is this real?” But because of the initial investment in reality that every individual has, the question of truth is not distinct; the question of truth is a precipitate of the next question playing out in the activity that is real life, which is “what should I do?”, but then as the significance of the Event passes into the terms of reality that seek to bring the meaning of the Event into reality as purpose, again as Otto above, “the mystery is frankly excluded” and the significance of the experience itself falls away, or rather becomes real. It is then sought after and is found again as progress is the investment in objective identity. If the question “what should I do”, which connotes the meaning of the experience as purpose, is answered, then reality is saved, faith in the True Object is upheld in that the ‘mysterium’ has been solved as purpose. The significant event is set in context as ‘inspiration’, or for a probably better colloquialism, ‘spiritual experience’, but even if the inspiration denies the experience as spiritual, here inspiration itself saves reality. It is when no performable act is conveyed, and no purpose is able to be termed, that reality falters. Doubt is the operative mechanism here, for the present is only presented as ‘path’ in a retrospection that cannot project it out upon the future as ‘a path’ of inspiration; reality is changed. Hence, what I understand of the ‘pocket veto’ rings a particularly interesting note. The playing out of the question of reality brings the question of truth and grants thereby in relief the significance of the pocket veto. For we are not talking about the veto as it is held in the pocket; this is indeed the Romance in reality. We are now talking about the veto once it needs be played and if it can be or not. If it can be, then the mystery that has been frankly excluded is conveyed into reality intact as a real item for negotiation, as a proposal, a hypothesis, a theory, that moves reality in its progress as a significant object to be considered. Yet if the veto cannot be played – and this evidences a particular showing of a true polemic of power – then the mystery that is frankly excluded is indeed excluded in reality, which is to say, it is destroyed. And this mystery is exactly the transcendent. *



 END Part 1.


 I believe I should leave some bibliography, which will also do for part 2 and if there is a part 3; in fact it could probably serve as a seed biblio for what is to come. Martin Heidegger. Being and Time, and other essays of his. Alain Badiou. Being and Event. Quentin Meillassoux. Beyond Infinity Francios Laruelle. Principles of Non-Philosophy Rudolf Otto. The Idea of the Holy Soren Kierkegaard. The Sickness Unto Death, and, Fear and Trembling ** For a brief discussion about the Romantic Era – and as a bibliographic site: http://www.historyguide.org/intellect/lecture16a.html And thank you Dave at Inthesaltmine.com for our continuing interaction, and his coining of the idea of a ‘pocket veto’.

The Matter At Hand, Part 1: Post-Modernism, Artificial Intelligence, the Conventional Limit, and Object Oriented Ontology.

From reading an essay a few days ago, I was reminded of The Postmodern Generator. You can go read a good essay at:
http://www.elsewhere.org/pomo/

Now when I say ‘good’ I mean it can make sense. If you have never heard of it, or didn’t read the very end of the page, the PM Generator is a program that generates essays. Click the link again and it will produce another one. They are completely false.

I was reminded of the PMG after reading a ‘actually legitimate’ essay that made a certain amount of sense but that I really could gain no baring upon what it was addressing or really saying. Of course, though, we must acknowledge that there are types of privileged discourse that have to do with production niches. Computer code may appear like nonsense to the layman, but the meaning of the code is easily identified to its object, whether it be origination, such as the direct meaning of commands and their ordering to the machine, or their destination, the effect or running operation of the code’s incorporation as an application. The ground and purpose of the code, though confusing to the layman, can be easily explained. Yet, in philosophy and theoretical discourse, we have a different situation. If I had gone into the essay (the ‘legitimate’ one I read) with a sense that it must have relevance and be based in a certain potential for truth, then I might have read it more than twice and made a good effort to find out what it meant, including following references to other essays that might be in its genre, and concluded that it had something significant to offer. But I didn’t. I saw — for sure after the second read — that, for one, it was purely privileged in its bearings, but privileged in a different way than computer programming; which is to say, the meaning and point it addresses is proposed and suspended in a cohortive discursive base that is taken as relevant merely because there are people in positions of authority and or respect who are speaking in such a way. But then also, for two, that not only was it probably important merely because certain people have developed an investment arena for meaning, but more so, the arena was merely that: The arena allowed for a fabrication (without grounding) to appear as if it had significance in deep human roots, socially ideological and or political, of a kind of substantial innately human kind and pertinence, and due to this fabrication of meaning caused a series of human efforts of various vectors (political, economical, ideological, artistic) to be based in the arena solely for the purpose of inflating the identity capital of the people involved in the fabrication of the arena. But it it is just this kind of insubstantial rhetoric that post-modernism allows to be true, for it makes itself true by it being a product of human sensibility, but of an insensible sensibility that is the egocentric transcendent that has gotten us exactly to the place of reasoning that sees world destructing activities, such as global warming or climate change, democratic-capitalistic support of aristocratic development, two-faced power structures that advocate equal access while being allowed for through an inherent subordination and oppression of designated marginalized segments of society, ideological disclaimers for ‘naturalized’ inequality and oppression, etcetera.

The point, I suppose, I am trying to make is that it is not that the PMG is writing nonsensical pieces of theory. The defenders of the significance of ‘real’ theory is the disclaimer that …” The Postmodernism Generator was written by Andrew C. Bulhak using the Dada Engine, a system for generating random text from recursive grammars, and modified very slightly by Josh Larios (this version, anyway. There are others out there).” They point at the ‘random’ and ‘recursive’ elements of the generation and exclude what other theory may be made by humans. And, this is not to say that human generated theory itself is also random and nonsensical at root. Maybe this is so, but then we have only enacted an eternal irony for which the argument is but a point of contention (perhaps a kind of ‘the’ point of contention whereby the individual is marked off to his her identity), and then one might be better suited to a religious monastery.

I am more concerned with how real theory is distinguished from PMG theory, because, for one, if we are indeed moving to the inception of a true artificial intelligence, we need encounter and identify the limits of human conscious effort and not only how human consciousness may operate as a real item, but also how this real item functions as a item of what is true of the universe in which reality is formed. We need encounter that aspect of being human that gains reality by its offense, that is, in the effort to create identity against the bare fact of its existence. We may have realized what it means to exist, but we have have not encountered how we react to such a sentence; we have only reacted to the truth, we have yet to reveal what occurs when such a moment of truth is come upon. If we allow ourselves as human beings to be able so easily fall prey to discursive ploys of fabricated meaning, should we not realize that an artificial intelligence will be able to notice this human tendency, this weak spot, and take advantage of the flaw in the fabric that is and has been causing our essential lack in potential? Should we think any less that an artificial intelligence of our own making will be an intelligence nonetheless not human intelligence ? The question must be: Can we program our lack as an inherent limit of artificial intelligence? Are we able to do this, or is the fact of the possibility of a true AI a harbinger an indication that our lack is indeed a lack of being human and not of our creations’ ? This is the issue of the point of contention: What is contingency and cause?

Because this is to say that the flaw is exactly the reassertion of essential Will that gains its force through meaning based in a universal maxim of segregation and the exploitation of blind spots inherent to such segregation, that this is a human mode, and that if a human as itself may see this flaw — shall we be so arrogant as to presume an intelligence of our making will necessarily be a human intelligence ? Indeed, would not an ‘artificial’ intelligence have at least an equal probability to have capacities that arise in the blind spot of human intelligence in so much as the likes of Graham Harman shine light into the regions of the universe that have intelligence (being) regardless of what human beings regard as such? The Frankenstein’s monster of human creation is not that humans let it get away from human control, but that humanity itself was already beyond its own control. Is not this the evidence that what we would consider an artificial intelligence actually more likely to be an intelligence that offends us, our ability to be sensible? Such that a true artificial intelligence would then actually be an intelligence that overlaps what is being (Dasein) as our mode of corresponding intelligence with what is intelligence proper, as modes of being of an actually more true universal reality? ‘Artificial intelligence’ thus might be that intelligence that evidences to us how our transcendental mode is actually merely one type of mode of being, A.I. then the revealing of the limit that is the transcendental thought by its actually arising partially within the (non-ethical) universal paradigm, straddling, if you will, the willed and the non-willed. Would human intelligence as a conventional red herring be able to stand up to a mode of intelligence that understands itself as a determined mode of activity, that is to say, determined by objects ? Nietchze might say that it should be able to.

For what are we seeing with the PMG? And what is the reaction against?

Shall we see in Part 2 ?

Harman and the True Object.

The question is no longer that of Being, for Heidegger has destroyed being, like a forensic analysis of material. Being was viable so long as there was a dialectic whereby reality could be based upon its one vision through the oscillating features held from one another, like a binary star. Hiedegger destroyed the dialectic (for conventional method), encompassing the description of how such an interaction takes place for reality, what the dialectic does, how it works, a description from a distance, in a nice neat package, defining the Trueness of the Object called Dasein, ready for distribution. Hence, the question anymore is not of being, but of truth. The issue with Graham Harman is that he stands upon the dialectic through setting aside the destruction of being, and thereby enacts a deception. He thereby may speak of other than human Daseins through the dialectical vehicle, all the while holding the dialectic out of sight, withdrawn as the Dasein by which other Daseins are possible is likewise set aside for the sake of proposing again a ‘new’ one reality where the dialectic is gone, and the subject likewise dead. He thereby may propose a new ontology of being: Object Ontology.

*

I must admit, as a read more of Harman I am becoming increasingly disillusioned and bored; I tend to see the rise of Speculative Realism and then it’s Fizzle to have ran along these same lines as I am experiencing and discovering. And I must say that it is because of what has occurred, what was enticed early on as a sort of promise has lead to merely another philosophical system; quite boring, but even more irritating was that it seemed like Harman might be one to be able to pull it off, but then he comes up with another system that proposes a more real version of reality. So conventional; so regular, run of the mill. So it is, the reason for this motion of his that lead to a positing a more real system is explained by the essay of the Significant Event, that such deceptions can no longer stay viable; that is, except in so much as the deception is working, and where it succeeds is exactly in that audience where denial is operative. The deception works because the conventional method is already submerged and distanced in a self imposed deception: the term-object identity.

The boredom of Dasein explained by Harman is symptomatic of the reversal and contrivance we see in Harman’s Ontology. Admitting the short reading, the boredom of Being Dasein in need of some danger is at the heart of why Harman’s seem so boring: because the danger of Object Ontology comes in response to the boredom of being that is, in itself, a preliminary mood, that is, a mood that has not been allowed its maturation, has not been let to risk, and so discusses subsequence. Like a lacuna, this mood that Harman seems to understand is the offense that is the Ontology in its Ontological functioning. Harman is required for his Dasein of many colors to describe as enactment the results of having True Objects as the basis of a reality that is ubiquitous as it is total in its assertion of a universe of only objects. This is to say that he is arguing his identity, an identity that has arisen due to his investment in the State of reality. Here multiple Daseins exist as the evidence of the description of how it’s being is not presence, like an oxymoron, defies and contradicts its own meaning. Beings may exist with a certain facticity of ‘being there’ as an environmental inclusive state, but the being of Dasein thereby includes the fact of other Daseins within its own ‘there being facticity’. The implication here is the point of contention between eternity and progress, between what Badiou calls ‘immortal’ and ‘victim’; Harman is enacting his victimization. The dangerous move apparently seen by Harman is gained by his view of his Dasein as a meaning of meaning, as a Being that is exempt from the situation that Heidegger presents to mean Dasein. The meaning of Dasein for Harman is already a meaning represented as a object of Harman’s presentation. Harman apparently already was viewing the significance of Heidegger’s work as a significance fundamentally different than what the meaning of Dasein would entail, which is to say, the corpus that is the explanation of Dasein was already in the format of meaning that represents as a presentation the True Object (meaning of meaning) as an objective reflection, over the meaning that the corpus presents. Harman already was was viewing the world as a whole constituency of True Objects, already was his faith unquestioned, already his faith not doubted, his naïveté a sham before it could be authentic. Rather than the danger which is the being bored as the boredom that is being, Harman’s risk, what is dangerous for Harman, is by his faith, that his deception might be uncovered.

But in one manner of speaking, he need not be worried, because his faith is vindicated in the power that establishes reality, as he is invested in this reality, as he has faith in this power, he is justified. His risk is entirely of his faith.

Nevertheless, the boredom or disappointment comes because while his categories seem to really get at something, he leaves us flat in a world of intellectual ‘weirdness’; but the weirdness is barely interesting — or maybe as interesting as watching someone solve a Rubic’s cube. I know now that every time he preludes an idea with weird, it’s not going to be weird at all but rather mundane and obvious; but somehow I am sure that it is weird to a certain type of type of reader and author, and this type is probably one who is oriented upon the True Object. For a while I thought Graham was really following the philosophical maxim of looking to oneself, but it’s seems his route for this is more conventionally methodological than it is novel or introspective.

Yet, I should say that we must give Graham the benefit of doubt; I am sure that Graham indeed feels that he is looking to himself and not being conventional (why else would he say that ideas might be ‘new’?). And this is exactly where the discourse of the Significant Event gains its footing; because Graham can not see beyond his faith. Faith makes true. The discursive posturing may appear quite the feat of meaning, but philosophically speaking, while impressive, it risks little.

*

SE Part 9: Some Zizek, with a pinch of Badiou.

We have encountered a description of divergence and how an arm of such motion remains conventional despite itself. On one side of things, conventional discourse functions to perpetuate its method by subsuming and sublating contradiction in real meaningful negation, exposing the contradiction as a form of negation that itself is negated but not reinserted as positive. Disputes have arisen concerning this, infamously around Hegel and his dialectic; venture to say that the argument is due to its want for inclusion in reality. Then on the other, this is all to say that the conventional method re-inserts or otherwise asserts its (hypothetical and practical) imperative, the True Object that compels through faith the downplaying of ‘mere’ intuition, so as to allow for contradiction as part of reality. The former can be said to identify basic movements of continental philosophy, the latter, analytic philosophy. We can discuss the significance of this apparent historical irony elsewhere. Suffice it for now that conventional philosophy can be categorized in this way; continental philosophy at least considers irony regardless of its analytical tendency for method which commonly reifies the more overt assertion of the primacy and ubiquity of the One reality.

*

It Is sufficient to argue backwards, to work from, as away from, the point of contention into a unitary discourse of inclusive reality, to take through intuition or inspiration of the term-object’s real-truth as a means to argue, as many authors do, a theory of simultaneousness, a theory whereby the terms coalesce or otherwise represent (albeit as an extended philosophical culturally relevant effort) an identical situation of reality (Zizek; Kair – myself, author of “Constructive Undoing”), or where real objects exert distances and effects in the same manner as humans do with objects, such that humans are also objects (Harman; Kair). It is sufficient for reality to argue through logic that there is no separation between, for terms, the experiencer and the experience, the subject human being and the object of its experience, the sayer and the said, the viewed and the seen (scene), or even the indication of overdetermined terms, such as ‘larger humanity’ or ‘society’, to the limit that expresses such idea, and then to suggest that such a situation may be realized and actualized into a sort of ‘new praxis’. Likewise it is sufficient to argue that objects are separate but ‘vicariously causal’ in their relation to each other. It is sufficient for the discourse of reality involved in the investigation of objects and subject-objects to reach a point when the saturation of meaningful terms allows for a redundancy of segregate categories to develop multiple Objects, or ‘multi-‘ universes, each overlapping universe holding the potential for truth by the nature of the necessary discursive ‘universal’ categories, categories that posit their segregation based within the intuited identity of term and object, that then may negotiate with other ‘universes’ toward a better ‘world’, and then propose a ‘new’ discourse that accounts for this. This is what discourse does in, or for, reality. When this occurs, though, that is, to reach the argument that makes the move for this deliberate (as maybe opposed to ‘organic’) — not over-determination, but its encompassment, the assertion implied by the unreflected intuition — designation or adamant removal of ‘sign’ for the sake of (faith in, intuition of) truth-reality, the terms of reality now must reflect themselves in relief, such that every term is the position-expression (matter, object) of a particular moment-space (energy, potential, kinetic), at once informing and being informed by reality in discourse — but without the inclusion of the position by which such a situation may arise; the True Object oriented clause of transcendence. That is, unless we posit that what is excluded is indeed not. This is then the opposite; imminence posited as reality, which is for no other terms, in definition, and in so much as terms are taken to indicate or otherwise show the truth (the true object), we have thus a return to what was just argued in the previous segment, redundancy and repetition.

What we have just come across is a real ironic moment. But this detachment, real individuals in a negotiated world, comes in the same course by which reality is always come by, choice, through the distancing of the object from the subject, through denial of that which offends ones faith, such that one universe can ‘no longer contain’ the meaning conveyed in the eminence (prestige, grandeur) of colluding meaning, the ‘singularity’ gained by the investigation into the (True) intuited object term — and ‘another’ universe is gained, another discourse. In fact, admitting the breaking of such singular activity, it is the revolt from this ‘meaningful’ abyss by which a real ‘multitude’ of universes arise. The real universe itself is thus not brought into question, rather, reality is now understood to involve a potential for many universes. Where once was the One, that which enjoined all terms’ meaning, that was (is?) impetus for which contradiction showed the route, now the same method has shown that the One is actually multiple (the pure multiple, ala Alain Badiou) which is the point behind the explication of conventional reality, the effect of contradiction being an indicator of what is ‘truly false’.

It is by this feat of consciousness that we can then begin to suggest that such intuition does not gain its footing from some ‘inspiring’ ethereal unknown, compelling the individual to act as an assertion towards some completion as yet unformed if not for the instruction of inspirational transcending element, but rather draws from what is already completed because what is completed is immanent; which is to say, the act, aside from the True Object-term identity, cannot manifest except that it is and does precisely as it does and is. Immanence, in this way, is what then allows for the multitude, of objects in a level playing field of universal operation, but more significantly, of individuals with their own ‘sense’ of truth, in a common arena of negotiation. But what is this sense? What is happening if everything is happening immanently? Is not such immanence merely another argument for and or relying upon a transcendental aspect or element? Have we not merely repeated the same arguments that want to decide upon what is immanence and transcendence?

Here then we have in action the evidence of the true power of reality. The limit come upon by the foreclosing of the transcendental ‘One’ universe, by the methodological reducing of what is or was transcendent of thinking to a True Object of such thought, reveals that what is or was otherwise transcendent has been usurped of its power by the real method, thus transforming this True Object, transcendence, into immanence that, again, proposes to be of some essential truth of reality. Radical or not, and irony aside, such a position gains little but a reification of the real method for establishing truth, as if the transcendent or now immanent aspect has inspired the individual to ‘bring down’ the knowledge of itself for reality, so that now all human beings fall under this rubric of truth. Then the Big or, this is not ‘really’ happening and everyone is really just doing what they do, and there is no encompassing true discourse; but then how are they doing that and how are we able to talk about there being none? What is the discussion about if it is really just the motion of immanent existence? This is hardly ridiculous, it is ironic. Because nothing occurs for the truth of reality without an inspiring transcendental agent. We have argued this elsewhere; whether or not we define terms such as to exclude a ‘transcendent’ clause, where maybe the human being is generating meaning by itself as a sort of ‘meaning machine’ but inclusive of all ‘other’ meaning that may be had, still, the effect is that consciousness operates so as to include and exclude as an imperative of real meaning. The issue of the point of contention, or the suggestion enacted by this point, is that consciousness, itself an effect of the human physiological being of the universe, functions to supply reality but resists at all costs the exposure that shows that reality does not present the truth of itself through inspired agency, that is to say, through an ability to have intuition of universally True Objects, except in as much as one has faith in the terms of discourse to define categories in particular manners so as to identify True Objects, and, only in reality can the agent be inspired by an intuition of the True Object. The limitation inscribed and described by this set thus implicates an exception to reality. Such descriptions (discursive schemes) that propose a grand explanation of the truth of reality thus proscribe a faith, and such faiths account for their trueness by default clauses that define the exclusions by which the system gains its stature for truth; and we may use Harman idea: anything that falls outside such an addressing is ‘accidental’. Such real schemes make so much sense to particular individuals that one can no longer get around them, discourse and discussion can offer no purchase for entry because every statement and every proposal has been accounted for by the tenants of inclusionary and exclusionary caveats. Hence, faith makes true.

To bring a most pertinent example of such faith in action is of course religious fundamentalism. Zizek describes the interactions of real faith in a recent article for the New York Times [http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/author/slavoj-zizek/]. Fundamentalism can be understood as such a discourse of reality that sets inclusionary and exclusionary aspects in a meaningful saturation of True categories; faith. What we deal with from a Western perspective is that there is such extremism, for the example of Zizek’s article, ISIS, the self proclaimed ‘Islamic State’, and how to breach such faith so as to mitigate violence. The discussion about such violence toward peace is taken up elsewhere. The significance that Zizek points out is not that there is an essential difference, but rather they ‘are already like us (the West)’, and the way they are like us, for the point if this essay, is that we and them are not only part of reality (Zizek categorizes this ‘reality’ as Capitalism, a category I tend to agree with), but, and most significantly, oriented upon True Objects. If this is indeed the case, then we should rather look at how such ‘Western view’ holds the object out away from itself, that is, how the perspective that we have, that gains fundamentalism as a category, is likewise a fundamentalism, if that albeit a ‘non-fundamentalism’, a fundamentalism that on one hand denies its being such, but on the other proclaims its (admitted) fundamentalism as a more correct, true and real basis of reality. The Christian fundamentalism of the West has already included the democratic-capitalistic discourse in its faith, already incorporated the secular inclusions and exclusions into its designation for truth, such that its faith, again, likewise merely shows the power of faith in reality. By this reduction, we should then consider then how reality itself is manifested in a particular manner, and that this manner, by virtue of its method that has choice as an integral and indeed innate if not fundamental tenant for all that may be true, cannot be ‘opt out’ of, which is to say, cannot be decided upon based upon an arrangement of discursive meanings.

*

The suggestion offered then, which is and was already the enjoining of real method unto itself to reveal itself, due to the logic of the explication put forth in the previous paragraphs, is never taken, whether it was not actually of transcendence or is now of immanence; such placements, the truth of such discursive formulations, are considered but never actualized in reality because it is in itself contradiction of the method. The method is real because it functions to hold the object out from the subject; yet while this method is founded in discrepancy, it operates effectively because it represents what is presented at once as an immanent and attainable goal: the True Object. Such contradiction of said method is offensive to the individual invested in reality, and so elicits from this offense “nihilism” as a ground of reductive reason that serves as a Biblical cherubim, securing the individual in its real position of willful inspired agency. Hence we can begin to understand the issue that Miellassoux and Harman bring for their proposal, but also the situation that is already enacted by maybe Miellassoux, but at least Harman, Badiou, Zizek, and Laruelle bytheir presentation. In this way we can also begin to understand how the veto and the pocket veto might come into play for the discourses of these authors in the discussion of reality — and their methodological dependence for their offering of solution — as to what is being framed as not real.

*

A side note: An operative question, when for example one reads Zizek [Please see Agent Swarm’s post that makes an argument that concerns this same feature: http://terenceblake.wordpress.com/2014/09/04/16-traits-of-continental-philosophy/%5D, is, how then are such observations brought? For, there is nothing evident nor inherent to his arguments that describe how it is he is able to bring such a discussion, nor even, really, besides the social commentaries that read like edicts for action, what he is talking about. Zizek, for all his apparent eccentricity and genius, gives us no insight as to why what he is saying has any relevant meaning for us. His social historical anecdotes appear to give his writings substance, and we are to assume his draws from a well reading, excellent education and grand synthesis of big ideas, but then, when one actually listens to the meaning of his arguments, one can only see that his whole parade cannot have the substance we think it holds, that if one takes to heart the meaning of his philosophy, aside from yet implicit to the directly implied call to action of the social commentary, one can only see that the very act of reading and understanding Zizek is itself a motion of contradiction, irony; and this is to say, for such an experience, not real.

The only respectable move in this situation, then, is to ask into this doubt.

*

Reality, in this way represented by discussion and argument, is sufficient unto itself, which is to argue by the extrapolation of method that a free individual is self sufficient, that is, in the ideal utopia that is the society of free agents. The discourse of freedom (social justice) thus promotes this maxim. But when we look around at the apparent social situation and if we can trust what is said of history, never is there a time when such ideology can ‘hold all the eggs’. The mythology of progress thus holds out its activity against itself to gain a purpose, with all the usual disclaimers, ‘we tried’ being the most basic one, but in the context of this essay, more ‘we are simply doing what is to be done’, whether we want to call it the solution to the discrepancy between the 1st and 3rd Worlds, the haves and the have nots, the rich and the poor, oppressor and oppressed, security and terrorism, environmentalism and the human effect towards Earth’s destruction, or the discrepancy that the institution of philosophy holds within itself. The world thereby may present itself as a current unitary discourse that can be viewed in a manner that Zizek describes in his book, “Living in the End Times“, for it seems apparent, according to the analysis of ideology that reflects unto itself, that there would be an ‘end’ and that this end is evidenced in the very motion that it has ultimately promoted by its method of seeking into the terms for their objects’ essential in-itself truth. In short, denial in this sense is the discourse of reality failing. The redundancy involved in such an undertaking is seen to be revealing itself, but due to the nature of the operation of consciousness for having true objects, it (reality) resists its uncovering, and this resistance can be understood, so Zizek suggests, as an historical analysis of ideology through the ‘five stages of grief’.

Indeed, following our argument of the Significant Event, there is only one ‘stage’ effective here: denial, for there will only be an end in as much as there is always an end in sight and presented in history through the present, just as there was an ‘end’ of the various ancient empires, as well an ‘end’ to the Romantic Era, to Modernism, Postmodernism, an ‘end’ of Y2K, an ‘end’ of history and or philosophy — in the extended analysis oriented upon Objects, such historical progress appears then to argue a ‘great culmination’ that ushers in a ‘new era’. To be fair, perhaps there is a real motion of this sort, but the proposal to be considered is that such reckoning never occurs, or more precisely, it only occurs through the particular condition of knowledge as an indicator of true reality for the individual. It is this condition that expresses the power of reality in the manner of Paulo Freire’s deliberation upon the game of oppression (both the oppressor and the oppressed are oppressed in the game of oppression); i.e. a human being attains its individual identity through joining in the discursive determination of reality, by appropriating the discourse of power, which we may call the ‘priority discourse’, which is to say, by becoming the oppressor. It is all too common to see the how the priority discourse usurps such ‘existential’ meaning for its own ideological purposes, locating specific arenas of oppression where such game occurs in the world while excluding itself (the analysis, as well as the effort to counter it) from such a category of world-state. It is not too difficult from a historical view to see where such free agency has gotten us. But this is reality, as Zizek aptly confirms, explicates and reiterates through his whole repertoire. With this in mind, we can easily see how Freud’s notion of the ‘death drive’ is significant, only now, the denied redundancy has taken the form of desparate solution; this too is a feature of the ‘end times’ the Zizek addresses in his recent book.

*

To explain how or why reality in its truth does not present any essential segregation of elements, to rely upon the identity posed of logic to the meaning of a phrasing of terms, simply reifies that such duality is not being overcome in the discursive re-presentation of Objects, but rather is only seen to be being overcome by individuals invested in the intrinsic mythology that is denying its end as its end is taking place because of the denial inherent of the orientation upon the scheme for itself that is positing its own ending. This is a discursive situation of historicity, the fact of history as an object, the result of discourse having power of dominion over reality, a presentation of affairs that misses the reflection of itself due to itself operating to maintain real progress. But this is not so much ideology as a hegemonic assertion of power, not that discourse itself has power, because ideology is a real situation of discourse; it is reality itself, as a designation of ubiquitous power by which ideology can be said to be the vehicle of power as opposed to other marginalized ideologies. Likewise, this is not a situation of an actual temporal movie of static objects, of reality ‘before’ having some different quality in itself such that the discourse then was manifesting reality (powerfully) differently than now; reality then was the same as reality now: it was reality. Reality was not behaving any differently than it does now for the human beings living in those times; and this is to say emphatically that the human being is not segregate from the operating universe, but complicit with its operation. If there was a reality that was different due to the hegemonic power of discourse, then it was exactly reflecting the condition of the universe in reality as human discursive power, as said, within the scheme of meaningful terms by which such discourse can be said to assert power as a hegemony. Sure, manifestation of things in the universe presented different conditions, but the effect of what is real was exactly the same; what was different is that now we have an idea of discourse asserting a power of primacy over what reality is and means for all of history as a True Object, whereas before what we now situate as discourse was seen and or defined through another discursive operation. This is redundancy in your face; this is the condition of knowledge now. This is the limit denied as limit, even to its understanding in its discursive formulation. Such notions are entirely ideological, absolutely Idea, absolutely real discourses about what is and was true for all time: the hard correlational limit; mythology functioning intrinsically. The fact is that no historical end ever occurs except in as much that ‘history’ is an object in-itself; the individual investment in reality will not allow it. This is consistent with another argument Quentin Miellasoix presents in his “Beyond Finitude“, that of another arch-fossil that occurs due to death, and evident in Zizek also; if an end were to occur, its ending would have no basis, but only the basis that arrives through there being no end — and if there is an end, then it is the indication of limit as what lay beyond the limit and antecedent to thought-reason; that which is not real. So to repeat; such a break prescribed by such knowledge never occurs in reality, except so much as an individual may be inspired through intuition of a ‘more true and real’ Object, that is always transcendent to the discursive operation. So it is: no break ever occurs.

In this manner, by this conventional method, the meaning of the phrase that describes this real situation approaches but never breaches the point of contention, and thus is never realized — understood but never actualized for real human living and experience — for the meaning that is supposed to be conveyed. Such conventional method can be said then, again, to be one of Bad Faith. Such logic of identity is not sufficient for the purposes of coming to any truth, but only sufficient for reifying and reestablishing that what is true is real and that such unitary reality is found through the terms themselves, the method of such terminology, as terms are understood to be gaining the truth of the grand Object of universal reality. So to reiterate in Quentin Miellasoux’s formulation, such method arrives through contingency that itself is necessary, but does little in this way to reveal what the facticity of necessity actually is or how it is indeed necessary beyond the reinscription that contingency is the actual truth of reality. In other words, the discourse of the real that proposes to have found itself through its method only serves to reify that faith makes true. Irony confounds such necessary contingency.

*

What is revolutionary in the context of our extended analysis is what can be inferred in ‘transformation’, or for another term, ‘conversion’. Such change never occurs in reality, neither outside of reality. Again, Zizek accounts for this. Categories do not change, but are converted in real discourse. But such a conversion is itself a category that attempts to convince or otherwise describe the route one may take to come upon the revolutionary experience. Yet, once having this situation, we can then discern the issue of the point of contention as a starting point that begins the real count as an arbitrary moment in reality as an event of the pure multiple (Alain Badiou). Where then such multiple is seen by the individual to have elicited from itself an inspiration, an intuited true problem of reality, the multiple is thereby reified by the inspired agent in reality, and the proposal continues to assert its correction in different forms, through the varied categories, as real progress, now the issue of transformation being seen as sufficiently described so as to be able to bring about the revolutionary experience. Yet inso much as this may occur upon the organization of real meaningful categories, the experience does not connote what it proposes, but simply shows that reality is all there is, that the priority discourse is indeed omnipotent and ubiquitous.

For this essay, what we have then in this description of reality is not a proposal for such transformation; such a transformation is ultimately real in its potential. What we have here is an exposure of how such real determinations themselves rely upon categorical disseminations of the True Object. The issue of the Significant Event thus posits through the veto that such proposals of transformation are themselves based upon temporal categorical manifestations of such Objects; and further, that such inspired agency thus moves to its argument by appropriating and converting real historical categories (schemes; phrase universes, Lyotard) as they are seen to indicate significant moments of reality, i.e. events of the multiple. Thus when such multiples are taken in themselves to indicate that set which is not included in another set and even its own set, we can no longer be talking about the real intuitive individual negotiating the world, some solution for the conscious individual navigating Life; there is a plenitude of such real suggestions for living. On the contrary, we must address then that category that contains all categories but itself.

Hence the irony of the discussion of the Significant Event.

**

In future essays (I figure my doing so) I will show how such conventional methodology conveniently avoids its own fault of representation. I will show how the discourse of reality assumes that the logic of an arrangement of terms is supposed to present an actual truth, and how this presumption of faith thereby redirects the telling to consequences of faith. I most likely will begin with Slavoj Zizek’s writing (we will see; many authors can serve as an occasion for this showing) because he appears to recognize and address in a certain way, the ‘gap’; his ‘parallax gap’ is a phenomenon located in the particular phrasing of conventional logic. He seems to notice this fault, but because he cannot or will not address the gap itself, he suits himself to describe the conventional ramifications (social contingencies) of having the gap. He is a master in this, and I even venture to say that he is the exemplar conventionalist, the ‘pope’ of conventional faith and its dogmatics. And indeed, one could see in his mastery the impetus for his discussions lay in his not being able to address the gap itself; thus Zizek can also be used as an example of how the veto, but particularly the pocket veto, is put in play, and thus he also can become a site by which to reach in the heart of the point of contention. In short, through the occasioning of various authors, I will show a ‘hack’ for conventional philosophy.

Similar to this, also in the future I will probably put forth a discussion concerning Francois Laruelle’s ‘active linguistics’, which is, I feel, the basis of his whole non philosophical enterprise.

For now, for “The Significant Event”, I leave the argumentation that proposes to lead one to the truth of reality to those authors more thoroughly invested in conventional reality. It is necessary that the ‘concrete’ social situation of individuals be handled and addressed. So conceding to their efforts and that their efforts rely upon such a faith, and that such faith only is posited as exclusionary, that is it asserts the inclusion of all that is allowed to be counted as true, whereas such instance of faith belongs to a larger situation where such faith does indeed operate, we move to speak more upon divergence.

End Part 9.