Monthly Archives: October 2017

Revisiting Nick Land 

Through VITUAL BORSCHT thru Sytheic Zero.
Nick land is an interesting character. I like him Only because of his definition of dark enlightenment on his infamous essay that I can’t seem to find a link to but it’s there. That being said, I think his character and politics is reactionary and childish, pretty much a ‘Self Half-claimed mysterious child who poses as a mature and sophisticated intellectual’.  If feel like his whole purpose in this world is to make money while inflating his thinker-ego, which is nothing new really. While his essays is interesting, it does mark a classifiable type. Remember Nine Inch Nails (great band), Insane Clown Posse (lame), White Zombie (ok) came out of the 90s.  Nick Land is a type. 

He is noted for coining the term “dark enlightenment”. I like that idea, but because I like that idea I think Nick land is caught in a enchanted fantasy. Now, I don’t mean this to discredit him or to say that he’s wrong or anything like that; this is not a point to indicate his incorrect ideas (though they are inflated; he’s a church of Nick) I say that because given the facts, the fact that I am able to understand where he is coming from, often even more than I can understand what he is saying about some world or something like that — somehow I seem to intuitively understand what he saying also — It must mean that the position from which he gains his perspective, that we might generalize  into calling “the dark enlightened state”, is itself a function of consciousness that comes about under certain conditions. Like certain Atari games of the 80s or Intelevsion, there are certain conditions that must be met in the order of thinking to thereby be able to even come upon an idea such as the dark and lighten meant, a position as well as an object of consideration. It’s like someone’s playing video game and then they happen to cook some buttons and move the joystick in a certain order in a particular part of the game and then a secret room opens up or some sort of secret message appears out of nowhere, A message or chamber that is completely irrelevant to the playing of the game itself, the kind of secret knowledge by which the rest of the game takes on a new quality, a different quality than I had before. 
The condition is not a generalized condition; it does not include all human beings in potential but is actually a particular type of understanding, what I call a particular orientation upon objects. The strange thing about it is if I’ve entered this other chamber or I have found the secret little instance of activity that allows me to get the secret message in the video game, if I go to other players then who have not encountered it and try to tell them where this instance is in the game it is very difficult for them to find that exact instance, that single bit on the screen but more than the screen, that single bit that single position in the whole map and layout of the video game where in one must also do a series of button pushes in joystick manoeuvres. In fact it is so difficult to communicate this to a person that for all purposes that are effective in our world of reality in which Nick land might be enlightened to some darkness, that we might call it incommunicatable. And this is what Nick relies upon for all the other derivatives (accelerationalism, etc..), that the secret will not be exposed. Great for religion. 

So foreign and almost impossible to re-create for another person in the game, that we got a call it a fantasy, and indeed a product of enchantment with reality. 

More later

DeLanda and Harman: A Comparison of Realisms

But of course, if we are to compare Harman’s Philosophy and any Deluezian position, we have a new distinction that can be made between ontology and metaphysics. It is not quirk of cosmological irony that Delueze’s name sounds so resonant with the English ‘delusional’.  Lol. 


(I’m a dork,  😄 or rather, hack, the Philosophical Hack.) 

The Perfect Crime: Enchantment as Vehicle of Subjective Purpose. 

Comment on this REPOST..

I’m not very familiar with this B guy philosopher that I hear a lot of here and there. (sorry I’m voice dictating and I didn’t really feel like going back and finding out exactly how to spell boy do they really lard lol) .

I’m only going off of a quote that’s on the link of the link. So I could be completely wrong and what the conclusion really is that this guy says be on the excerpt.

From what I’ve gathered from B it seems that he’s kind of a complainer. This excerpt in the link talks about some sort of lamenting that we’re no longer in the sacred zone or something like that. Hey saying like oh nothing is sacred any longer because now everything is a commodity everything has been flattened so we have no sense of the sacred. 

I think he is representing and immersion within transition. The From and the Where To don’t really matter in as much as the expression is one that goes along with transition, and this is to say the feeling that goes along with an attachment to what is seen of the past as good or somehow quality and a perceived future or even present situation that is indicating a future that is not as good or somehow lacking in substance.

Now, when  we are able to get beyond such lamenting transitions, we might then see clearly that we have not lost the sacred but we have merely moved the blocks around; the sacred is still there. The terms have changed but they indicate the same situation. The question is do I still have a sense of spirit to spite what I think the world is doing? And, is the world ever a holy and sacred place? What am I depending on when I say that we have lost a sense of the sacred? 

I would say that “we” have not lost anything, And that the people who love a sword of doom and gloom philosopher of a bleak future are ” optimists”, because they hang onto a static and stable sense of the past and or their central sense of being projected into a future hope that more and more never comes to pass. I, on the other hand, am a sort “pessimist ” because I see each moment as full of potential as I try not to project my resentments out upon the world to cloud my view. They of course are a certain kind of Realist because in reality everyone has all sorts of opinions and attitudes upon situations and their outcome, and of course their presence in the world is very serious matter. 😄

 So it is that B evidences a type of human moment that sees words as indicating actually true essences of being, such that the larger conflation of these essences show them reflexively and automatically a bad end. 

Yet, When we discover what an object is, we are no longer are caught in that kind of limited paradigm, no longer caught in reliving the past as a present identity toward the future;  which is, as many have said, death. Hence the lament. 

The perfect crime is that B himself has committed the crime but is putting it off into something else so we all look over there and not at the actual culprit. 

The manner of Being enchanted follows the rationale behind Plato’s Allegory of the Cave. The Allegory itself is an enchanted image of realty where people are existing in various roles and stages in a progressive march of the human species into the future. 

So it is that when we can see B as merely   expressing a particular mode of Being a human in history, then B can appear to resound with the meaning of Graham Harman’s “always been disenachanted”. If we understand that the human being is always (as a general and common condition) caught ‘in the middle’, seeing no correspondence of their Being with any being that is outside the human correlation: The evidence of other human beings correlated with ‘the only Being’ allowed, as a thoughtful excersizing, presents an axiomatic limitation in all a thinker can know. This limit thus supplies the necessary catalyst for displacement of Self in order for it to commune with a transcendent ‘other’ that confirms its exceptional placement in the universe, but also an exceptional role whereby such Being can have an effect upon the ‘separated’ and functioning world. This displacement thereby allows such human Being to understand its alienation within a context of purpose, which manifests as (probably) one of three Selves: The Colonizer who speaks the future as a ‘good’ Being as The Soveriegn whereby all others gain their purpose; the Colonized who speaks the past to bring about a ‘good’ future; the Complainer who speaks the future as the ‘good’ past. But in fact, all three are caught in what Paulo Freire called “the game of the oppressor”. These are thus subjects of enchantment, or for another term, Enlightemnent, as each plays their role in the respective world of progress. 

We find that human beings have always been dis-enchanted when we start to understand consciousness through what it does rather than by what it processes, as a universal object before a centralized thinking subject. We find that the Allegory of the cave, while an enchanted idea, nevertheless always finds itself as describing a relational situation wherein the (conventionalized, normalized) point of the Allegory withdraws from view to allow for what Badiou might call ‘the beginning of the count’. 

Description and argument: Discerning Resentment and Bias in Philosophy.

REPOST of a bit in Ressentiment.

Nietzsche talks about in one of his essays somewhere (or maybe it is Kierkegaard) how he seems to have more compassion and understanding and relation to authors of the past, of a history, of a presence that is detached or somehow distant from himself, than toward contemporary philosophers, philosophers that existed at the same time as him, that he has little or no compassion.

I often feel the same way.

Slavoj Zizek and myself seem to have been moulded from the same bed of clay. I doubt that I will ever meet him and I doubt that he will ever hear of me, and so such speculations, however incorrect or presumptuous on my part, must indeed be the case. We may not of be dressed in the same fabric, our hairstyles and musical interests depart from one another’s, and our accents and mannerisms are definitely of different characters.

Nevertheless, I came to the same conclusion that he so eloquently and oddly describes and develops, and I even heard recently Levi Bryant suggest, namely, that an author does not fully realize the meaning of his proposals, and often and strangely enough, in fact, doesn’t even realize what they mean, and even more strangely and contradictory, sometimes makes incorrect arguments that stem from their own ideas!

One of the situations I point out in my book has to do with an apparent confusion in the discipline of philosophy. Sure, we have come up with a number of sub-disciplines such as ontology and epistemology, and even a greater division with Continental and Analytical philosophy, but I think there is a more subtle yet significant issue going on besides whether we are talking about methods, semantics or syntax. I say that this distinction has to do with an orientation upon objects. (See my book if you are curious as to how this relates to Graham Harman’s Object Oriented Ontology/Philosophy). Part of this issue is that there a basic and fundamental breakdown in communication that cannot be over come through current conventional methods.

More relevant to this essay here is the distinction between description and argument. The question might arise as to whether a description is an argument in disguise, but I think the significance involved is when one sees an argument as a description. When this occurs we have a different animal growling. The problem, as I tend to see it, is when a description is understood automatically as an argument.

When I say “tree” and point over there, there is no argument. I say “tree with leaves”; no argument. If I say “the tree has a brown trunk and green leaves, all of which are made of cells”, there is no argument in there. It is a description. When I goto the bar and order a beer, I am not making an argument to the bartender about beer (usually).

Yet for some reason, when it comes to philosophy, the automatic recourse to an apparently overwhelming amount of self-reported-philosophers is that certain statements are automatically arguments. If I say anything that remotely resembles philosophy, it is taken as an argument to be debated as to its veracity and qualifications. I call this common mode a real mode and also a conventional mode. I suggest that the discipline of philosophy is at a point when we need to begin to find away to discern between these two routes, and without arousing resentment from those conventional philosophers that have automatic recourse to the single view of argumentation. (See Heidegger “What is it we Call Thinking, about this one dimensional manner). Because, if I may use Nietzsche here: the conventional philosophers are unable to think outside of their resentment, and so use what is common as a leverage to pull what could be exceptional back into the regularity of the ideological norm. They argue their Being. 

To not argue Being is an extremely unpopular idea; no one wants to admit that thier rationality and ability is compromised by an aspect of themselves that withholds or otherwise cuts them off from the possibility of Reason –even if Reason is problematized likewise. One is not allowed to admit that there is a manner of discussion that excludes some people, but this is because those so offended simply are not understanding the issue at hand nor then do they want to nor see that it is possible

An example about ressentiment: I do not and will never know how to program machine language, yet somehow this does not offend me. The idea that I will not ever be able to do certain things regardless of what conventional potential might be shown to me, does not offend me. But for some reason, if I suggest that there is a manner of thinking upon things that not all people will be able to comprehend despite education or intelligence, then I have breached a social ethic, and I become biased as people get offended. Such recourse simply evidences an approach to things that is ignorant; such philosophers and people in general do not understand how such a discourse could be not biased.

Just think of race relations and social justice: White people cannot understand the lived experience of people of color ( generally speaking, at least, in the U.S., Africa, perhaps India, maybe everywhere in fact..). And, not only is it an incorrect sentiment to say that “oh, I don’t see color, I only deal with individuals”, but it is indeed racist. At best, White people can be allies to people of color by getting over their ressentiment that the human Being is a common sort by through which everyone may have access to knowledge within the potential of discourse, because this common sort, as we find in the critique of race relations, is a sort that is and has been implemented by discourses of power (bias; systems of power; colonialist white privilege ). Then, and only then, can we begin to discuss racism and its solutions. So I say of (conventional) philosophy of its mode. Not that it is racist necessarily, but that it will not admit its own lack.

For now, I merely throw this out there. I am not going in to all the repercussions involved with this most apparent and usually common ideological methodology.

Pondering Determinism.

Ive been having a discussion with Marvin from  A Keen Graspblog about determinism, and Im posting my latest reply. Please see my post Preliminary thoughts on the parameters of determination: Phenomenology and Object Orientation.and its comments for our ongoing discussion…


The question that is suspended there is the issue of mind and brain. The assumption is that there is a brain (and or mind) that we can know that is not a model, upon which or generally from which, or due to its operating, that models are made. One question would be how do we know when the modeling stops? Of course, I would imagine that it stops at what is obvious, or what is practical; the questioning of matters stops with what is apparent. Upon such apparent matters, we base our observations, relations, judgements conclusions, opinions, etc…

I agree with this. Likewise, I can understand religion as spiritual support.

I have pretty cogent ideas about how many things fit together philosophically (but Im open to dabate and change); they are the content of books, written and being written. But one piece Im looking at is determinism, so its good to have the definition you give, at least in so far as the significant piece there; correct me if I am wrong, its seems the burden of proof for determinism is is predicitive capacity.

This is a good definition. It allows me to again point to what is real, and say that indeed this definition is very practical, involved with determining what of reality is indeed real or possible.

I do not have fixed ideas around determinism (oddly enough, lol). I am working through the possibilities involved. Throwing stuff around, seeing where it lands, so to speak. Currently I am seeing the practical definition of determinism a bit light.

I do not question that I have to live in a very practical manner, think in certain ways, make choices, regardless of if they meet a definitional criteria of “pragmatic”. While definition is a real feature of discussion, though, I am not sure that ‘definition’ is a sufficient category to be able to encounter all that may be acting or involved. At every point I have to ask what I am suspending in order to come to a definite idea of a situation, and then how I am able to carry that suspension into other contexts? That the brain/body behaves in a certain manner practically, I think is narrow in its reckoning. While I do see that we must only describe what the body (the body in the sense of bodies, or objects, possibly) is doing, I think too often we first rely upon a limit that is immediately apparent, given, and then make decisions on this seeming “absolute” limit by which we come upon things.

There are many instances which could displace pragmatics as a viable manner by which to discern what is true. A sole reliance upon definition can be seen as slightly faulty.
For example of your apple: The assumption of limit that the model itself is exempt from being merely a condition. If we investigate, say, into the apple, we find that our model of the real apple that was once working, at some point along the investigation, fails, or at least we find that the model “apple” is constituted with an array of things that are not properly the apple. So at some point we merely ‘decide’ that X= apple= real, and not-X is an illusion or an aspect that makes what is ‘real’ a kind of illusion with respect of what we find in the investigation. For example: I find that apples are made of atoms, atoms of electrons, protons.. etc.. until we come into quantum estimations, etc..

The assumption here is that consciousness is giving me reliable data to work with; very practical and real, of course. The issue is not that it may not be giving me reliable data, but that this set of data is functioning in a manner to give me data that is irrefutable, or only refutable given certain conditions that are already a part of the particular manner. It seems to me that we have found a manner that consciousness functions: It is not that it finds actually true things, and not even models, but that such models function as Truth, and so to say that it is merely a model serves as a justifier for that particular manner of consciousness given data that is come upon as automatically true. It is like a redundant an unnecessary act to have to say “models”; its like every time I goto drive my car, I cant just drive my car without announcing to everyone all the time that I use it to go places. It is almost like a particular set of knowledge has become so tentative and found itself on such precarious grounds, that now it has to announce the truth that is in fact happening as “merely a model”. I see this as a feature of religion: It must produce apologies for its lack, for what innately occurs by the religious reckoning that is actually offensive to the functioning of the mode of knowledge, the ‘positive’ faith. I cant just say that God is real, I have to justify it along certain lines. My question is like, if God exists and is functioning truly, why would I have to justify it?

This conclusion, and the effect of such a conclusion, whether cognized or merely effecting, appears to have explanatory power for what is occurring in many places politically. No longer are people and groups feeling they just justify their actions and beliefs to a common sort, rather they just cut off rationalizing to the general sphere and act. The extreme examples are the American alt right and islamic terrorist groups. Well the Islamic terrorist groups probably have never felt the need to justify their activity to secular or Western powers, The alt right on the other hand being involved and invested in western ideals can be seen to be appropriating what otherwise are liberal postmodern intellectual philosophical concepts correctly but then applying them in a manner that is really offensive to the institutions that gave rise to these philosophical ideas. It’s as if the alt right has committed a foul in the game of intellectualism. 


But See that I am not making an argument about what is true or false, or about what may be more true or less true, but I am attempting to describe what is occurring. This approach really does nothing for an ability to choose upon activites or where or what I might be in reality, it is not a practical philosophy; I do not feel I need to know why I do things except in as much as I rely upon a practical manner of reconciling behavior to its justifying and predictive attributes –and indeed I do rely upon such avenues. Nevertheless, the nature of this investigation appears thus to be necessary, because it has little to do with what I might choose to do, what I might choose to be interested in, as though I might weigh up options of what might be interesting to talk and think about; I cannot help but put everything through a particular filter, a particular lens. Due to this apparent necessity, and my inability to chose what I cannot choose, the description seems to arise out of determined set of qualifiers, qualifiers that themselves arise within a necessary arena in which we choose. Indeed, I can choose upon various topics, but its seems that every occasion yields from me the same order of activity, yet framed in different instances. Its predictive quality thus might be found as a kind of history of the future, similar to what we find in the Bible.



I am understandning in a very practical way, how people came to the notion of a difference in philosophy between European continental and (generally) English-AMerican analytical philosophy. So I appreciate this opportunity. Part of my issue, also, is that what we have come to rely upon as continental, and indeed the now traditional divide, is almost useless. Often enough, what is deemed ‘continental’ is misunderstood as much as it is placed in a sort of scholastic category of speculation, which, to me, completely misses the point that the discerning came about, and indeed ironically becomes a topic that some philosophers (Badou and Zizek come to mind) even address about how what is original is commandeered by what is subsequent and or redundant, such that we have is a ‘changing of the past’ that can no longer be reckoned to its basis in common circles because of the nature of the change. Can we ask then what of those who see the substance that is the changed as no having fidelity to the intension involved?

But again: the point is not that what is practical and real has any other ‘more truth’ underneath it. The point is that there are two irereducible and mutually exclusive routes upon objects. Ill shut up now.