Philosophy as Discursive Strata.

Sometimes it just doesn’t work. What doesn’t work?

At least a couple of well known philosophers have said something to the effect that philosophy is about one thing. I like that and I agree, even while I know that there are many philosophers who would not be able to concur with that philosophical premise.

Along that line, then, a certain kind of consideration would have to ponder just what this one thing is? Well, some would say, it is the one thing that the philosopher writes about. Yeah; we could say that there is this one issue that the philosopher is attempting to treat at particular junctures. For example, one can see Savoj Zizek books as treating different issues; “Event” deals with events; “Living in the end times” swirls around the idea of the end times and what that can possibly mean; “The Parallax Gap” deals with the repercussions of ways of thinking about things, et cetera. Yet likewise we could say that Zizek is dealing with one thing through various discursive phases.

If we have this manner in mind, Wittgenstien’s facts and propositions come to resonate a meaning of redundancy. But Wittgenstien would not have facts be anything specific, more criteria upon which propositions may be made, but we have to wonder then how he could even use the word ‘fact’. How could ‘fact’ mean anything if it wasn’t identifying something specific? Yes; with Witt, we find already Correlationalism budding its real head. And if we think we have  gotten any further than Witt, then we are not really dealing with one thing and have completely left the arena in which we started. This is the point of contention.

So I say that while each philosopher who is dealing with One thing is dealing with it, then they are not, taken together, dealing with multiple things, but are only dealing with multiple things within a certain orientation upon objects. 
Im liking Hickman’s bit on Stiegler, for in there he talks about different philosophical types as approaches upon the matter at hand. I see this situation as indicating orientation and propose philosophy would do much better if we had a way to distinguish which orientation is being expressed upon. Philosophy, as a whole discipline, lacks in as much as issues are perpetually veiled while dipped in a cloud of ambiguity due to the fact that (1) those who are talking about One thing, the One thing that many others are talking about, often enough do not have the fortitude to come out and say it, rather, and argue over various term designations with others who are obviously not understanding the issue in the first place. These ‘first type’ are in the attempt to describe or otherwise argue their point to the other within a given arena in which the communication is already successful provided the addressor uses the correct arrangement of terms. 

There are layers upon layers of issues just in that idea that need be played out. But it is enough here to goto the end of that laying out and say outright that such communication has already failed because of the two orientations. My proposal is that there is no overcoming that inherent barrier between these two orientations, but that because there is a (2) real imperative (of identity, of transcendence) located and insisted upon by faith, philosophers of both types still try to enlist the other through a particular type of argument toward proving (the method of non-contradiction). It is thus the (a) instance upon real ubiquity of potential, accompanied by the (b) philosophical attempt to overcome its inherent ambiguity of objects [the ambiguity that at once ‘gives’ philosophy its teleology while arguing (holding out) against its identification thru ontology and epistemology], that has brought about the current real philosophical situation where (c) real presentism is weighted against a determinist discourse that (d) relies upon the suturing of term to object (faith), that then (e) reifies as it re-uses the ‘knowledge’ gained through the denial of redundant theoretical posture to arrive at (f) the central thinking-agent, where discourse is equated to reality, and new terms of reality arise from some chaotic void of unknowability. Has anyone ever read the medieval Mystic (scholastic?) text called “The Cloud of Unknowing”. WTF is philosophy doing these days?  Stop me now (I’m such a dork)…

This principle of non-contradiction is likewise and redundantly enforced to The Unitive One Omnipresent Reality ( UOOR.  wait.. What??), such that every discursive situation is automatically taken to fall within the stratified scheme in potential; Logic is taken axiomatically equivillent to what is unilaterally and ubiquitously real, instead of as a tool that is used for various applications. My point asks how long do we have to argue over the same situation before we see that the talk about the One thing is not being communicated in its Oneness not because, as Witt., there is no identifying fact, but rather because philosophy is taken within this, and as indicating of, and co-conspirator with, The omnipresent and ubiquitous reality. Perhaps, once we admit that there is a discrepancy between, what we can call, philosophical worlds that are only traversed vectorally, and not axiomatically, then we will be able to see philosophy as, on one hand, a mechanism that functions like an engine, with identifiable aspects and interactions, and on the other hand, a ‘religion’ that supplies the metaphysical and cosmological bases upon which real estimations may be debated, disputed and confirmed, such as ideological and political situations. 

Zizek has already shown us that this can be the case, but he has not moved beyond the mere talking about how it can be the case, and actually tends to reify the function to perpetuate the cloud for the sake of real ubiquity. In order for this to come about, philosophy as a discipline would have to look at the conditions of its own hubris, which hardly every happens.

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So to get back to what doesn’t work. First we have to see that the philosophy of the One thing can work in different ways, including the way it is working in this essay. If we understand Zizek, say, talking about One thing through the various occasions (Event, Parallax Gap, Hegel, Lacan, terrorism, etc..), then we can ask not what this One ting may be, but more how this One thing functions. Does this One thing begin the argument, that is an ontological object, or does this One thing act as a teleological object, the object that the discourse gathers and rallies around and toward, as purpose, but more as ‘prior given result’. Historically, this One thing, which we can call the Object, has been understood to be the same thing, and at that, not worth distinguishing. This is because historically philosophy has been and is involved with the One Real teleo-ontological given, as I have just said above. It is only when we can begin to accept our limit as limit, which is, as the fact that we are not actually in communion with any ‘unknown’ inspiring source, including that which we routinely and always regard as ‘thinker’, that we can begin to place the workings of discourse into its proper scheme (Witt scaffolding). We have withdrawn far enough; there is no withdrawing farther. In reality there is now only rehashing in different terms what has already occurred, and there is the categorization of the facts that are used in the redundant religious posture, the effective intrinsic mythological palate, so to speak.

Those who see the eternal infinite in the dance of terms that arise from some unknown chaotic void-nil will continue to argue against its own categorization, will continue to rally against being controlled, as they see it, against their existential-transcendental privilege and will. But so it is; they will not have to relinquish any control; they will continue as they already and always will: free agents of transcendence. As i say: Two irreducible (mutally exclusive) routes.

What works is real faith. It always works. What does not work is the idea from afar of the finding out how just what works works. What does not work does not work because of religious offense against its real faith. What is true works regardless of any possible offense; this also concerns the point of contension.

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This all goes to my past few posts. They didn’t really work, but philosophy was: To point out how philosophy can work. The object is out there. I begin here, and see the object out in the distance. Can I make it? Will I make it? I don’t know. But I go. I begin within a certain discursive horizon that becomes more limited as I place each term-clause in its particular place. What is being built? The object is there, but is it true?

I really like The Not So Solid Earth blog. I can’t find the exact post, but s/he describes the artistic process as a geological laying down of strata that can only occur within certain limits depending upon was has been laid before it.

What is the picture we have of my last few posts once they have been laid down, the terms and clauses in their determined strata? Ends that might support the means, but are not, after all, entirely real. What does that mean? What does that end?

Here is then an example of two routes. 

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