Monthly Archives: August 2016

Instigation of Offense and the Beginning of Real Faith. 

[this is uncorrected voice dictation…]

We might imagine that there is no going back, that there is no effective check to bring things in balance, no conscious awareness that will allow any sort of uprising which will or can disrupt The motion of the world. 

Because we are concerning here not so much with what might be true of humanity, but more what humanity perceives; we are dealing with what is real. And what is real is that humanity will always usurp whatever state of affairs into its proper construct of meaning. And this construct is based in a distancing of the individual human being from the operating universe, and it is from this point this functional divestiture, by which reality proceeds. In this we always want to break up from the conglomerate powers. We always want to assert an essential freedom; even as we might argue there is no free will that very argument is based in the presumption of freedom and thinking about how to consider things. We in the west want to look at the history of the world and see that somehow we have brought enlightenment to the world, freedom to the oppressed cultures and societies, liberation where there was only drudgery. Indeed this is reality; for every despot there will be a hero. Even if 1000 years goes by hundred despotic rule eventually that lineage that tradition will die will go away in favor of what is not despotic. The hungry will always be fed or they will die; if they don’t die then they will be fed. Systems situations and manners of proceeding into the world will always be set aside for what is perceived as righteous and proper. If it is not proper then what is improper becomes proper. That is until it is seen is not proper. Humanity will endure through these vacillations regardless of how we want to define it. 

But reality must have it that these definitions refer to essential situations, situations that refer to choice over good and evil and the larger ethical world. 

And due to this want, due to this real mandate, there will always be a power structure of the few over the many; presently this power structure is defined and organized around capital but to be more specific and simple, money is power. 

While some people may not agree with this or even look upon it as some sort of unethical situation that we need to correct, whether we call it capital or money or some other term that we haven’t invented yet that will always be a meaningful unit for comparison by which human beings will become more powerful than others. 

The real situation is this way because there are individuals that are not concerned with these unitsof power that we call money in such a way to organize their being in a hierarchical manner, which is to say to have power over another. The facets of this unconcern is not really the issue, in fact it is the disorganization of such units of meaning by which certain people may consolidate their power through capitalization. R concern and the issue right now is that they are indeed are people whose main concern are the organization of these units of power, and due to this unequality this inherent difference in value and concern, those who are concerned with the organization of power will amass always more power. Inasmuch as there may be more than one person in this class with us have groups of people that function together for the purpose of the organization of power, and so whether or not one person or one or more of these groups get challenged by what we should call the masses of disconcern, The very nature of the organization of the units of power continues to amass such units and continues to maintain an established such organization despite the individual failure. 

This is all to say that the real world functions within a perception of checks and balances, but that the system of power has developed in such a way to be beyond checking or balancing. In fact it is built in such a way that the checking and the balancing is relied upon, The view that such checks and balances actually have an effect upon the organization of power is relied upon for further consolidation and amassing of power. 

We must find then that the Enlightenment was a moment in the process of human consciousness coming to terms with itself in the universe. Which is to say consciousness as a manifestor of meaning is coming to terms with the determination of such meaning, which is to say of the negation of the transcendental clause. 

Yet we should keep in mind that reality always usurps meaning for itself, and regardless of what consciousness maybe revealing unto itself, there will always be two routes upon objects. One route that lives through the denial involved in the faith in the transcendental clause as an agent of transcendence, and one route that sees the truth of human existence and develop a true science of the human being in existence. This latter occurs through it necessary divergence of common understanding. Where is this has taken place on some rudimentary and elementary levels, such as science has to do with the long game which occurs over many lifetimes many generations. 

Issac Asimov in his Foundation books May have been more correct than anyone would dare assert. 

Maybe. 

REPOST: 

Election 2016 Bonus: The Long Overdue Death of the Mainstream Media

In a revealing statement earlier this month, the mainstream media admitted it would never recover from its irresponsible and negligent coverage of the 2016 presidential election.

corporate media, Donald Trump, Media, Hillary Clinton

https://deusnexus.wordpress.com/2016/08/31/death-mainstream-media/

Risk 2…

So what do I mean when I talk about Heidegger’s risk and his support of nationalistSocialism? 

Right off, I definitely do not mean that ones philosophy should be founded in a type of social activism. Indeed philosophy in the loose sense in the larger sense can be said to be a kind of Political philosophy, like someone’s philosophy of human rights or gender equality or merchant access; for sure one needs stand up for their philosophy in this sense. But likewise we should be more so skeptical of the view that see his philosophy as primarily, essentially and inextricably linked to social activism; I do not believe that The veracity of a philosophy need to be evidenced or proven by some sort of social activism, for example marching on Washington or something. Yet it is by this determination and apparent orientation that we find an impossible partition between essential, what we might call, cosmological substrates, The political ideological realm being that what we call ‘real’. 

No; we are not associating Heidegger’s risk with this type of philosophicalorientation. That he is perceived within this orientation to perhaps have taken a risk of that same sort is based in the type of argument that I call redundant. For sure there is a Heidegger that took an ideological risk in his move toward nationalist socialism; but this is not the only Heidegger. In fact that Heidegger is a phenomenological being.

And so in reference to Derrtida’s book “of spirit”, we can begin to find a more significant meaning to Heidegger’s destitution of spirit. 

Though I have yet to begin my reading of “logical investigations” (Husserl; Hs mentor), I feel it is not difficult from the pool limitary sketches that I’ve come across of phenomenology to understand Hursserls General form, and though I will approach his books with an open mind through a tabla rasa if you will, I am fairly confident that the reading of his material will only serve to and large in the ways by which to speak about what is said; I am eager and hopeful, though, that reading of logical investigations will completely disrupt not only my preliminary understanding of him but likewise my whole view upon the universe. We shall see. 

If we can trust a certain generic and typical historical presentation, The common of history given us, then it is not difficult to agree with Sartre that Kierkegaard may have been the first exit stencil lis then it is not difficult to agree with Sartre that Kierkegaard may have been the first Existentiaist, but more that the break had most probably already occurred with Hagel such that Kierkegaard became necessary. We find then by Heidegger the voicing of the situation as it was already becoming apparent the destitution of spirit. The desperation of Kierkegaard was only slightly an earlier indication, and Hursserl then appears to be, if you excuse my crass language, and almost frantic attempt to re-suture what so Obviously and apparently was drifting apart. With Heidegger we have the Mark of the ship drifting from its mornings. The move towards nationalist socialism and the question that involves Dasien creates the condition of post modernity through the doubt involved by the risk invested in the discourse evidenced of Heidegger work. 

For the risk was exactly that: The question that moved the enlightenment within a singular force was brought upon itself to question by the movement of world forces. We find that, in effect, Dasien was defeated in World War II. Make no theoretical mistake. 

The desolation of world was brought by the destitution already invested in the question as evidenced by the discourse of the question itself which is Dasien. The risk of Heidegger was the inherent possibility of the question itself manifested indeed as world as argued by Heidegger. What is apparent then and now is that no one gives a fuck. The question thus resides in whether or not we resort to finding truth in a common humanity, which is to say in the majority view, the route wherein the mojority find identity in religious comfort. 

If we understand Heideggernot as a proposal of what might be occurring, which is to say as an argumentative proposal , but indeed a reflection of what ‘is’ occurring as a ‘has’ occurred, then we can do one of two things, but actually three. 

The first is what I call conventional. This approach takes material within a scheme of essentially valued orders. A scaffolding of real truth. In this arena various authors and ideas are commodities to be used within fashion and fad to establish identity move careers and make a happy living . In this course it erects and maintains the political idea logical economy of real things. 

The other two concern Dasien in its originary sense, we might say and it’s true sense. Here, similar and largely correspondence with conventional route , either we take Dasien as an essentialcategory of being human and transcribe the meaning of Heidegger’s work into the ever present moment of transcendental being and use his ideas as platforms to make further statements upon what might be real of being and time and such; or we already understand Heidegger and what has occurred and find that indeed the spirit is destitute, which is to say marginalized, denied,  suppressed and oppressed, and ultimately colonized for the purposes of real effort. 

It is thus the contradiction involved in the irruption ofDasien, of its construction of dis-truction, de-construction, that allows for the discernment of reality and what we should call the divergent thesis. This last can announce the large misunderstanding involved in the appropriation of Francios Laruelles non-philosophy, and speaks to what he calls ‘Christ’. 
The risk of Heidegger is that which is confirmed in the fact that I may have anything true to say of Heidegger in this moment. The risk of Heidegger exactly was no risk; because he risked everything. The move towards nationalist socialism which appeared to be a rising through German idea list philosophy is the ironic confirmation of spirit destitute for real determination that we now call capitalism. Those are the terms that designate what reality may be the situation will always remain the same: Spirit does not rise and fall within the coordination of an essentialist doctrine of manifested discourses. On the contrary; we might be able to speak of the his store cool manner of being human in the world as involving two oscillations, to paths, that at times coalesce in a certain manner to coordinate being and historicalevent, , and at other times diverge such that the coordination is no longer salute and the unitary meaning of discourse crumbles into multifocality. 

Risk…

Original post titled “Falsification”,   It’s a very good outline and another reason why I tend to say that a science of philosophy is possible, but we have to take risks. Philosophy does not take risks upon its own ideas for the most part. It take risks within a career mentality, if I may stretch a term, philosophers take risks with their identity, which is to say that they’re proposing an idea that they have come upon through their intuition upon the world of transcendence. The risk is entirely  theory, for they’ll sit there and argue their proposal which is their academic identity, which is to say The risk is utterly speculative and philosophical and not scientific. 

Instead the risk I talk about appears as a scientific risk in the sense of this post below. That a science may be found through the assertions that propose a test that has nothing to do with whether one is arguing it’s truth or not; it is theory in the sense ofhypothesis of evidence. As I have said elsewhere , to argue a set of postulates , to construct a structure of meaningful phrases based upon the logic that orders the ability of such structures to make sense, merely stands upon pedestals similar to that of Freud and marks and the like mentioned in the post below. The true test, The scientific test , The test of fact , comes not through perpetual ideological restructuring and reducing of terms to relative motions of human interactions — these are political and ideological arguments of real ideological space; The true test comes in what is repeated , what repeatedly arises as the occasion for such ideological strides and maxims . The facts, then, can only be found in the motions of time,  despite how we might argue such theoretical ideas, strategies of argument and debate.  The proof of the fact of a Theory will be found over an extension of that theory applied to actual circumstance of history. And this is not found over a mere 10 or 20 or even 50 or even 100 years ; it is taking us nearly 3000 years just to be able to come to this idea of what might be a factual philosophical basis . This is what we can mean when we talk about historicity, The fact of history. It is not so much about whether Marx was correct so far as I can use a particular argument to argue Marxist view upon the world and its political ideological unfolding’s; rather what might be true and factual of Marxist Siri is what is subsequently shown in the actuality of historical unfolding. That’s sweet don’t fall into the category of Marxist arguing it is this way as in the post below or Existential arguing it that way,  or empiricalist arguing it another way; all such arguments fall into identity politics. The fax that arise out of the description of what is occurring in these identity politics will indeed be a philosophical science or a science of philosophy and that can only be found over an extension of time and history. The risk one must take is to suspend his present identity for the sake of the historical possibility, to make proposals upon the past but as well the future, definite and specific statements of facts that risk being countered. 

This is why we have the big names. Heidegger took a risk with his support supposedly of nationalist socialism. 

And this is indeed what Kierkegaard talked about so far is Abraham and being a night of faith. 

This is why we talk about ways of knowing, routes of meaning; these are not epistemological byways of one unitary manner of understanding, of one true and ubiquitous reality world. They are ultimately different manners of appropriating objects. 
REPOST: 

Falsificationism

One problem with professional philosophy—and this holds for some of the sciences too, like physics and biology—is that the subject matter is difficult to master and require a great deal of time and technical training. This does not, however, stop philosophical concepts from spilling over into popular discourse, where they are usually poorly understood, or […]

epistemology, logic

https://lastedenblog.wordpress.com/2016/08/29/falsificationism/

Suspension of Anachronism in Philosophy? 

Just a pondering…

When I watch the newer Sherlock Holmes movie I just had a awareness about the date. Just looking at their outfit in the setting and clothes it’s impossible to not know that you know late 19th century. Despite the modern fighting techniques and such — One cannot help but feel a certain date when you watch Gunsmoke or wild wild West, or bonanza. Or how about Metropolis. 

Whenever we see these movies or shows one does not have a sense at all that these periods and stories (whether. Contrived like the Sherlock Holmes movie or actual like the gun smoke shows ) are to take place contemporary with our watching them. Every moment of context is mediated by the idea that these shows have occurred in a different time.  And the sense of time automatically has a certain category of understanding knowledge perception date attached to them. 

A book that comes to mind is the big book of Alcoholics Anonymous. When you read that you get a distinct feeling of date. Some of the phrases that he uses, in that book in order to understand what they’re saying you almost have to look it up in a dictionary. 

Or even read old science fiction novels like HG Wells or HP Lovecraft. Isaac Asimov. It’s difficult not to ‘feel’the date. 

I’m sure everyone is understanding what I’m getting at by now. 

Somehow with philosophy I don’t really have that kind of view upon books usually. For some reason most of the time when I read books on philosophy I read them kind of from a sense that they concern me now as their content is appearing to me at that moment. Reading Kierkegaard somehow I take his writing within a sense of style rather than in a sense of time. Similarly Hagel feels more like a style to me. I suppose I have to temper my perception of Plato or Aristotle to that of the author who translates them though. 

I was just considering Hurssel logical investigations (i’m going to venture into that fortress soon) and just reading Wikipedia’s summary of his arguments as a sort of primer (since all my appropriations of phenomenology has been through other authors and summaries and analyses, I figure it’s time I get down to the original meat) it struck me how the argument or issue that at least wiki is saying that logical investigations addresses ‘feels’to me dated. Strangely enough reading Plato doesn’t feel to me the same kind of date. Actually I’m thinking about all the various authors have read, it’s strange how I have perception of date through different manners of their presentation; I read something of Lessing recently and I couldn’t help but feel less a date as an anachronism of argumentbut more by his style. Bertrend Russell has a style that always strikes me as 1920; I don’t know why.

It is kind of weird inpondering this topic. 

I suppose it is because of my philosophical position. But I’m not sure, if except add a somewhat young age, I viewed the discussion of objects as a discussion of things segregate from my understanding of them. It is interesting that at least wiki speaks of Hursserls consideration within a sort of automatic understanding of the situation. Things’out there’ and the possibility of that situation. To me, that is such a strange concept that it is difficult even to place the very idea in discourse. I find what seems such an easy assumption in Wikipedia, even as I understand what it is saying clear to me , difficult for me to speak of when I go to try and describe it. That is weird. 

But nevertheless that type of argument that Hursel was I guess attempting to overcome (we shall see as I will be reading it soon) seems to me anachronistic,  it ‘feels’ to me dated. 


But the point I suppose I’m trying to make is that I for one don’t take philosophical books automatically with in a historically temporal appropriation. Somehow I seem to take all philosophical books upon a level playing field, discerning their merits and defficiencies by the meaningful content that I gain from them, appropriating A sense of time from the actual argument (most of the time I suppose even though I have said sometimes style just hits me). 

I find that strange. If someone was to present to me a mechanical device from 100 years ago, I would not dismiss it on it’s perhaps lack of modern functionality. I would dismiss it instantly upon the very fact that it is 100 years old, and then bring it in to have some Modern conception . When I read HG Wells I’m not considering his science fiction as a contemporary piece; I might extrapolate his ideas and see how they might compare to what is occurring now, but I don’t take his writing as a piece that occurs now.

There is something about historical ideology, style as well as topics and approaches to topics , that categorizes certain ideas with in a temporal scheme, and that some of these ideas tend to avoid this automatic categorization. 
I’m sure there’s much philosophical speculation that can be found within this pondering.

But I suppose that the oddity has something to do with innate ideas and the idea of a stratified common humanity. 

Do You Love Me: Music Philosophical Theory. 

I’m beginning with a typical theme of this music theory, this philosophy of music, with Nick Cave and the bad seeds song

Do You Love Me, part 1“.

Beginning in this way we notice all the facets involved of many philosophers. The first that comes to mind is Alain Badiou and the idea that the philosopher is concerned with one thing. Theodor Adorno’s Negative dialectics come to mind also. Soren Kierkegaard and his teleological suspension of ethical and his piece on Don Giovanni, as well as most of his books. Derrida also comes to mind, in particular the book I’m reading now, “Of Spirit”. And at that even Heidegger’s Dasien. We might even also see that it is not difficult to consider some of the Speculative Realists and Graham Harman’s object ontology. In fact there is a whole library of western philosophers’ ideas that can be applied to just this one song in a way to where the application removes the possibility of doubt that there may be a linkage of philosophy to art.

I have asked myself why do we find philosophers referring to art in their philosophy? We have Heidegger involved with Friedrich Hölderlin; Kierkegarrd considers Mozart; Quentin Meillassoux takes apart Stephane Mallarme; Harman got into H.P. Lovecraft; there are plenty others. But what strikes me is that noone (no one? That I have noticed, anyways; I could be very wrong (can someone help me out??)) has been considering art that is happening at the time of the philosophy. What I mean is, it appears to me that all these philosophers only consider artists of their (relative) past. Why are all these philosophers bringing past forms into relevancy of our time? Are there no current and living artists that may represent the significance that seems to only occur in old dead artists?

Now, as I said in the other post; I am am not talking about some cultural philosophical analysis the likes to reify themes of social justice or ideological evangelism of recursive ontologies. Slovaj Zizek is great in this regard; his is ideological recursively in its most immediate incarnation; his is the mark of the closed distance, he is the example of his own ‘filling’ of his own parallax gap. We could write a whole book on what is occurring with Zizek, but then by then end of it, never get further than anything Zizek has already said himself; suffice it to say that when we begin to understand my work, let alone his work, then we might also begin to have a baring upon what is occurring for a number of philosophers, if not philosophy itself in general. This brings to mind certain authors, and as well (again) the issue I treat most everywhere in my work: I am not sure we need to plaster over an issue with thick, viscous jargon and dense conceptual acrobatics in order to find out what is occurring. Though an idea might be entertaining in its conceptual gymnastics and the dexterity and or flexibility of thought that is required to understand them might be fun to consider and talk about (like a rollercoaster), often enough it is the assumption of depth in what appears as complex that amounts to true nonsense and really gets us nowhere besides spinning in a theoretical circus. When we begin, as well as when we are proceeding, we should always keep in mind the question as to if we are actually contributing to something significant or if we are merely creating self-aggrandizing conceptual pleasentries for social mobility circles. Are we getting anywhere or are we risking nothing.

Blah; enough of my proselytizing. Back to the point.

When we speak of a ‘first’ philosophy, we must keep in mind the meaning that I suggested in my post “Being Decay”, and see that we have settled in the land of what has been typically called ‘Continental’ philosophy, but likewise that arena from which we find a further divergence, that is, in so much a what is ‘continental’ perhaps has become merely another conventional philosophy; whatever its significance was, we might be able to notice that the destitution of spirit (see my earlier notes on Derrida’s book) marks a collapse of continental arena; more precisely, the move of what could be the point of the continental designation is into what is ‘destitution’, or of ‘desolation’. It is this desolation that the Postmoderns mark by their attempt to ‘pull it back’ from the nothingness, the void that it fell into. This is the irony of the post-Postmoderns such as Laruelle and Badiou, as well as Zizek. This is to say that the idea of democratic multi-vocality is itself a voice of the destitute spirit.

Our concern is that never (it seems) do or are modern philosophers considering an art that is actively present, meaning here, by contrast and therefore the spirit that is indeed destitute, that spirit that is indeed living on desolation row, instead of attempting to deny the fact of its existence. The reason why philosophy, as a philosophy that concerns ‘spirit’ ((with or without parentheses)) of any sort, is destitute is because the spirit by which it proposes to be concerned in indeed lacking. We might then reconsider what I mean when I say that conventional philosophy deals with everything from a distance, but proposes it within a condition of intimacy and why I say that what is theoretical occurs at a distance, but further that this is not always the case, but is only the case in a particular condition of Being, i.e. that ‘spirit’ of Being-there that is destitute of spirit in as much as it exists through a denial of this situation. We shall elaborate on this facet later.

To wit; Nick Cave is still alive and playing concerts! But we will also notice that his situation evidences the transition (the conversion? Harman?) that had already occurred, what we notice as Postmodern, which is an apology for Modern, that still had a plausible purchase upon authenticity in its attempt to rescue the the wayward spirit, and the post-Postmodern, which is an apology for the Postmodern not being able to rescue it. In other words, we find that the German Idealists (in a very general, as well as very specific sense, as well as the French and others) ironically were correct about somethings while being entirely incorrect of those same things. We begin to understand what Kant was talking about, what he was addressing, and we see how the closing of the distance that appeared in the Modern found its closure now in the explanation wherein the destitution of spirit marks, but not in some sort of anti-spiritual atheist biological evolutionist continuance of ‘Being there’ ontology, but rather exactly in the Being-there having no substance, but entirely consituted in material; what we view as historical does indeed function within a presumption of the material of substance. Yet we find the closing marks that point of divergence because the closing that is the meaningful nothingness, the coming upon the nihilistic universe, did not end anything. We find, inevitably, if we can be honest, that it is not that somehow ‘nothing’ is at the base of all things, but indeed, that the rational route by which it founds substance in nothing is the destitute spirit, but further, that the only manner, the only possibility through which such destitution can be noticed is by the spirit that is not destitute, which is to say now, not real.

We begin to get the picture that philosophers sit in their library chair and ponder deep and significant elements of philosophical lore through long hours of reading and study of other literary folk who (it seems) must be dead. We cannot but ask: What risk was wagered? If it was anything less than death then we have to question just what was come upon by such novel considerations. Strangely enough, Heidegger can be seen in the attempt to buck the trend of ‘academic safety in distance’ in as much as he does indeed talk about “the work of art”. I admit, though, that I myself do not go out an look for philosophy-art, but somehow I feel that there should be at least some who are engaging philosophy and art that are contemporaneous with one another. Here is one artist/blogger I have come across. The impression I get from much of our current (state of conventional) philosophy is that same age-old image of the scholar who never encounters anything real (dangerous), while proposing great treaties on the nature of reality; they surround themselves with the ideological, epistemological, ontological, walls built of discourse, isolation, but painted with the veneer of life of the Everyone, of the masses, the common human being, of social commentary. But this is what the academic institution is for, what it does, and why it does: It supports the real ideological paradigm and supplies the rationale for why it is supplying the only route for what can possibly be true. We the call this type of philosophy conventional, but likewise we call it, unapologetically, real.

But what of the actual experience of life? What of the engagement with all things legal and illegal outside the safety of the theoretical world? Here we have a distinct possibility that brought about the Continental-Analytic distinction, what it used to mean. Heidegger, for all his insecurity posed as confidence, at least took a stand, however questionable it may have been. We have to ask as we read, for example, “Being and Time”, what the fk is he talking about? This has got to be the question that leads us into the Continental tradition, and the same one as well that finds it having dissolved in its attempt to be real. This is Heidegger’s (WW2) mistake, as well as all those German idealists; the irony of Heidegger is the truth of the falsity, the forensic analysis of ‘spirit’ that does not understand that its method is destructive; the ‘question’ is the imperative of historical manifestation, which is at once the move toward this ‘spirit/world Being-there’ that is destroyed upon its implementation (what struggle are we talking about here?). It does a disservice to the meaning of them to attempt to bring their ideas into our reality as if it still has relevance as a living philosophy. Even then it was already dead; it just had to come to a re-cognition; that this was indeed the case.

When we begin to see that this closure is not one upon some ‘universal’ or ‘common human’ spirit, then we can begin to see that what has been theorized within a horizon of a closing of distance, of the ‘shrinking’ of the distance between theory and its object, has reached its apogee in the present, now, and we can start to understand what I might mean by a theory of Rock and Roll, or a philosophy of Rock, or even music theory.

A sort of side note: We must have compassion and a certain sympathy, indeed an empathy, for Badou, when, as of late I am told, he appears to have come upon ‘love and happiness’ after a life-long philosophical journey. For it is possible to view him, his work and perhaps his history, as a result of being caught in the ‘mistake’ of the academy, of finding his theory through a closing distance. Indeed; what else could Badou mean but that we, as philosophers, are concerned with one thing? And what else could Hegel have meant by his voluminous statement?

With all this in mind, consider the lyrics to part 1 of “Do You Love Me”:

“Do You Love Me?”

I found her on a night of fire and noise
Wild bells rang in a wild sky
I knew from that moment on
I’d love her till the day that I died
And I kissed away a thousand tears
My lady of the Various Sorrows
Some begged, some borrowed, some stolen
Some kept safe for tomorrow
On an endless night, silver star spangled
The bells from the chapel went jingle-jangle
.
She was given to me to put things right
And I stacked all my accomplishments beside her
Still I seemed so obselete and small
I found God and all His devils insider her
In my bed she cast the blizzard out
A mock sun blazed upon her head
So completely filled with light she was
Her shadow fanged and hairy and mad
Our love-lines grew hopelessly tangled
And the bells from the chapel went jingle-jangle
.
She had a heartful of love and devotion
She had a mindful of tyranny and terror
Well, I try, I do, I really try
But I just err, baby, I do, I error
So come and find me, my darling one
I’m down to the grounds, the very dregs
Ah, here she comes, blocking the sun
Blood running down the inside of her legs
The moon in the sky is battered and mangled
And the bells from the chapel go jingle-jangle
.
All things move toward their end
I knew before I met her that I would lose her
I swear I made every effort to be good to her
I swear I made every effort not to abuse her
Crazy bracelets on her wrists and her ankles
And the bells from the chapel went jingle-jangle

And then, once we see this announcement, this proclamation of the situation in the present, of the present already occurred philosophically, later we find Nick speaking in more certain terms of the spirit in its very destitution, yet within a longing, such that the recourse of such spirit is to prostitute itself, for that is all the substance it has left, all the value it holds in its destitution. In this we caution against holding identities apart to say “this” instead of “that”, that ‘this’ interpretation is actually more real that ‘that’ one; of course, what is real determines is own real-truth, but as it is already determined in its offense, in its resentment (do I hear Nietzsche?). In desperation, people cry out for more institutional definition, so in the destitution of spirit do people look more and call out for what is ‘more real’; hence the recent popularity of (what we might call) the “New Realism” (including Speculative Realism).

 

Do You Love Me, part2

“Do You Love Me? (Part 2)”

Onward! And Onward! And Onward I go
Where no man before could be bothered to go
Till the soles of my shoes are shot full of holes
And it’s all downhill with a bullet
This ramblin’ and rovin’ has taken its course
I’m grazing with the dinosaurs and the dear old horses
And the city streets crack and a great hole forces
Me down with my soapbox, my pulpit
The the theatre ceiling is silver star-spangled
And the coins in my pocket go jingle-jangle
.
There’s a man in the theatre with girlish eyes
Who’s holding my childhood to ransom
On the screen there’s a death, there’s a rustle of cloth
And a sickly voice calling me handsome
There’s a man in the theatre with sly girlish eyes
On the screen there’s an ape, a gorilla
There’s a groan, there’s a cough, there’s a rustle of cloth
And a voice that stinks of death and vanilla
This is a secret, mauled and mangled
And the coins in my pocket go jingle-jangle
.
The walls of the ceiling are painted in blood
The lights go down, the red curtains come apart
The room is full of smoke and dialogue I know by heart
And the coins in my pocket jingle-jangle
As the great screen crackled and popped
The clock of my boyhood was wound down and stopped
And my handsome little body oddly propped
And my trousers right down to my ankles
Yes, it’s onward! And upward!
And I’m off to find love
Do you love me? If you do, I’m thankful
.
This city is an ogre squatting by the river
It gives life but it takes it away, my youth
There comes a time when you just cannot deliver
This is a fact. This is a stone cold truth.
Do you love me?
I love you, handsome
But do you love me?
Yes, I love you, you are handsome
Amongst the cogs and the wires, my youth
Vanilla breath and handsome apes with girlish eyes
Dreams that roam between truth and untruth
Memories that become monstrous lies
So onward! And Onward! And Onward I go!
Onward! And Upward! And I’m off to find love
With blue-black braclets on my wrists and ankles
And the coins in my pocket go jingle-jangle

 

But this is not the end of spirit. For the nothingness that we come upon is nothingness because it is not nothingness; it is a mark announcing that the route of reason that came upon its insubstantial basis is indeed incorrect in its estimations.

Secular is a real designation of a particular route, a real route, just as religious and spiritual is likewise real material categories. All designation of a particular meaningful paradigm (mythology) has been worked to its end. A pass is enacted that then allows for reality to move apparently unhindered. We find a similarity to the efforts of Bruno Latour, for an opening is needed since reality is found to rely upon invisible passes that shut out the truth of the situation; something has shaken loose, something that shows reality as a faulty estimation.

More in a bit.