An Brief Heretical Outline of Our Current Situation: Phenomenology and Scientism.

Here is an end note from my upcoming book.

I have changed the title to “The Moment of Decisive Significance: A Heresy“.

This is a book of blatant confrontation and direct exposure, and not of spirituality or self help.

BTW: One of my ex-professors read a small bit of my unedited copy and replied to me: “It appears that you have written a self-help book, and being as I am not very interested in self-help, I probably won’t read the rest.”  Talk about pompousness and presumptive privilege. He was even a religious studies philosophy professor. Yes, its is an object oriented view through the Gospels, but Fuck man. I hope all you people are not as myopic and dense as he is. Funny I used to have respect for him. I can’t even imagine Where he would have come up with such an idea. I guess its because my ideas are So offensive (correctly framed 😛) that was the only way he could come to terms with what I am saying.

But hey; Ive said I appreciate any feedback. He gave me his feedback. And I think his ’emeritus’ title is undeserved. So there.

 From what I have experienced in my 3 so years of blogging, I am skeptical of academic presumptiveness and pompousness, and Dr.– just topped it off. So if you are an academic, and honest, please take my occasionsal discursive promiscuity and crass lip with a hint a compassion and understanding. I am most probably not talking about you, and even as I might overgeneralize and say ‘academic’, I do have respect for many scholars.

I am honest and often naive; but fool me once, shame on me…   
“note 129.

The ‘historical moment’ of Jesus is intended to reference the facticity of history over the negotiated interpretation of it. The difference is found when we consider that we have yet to exhaust the phenomenonalist intension ( in a general sense meaning ‘centrist subject’);  the conventional method of finding truth that is likewise involved with an establishment of identity is problematic. This is why there is and has been an issue with some ‘continental philosophers’ suggesting their ideas might denote a kind of science, or that we might be able to develop some sort of a phenomenologist scientism, if you will. What we might call a ‘pure’ method of science is one that moves in laborious increments punctuated by momentous insights that cannot be anticipated, not only around perhaps a single scientist with a purpose in mind, or an aspect to investigate, but through all the multitudinous scientists likewise working on often tiny aspects of the same issue. While one could argue there is a kind of concern for identity in every person (as well as a subjective bias such as Bruno Latour proposes to have uncovered), the science itself, for the hard core scientist, is what is important and drives the effort.
Admittedly, this might be a bit deluded in ideal, but if we are going to apply a philosophical reduction here likewise (not necessarily a phenomenologist reduction), then we would have to ask how even science itself, the proper science of physical mechanics and such, functions in the way it does for accomplishments. Of course we cannot completely dismiss real subjective ‘interference’ with objectivity, but the issue here is not about absolutes. This issue concerns methods. The issue concerns the real cohesion of disparate situations. What we are calling ‘conventional method’ is meant to specifically draw our attention to philosophy and its domain; we suggest that there is a type of real endeavor that works to draw all things unto itself, to reconciliation, and this is the motion of identity, of real objects. This motion for the human being is thus involved with what we usually call subjectivity but is really more an indication of ‘being value’. In other words, this translates for the human being into having ‘self-worth’ or even ‘relevancy’ or ‘importance’; we might even say that there is a libidinal drive for identity, and this is indeed part of the constitution of reality.

So it is that in reality, the conventional method misses vital components of truth for the sake of identity and even argues identity as a ubiquitous feature of what might possibly be true; conventional method draws all things unto itself and then argues its truth as if it is the only truth possible. And this is to say that even allowing for the possibility of more than one truth is indeed a move of this drawing toward unity. It is a unitive proposal to say that there is more than one reality. This is, in itself, a phenomenalist move. The point here, though, as I have said, is that such a method is completely incapable of entertaining that which lay outside is purview, but this does not mean that there is ‘nothing’ that it does not address or is capable of addressing; rather, this is to say that reality is the negotiation of terms and thus the historicity can never be contemplated by the conventional method due to its foundation is what is real. Conventional method is thereby centered around a subjective interpretation of what is occurring and the negotiation of these relative subjective agents. Also, again; this is not to say that somehow it is incorrect, but only that this is the way it behaves, this is the true description of how real philosophical negotiation occurs.

Thus when we speak of the ‘historical moment’ of Jesus, we mean to refer to that fact not negotiated. Here then, we can only be speaking from the historical motion itself; and this is to say that in this particular historical moment, the event of the minimal human experience is seen to involve ‘God’ as this universal and basic form can be communicated across disparate arenas, which we are finding through our venture through the Gospels here, are two different teleological fields, as we say, two routes of coming upon the object. The historical moment of Jesus is that moment wherein there is only a real human experience, a one common ontological arena, such that what is definitively and absolutely two teleological bases is understood as implicating a further unity, at that, as ‘secret’ or ‘spiritual’ unity, as if a real ontology necessarily, automatically, axiomatically and omnipresently involves the totality of all things.
The problem then of the usual conventional philosophical route is that because it is incapable of allowing for anything that is not determined in subjective negotiation, when the logic of the ends of discourse is presented in history, it is understood as such rather than experienced; which is to say there are two types of what is called ‘experience’ that are proposed to equate to meaning the same thing. What is understood through philosophical proposal is viewed the same thing as what is posed in philosophical proposal. The ‘ends’ is viewed upon as a logical conclusion based upon the subjective center of thought ‘thinking and considering’ such logical pathways. This is to say that despite what definitions might arise to say reality is this-and-that different than before or what another definition might have proposed, still the thinker is thinking these things through, considering various discursive designations from a central and prioritized Self, consciousness, or subjective agency. Even if we were to somehow logically crawl step by step to be able to say “From dog flower spichz consliger fghkioh tomorrowpd cloud ring flies to refridgerator” and mean something significant, the metaleptical slide that has occurred to be able to have that clausal phrase mean something meaningful gets nowhere further that the sentences we are using at this moment to convey an idea. And this is to say that the human being will always be a human being despite what clausal structure we set upon it. The political and ideological structure may change, but the question is always how we were able to develop a global society out of different ‘humanities’ speaking different languages who all have different terms and even grammars that order various ‘realities’ if we were not all human?

The conventional philosophical method has thus ‘skipped’ (what Latour might call a pass) the end of phenomenology through the application of logic upon it to thereby posit by a sort of reasoning that we should move to consider something else besides the dead end phenomenological reduction. This is because the conventional method requires novel ideas. But these very ideas are based into the phenomenologist move, as we said above, these ideas are based in the reduction, in drawing all meaning unto a centrist occasion. Hence phenomenology has not ended but was merely passed over for the sake of establishing another real identity. It matters little if anyone prescribes to Hursserl’s method or moves along his methodological pathway to a particular (non?) definitional ‘experience’ because when it comes down to it, this kind of method or attitude upon definitional paths, merely yields another definitional situation (that here we can call the ‘phenomenological reduction’); an individual moving along Husserl’s clausal path to his meaning avoids the path that is already being allowed for the ability to even take his path to any meaning, whether it agrees with him or not.


The point here is that while conventional philosophy would sooner not have to argue over how identity is a feature that must be dealt with in reality at all times, and as well not have to expose the weak point of the platform by which the institution continues, the whole platform that is taken as a necessary condition of real negotiation has already been argued and found lacking. But where these arguments have occurred, they are taken in stride to merely be another part of the negotiating of the ubiquitous ever-presence. In order to come to terms with what is actually occurring, conventional method must be set aside as a feature of a kind of functioning of human consciousness. When this happens, or may be seen to be possible, we begin to see how scientism might become viable, but the only way is to disregard what the conventional method has to say about it, but more, that whatever it has to say about the analysis based upon this view, is itself more evidence of what consciousness does.”

–from “The Moment of Decisive Significance: A Heresy” C. 2016. Lance A Kair.


AUTHOR’s COMMENT ON THE NOTE: The opening to the discussion of what consciousness is actually doing, as opposed to the discussion of what consciousness gives to be considered, is made by fully acknowledging that the phenomenological occasion is a capitalistic subjective identity that does not account for the totality of human existence, that what its gives is a religious foundation for Being. It is an effective theological directive. What occurs outside this capitalistic determination is a situation that threatens identity; it is a heresy. Thus, somehow, the opening will be made for those to whom that threat is of no concern.  This is the proposal upon which a science of human consciousness seems must be based.

But we will see what occurs.


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