Concerning “Absolution”: Reply to Dave at BSG.

I wrote this reply to Dave (from the blog Big Story Guide) in Word, and it would not paste to the reply in the comments, so I am just puttng it in a post.

(The revision -already – of “Absolution” will be out soon. I changed the name of it to: “The Moment of Dicisive Significance: A Heresy”. I am proofing it as we speak.)

Here’s the reply to Dave’s comment found under my earlier “Exerpt from Absolution” post:

The “Not politically..’ thread, I was never really comfortable with. It was just a kind of pure emotional reaction. Just maybe to let people know Im human, maybe. Lol

I suppose the point of an alternative reading is that, in a manner of speaking, there is no value in it. Perhaps, one could say, it is utterly fact. The use of a bolt, say, depends upon what it is needed for, and while one could say the value of a bolt is to secure pieces fastened by a screw, that this is the ‘true value’ of a bolt, one could just as well say the value of a bolt is to add a hexagonal metallic shine to a canvas.

Or, the value in it is in its capacity to upset. 

In fact, just a post or so ago, someone replied as to why he should be interested in what I posted. And I replied, basically, because the expression of the question is the fact of being invested in the real ideological paradigm. Lol. And so his her question reflects how he is caught up in it, expressing a desire not to be, and asking if anyone knows of a solution to get out of it. I said, sorry, you are doomed. Because the reason he would ask me that question is itself a reflection of the condition of reality, and no one can choose to escape reality. So his question is but a necessary condition for the writing of the essay; which for real estimations would then be complete nonsense (for how would I have known he was going to ask the question? Answer: because I already asked it.)

In a way, this is what I am talking about in the book. There really is no value in reading it or understanding it because that would imply that I am writing it to teach someone something. In fact, the Scribd version you are reading is a pre-edit, and the published version I am proofing right now, has a Preface, a Preface to the Introduction, and Introduction and a Note on Orientation, all before we even get to the Prologue. The repetitive pre-body sections defy the common method of what a book is supposed to do. And, I felt that the Scribd version had left out some necessary guides for the rest of it.

I talk about the book as an ‘object oriented view through the Gospels’, and so I felt I should tell people what I mean by that in one of the pre-sections. In it, I describe how some might take it as meaning something similar to having a goal in mind, like I am oriented upon an objective. But this is not what object oriented means. Likewise, I say that I am not concerned with causing or conveying any meaning for the purpose of any sort of transformation to occur, and that I am not trying to prove anything. I am simply laying down the facts of the matter. Like a line of computer code, those who understand it will already understand, and the operation will be verified in their experience.

The value of the book thus is found along a different teleology, a different purpose-goal-value than real estimations. I know; it sounds crazy. But also a reason for the book is to show the ridiculousness of certain philosophical approaches by bringing them to their extended conclusions, extensions that most philosophers will not make because it would defeat their purpose (value) of their making the particular argument. Reality and subjective concerns are the short game; conventional (regular; common) reality is based in a primary human thinking subject, what I call in the book the ‘transcendental agent’ or ‘the agent of transcendence’, but in philosophy is often called the ‘phenomenal subject’ or the ‘centrist subject’. Real subjects are mostly concern with their own Being, and measure everything by it, by the real teleology.

The long game concerns a different teleology.

*

I wont discuss various Bible verses with you here because I feel I have already put forth the arguents and examples concerning what you are asking in the book. I feel, though, if you read what is there, instead of imposing your sense of what is correct, if you read it for what it is saying instead of constantly referring it to ‘what you know as true’, then you will be able to understand at least what I am suggesting. Then, whether you agree with it or not will have a more thorough basis.

I might suggest, though, that perhaps if you still wish to continue reading it, perhaps you might better see what it is the book is portraying if you place yourself in the position of the Pharisees. The meaning might show itself in relief if you read it with that view in mind.

My point really is that we all know the traditional version of the meaning of the Bible. It is not  a secret. I am not arguing that it is false or that people should not believe it. But there is a different meaning that arises from it also.

***

FYI: If it helps; the summary of the book that I put on the inside fold of the Jacket goes like this:

“The Moment of Decisive Significance” is an object oriented exploration of the Gospels. Counter to the reductionist philosophy of the Enlightenment from at least the past 200 years, I argue two irreconcilable routes upon objects. An object is a universal Being. Likewise, contrary to the Modernist extreme that allows for Post-Modern alienation and its eruption into plurality and multi-vocality, I see that the discourse of the Enlightenment and its colonialist politics have merely drawn a more substantial partition between inclusion and exclusion. The Enlightenment supposed to be able to reconcile these routes; the reconciliation is the route of the Enlightenment. This essay is the description, as well as an example, of an alternate route, similar to what some authors have called the ‘dark enlightenment’.”

Advertisements

Nonsense and Why Should Anyone Care Anyways.

This his a response to a comment to a recent post of mine (The ‘Little Deleuzians’ post)

IMG_0456.JPGWhy should anyone be interested in this subject matter?
I am probably absorbing too must self interest into this question, but you did post it in a reply to my post, so…
*
Any one who writes might ask themselves the same question. Why should anyone care or be interested?
*
I might rephrase this in the context of Zizek’s framing of limit, that I agree with: (and I rephrase Zizek (also)): It is very difficult, if not impossible, to think outside of capitalism. Because I see this is really the un-separated reason why the question even comes up. It would seem there is an implicit call, a kind of desperation, to be out of this capitalized situation.
*
In other words the question is yelling: I am just not going to participate in this capitalistic nonsense.
*
And hence the issue at hand.
*
We must lose the modernist bracketing.
*
I do not believe that capitalism comes about because of some universal, ‘manifest destiny-ed’ kind of goodness for human kind. I think it is a particular manifestation of, as has been said, a desire production machine, of sorts, but that this machine is not some total explanation of what a human being does. This is to say that the notion of this desire machine does not account for the total human being. On the contrary, it is merely an explanation of a particular aspect of what a human does, but an explanation that is proposed as a total accounting because of the position out of which it comes (capitalized identity). A particular aspect that arises within consciousness, a part of consciousness, that allows for itself as a kind of ‘Jehovah’, in a kind of gnostic sense, one that usurps power and establishes itself as ‘creator’ and ‘commander’ of the universe. One that abolishes all that is before it or foundational of it.
*
See though: This is an operation of consciousness and not some talk about actual True things of an objective (subject-object) universe. We have to be quite Zizekian in this setting. It is an aspect of consciousness that arises to proclaim itself as the totality of what consciousness is, and thereby obscures by decree that there is no asking how it functions or what it does; thou shalt have no other God before thee: Thou shalt not have any other consciousness – that type of shit.
*
Capitalism, if we can use this term to denote a particular prescription for how to come upon World, establishes (S1) consciousness against (s2)consciousness as a non-segregated universal object, an object amoung other objects {S1 is distinct from and not equal to s2}. But this is not to suggest some cosmic spiritual consciousness. No. The recourse that would have us reduce this situation to this kind of spiritual truth is yet but another conventional situation of segregated human centrism (S1), albeit this time as a cosmic center. Any aligning that one might posit as a spiritual effort is a real effort, an effort that seeks its identity as a centrist Subject in control of this otherwise chaotic universe, even as such seekers might say the point is not control (that its self is a statement of having control), and even as they might suggest that we have a choice in how we might feel at any moment. Yet likewise, this is not an amalgamation of consciousness into some formless chaos from which horrific things can arise at any moment; this is also an asserted form of real consciousness (S1).
*
It is this want for control of real conception that forms the heart of capitalism. This is why we tend to revert back to Hegel in our estimations along this line; because this is an issue of enlightenment, of The Western Enlightenment. This issue arises not so much because of any free willed agents have considered various arguments along a traditional history of arguments and proposals – this is indeed consciousness functioning how it is supposed to as a subject of reality – but more because of these agents are merely a manifestation of consciousness itself, of how it functions.
*
Meaning, in this way, should not be construed to have only to do with cohesive manifestations of thoughts, and perhaps be better understood to encompass all that is. By this I mean to indicate that there is nothing that does not make sense, including non-sense, and including nothing, and further that I am not sure what something of ‘non-sense’ is. In the context of your reply, I think I know what you are saying, so I am addressing this by saying that the only ‘thing’ that is or has ‘non-sense’ is what Rudolf Otto calls the Mysterium Tremmendum (His book: “The Idea of the Holy”). In fact, he even mentions the issue in one short phrase that he seems to set aside for the sake of his larger argument:
*

“ It first begins to stir in the feeling of ‘something uncanny’, ‘eerie’, or ‘weird’. It is this feeling which, emerging from the mind of …man, forms the starting point for the entire religious development in history. ‘Deamons’ and ‘Gods’ alike spring from this root, and all the products of ‘mythological apperception’ or ‘fantasy’ are nothing but different modes in which it has been objectified.” (Otto. pg 14-15. Oxford. 1958)

*
The moment of this kind of experience is thus ‘non-sense’ in the positive sense, and we should note that it is from this moment that the Enlightened capitalist draws his inspiration. Also note that a corresponding negative sense of this same situation is what THREE POUND BRAIN had noticed (see my earlier post “to Ping or not to Ping”), but as we suggest is a result of argument backward, a result of following the meaning of reductive logicking of objectival reality regressively, as Hursserl might have shown the path, but often enough and then every Enlightenment philosopher does, to that very same place of ‘nothing’, which I so whole heartedly agreee is merely a ‘crash space’ of capitalist philosophical reductionary method. It is the paradoxical situation that likes to assume objectival ‘in-itselfs’ and then use the tool of logic and thought to argue backwards from it from the priviledged space of Subjecthood to the Subject. Far from meaning the same thing, though, this place or space, cannot be said to be the same object, the same ‘empirical’ place; indeed, there is a teleological partition between these spaces of meaning. Thus to understand this ‘same space’ we can (are capable of) only speak of this situation in terms of orientation, because once the (we shall call this negative motion that leads to a crash space, a collapse of the conventional method, the ‘Hursserlisan-Phenomenalist’ space) reduction has occurred (as a real meaningful philosophical route) then there is no explaining how this reduction does not account for all things. On the contrary: The capitalist method is the method that asserts as it dominates over all possibility (as above with the ‘most difficult’), and it is the dependence and its accompanying demand of compliance that leads to this crash space but as referenced most often as a necessary foundation from which further power is derived. At once, the transcendental experience of communion (the inspired thought) is automatically segregated from its own consideration as this is an axiomatic real truth from which the method gains its credence, even while is uses this communion to argue itself to a logical space that is (still) held from itself as a sort of ‘logically thought built space’ that must then (logically) include the thinker even as it is holding such conclusion away from itself to be beheld. This is the capital investment yield. This is the given Enlightened way that is held over every human being’s head as a mirror for comparison for the purposes of justifying (as we are finding) not eveyone’s humanity, but mainly the conventional philosopher who subscribes to the discursive method of the Enlightenment.
*
What occurs by this ‘empty space’ though, this moment of ‘non-sense’, of the encounter with the mysterium tremmendum, is usually and commonly not so much the meaning that there is nothing knowable outside of sense, but more that what may be outside of sense is indeed granting sense, albeit of transcendental inspiration. The Enlightened mind (and I use this in the most Western sense of this essay) does not see this moment as being encapsulated by the discourse that arises around it, around this ‘empty space’; rather the Enlightened subject sees that this discourse has arisen because of that moment of experience with the mysterium tremmendum, as if that encounter was indeed ‘meant to be’, as though there was some purpose imbued by the very Event itself into the human subject.
*
The point of showing this is that it does not happen for everyone, as if this is a metaphysical description of The Actual Common Human Being. It happens only for a few, and these few people thus being so motivated by the inspiring [God/nothingness/thought/void] thus understand this revelation as involving all human beings. They thus pronounce upon the world their philosophical-religious proposal. They capitalize upon the transcendental communion. This is Modernism, and as well Post-modernism; the call and response of the modern religious hymn.
*
Now, keep in mind that I am not discounting thought per say, or suggesting that people do not think or have inspiration. Far from it; I am describing what is occurring, and through this description am coming around to answering the catalyizing question of why anyone should care about what I’m saying. It is near impossible to think outside of capitalism. So it is that likewise I am not suggesting that I am attempting to think outside of it, and actually fully embracing the totality of it implication for the question raised.
*
I am explaining why one would raise the question about why anyone would want to read or consider what I have to say. Before this dilemma, such a question would not be raised because the answers offered would naturally be answering the questions that seemed most pertinent to everyone, de facto, of course. Now, though, the glamour of the Enlightened Subject is wearing off; the proposal of the common humanity is being noticed as a sham, as just what I said: An assertion. This is what Post-modern was supposed to show, but then its meaning was usurped by the Modern (capitalistic) method because Post-modern was still using the tropic themes of the Enlightenment.
*
Now conventional philosophy has played it out to its end and beyond. Of the likes of Badiou and Laruelle, the end is manifest. Subsequent philosophers this now, like an alcoholic who will not admit he has a problem, must hide the issue, they must act like there is no problem and continue the theme of the Enlightenment because that is indeed how they are knowing their place in the world. This is being felt, though, by those for whom the ideas still play, but somehow have not brought about the promised land of transcendental success that the other, more established agents have. This situation thus brings into question the route by which the very theory proposed of the Enlightened state gains its credence.
*
This is a play of power. Such it is that the questions as to why anyone would be interested in what I have to say arise in near defeat, asking if there is anyone that can resolve the apparent failure of the Enlightened state.
*
But the answer is no. The Enlightened state is a failure. A sham perpetrated by the agents of transcendental communion, so to speak.
*
Yet again: This is not to say that people do not think or are not inspired. This is to say that capitalism is based upon the trope that if a person correctly applies their subjective thinking within the scope of a transcendental scope, then they can become an agent with a purpose as knowledge will arise and move that person to some sort of success, achievement, or otherwise fulfillment of their objective.
*
Yet, it is not that such a situation may not arise otherwise, but that consciousness is behaving within this arena where such ideological messages are being lost and being found unbelievable of not outright false.
*
The ‘sense-data reports’ are feeding people contradictroy information about reality and their place in it. It is not possible that there can be data that is inherently or essential separate from the appropriation of it. The dysfunction is the process of consciousness coming upon itself in the attempt to hold itself away from itself. Consciousness is attempting to reify reality, to maintain itself as a real identity, and in a very Post-modern manner of speaking, the meta-narrative is failing. This is why we cannot say we have gained anything beyond our Modern world, because post-modern is modern.
*
Again, again; this is not to say that there is some ‘grand apocalyptic end’ of the world coming. It is only that consciousness is developing another, as Latour might put it, another meaningful pass around the offending situation of consciousness coming upon itself as an object in-itself. The victims of this motion are those who are invested in the capitalistic myth, for intrinsic mythologies are how consciousness functions to establish reality.
*
But never does a mythology totally fail; that is what passes are for: To keep reality viable, to keep it functioning as reality. Only within the mythological construct are there ‘real truths’ where absolute consequences will occur. But they never occur, but only in the past as the past then is constructed to justify the present mythological state.
*
My answer to the question of why anyone would be interested in this subject matter is that the implicit motivation for such a question is involved in the effort to reconcile the real conventional philosophical conclusions to the sense that they are incorrect as they are proving in the same motion their veracity.
*
The most difficult thing is to think outside of capitalism, but this is because everyone is already not only trying to think outside of it, but indeed are thinking that they indeed are. Hence the question that reflects the end-stage Modern paradigm of Post and then Post-postmodern meaninglessness.

Response to Blake.

This now is more close consideration of Blake’s recent comment in my previous post, and his later post. ..

 

I did ask for a ‘why cite’.

I cite, of course. And it is a kind of support for an argument that Im making, and it is, as you say, also, participating in specific dialogues, to show that indeed not only am I saying such and such, but here is someone else saying the same thing, albeit, in different terms. And often, they are saying it better.

I see yours, Terrence, as seeing this commonality, and drawing parallels between authors. Far from shutting down discussion, yours is to spawn interaction. I think. For sure.
Your ‘little Deluezians’ do not share your Badiouian (multiplicity) or Larurellian (democratic) motion, I think you are pointing out. My experience with this is that they tend to want to reduce everything to Delueze, as if (they, D and G) said it all. I think thats what you are saying.

And I can understand that. I understand how it is possible to apply Deluze and Guattari to every corner of experience and theory. But people want to be religious in their philosophical adherence. they think because some guy said it really well, that they must be right, and then compare everyone else to that one figure.  But for me, I likewise see this all over the place; Derrida. and Zizek, and Kant, and Kiekegarrd, and Nietzsche, Hegel, Hiedgger, Lacan, and Adorno…you get the picture.

I see this is because they are all not only addressing the same thing, but merely using different terms to talk about it. Each instance of reading I find that I whole heartedly see that they are not only granting me the total picture, but then offering something else based upon this total picture; I call this the issue of the subsequent. One question I have not begun to address is how the subsequent arises; perhaps it is a kind of Badiou injection in a real sense. The question is how it is that I may read an author and know exactly what he is talking about? Is it because we are Rhizomic sprouts of individual desiring machines? Each stemming from a common universal source, of which we each have our own individual view? Each occupying or otherwise manifesting ‘voids’ within a filed of multiplicity? Each of us historical agents of some larger cosmic motion? Each our own window of parallax through which we express momentary conflations of objective being?

Every author has their own ‘individual’ manner of expressing the same thought. The problem arises when we are supposed to have to show how whatever two of three or more authors ideas might conflate. But of course it can’t be done at once, but rather unfolds over multiple atemporal periods, such as, the thought, the writing down of it, the verbally expressing it, the discussion around it, the reading of it by another, et cetera. It is the dependance upon this True and unquestioned method that allows for perpetual mistake and debate, the reliance upon that this mode of being expression is the infallible and true manner of coming upon truth.

Many authors I read I find that they ‘do it’ for me. They verify not only that I have come across the significant issue, but that they did too. And reading them is like reading a tape recording of myself talking about whatever moment they happen to be talking about, if I knew whatever particular terms and manner of structuring. (personal flare and style). That is the only way they can possibly make sense to me, if they indeed are expressing something akin to Plato’s remembering — but then I have to be careful about even expressing that because some one else who is so offended in their being that I might suggest me as opposed to them, or that they indeed are coming up with new ideas, and being taught through the banking model of education, and as well that their particular moment-agency isn’t unique to their communion with the immanent transcendence, no matter how they want to talk about it. I can just as well say that I get my inspiration from this petrified piece of dog-doo in front of me, that its folds and scent move my words to express the existential presence of parallax immanent multiplicity.  The terms only relate real objects in reality and tend to create want for a common meaning, such that I defer what makes sense to this common sourse. But this is not to say that nothing exists outside of the reality. It is only to say that reality is defined by a particular cadre of individuals invested in their real identities who are oriented upon this common objectival  source to gain their truth. But this likewise is not to say that somehow I am not real, but only that the entirety of my being does not reside in reality. Is not this what many authors have indicated in a number of ways also? Is this not the meaning of ‘nil’ or ‘nothing’, that I am incapable of reckoning beyond a certain point? I say that some people have reckoned beyond this point but are constantly having to try to prove it to people who have not; that this is the philosophical problem, and specifically Laruelle’s problem, the problem that he can’t get over.

So I say lets get out of the capital important ideological discussion of political social justice and let that governmental discussion do its thing.

*

My question is then how can this be possible?  As well, How is it that the thing may make perfect and total sense to me? What is it I am seeing that everyone is talking about, this common object?

What is the issue? Surly not some relative individual expression of essential free will.  Some setting aside the given.

Then I see all the discussion occurring, all the referencing, all the debate, and I wonder: If they are addressing the significant issue, then what is all the debate about? For the only way, it seems to me, that we can have differing opinions is to have a bunch of transcendental communing intuiting thoughtful agents in the attempt to establish themselves. Again: This does not mean that I am exempt from this situation. I am not arguing exclusivity. I am stating facts. So again, then someone want to argue with what I say are the facts. Suppose they say there is no transcendental agency. Then I say, well you are not understanding what I mean when I say transcendental. So we begin to fall into the conventional method of transcendental agency where I am inspired in my thoughts and so is this other guy; two agents who are ‘being inspired’ conveying their thoughts for the purpose of discussion.

Do we ever agree? Do we ever get anywhere?

In reality, we get than ever unfolding moment that denies the act proposed by the situation above. So then we return to the discussion. How long do we do this? How many beers do we have to have before we play darts? And then when we play darts, what happened to the philosophy?

It disappeared. That is unless we are proposing that it is like some sort of ever-present physics, a metaphysics, and we start the whole round again.

How is it possible that someone says I agree here with that dude, but he has it wrong there, and this is whats wrong about it.

Indeed. Badou I think would say that is the void injecting itself in reality, into the multiple. that this is how reality functions. The unfolding of process.

And I agree. Just as I agree with Laruelle that there is a Unilateral Duality. Just as Hegel.  and many others. Husserl (what Ive read). All of it makes complete sense. (but the more recent SR authors are in a different category and fall under a slightly different rubric for addressing them. )

As likewise I understand how Zizek situates his version, what he is really saying about the situation.

But it is because each of these authors indeed are telling it like it is and not merely telling ‘a part’ of it, that I have to ask what am I referencing when I cite them.

For, they are not merely ‘having a particular view’, merely one view in a multitude of views, but indeed are explaining the totality of the world, indeed as I have said, in their own terms, in different terms.

So I say, the problem is in taking these different terms as if they are referencing actual objects in-themselves, as a retrograde appropriation of terms, instead of seeing that each clausal set is stemming from the same substrate, the same issue, the same object, which according the the regular philosophical method, what I call the conventional method, does not see. Instead, the conventional method sees only what stems from the given.
LAruelle’s ‘uniqueness’ is due to the fact that he must, and is well used to, justifying his ideas to people who do not understand what he is saying, in a manner of speaking. He is constantly fending off misappropriations of his ideas. This is what he expresses when he says (rephrase) ‘non-philosophy being made into another philosophical object’.

Same with Zizek. they are used to debating their identities. This is also why Zziek claims such difficulty to think out side capitalism: Because that is his world; his ‘immanence’, so to speak. It is the philosophical world where in he must justify his position. This is the conventional method. This is the evidence of the end of a particular philosophical paradigm. that philosophy has become ‘self aware’ so that the only way to continue in the same mode is to deny the self awareness for the sake of identities, but that of capitalized identities, or, agents who capitalize upon their commodified fetishized identity. This is not ‘our time’; only ‘our time in as much as we have faith that Zizek is some sort of ‘unique’ real individual, expressing ideas and thoughts that are essential segregated as real things, real distanced objects.

Laruelle’s ‘imminence’ is not different than zizeks conflation of objects. Only in the real estimation of capitalized identities does Zizek come up with idea that are ‘his own’, that can be debated with as if he somehow is incorrect. That occurs exactly in reality.

So the issue is not longer this unfolding process. that just gets us philosophy careers, rhetoricians, and politicians. Which is fine. that is real, that is how reality functions.

But if really want too get to a science about what is occurring, then I feel we need to stop attempting to make another metaphysical proposal in the unfolding dynamic multitude of relative creative intuition.

I feel we need get down to facts. And in order to do that, one needs already have played out all the arguments, but because they have already played. The only new philosophical arguments are ones that reside in the same denial by which real agency arises.

And again again: I am not arguing that somehow I am exempt from such real estimations.

I am saying that science is the long game. Each has his and her parts. All the facts are there, the evidence is in. Now the science can begin.

Similar to what latour advocates, we need an opening .Perhaps we could start with first closing the distance that theory maintains. Get to that which theory wants to hide.  

The ‘Little Deleuzians’ and ‘Burning (some kind of ) Guattari’ thingamajig. Some Comments. 

I am enjoying the description inherent in AGENT SWARM’s last few posts.

While his project works on a different plane, if you will, than mine, one of the issues I constantly address is why or what I am doing when I reference some ‘great Big’ philosophical names.

Am I referencing as proof, or am I referencing as verification?

I think Terrence at SWARM is saying, in a certain sense, that the ‘little Deleuzians’ are referencing for proof, whereas Deleuze himself was offering verification.

The difference to me is the difference that I talk about in my book “Non-philosophy and Aphilosophy“; namely, that which concerns what I term the ‘philosophical revolution’, as well as what my next book “The Moment of Decisive Significance” speaks more in depth about, again, what I call one’s ‘orientation upon objects’.

(Im sorry; Im finding I cannot help but plug my books because they talk and explain the issues involved, and I don’t really feel like having to spell it out all again. I mean; isn’t that at least one reason why we write books?)

All this is because Im not sure why I would need to reference authors I have read. Can someone tell me? Because (as I explain in “Nonphilosophy“), once we understand the issue then there is really nothing that anyone has not already said about it, and if there is something, then it is subsequent the ‘moment’ and likewise really only saying things that follow sensibly from their originating configuration of meaningful terms coupled with the vector implied by the originating clause. If I were to reference all that has been said about an issue that Ive read and all the authors that I have come accross that may have gone into myself coming to any particular meaningful juncture to be able write something down and prove my argument, the bibliography and notes section of the book would surely be many times longer that the piece in which Im trying to say something. In fact, it is very possible I would need the length of book just to justify a small  6 paragraph blog post; to truncate it would necessarily be a lie and largely false; it would be false to say that any one person proved to me such and such to allow me to make an argument in the attempt to prove what Im saying is correct. In this sense, I may not reference Zizek, say, to necessarily prove anything, that is, unless I am attempting to prove that indeed he said such a thing; the fact that Zizek said something particular, it is referenced because the particular reference verifies that the issue at hand has been spoken about before as well as is continually being talked about in various ways.

The issue also thus indicates a divergence in the appropriation of discourse because then all the ‘little’ people can indeed reference the same parts of Zizek to prove that they have a valid position in the real discussion, just as the ‘little Deluezians’ might reference Delueze to stake their claim in the battle of identities (which ironically would be then the ‘greater’ vehicle).

Part of this whole thing  thereby is the manner that the issue is made to be distant yet in the same move viewed as talking about something intimate and close. Theory is used in place of talking about the issue in a manner that appears to be addressing something intimate. Here is an example. Granted, there is a certain artistic dinension there, but What occurs in such theory often functions at once for a ‘bringing into the fold’ of identities such that the agent of transcendence (the real human subject) understands that his or her particular intelligence or educational privilege has been communicated to. The agent is thus reified in its reality through the displacement of the experience to that of a transcendent significance, which is to say, that they have ‘been chosen’. The agent does not see this move as involving any transcendence due to the already made investment in real estimations, this is to say, their individual identity. The true nature of consciousness is of no concern to them; even while they will read some nice phrases by their authors that surely are talking about significant issues of Being, existence, humanity and consciousness, they thus will often miss the meaning as they as involved in establishing their identity, the identity ‘chosen’ by the transcendental state, of the transcendental communication of intimate communion across the unitive ontological scheme, even while such a transcendence is debated pro and con.

This is not to say that conventional theory does not have its place.

But here (above) is the issue showing itself for those who would indeed be involved in developing a science of the human phenomenon. A necessary divergence is indicated. Not as a reductionist resort or default to the common argument of proof; rather, first as a development of what is being verified in the investigation as facts apart from the common never-ending real mythological negotiation of relative True Objects. (Again, some of these terms I develop in my books. Sorry.)

 

Repost of Brassier on Land.

There are two interesting things going on here: One is meknowing what the hell this repost is saying, and Two, that when it makes sense, the attempt to apply it to real life, to reality, makes you undetstand that it is utterly theoretical. In other words, when im going about my daily activity, the sense it makes is at once nonsensical and extraneous. (Sp?).  

In as much as he might posit it as a sort of understanding of reality, he has set aside that when he goes and orders a beer at the bar, the theory is gone, unused, empty, non-existent, set aside like the dollar for a commodity. He has merely asserted that reality is thus segrgational despite what the theory says it might or might not be. That is contradiction incarnate. 

This is why when we find the actual meaning of the material, either we have faith in the potential of the thought to reconcile the theory to itself,  or we have to admit that the theoretical reconciliation is not real.

See and understand: 

REPOST: 

WHY KEEP INTENSIFYING? Brassier on LandOriginally posted on rediposture: Land’s work is a “mad black Deleuzianism”. What is really interesting in these texts is the way in which there is an extraordinary re-elaboration of negativity, a kind of non-conceptual negativity, and these texts bristle with this kind of sublimated fury, and that’s what makes them really powerful. (part one) Dyrek…
WHY KEEP INTENSIFYING? Brassier on Land

coincidence? 

Sometimes sychronicity is the only way to have any meaning at all. Sometimes things just make sense because that is what is occurring.
The issue is meaning.
 Hmmm. Where have i heard that before?

REPOST: 

(For some reason, it wouldnt let me repost right to his site. Hopefully you can find it.) 

Our current hierarchical view…Our current hierarchical view of ourselves and of our consciousness (with “I” at the apex, and “my ideas, my emotions, my experiences, and accumulated skills, etc.”, below) can now be shown to be fundamentally incoherent in a number of ways—the central contention being that in actual fact there isn’t and there can be no centre […]

zen, authority, cosmos, mind, time, learn, void, death, frontier, action, communicate, force, truth, revolution, children, chaos, demon, war, reminder, krishnamurti, energy, freedom, substance, infinite, matter, bohm, space, consciousness, civilization, psychological, world

https://syndaxvuzz.wordpress.com/2016/06/09/14296/

Crash Space and the Move to a ‘Science’ (of the Subject): To Ping or Not to Ping, Phenomenology and Observer Effects. REPOST

 

THREE POUND BRAIN Im finding has got some cool observations, often a manner of approach that seems insightful.

In the discussion of a philosophical scientism, the post below appears to me to indicate more a datum, a kind of data point, over a semantic content. If we hold to the idea that indeed we will be able to come upon a ‘phenomenological science’, so to speak (for lack of a term; maybe it is better voiced as a science of continental philosophy, science of the Subject, or a science of philosophy, or existential science) it will come when when the content of proposals does not fold back into itself to ask questions of its epistemological and ontological being. The problem we (as a kind of Western dominator-colonialist hegemonic discourse) have been dealing with for some time in philosophy is the problem of redundancy; that is, the recurrent check upon sovereign privilege. Yet we cannot escape the issue that surrounds the statement ‘for those who understand’, for, there is indeed an issue for those who understand, if you catch my drift*.

This is where this essay by THREE POUND BRAIN seems to have purchase. Quite compelling; these thinkers have conflated particular arms of the issue to further close the gap that occurs in the perpetual philosophical deferring of redundancy. The issue of what we are calling a science of the Subject (again, for lack of a better term), concerns our ability to dismiss ourselves from the semantic content of philosophical discourses: This only occurs for those ‘who understand’ the issue. The issue is, as I just said, the recurrent enfolding of meaning; this issue has to do with a kind of route where the thought is always extricating itself from the object of its proposal in the effort to find a more true thing of reality. So, if this be the real case, what is and has been occurring all through our history of critical thought, then what is it issue in our ‘science’ concerns an ability to be removed from that recurring redundancy.

The redundancy, the space of ‘naught’ that the redundancy covers, the ‘pass’ that maintains the current paradigm that situates ‘subject’ and ‘object’, is what the essay below calls a ‘crash space’, for another term, and aside from the struct Husserlisan phenomenological reduction, it takes a certain kind of understanding of the issue (this, itself another kind of redundancy) to see and accept the the Reduction is indeed a facet of everyday human life, over a particular methodological approach.

What we find, though, what inevitably is a part of the science that accepts instances of truth (objects) is that this essay below thus becomes another data point. In order to see this, we then need to understand what the traditional philosophical method does, and how it produces ‘Objects’, which is to say ‘ideological/mythological objects’, as opposed to witnessing and involving the manipulation of mere objects themselves.

We need notice that philosophical reduction can occur with any object, that the Phenomenologist reduction is not a particular meaning upon a particular clausal route, as if it occurs only when one thinks in a manner that Husserl denotes, describes or explains. In fact, any object may be looked into to find that its basis is naught; but this does not mean that it thus is a relative ideological manifestation, but more indeed that the ideological manifestation itself reduces to naught, that the route is incorrect in its maner of reckoning. Yet again, this does not mean that there is nothing ‘outside’ of whatever. This ‘nothing’ is the crash space. All discourses arise an an ideological mandate, as a intrinsic mythology, due to the substantiation of a single foundational fact, this fact being the uncontroversial term, the ‘given’ of the discussion.

It is here that Harman’s ‘over’ and ‘under’ determination becomes operative as relational analogous categories to describe what his occurring, again, not as substantial real components of objective quality. His arguments are against particular contexts, particular discursive ‘givens’ that he must confront as a member of the academy, for which he must produce content.

So also, we then see, as much as the essay below represents a datum over another semantic point of argument, it is because it takes another ‘given’ as a means to argue a particular point about what may be real; this time a sort of ‘brain’ or ‘physical operation’ of such real structure. The given of the physical brain producing experiences has allowed a view that sees itself as a partial manifestation of an impartial effect, and has understood that without such partiality (the partiality wherein what is impartial likewsie resides in meaning), ‘nothingness’ occurs in meaning and its corresponding ‘feeling’, which is the collaspe of knowledge into itself, collapsing upon itself. And, that this means only that when there is no view that there is no view; it does not mean that there being no view means that the world is the view. This fact reveals something about the nature of being human, and it is more than an existential nihilistic uselessness amd purposelessness.

Similar to Bruno Latour’s effort in AMIE to first identify the need for an opening, and then to allow for the facts that can be discerned because an opening has been allowed: So it is that we might begin to find these ‘givens’, and how they manifest discourse as proposing substantial content. These ‘givens’ as datum, rather than the argument upon what is reduced or produced from the discourses, which result in redundancy; seeing there discourses as results of a given situation, thereby grants us the data by which to discern our sought after science. The data will then be the content, but not in its argumentative capacity, but rather what it is doing. 

The example is, say, a chair. How much do you need to say in describeing a chair before I understand what you are talking about? Probably very little. Yet conventional philosophy says that you can never describe enough, and I will never realize what you are describing as a chair. It takes little more than this to realize that philosophy of this sort is based in a fantasy. So we might see that the idea behind these two aspects of the philosophical method is: Left only with a capacity to know, which is to say, if I already did not have a conception or idea of what a chiar is, and or I did not have recourse to a personal gesture from the first person toward the object in question at hand for reference, and or in some imaginary world where there might be a being or intelligent creature who is not human who has no access to a chair nor has ever experienced what a chair might be — in the condition of at least one of these three conditions, knowledge left to itself would never be able to convey the chair to another’s knowledge suffuciently to supply this other with ‘chairness’. Always there would be another question that would have to be qualified, and the answer to which that would fail to qualify exclusively what a chiar actually is.

Nevertheless: There is a chair right there and I do have recourse to many human aspects and relationships to be able to convey to me what a chair is sufficiently enough for me to not only use it functionally (to sit down on it), but as well to use it in communication on many levels. One might ask: What else is a chair then? Wee; it is more than ideology and political social justice, though these things are indeed necesaary and good (we should instead just call them what they are instead of lumping them into the category of ‘philsophy’.)

Conventional philsophy would have it that we have access to what the chair might actually be, but not only this. Conventional philosophy assumes as it is important that we not only acknolwege that the chair exists as ‘more than’ a chair, but also argues this importance. This is why modern conventional philosophy has been accused of being nothing less than sophistry. The aggravating issue has to be what happens when we notice what conventional philsophy is doing.

We notice that philosophy is arguing its own validity even in the face of the exposure that its validity is merely an argument. The idea is this: Do I have to argue that a chair is a chair for it to be a chair, or is it always already a chair? I would say that the chiar is a chair regardless of what I want to say about it, but that further I can say many things about a chair, but I dont have to argue its existence for me to be able to consider the many things about what a chair may be.

Now; when we look at philosophy and we realize what it is doing, what does that mean?

I say thay it means that we have found the object called philosophy despite its argument about how it cannot be found. I say that this object is conventional philosophy because most philosophers are so caught up in the method, the substance that is logic step 1, logic step 2, step 3…as of logic is more than merely a tool, that they are incapable of admitting that thier method has been identified, in fact, as an object. They will be completely mystified as to what I can possibly mean, and will use the method to prove to me I am wrong, that philosophy is not an object that can be found. Yet it is because I used no method to find it, I stick with what I am doing to call it philosophy, and distinguish the arguments of convetional philosophy as now a near empty set, an object whose content I may now use as data.

So we might continue along this idea: How much do I have to read of Emmanual Kant before I understand what he is talking about? I say not very much, because , just like the chair, once you understand what he is saying, you understand the object he is talking about. Likewsie; how much do I need to read of Hurserl? Quite soon in the reading of Husserl you see the object he is describing. What about Derrida? Delueze? Wittgestien? Hegel?

What happens when we admit the object they are talking about is indeed a common object, rather than a secret and deep, complex and elusive object? Answer: We can begin to address what these authors are saying as data, that is, as examples of what Subjects are doing with the common philosophical object. Relieved of psycholoigcal theological approximations that rely upon intuited transcedental subjective interpretations to manifest identity, we can thereby begin to view the human object, as opposed to having only the enfolded and redundant subjective interpretation of objects. Once we can begin to accumulate data on what the Subject is doing with the common philosophical object, we can begin to more fully understand what the human being is, and what it does.

 

The THREe POUND BRAIN essay evidences a certain cognition, a certain intentional acknowledgment of the issue, as well as intuiting what needs to occur. It seems that, at least here, THREE POUND BRAIN evidences a closer move toward this science.

 

 

* “The Moment of Decisive Significance: A Heresy” which will be out soon , fingers crossed , addresses these concerns, albeit in a non-conventional manner. The Revised edition has an added Preface, Preface to the Introduction, Forward and an Introduction, as well as an Author’s Note,  just to make sure everything is handled. 😄

REPOST:

 

JAMES XAVIER: Sam, what’s the range of human vision? SAM BRANT: Distance? JAMES XAVIER: No, wavelength. SAM BRANT: Between 4000 angstrom units and 7800 angstrom units.* You know that. JAMES XAVIER: Less than one-tenth of the actual wave spectrum. What could we really see if we had access to the other ninety-percent? Sam, we […]

via To Ping or Not to Ping: Physics, Phenomenology, and Observer Effects — Three Pound Brain

 

[NOTE: A variation of this comment about an essay posted in THREE POUND BRAIN forms part of the “Preface to the Intorduction” of the revised 1st edition of the book “Absolution“, that is called now: “The Moment of Decisive Significance: A Heresy“. It is copyright 2016 by Lance A. Kair.]

An Brief Heretical Outline of Our Current Situation: Phenomenology and Scientism.

Here is an end note from my upcoming book.

I have changed the title to “The Moment of Decisive Significance: A Heresy“.

This is a book of blatant confrontation and direct exposure, and not of spirituality or self help.

BTW: One of my ex-professors read a small bit of my unedited copy and replied to me: “It appears that you have written a self-help book, and being as I am not very interested in self-help, I probably won’t read the rest.”  Talk about pompousness and presumptive privilege. He was even a religious studies philosophy professor. Yes, its is an object oriented view through the Gospels, but Fuck man. I hope all you people are not as myopic and dense as he is. Funny I used to have respect for him. I can’t even imagine Where he would have come up with such an idea. I guess its because my ideas are So offensive (correctly framed 😛) that was the only way he could come to terms with what I am saying.

But hey; Ive said I appreciate any feedback. He gave me his feedback. And I think his ’emeritus’ title is undeserved. So there.

 From what I have experienced in my 3 so years of blogging, I am skeptical of academic presumptiveness and pompousness, and Dr.– just topped it off. So if you are an academic, and honest, please take my occasionsal discursive promiscuity and crass lip with a hint a compassion and understanding. I am most probably not talking about you, and even as I might overgeneralize and say ‘academic’, I do have respect for many scholars.

I am honest and often naive; but fool me once, shame on me…   
“note 129.

The ‘historical moment’ of Jesus is intended to reference the facticity of history over the negotiated interpretation of it. The difference is found when we consider that we have yet to exhaust the phenomenonalist intension ( in a general sense meaning ‘centrist subject’);  the conventional method of finding truth that is likewise involved with an establishment of identity is problematic. This is why there is and has been an issue with some ‘continental philosophers’ suggesting their ideas might denote a kind of science, or that we might be able to develop some sort of a phenomenologist scientism, if you will. What we might call a ‘pure’ method of science is one that moves in laborious increments punctuated by momentous insights that cannot be anticipated, not only around perhaps a single scientist with a purpose in mind, or an aspect to investigate, but through all the multitudinous scientists likewise working on often tiny aspects of the same issue. While one could argue there is a kind of concern for identity in every person (as well as a subjective bias such as Bruno Latour proposes to have uncovered), the science itself, for the hard core scientist, is what is important and drives the effort.
Admittedly, this might be a bit deluded in ideal, but if we are going to apply a philosophical reduction here likewise (not necessarily a phenomenologist reduction), then we would have to ask how even science itself, the proper science of physical mechanics and such, functions in the way it does for accomplishments. Of course we cannot completely dismiss real subjective ‘interference’ with objectivity, but the issue here is not about absolutes. This issue concerns methods. The issue concerns the real cohesion of disparate situations. What we are calling ‘conventional method’ is meant to specifically draw our attention to philosophy and its domain; we suggest that there is a type of real endeavor that works to draw all things unto itself, to reconciliation, and this is the motion of identity, of real objects. This motion for the human being is thus involved with what we usually call subjectivity but is really more an indication of ‘being value’. In other words, this translates for the human being into having ‘self-worth’ or even ‘relevancy’ or ‘importance’; we might even say that there is a libidinal drive for identity, and this is indeed part of the constitution of reality.

So it is that in reality, the conventional method misses vital components of truth for the sake of identity and even argues identity as a ubiquitous feature of what might possibly be true; conventional method draws all things unto itself and then argues its truth as if it is the only truth possible. And this is to say that even allowing for the possibility of more than one truth is indeed a move of this drawing toward unity. It is a unitive proposal to say that there is more than one reality. This is, in itself, a phenomenalist move. The point here, though, as I have said, is that such a method is completely incapable of entertaining that which lay outside is purview, but this does not mean that there is ‘nothing’ that it does not address or is capable of addressing; rather, this is to say that reality is the negotiation of terms and thus the historicity can never be contemplated by the conventional method due to its foundation is what is real. Conventional method is thereby centered around a subjective interpretation of what is occurring and the negotiation of these relative subjective agents. Also, again; this is not to say that somehow it is incorrect, but only that this is the way it behaves, this is the true description of how real philosophical negotiation occurs.

Thus when we speak of the ‘historical moment’ of Jesus, we mean to refer to that fact not negotiated. Here then, we can only be speaking from the historical motion itself; and this is to say that in this particular historical moment, the event of the minimal human experience is seen to involve ‘God’ as this universal and basic form can be communicated across disparate arenas, which we are finding through our venture through the Gospels here, are two different teleological fields, as we say, two routes of coming upon the object. The historical moment of Jesus is that moment wherein there is only a real human experience, a one common ontological arena, such that what is definitively and absolutely two teleological bases is understood as implicating a further unity, at that, as ‘secret’ or ‘spiritual’ unity, as if a real ontology necessarily, automatically, axiomatically and omnipresently involves the totality of all things.
The problem then of the usual conventional philosophical route is that because it is incapable of allowing for anything that is not determined in subjective negotiation, when the logic of the ends of discourse is presented in history, it is understood as such rather than experienced; which is to say there are two types of what is called ‘experience’ that are proposed to equate to meaning the same thing. What is understood through philosophical proposal is viewed the same thing as what is posed in philosophical proposal. The ‘ends’ is viewed upon as a logical conclusion based upon the subjective center of thought ‘thinking and considering’ such logical pathways. This is to say that despite what definitions might arise to say reality is this-and-that different than before or what another definition might have proposed, still the thinker is thinking these things through, considering various discursive designations from a central and prioritized Self, consciousness, or subjective agency. Even if we were to somehow logically crawl step by step to be able to say “From dog flower spichz consliger fghkioh tomorrowpd cloud ring flies to refridgerator” and mean something significant, the metaleptical slide that has occurred to be able to have that clausal phrase mean something meaningful gets nowhere further that the sentences we are using at this moment to convey an idea. And this is to say that the human being will always be a human being despite what clausal structure we set upon it. The political and ideological structure may change, but the question is always how we were able to develop a global society out of different ‘humanities’ speaking different languages who all have different terms and even grammars that order various ‘realities’ if we were not all human?

The conventional philosophical method has thus ‘skipped’ (what Latour might call a pass) the end of phenomenology through the application of logic upon it to thereby posit by a sort of reasoning that we should move to consider something else besides the dead end phenomenological reduction. This is because the conventional method requires novel ideas. But these very ideas are based into the phenomenologist move, as we said above, these ideas are based in the reduction, in drawing all meaning unto a centrist occasion. Hence phenomenology has not ended but was merely passed over for the sake of establishing another real identity. It matters little if anyone prescribes to Hursserl’s method or moves along his methodological pathway to a particular (non?) definitional ‘experience’ because when it comes down to it, this kind of method or attitude upon definitional paths, merely yields another definitional situation (that here we can call the ‘phenomenological reduction’); an individual moving along Husserl’s clausal path to his meaning avoids the path that is already being allowed for the ability to even take his path to any meaning, whether it agrees with him or not.

 

The point here is that while conventional philosophy would sooner not have to argue over how identity is a feature that must be dealt with in reality at all times, and as well not have to expose the weak point of the platform by which the institution continues, the whole platform that is taken as a necessary condition of real negotiation has already been argued and found lacking. But where these arguments have occurred, they are taken in stride to merely be another part of the negotiating of the ubiquitous ever-presence. In order to come to terms with what is actually occurring, conventional method must be set aside as a feature of a kind of functioning of human consciousness. When this happens, or may be seen to be possible, we begin to see how scientism might become viable, but the only way is to disregard what the conventional method has to say about it, but more, that whatever it has to say about the analysis based upon this view, is itself more evidence of what consciousness does.”

–from “The Moment of Decisive Significance: A Heresy” C. 2016. Lance A Kair.


 

AUTHOR’s COMMENT ON THE NOTE: The opening to the discussion of what consciousness is actually doing, as opposed to the discussion of what consciousness gives to be considered, is made by fully acknowledging that the phenomenological occasion is a capitalistic subjective identity that does not account for the totality of human existence, that what its gives is a religious foundation for Being. It is an effective theological directive. What occurs outside this capitalistic determination is a situation that threatens identity; it is a heresy. Thus, somehow, the opening will be made for those to whom that threat is of no concern.  This is the proposal upon which a science of human consciousness seems must be based.

But we will see what occurs.