We are seeing with some authors the coming to terms with the determination of existence. Here is a primer:REPOST:
(Sorry the paragraph breaks might be off 😜)
The Significant Event: Part 3. The Outline of Hard Correlationalism.”Where I am offended, there is faith.”
We are moving toward the veto and an analogy of legislature. The veto concerns how knowledge is appropriated by the human being to reveal his or her orientation upon objects.
To reveal the legislative analogy, it is useful to speak about the existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre. The general conventional meaning of one of his main ideas is typically used to justify the limitation that reality imposes upon the individual, suggesting that once this limit is realized, the individual who then comes upon an existential crisis can revolt from the abyss that lay beyond the limit, and the individual being aware of reality’s limiting effects may thereby then choose him or herself out of the limit and come upon a true agency, true freedom. While Sartre may have been attempting to speak of something else, something more profound, the terms he uses to situate this motivation are typically used to support the progress of reality, to imply that conventional understanding is gaining good purchase upon how to go about finding, locating or defining the True Object, but actually due to this reckoning reveals a condition of discourse the time he penned his ideas as the condition of knowledge.
The example of the problem can be located in the following statement: This is achieved here by the individual coming to an awareness of a particular historical meaning that has been incorrect; one can thereby locate the deception in a past that has been informing the individual to its contingent historical fault, such that now the individual may be able to move into a more effective conscious position by which to enact ‘the good’, which can be likened to a person being at a peaceful or now comfortable type of union with Itself so as to enact an effective agency.
The issue here is not so much a drawing upon ideas represented in history, not so much an addressing what is given as a True Object of history whereby one may then realize a problem inherent of the solute statement given in a complete manner transmitted directly through time from the author by the reading of it, for this type of addressing relies upon a real subject and object, an orientation that holds within its representation transcendent and immanent motions, which then defies the effort to remove the transcendent thinking because such a statement of solution is posited in the very transcendence it proposes to remove. Neither is it so much a problem of the existential effect that would locate the reason for the transformation (Harman’s ‘conversion’?) in an actual transcendent agent, such as God. Rather, the problem is how it is given, or for discourse, what is the condition of knowledge such as it is capable of describing the Event. The direction here is of the coaxing out the problem located in the phrasing of such a meaning; the issue is how to remove the ironic motion from the apprehension of discourse that seeks the solution to fall to one side of meaning or the other through selective denial. It appears then that this approach should achieve our objective, and thereby destroy the transcendent clause from the present effectuation of meaning that remains problematic. But, in other words, it is not simply a matter of describing how logically it makes sense that transcendent thinking should be eliminated; we must instead show how the effect of transcendence permeates the ability of the individual to establish itself in reality. The showing that is effective cannot be of True Objects, for the real discourse by which this showing is made maintains the distance that demands a transcendent interlocutor, or at least a Kantian intuition. The showing must be more intimate; it must be ironic, and hence, for the discourse of reality, bridge what is not real. We thus need situate history upon a polemic that concerns True Objects.
In one orientation, history is seen to reflect, convey or otherwise transmit information about events of the past that actually occurred similarly to what the telling of it is conveying. The historian’s job is to attempt to clarify particular historical situations as to their truth, and the critical theorist’s job is to uncover meanings of historical discourses that are or have been encoded into the present activity of discourse that establishes the arena by which individuals negotiate reality. Both of these endeavors rely upon a real True Object. Hence Sartre can be read to be saying that the story that has been transmitted through time has been transmitted along a particular agenda, a particular way of approaching and viewing the world and history, and that this particular way amounts to why human beings in the present may be having more difficulty in life and the world than one should somehow suppose they ought to. And, because this orientation apprehends discourse as catalyzing intuition of Objects’ truth, Sartre is seen to present a situation that has been identified in the progressive progress of historical time, such that ‘now’ or since, individual thinkers may consider that Object and move beyond it, applying more intuition upon that now established True Object. Hence we have modernism, that is said to have promoted and demanded individual adherence to a particular and singular truth, which due to Sartre’s and others’ analyses, the breaking free from these historical limitations brought the ‘post-modern’ era (as well as any labeling of existential-critical-philosophical ‘moments’ or ‘turns’) its opening for discourse on social justice. I am not sure if any ‘breaking free’ has occurred, but this manner of dissemination is exactly real.
In another orientation, what we have said is ‘not real’, history is taken to mean the True Object that supplies the condition for the state of reality such that individuals find themselves justified by appropriating and behaving in a particular manner that is designated by the real method for truth. History and discourse are complicit in this real telling and are spoken about with reference to particular contexts that arise due to a necessary order by which terms can only and must have meaning in themselves, for other terms, and for any phrasing of terms to have any meaning. In this orientation, because freedom has no essential foundation for its meaning, because history and discourse are the effective limitation upon a human being, one can only move unilaterally, which is to say, completely encompassed such that there is no other move but out of choice; hence instigating or calling forth a duality. The exegesis and exodus is this: Because freedom is bondage in the act of attempting to find essential freedom, yet in this act the human being searches, which is, chooses to look for an out among constant imposition of limits, the only way out is not to (choose to) revolt from the ‘abyss’ that is the perpetual coming unto ends – it is not a move of denying the abyss and thereby armed with full knowledge of the existential situation being able to choose a path in recognition and awareness of limits. No; rather, it is an accepting (non-agency, so to speak) of the abysmal as a necessary situation of existing – that there is reality that behaves this way for human beings – and there by losing the ability to choose due to such choice being established and estimated by the conventional reality that is, by its very nature, limit. The revolt, by this orientation, is against the very volitional act that would have one revolt from the limitation back into the limitation. The result is necessary; which is to say, one who is so motivated by truth as opposed to identity cannot but continue the move that was begun by truth itself, which is, in the last instance, the human being dismissed from reality’s decisional imposition of route for the individual by choice. The only route that is possible is the route that reality says is impossible as a real imperative: the removal of choice. This then is freedom unconditioned by the contingency of reality, or rather absolutely conditioned by contingency, but moving in the necessary direction accorded by the imperative of truth that arises from the fact that reality is contingent.
We can then say with assurance why the discourse of reality that proposes its containment of all possibility as possibility in its route, its proper method (Francois Laruelle’s ‘philosophy’), tends to land on the side of the former orientation, of the True Object. The reason is located in its insistence for True Objects. Choice is one of these objects — for we are not dealing here, of this essay, with True Objects, objects in-themselves with information about themselves that are intuitively transferred or transcribed into knowledge by a transcending agent, of sorts; we are dealing with meaning and significance. Choice in this way is understood by those oriented upon the True Reality as revealing a True Thing of reality, but this is to say not that there is not choice, but that the real idea of choice evidences a meaning that correlates choice as a substantial True Object among other Objects, and so means something specific and particular that is reflecting at all times an ‘in-itself’ feature of the One True Reality. Choice is there by determined to mean a particular True Object, and not itself an effect of the human consciousness that exists despite this Reality; choice, in this way of the operation of consciousness, means that no choice is impossible. Conventional reality has it that without choice there can be no reality.
This is the reason why real individuals find the situation of no choice, determinism, so offensive, so ridiculous, so absurd, so nihilistic – as I have described it here, this is not saying that there are no real situations of no choice that are not offensive, like being found guilty in a court of Law when one is innocent. And this is what prompts the divergence from the conventional determination of contingent reality; I am describing an actual situation, a true situation of significant meaning that the discourse of reality has failed to account for historically, that, ironically, despite having no choice, reality persists. Psychology may proclaim its contingent diagnosis of the individual, and other ‘philosophical’ ideas may describe events and activities, but they cannot address the failure of its ability to not rely upon the intuition by which reality establishes its psychological and physical truth — rather they can only do it through seeing that it has already been addressed by their conventional faith.
By the ability to speak, by the sheer availability of discourse for meaning, only by the current condition of discourse, can irony leave its house of mysticism and spirituality, of subjectivism, intuition and inspiration, and arise to be able to confront the world as the last thing reality would have it be.
In this way, the real move that has resulted historically is the attempt to incorporate and otherwise reconcile what is is not real. As we see in the historic philosophical movements, or turns, since the beginning of our modern age at least, which is to say since the European Enlightenment c. 1400-1500 CE, this attempt is futile; indeed, it is absurd that the effort of reconciliation continues in reality. Hence the notice of departure of Francois Laruelle with his non-philosophy, the venture into the nature of the True Object the Speculative Realists, and the venture into that which counters conventional faith, what I have come to tentatively refer to for my work, aphilosophy.
From what we have discussed thus far, the matter might be beginning to show itself.
The veto is a rejection of a prior decision, and it is the significant event that allows for the veto to be distinguished. Legislature is the body that decides upon the Laws of the State; a veto rejects the decision of the legislature and requires them to renegotiate the proposal.
When reality is understood as holding all the routes because it is the One and only route, the veto is not needed. The Laws and proposals are seen to stem from an attainable truth and thus are seen to be addressing real and true things, objects that in this way are effectively absolute in their potential and the potential that lay in the One truth that is attainable, in a real singular ethical horizon. Reality has choice that pervades all possibility for truth; any proposal that is made is thus made de facto a real proposal, subject to the same Laws as everything else, proposals made by the method for the furthering of the method for truth in reality. A veto here is not necessary because choice is effectively an ‘ever present potential’ for veto, as the State of reality has Laws that are modified by proposals that are developed through agency based in choice.
With the occurrence of the significant event, the veto as such becomes viable. In this preliminary situation, the State is understood to hold a potential in itself to be overturned, and in this way it is not difficult to see that the veto may be applied to the Proposal of the Law of the State. Here, the veto is come about by a ‘secret’ proposal that the State is now seen to have thus far withheld. This secret is the effect of the transcendent clause of the State, where the State, reality, catalyzed by the significant event into its ‘unity’ by the proposal of its ubiquity, its omnipotence, thus determines a counterpartial ‘totality’, such that a ‘material’, ‘physical’ and or ’empirical’ arena arises to account for the State, and the ‘immaterial’, ‘metaphysical’ and or ‘transcendental’ arises to account for the State’s accounting. See also Meillassoux, as he likewise describes this feature.
The problem that arises with the introduction of this situation defined by the State and the significant event, presents the problem by which is necessitated the divergence from conventional methodology, Laruelle’s philosophy, or philosophical decision – reality that is based in a unitary discourse of the Real, the de-cision of Truth; that is, the divergence is necessary due to the limiting effect of reality that we have discussed of Sartre’s existentialism earlier: no other route for the condition of knowledge presents itself when knowledge itself is taken as a ‘whole’, for all its inclusiveness. This latter problem is what I will call hard correlationalism to distinguish from what Quentin Miessaloux has termed ‘strong’ correlationalism.
Strong correlationalism puts all knowledge in correlation with all other knowledge such that all situations conveyed by discourse past, present, future, possible and impossible, fall only into knowledge itself as presented to the knower such that the limits of knowledge designate absolute limit, an ethical horizon. Strong correlationalism has the problem before it as how to deal with reality, as it is not specifically subjective and not entirely objective, but both; its solution thereby follows the general conventional Sartrean existential scheme noted, whereby one revolts from the abyss and then comes upon true freedom or agency. I have argued this situation myself, but diverge from this strong correlational model with the amendment that it is a function of human consciousness to present absolute categories, and that these categories function to supply reality, a scheme of True Objects, through meaning, to such an extent that the past is thus a ‘true’ past, indicating the Truth of the past, so it is, and thus is supplied a proper method for coming upon true reality.
Hard corrleationalism, the problem that necessitates a divergence, has to do with what Jean-Francios Lyotard conveys in his book “The Differend about communication. The problem, which Lyotard indicates by a ‘differend’, has to do with the significant event. The question he poses I reiterate: If there is a situation that does not adhere to real determinations, that is, does not uphold the Law of the State, how does one communicate what this situation is? How does one make his case to the State when the State does not hold the means to communicate it and thus hear the case?
Now, we must address the situation I presented above. The problem that incites divergence, the latter problem, is in line with Lyotard’s question; i.e. When one is come upon by the significant event, how does one speak of it? I have suggested that the significant event vetoes reality, which is to say that it questions the legislature’s proposal, the Law of Reality, due to its conveying what is significant of the Law itself, which is the transcendent clause. Thus we can say that the individual who is come upon by the significant experience has found recourse to an ‘executive’ branch of the governing body. In the more significant of featured significant events, this can be called ‘inspiration’, and where religious belief is involved, a type of spiritual experience, or even ‘revelation’.
The problem that occurs in this case is due to the real ‘strong’ correlational position. This significant event, while being viewed as a legislative breach, is actually gaining its stature in the governing body, the State of Reality, and it is by this move that we gain the free individual. It is of the pure multiple. The State being omnipotent, proclaiming its accounting for all possibility, has already established that the individual is accounted for by the State, and the individual of the significant event who finds inspiration in this way, through the transcendent clause, who moves then in revolt of the abyss that appears at ‘the end’ of the State, that which resides ‘on the other side’ of reality as viewed from the investment in reality, who then proposes to have come by a ‘better’ solution to the limits of reality or to be able thus to have true freedom — such a one is, by the transitive function of multiple sets, asserting and upholding the Law by conforming to the State, reality determined by immanent and transcendental operations. We will later take up how this evidence argues a real yet true transcendental progress. The solution to Lyotard’s query for such an inspired significant event is real, which is to say, was already real because its capacity or ability to be communicated was already present inso much as it was inspired. Hard correlationalism in this way correlates not only knowledge but experience itself with what is true and real; what is ‘hard’ of such correlation is that experience itself is already correlated with reality, and thus mere strength of argument is not sufficient to overcome its regulation. We can say then that this type of significant event was a real experience, and so never had recourse to a veto, or rather, always held within its sphere the potential or capacity for choice. We can also say then that the individual who is come upon by this kind of significant event is oriented upon the conventional True Object.
The State of Reality functions in this way and the same problem arises in two forms. On the one hand, the experience itself appears not to convey the same meaning as the discourse of reality would have it, and so part of the problem is determining which meaning is true. As more such experiences convey variant meanings, reality situates what should be counted as true, to wit, whereas the fact that people are having such experiences is real, the meanings of all such experiences cannot be true. The State thereby comes into its power of enforcement to determine what is true and real, not only as to what is to be counted as legal, which is to say, what people can say and how (the method by which) they can say it for it to included in what is real and true, but also, due to the real determination that equivocates terms to intuited truth of Objects, what such phrasing is allowed to mean to be true in reality. Hence , the aphilosophical move that disrupts such reality by introducing what is not real ironically.
So, on the other hand, we have a real maxim that has consolidated power through the conflating of different aspects of being human into the legal form of the individual of the State of Reality. To be fair: it seems an innate feature of being human for people to be selfish, manipulative and unfair in their dealings with others, even to the point of violence, and it is this feature against which the more institutional conventional governing body is formed. Yet ironically it is this necessarily crass and reactionary forming of worldly governance that historically routes its conventional philosophical analysis to a common humanity and its One reality, taking this apparent anarchistic tendency of human activity and its real solution as indicating (the transcendent) that a real philosophical solution can also be found, and incidentally, thereby arguing and maintaining the terms of conventional faith in the State of Reality. It would seem then that the discursive connection between the worldly governance, the nation-state, and the governing that occurs through the Real State of Law, is not true so much as it is enforced in the same ways and by same mechanisms that Paulo Freire outlines in his “Pedagogy of the Oppressed” about the game of oppression.
For those so keen, what we have here is a presentation of a presentation, and so a re-presentation of what is mistaken of the historical representation. Yet, the point here, now, is not identical with what has come before; the repetitions, the reiterations that have come before have — that have always come before — been limited in so much as they could be represented now. As I indicated earlier in this essay, the previous presentations have been limited by the condition of knowledge, and this is to say that the terms of reality (the ‘greater’ vehicle) were incompatible or maybe ‘not-conditioned’ to allow a phrasing that could accomplish the break that individuals of the significant event for so long have been involved with. This is to say that the they were still in the effort to reconcile the discrepancy, the ‘split’ that can be associated with the subject and the object, the ‘cogito ergo sum’, to the One True Reality, that the condition of knowledge was such that it admitted no split, and this is to say that conventional discourse was in no condition to allow for such a break. Or rather, to be most explicit, the best conventional discourse could do, the best that its faith could muster, is the object that we call ‘post-modernism’, that admits, for one, ‘multivocality’. Such it is with the solution to conventionalist existentialism and its real operation in strong correlationalism, where the individual is the real true establishment of reality, and the end of the discussion as to what is real. Hard correlationalism defines the limit of what is real by allowing for the truth, not that then derives a ‘new more real’ truth out of the waiting upon the operations of contingency that will inevitably offer a further proposal, but rather that must, in line with the premises above, be necessarily not real, that which is the same.
It may be due to this final determination, that the reason for discussions such as this will be forgotten. This is because human consciousness functions on the effectiveness of intrinsic mythology, and the exposure of this feature of consciousness to itself seems to involve a necessary forgetting.
End Part 3.
So we have outlined the only possible routes given the condition of knowledge. Speculative Realism proposes the objective route, the ‘speculative’ ramifications when the meaning of the limitation of discourse outlines above is taken as marker of necessary direction. Yet, consistent with the operational imperative of human consciousness, the description of the object cannot do without the description of the subject. The purpose cannot do without the topic; to have action, there must be parameters that define what action may be taken.
Part 4 is a more thorough addressing of Quentin Miessalloux’s version of Speculative Realism.