Monthly Archives: November 2015

Consciousness has less control than believed, according to new theory

This was already formulated in a book I read in 2004 for college: 
According to Morsella’s framework, the “free will” that people typically attribute to their conscious mind — the idea that our consciousness, as a “decider,” guides us to a course of action — does not exist. Instead, consciousness only relays information to control “voluntary” action, or goal-oriented movement involving the skeletal muscle system. Source: Consciousness has […]

What some philosophers sound like. 

You know, for the most part, philosophy is pretty damn boring. I think that’s why most people don’t read it or like it. But then there is a certain type of intellectual who likes the puzzle part of philosophy; they like the creativity , to watch the eloquence of problem solving, the twists and knots and the various interesting ways people can undo through spelling out. 

While it is interesting at times to watch how people solved a certain problem, mostly to me, the mere puzzle solving is boring, pedestrian, mundane.  It is impressive sometimes, but no more than a gymnast. Maybe that why I’m not so into sports. I do like watching the actual plays, and I got my team I root for and know a tiny bit of the politics and larger seasonal bracket strategy and stuff, but mostly it appears to me so routine and uninteresting, slightly entertaining, but mostly like listening to pop music. Sounds nice but oh so BORE-ing! 

So maybe I gave myself away. 

Philosophy is interesting to me when it verifies and confirms what I already know.  Sounds lame and self centered doesn’t it. Well, it is just this type of verification that so rarely occurs ‘out there’ that allows for people to understand what I’m saying as self centered. And that’s why it is interesting, because so very very few people really understand what philosophy is: The only way it verifies to me what I already know is by conveying a meaning that apparently so very few understand. 

Fkg stupid, huh.  

Take the example of music. Pop music is so very boring and lame, as well as POP-ular because it is doing nothing interesting. It is mundane repetition. Sex for fucking; beats for moving; lyrics for saying the same thing everyone else is saying; sound for getting loaded; bliss in vacancy. Worship for fashion; security for money.  New new new from old old and blah shit crap. 

Now this is never to say that I think Ratecliff’s song. SON OF A BITCH is not catchy and even pleasant and danceable, more that it is a product first and art second, of having only the ignorant bliss. It is identity and dumness before authentic relation. It is flat music. Don’t get me wrong ; I’m pretty dumb and sometime music is just there to be dumb to, but the mundane human interactive world of bs I just had to leave, even almost before I entered it. 

I am an artist because art is first; and what comets next … Well, pop music never occurs without some sort of social investment. There is no choice in being socially involved. Sometimes you just gotta accept things. 


BUT on a slightly different tangent…
What prompted this post and then got keel-hauled into the above non-sense is : maybe it’s the translations: 

Derrida is like reading folk music. Ive been browsing through a book of his essays and I remembered why I never really got into him. I’ve read enough, mind you, to know that he is merely repeating what I already know, but now we should be looking at how philosoohers say it. He is quite interesting in as much as he has to be included in what is interesting, but honestly, he’s kind of a pussy. Reading Derrida is like reading poetic mush about the beauty of a sunset. You can’t account for taste.

( yes; I do write mushy poems, but I don’t usually like to read them by other people. But wait: My mushy poems aren’t mushy though; they are sincere. There is a difference. Sincerety is not boring, but sincere poems can be nauseating — and not in Sartre’s sense! )

Derrida puts all this poetic mishmash literary image-while-still-being-scholarly stuff. It’s like listening to folk music. It’s nice. But, lets be real: kinda embarrassing. At least now it is. And again, don’t get me wrong: some of the folk stuff I did (or maybe do) listen to and like, but I was quite high then (am I now?) and upon awakening…. I dunno, I guess I’m not as poetic as Sarte and Derida. (I talk out my ass sometimes). 

Heidegger is like listening to classical music, a lot of marching though. Even though he might be talking about poetic stuff, he still evokes a sense of passion with heart, but not the bleeding heart kind. He speaks with authority (ironic, huh.) moving, pulsing, turning, peaking, dropping. 

Zizek is like  Lenard Skynard or Arosmith, or even Led Zeppelin. As many have said, Zizek the rock star. He bubbles literary guitar hero solos. 

That’s all I got right now for the philosopher-music analogies. 

But, I dunno; I think maybe what is needed now is a little punk rock, a little Hendrix metal, a little hard core Dead jam philosophy. And the great thing is: it can’t be faked. 

I’m sorry, but some of these academic types, it’s like theve never partied. Never actually been crazy. 

But I’m a judgemental fuck.

I probably don’t mean any of this. 

The Stream and the Valley. 

I love you.

Like the stream and the valley.


The valley






The big view

Upon its crests,

Or the intimate

At the banks of its acquiescence.


The stream




Meandering but focused.

Out but in.

Attacking with no quarter

Its determined route

While relinquishing to its





I love you.


As the valley lets the stream draw

What the valley is;

As the stream allows the valley to show

Where the stream goes.


I love you.


-Lance Allan Kair. 2015


Bouncing poem.

Can you see what I can see?

I described it is perfectly.

The sun has now become a hole in space

And I can see the sun set in another place –

Can you see it too?

We are lucky, me and you.

Because when you get caressed by a double sided vision you are blessed.

And when this world lays an opportunity to understand some more of Her complexity, she paints another stroke in my picture of it all.

And as I stand back from the portrait 

She is painting me

It seems like subtle patterns evolve inconsistently.

This peculiarity really


Has me

Bouncing off the walls.

Can you hear what I can hear? It sounds like it’s not far from here, it sounds like thunderbolts are in the make.

And is the Lightning all around us a mistake? I can see the light of heaven in the clouds and hear the trumpets sounding of the angels glancing down to earth to see what it is worth.

And this world looking back at them has come up with no answer of the end

As she paints on the canvas of us all.

c. 1991, 2015 Covert Sound Philosophy. 

The Role of the Hermit.

The hermit is a conventional scapegoat. The categorization imposed upon a person allows the conventionally faithful their comfort in reality.

“…the act of insaturation has to provide the opportunity to encounter beings capable of worrying you. Beings whose ontological status is still open but are nevertheless capable of making you do something, of unsettling you…Beings that have that have their own resources.” (Bruno Latour. The Inquiry into Modes of Existence. c.2013. Harvard. Pg 161)

In the pervious post I indicated that I am not advocating or implying a withdraw that could indicate a hermit or an ascetic in the conventional sense. In fact, I go so far as to imply that there is no longer a possibility of such a place, such a status.

While I will at some point show how Latour operates along a particular vector, within a particular orientation upon objects, for now we can begin to see that the operator stays there, where she is ontologically, part in reality yet part not real, insaturated in the conventional assertion of ubiquity, omnipresence and omnipotence. We can begin to understand how I might frame reality as conventional and at that established in faith. For what is unsettling of insaturation is indeed the element of offense that allows for conventional faith to operate, for the conventional route to have credence; Latour says as much but indeed sees his orientation as the only viable route. (More on that later). 

What is still shoved into that outside and marginal (read: unimportant) position, called the hermit and the ascetic, is indeed that which remains to be heard.  But only by those who have ears….

“…Beings who-…keep on standing there, uneasy, at the crossing.”(Ibid. pg 162)

More on Hermits..

There is a certain confusion in philosophical circles in the discussion of beginnings. Commonly we hear of subjects and objects, ideology and such, eras, turns, paradigms. All of these depend upon a particular rhetoric of subjects and objects. One of the problems of philosophy in this area is the same as most of the areas, namely, that no one knows what the hell they are talking about, or more precisely, no one knows what anyone else is talking about, and if they do or think they do, they are in a discussion as to which terms and situation of terms are more correctly situated to describe this supposed common object. In fact, this situation is so inherently aggravated, philosophy itself can be seen as a process of the attempt to figure out what the hell we are talking about.  Further, this is so much the case that it brought or brings a default to this condition, such that philosophy can continue in its conventional vein, justifying itself through the proposal that all it does is situated a present reality in discourse. Within this, though, then, one might say that there are those who take a certain arena that appears to be somewhat definite, and then talk about what other possibilities might arise or otherwise exist of that arena that have not been illuminated yet, the faults and strengths of the arena. But bring up the question of the arena itself then we have a more insistent problem that is usually solved by deferment to whatever writing pieces are seen to be the originating impetus of the arena. In other words, question the arena and people will often lead you back to the arena, so that it in effect is never questioned. This is the philosophical problem that non-philosophy notices as well as the situation that correlationalism wants to define.

So when in the example of Land’s treatise in my previous posts Land speaks of enlightenment, he is using a vague notion that is never defined. Perhaps he gives us a particular rendering of what The enlightenment or enlightenment is or was such that we are hearing a report of what subsequence may occur, but the point here is that the term itself, either as an historical moment of the Western European history, or as a sort of psychic transformation of the human mental being, or a combination, sequence or coincidence of both — still, I have yet to hear what exactly this term means. Indeed, in my book “Non-Philosophy and Aphilosophy”, I default to a similar notion that I call the philosophical revolution which I critique, but the idea of enlightenment is used or implied so liberally as a trope in various discourses that talk about what may be ‘actually’ occurring in the history of the future, so to speak, given such a vague idea that is supposed within a common understanding, anyone can really say anything they want so long as they use common discursive structural formations, along with popular forms of discursive objects (fashionable ideas such as Speculative Realism, or Realism), along with marketing techniques (which are already well established in the institutional-religious-political pipeline, the propaganda machine of ideological support), this that we call a part of the conventional method, and the author will have a soluble discourse that people will see as substantial, talking about things that might actually be true. It matters little whether what anyone is saying really has any substance, the post-modern method tells us that substance is measured by popularity and structure. This is the religious truth that the faithful follow. It appears that very little critique actually goes into these discourses, that is, as much as, say, Scholasticism entertained critique, but they nevertheless are real, however much ethereality they encompass in their substantive proposing.

The issue with Land is the vector he takes, the vector that appears to stem sensibly and only toward the ideological object, but more, that in taking this route, it seems obvious and sensible commonly. The pass that Land takes occurs in the first few sentences of his report in the previous post (Dark Enlightenment); he moves smoothly from a short description of what should obviously be meant by enlightenment, i.e. an historical moment and an event, that ends in paradox and contradiction, that the post-capitalistic state tends toward a type of market interaction of mutual benefit, of the checks and balances thereof, some type of world that smells very similar to the general idea of communism. The problem is not so much that his conclusions are incorrect or wrong, or even that his route is wrong – remember, we are not in the business of real negotiation, not concerned with what is more real. We are involved with what has been historically marginalized out of existence.

If there is enlightenment, then there is a subject of enlightenment, and this subject is even more elusive. If there was a subject that was not of enlightenment, then it was a subject of no enlightenment, for we cannot have what is of some speculative future; we find this in the heavenly discourses, often enough, those discourses of the Book, and this kind of eternity does nothing for us now.

What we have now is a confusion of enlightenment. When Alan Watts speaks of the hermit, and Alain Badiou speaks of the ascetic, they are both indicating an object that chooses not to participate in the ideological play, that indeed their play is to be exempt. It would seem by my argument that I am proposing something similar. But this is not the case; I am proposing something that participates as the minority voice. See; it is by such a discourse of the hermit and ascetic that the intrinsic mythology may still perform as a functional reality, as if the real discourse is accounting for the Truth of all existence, all that can be and ever be; which is to say, not only are we all subjects of enlightenment, the potential thereof, but moreso subject to this Truth of existence that he is describing, which is ultimately politically ideological. The point, though, is that there is no evidence that we are all included in the discourse of enlightenment (of the transcendent clause), but as well, that there is yet no established linkage from the subject to the ideology; the linkage is assumed of the common humanity. Faith. Within this faith, we do have plenty of evidence presented for the subject of ideology, of the state, but we have no such evidence that shows that enlightenment is indeed part of the common humanity as a whole. We should only assume, then, that such a discourse is made by those for whom enlightenment is part of a real experience, such that the discourse of enlightenment stems from the enlightenment already had (this is the proposal of “Non-philosophy and Aphilosophy”). Hence we have a credible outline for ideological reality as religion, but a catholic religion in the true sense. For, if there are those for whom either enlightenment is put off as into a real ‘heaven’, or an a one-day attainable state (enlightened), and then those for whom enlightenment is understood as a state already attained, those who feel that their enlightened state obligates them to look out for the ‘others’, as well a set the example as enlightenment as indeed a real situation of potential, religion seems not a too far off term for this real world meaning. It likewise is not too a terrible meaning of the ‘new world order’.

But again, as Land seems to acknowledge: This is part of the modern enlightenment, that it move toward an apocalyptic end, a great catastrophe. And he seems to acknowledge that he has difficulty not believing such an apocalypse will come about. Is it so difficult to see this as an investment in identity? That this enlightened state is a self fulfilling prophecy? But not so much as a real ideological manifestation, but merely a way of witnessing one’s faith.

In this sense, what Badiou, as least and Harman are describing by their withdrawn object (the hermit, the ascetic) is the product of their faith, witnesses of the fear that is invested of such ideological position. The scapegoat that justifies their fear, as well as their enlightened effort.

Perhaps the soundtrack to these posts can be found HERE.  “Bouncing off the Walls” could be the first indication of a link that will become evident later as we proceed along these Constructive Undoings. (The song can be downloaded for free, btw.).