Consciousness has less control than believed, according to new theory

This was already formulated in a book I read in 2004 for college: 
According to Morsella’s framework, the “free will” that people typically attribute to their conscious mind — the idea that our consciousness, as a “decider,” guides us to a course of action — does not exist. Instead, consciousness only relays information to control “voluntary” action, or goal-oriented movement involving the skeletal muscle system. Source: Consciousness has […]


What some philosophers sound like. 

You know, for the most part, philosophy is pretty damn boring. I think that’s why most people don’t read it or like it. But then there is a certain type of intellectual who likes the puzzle part of philosophy; they like the creativity , to watch the eloquence of problem solving, the twists and knots and the various interesting ways people can undo through spelling out. 

While it is interesting at times to watch how people solved a certain problem, mostly to me, the mere puzzle solving is boring, pedestrian, mundane.  It is impressive sometimes, but no more than a gymnast. Maybe that why I’m not so into sports. I do like watching the actual plays, and I got my team I root for and know a tiny bit of the politics and larger seasonal bracket strategy and stuff, but mostly it appears to me so routine and uninteresting, slightly entertaining, but mostly like listening to pop music. Sounds nice but oh so BORE-ing! 

So maybe I gave myself away. 

Philosophy is interesting to me when it verifies and confirms what I already know.  Sounds lame and self centered doesn’t it. Well, it is just this type of verification that so rarely occurs ‘out there’ that allows for people to understand what I’m saying as self centered. And that’s why it is interesting, because so very very few people really understand what philosophy is: The only way it verifies to me what I already know is by conveying a meaning that apparently so very few understand. 

Fkg stupid, huh.  

Take the example of music. Pop music is so very boring and lame, as well as POP-ular because it is doing nothing interesting. It is mundane repetition. Sex for fucking; beats for moving; lyrics for saying the same thing everyone else is saying; sound for getting loaded; bliss in vacancy. Worship for fashion; security for money.  New new new from old old and blah shit crap. 

Now this is never to say that I think Ratecliff’s song. SON OF A BITCH is not catchy and even pleasant and danceable, more that it is a product first and art second, of having only the ignorant bliss. It is identity and dumness before authentic relation. It is flat music. Don’t get me wrong ; I’m pretty dumb and sometime music is just there to be dumb to, but the mundane human interactive world of bs I just had to leave, even almost before I entered it. 

I am an artist because art is first; and what comets next … Well, pop music never occurs without some sort of social investment. There is no choice in being socially involved. Sometimes you just gotta accept things. 


BUT on a slightly different tangent…
What prompted this post and then got keel-hauled into the above non-sense is : maybe it’s the translations: 

Derrida is like reading folk music. Ive been browsing through a book of his essays and I remembered why I never really got into him. I’ve read enough, mind you, to know that he is merely repeating what I already know, but now we should be looking at how philosoohers say it. He is quite interesting in as much as he has to be included in what is interesting, but honestly, he’s kind of a pussy. Reading Derrida is like reading poetic mush about the beauty of a sunset. You can’t account for taste.

( yes; I do write mushy poems, but I don’t usually like to read them by other people. But wait: My mushy poems aren’t mushy though; they are sincere. There is a difference. Sincerety is not boring, but sincere poems can be nauseating — and not in Sartre’s sense! )

Derrida puts all this poetic mishmash literary image-while-still-being-scholarly stuff. It’s like listening to folk music. It’s nice. But, lets be real: kinda embarrassing. At least now it is. And again, don’t get me wrong: some of the folk stuff I did (or maybe do) listen to and like, but I was quite high then (am I now?) and upon awakening…. I dunno, I guess I’m not as poetic as Sarte and Derida. (I talk out my ass sometimes). 

Heidegger is like listening to classical music, a lot of marching though. Even though he might be talking about poetic stuff, he still evokes a sense of passion with heart, but not the bleeding heart kind. He speaks with authority (ironic, huh.) moving, pulsing, turning, peaking, dropping. 

Zizek is like  Lenard Skynard or Arosmith, or even Led Zeppelin. As many have said, Zizek the rock star. He bubbles literary guitar hero solos. 

That’s all I got right now for the philosopher-music analogies. 

But, I dunno; I think maybe what is needed now is a little punk rock, a little Hendrix metal, a little hard core Dead jam philosophy. And the great thing is: it can’t be faked. 

I’m sorry, but some of these academic types, it’s like theve never partied. Never actually been crazy. 

But I’m a judgemental fuck.

I probably don’t mean any of this. 

The Stream and the Valley. 

I love you.

Like the stream and the valley.


The valley






The big view

Upon its crests,

Or the intimate

At the banks of its acquiescence.


The stream




Meandering but focused.

Out but in.

Attacking with no quarter

Its determined route

While relinquishing to its





I love you.


As the valley lets the stream draw

What the valley is;

As the stream allows the valley to show

Where the stream goes.


I love you.


-Lance Allan Kair. 2015


Bouncing poem.

Can you see what I can see?

I described it is perfectly.

The sun has now become a hole in space

And I can see the sun set in another place –

Can you see it too?

We are lucky, me and you.

Because when you get caressed by a double sided vision you are blessed.

And when this world lays an opportunity to understand some more of Her complexity, she paints another stroke in my picture of it all.

And as I stand back from the portrait 

She is painting me

It seems like subtle patterns evolve inconsistently.

This peculiarity really


Has me

Bouncing off the walls.

Can you hear what I can hear? It sounds like it’s not far from here, it sounds like thunderbolts are in the make.

And is the Lightning all around us a mistake? I can see the light of heaven in the clouds and hear the trumpets sounding of the angels glancing down to earth to see what it is worth.

And this world looking back at them has come up with no answer of the end

As she paints on the canvas of us all.

c. 1991, 2015 Covert Sound Philosophy. 

The Role of the Hermit.

The hermit is a conventional scapegoat. The categorization imposed upon a person allows the conventionally faithful their comfort in reality.

“…the act of insaturation has to provide the opportunity to encounter beings capable of worrying you. Beings whose ontological status is still open but are nevertheless capable of making you do something, of unsettling you…Beings that have that have their own resources.” (Bruno Latour. The Inquiry into Modes of Existence. c.2013. Harvard. Pg 161)

In the pervious post I indicated that I am not advocating or implying a withdraw that could indicate a hermit or an ascetic in the conventional sense. In fact, I go so far as to imply that there is no longer a possibility of such a place, such a status.

While I will at some point show how Latour operates along a particular vector, within a particular orientation upon objects, for now we can begin to see that the operator stays there, where she is ontologically, part in reality yet part not real, insaturated in the conventional assertion of ubiquity, omnipresence and omnipotence. We can begin to understand how I might frame reality as conventional and at that established in faith. For what is unsettling of insaturation is indeed the element of offense that allows for conventional faith to operate, for the conventional route to have credence; Latour says as much but indeed sees his orientation as the only viable route. (More on that later). 

What is still shoved into that outside and marginal (read: unimportant) position, called the hermit and the ascetic, is indeed that which remains to be heard.  But only by those who have ears….

“…Beings who-…keep on standing there, uneasy, at the crossing.”(Ibid. pg 162)

More on Hermits..

There is a certain confusion in philosophical circles in the discussion of beginnings. Commonly we hear of subjects and objects, ideology and such, eras, turns, paradigms. All of these depend upon a particular rhetoric of subjects and objects. One of the problems of philosophy in this area is the same as most of the areas, namely, that no one knows what the hell they are talking about, or more precisely, no one knows what anyone else is talking about, and if they do or think they do, they are in a discussion as to which terms and situation of terms are more correctly situated to describe this supposed common object. In fact, this situation is so inherently aggravated, philosophy itself can be seen as a process of the attempt to figure out what the hell we are talking about.  Further, this is so much the case that it brought or brings a default to this condition, such that philosophy can continue in its conventional vein, justifying itself through the proposal that all it does is situated a present reality in discourse. Within this, though, then, one might say that there are those who take a certain arena that appears to be somewhat definite, and then talk about what other possibilities might arise or otherwise exist of that arena that have not been illuminated yet, the faults and strengths of the arena. But bring up the question of the arena itself then we have a more insistent problem that is usually solved by deferment to whatever writing pieces are seen to be the originating impetus of the arena. In other words, question the arena and people will often lead you back to the arena, so that it in effect is never questioned. This is the philosophical problem that non-philosophy notices as well as the situation that correlationalism wants to define.

So when in the example of Land’s treatise in my previous posts Land speaks of enlightenment, he is using a vague notion that is never defined. Perhaps he gives us a particular rendering of what The enlightenment or enlightenment is or was such that we are hearing a report of what subsequence may occur, but the point here is that the term itself, either as an historical moment of the Western European history, or as a sort of psychic transformation of the human mental being, or a combination, sequence or coincidence of both — still, I have yet to hear what exactly this term means. Indeed, in my book “Non-Philosophy and Aphilosophy”, I default to a similar notion that I call the philosophical revolution which I critique, but the idea of enlightenment is used or implied so liberally as a trope in various discourses that talk about what may be ‘actually’ occurring in the history of the future, so to speak, given such a vague idea that is supposed within a common understanding, anyone can really say anything they want so long as they use common discursive structural formations, along with popular forms of discursive objects (fashionable ideas such as Speculative Realism, or Realism), along with marketing techniques (which are already well established in the institutional-religious-political pipeline, the propaganda machine of ideological support), this that we call a part of the conventional method, and the author will have a soluble discourse that people will see as substantial, talking about things that might actually be true. It matters little whether what anyone is saying really has any substance, the post-modern method tells us that substance is measured by popularity and structure. This is the religious truth that the faithful follow. It appears that very little critique actually goes into these discourses, that is, as much as, say, Scholasticism entertained critique, but they nevertheless are real, however much ethereality they encompass in their substantive proposing.

The issue with Land is the vector he takes, the vector that appears to stem sensibly and only toward the ideological object, but more, that in taking this route, it seems obvious and sensible commonly. The pass that Land takes occurs in the first few sentences of his report in the previous post (Dark Enlightenment); he moves smoothly from a short description of what should obviously be meant by enlightenment, i.e. an historical moment and an event, that ends in paradox and contradiction, that the post-capitalistic state tends toward a type of market interaction of mutual benefit, of the checks and balances thereof, some type of world that smells very similar to the general idea of communism. The problem is not so much that his conclusions are incorrect or wrong, or even that his route is wrong – remember, we are not in the business of real negotiation, not concerned with what is more real. We are involved with what has been historically marginalized out of existence.

If there is enlightenment, then there is a subject of enlightenment, and this subject is even more elusive. If there was a subject that was not of enlightenment, then it was a subject of no enlightenment, for we cannot have what is of some speculative future; we find this in the heavenly discourses, often enough, those discourses of the Book, and this kind of eternity does nothing for us now.

What we have now is a confusion of enlightenment. When Alan Watts speaks of the hermit, and Alain Badiou speaks of the ascetic, they are both indicating an object that chooses not to participate in the ideological play, that indeed their play is to be exempt. It would seem by my argument that I am proposing something similar. But this is not the case; I am proposing something that participates as the minority voice. See; it is by such a discourse of the hermit and ascetic that the intrinsic mythology may still perform as a functional reality, as if the real discourse is accounting for the Truth of all existence, all that can be and ever be; which is to say, not only are we all subjects of enlightenment, the potential thereof, but moreso subject to this Truth of existence that he is describing, which is ultimately politically ideological. The point, though, is that there is no evidence that we are all included in the discourse of enlightenment (of the transcendent clause), but as well, that there is yet no established linkage from the subject to the ideology; the linkage is assumed of the common humanity. Faith. Within this faith, we do have plenty of evidence presented for the subject of ideology, of the state, but we have no such evidence that shows that enlightenment is indeed part of the common humanity as a whole. We should only assume, then, that such a discourse is made by those for whom enlightenment is part of a real experience, such that the discourse of enlightenment stems from the enlightenment already had (this is the proposal of “Non-philosophy and Aphilosophy”). Hence we have a credible outline for ideological reality as religion, but a catholic religion in the true sense. For, if there are those for whom either enlightenment is put off as into a real ‘heaven’, or an a one-day attainable state (enlightened), and then those for whom enlightenment is understood as a state already attained, those who feel that their enlightened state obligates them to look out for the ‘others’, as well a set the example as enlightenment as indeed a real situation of potential, religion seems not a too far off term for this real world meaning. It likewise is not too a terrible meaning of the ‘new world order’.

But again, as Land seems to acknowledge: This is part of the modern enlightenment, that it move toward an apocalyptic end, a great catastrophe. And he seems to acknowledge that he has difficulty not believing such an apocalypse will come about. Is it so difficult to see this as an investment in identity? That this enlightened state is a self fulfilling prophecy? But not so much as a real ideological manifestation, but merely a way of witnessing one’s faith.

In this sense, what Badiou, as least and Harman are describing by their withdrawn object (the hermit, the ascetic) is the product of their faith, witnesses of the fear that is invested of such ideological position. The scapegoat that justifies their fear, as well as their enlightened effort.

Perhaps the soundtrack to these posts can be found HERE.  “Bouncing off the Walls” could be the first indication of a link that will become evident later as we proceed along these Constructive Undoings. (The song can be downloaded for free, btw.). 

Alan Watts – Insecure societies and hermits

It should be no secret what is going on here; but offensive as it is, of this we should also be aware. This talk was given, seems from the small references he mentions, around 40 years ago.

Video post.

Source: Alan Watts – Insecure societies and hermits

He speaks rather plainly and practically, and we might perhaps see that he speaks from a different condition than we might perceive of his talk now; which is to say, we should not reduce what he says to be directly applicable to our situation now, as if there is some constant and universal stasis that we somehow have access to. We are filling out just what condition means, and how what he is saying he is saying to and from his very moment, as it extends no further. This is the meaning of the limit of discourse; correlationalism is the conventional situation that would have Watts be speaking likewise of our current situation as there might be a progress from his to ours, as well as a stasis (this posited stasis is the transcendental clause). He was speaking of the particular historical condition that is his moment. What we can gain, though, is that the quite practical is just his speaking of that which does not change, but in the context of what is seen to change. This is entirely philosophical in the broad sense.

Philosophy in the narrow sense, in the conventional sense that sees progress, that always begins in the middle of the conversation even as it looks to ancient and historical texts to find the beginning (ancient Greeks; Scholasticsm; the general move of Western philosophy; the temporal Trueness of the periodic philosophers; et cetera.), should properly be seen for what it is as what it does: It argues the total inclusion of all human beings, the justification of the ideological city-state-nation, where none is allowed to be excluded. Watts put it in terms of governments and society but that is the grounds for post-modernism. The application of what he says comes from the possibility of escaping the ideological maxim and its coercive force of power. It does not come from merely being a ‘hermit’, as one who lives inside may describe the outside — see that in the 60’s (or before) there was still close memories of the Old American West, still Orientalism and Exoticism was present; cowboys from the old west were still alive; areas of the world that capitalism and commercialism had not touched. We cannot possibly understand such a reality; but the advocates of conventional reality would have it that we can through the descriptions that come to us along the route of progress and its causality.

See that the reason why Alain Badiou argues that the operator of Truth need not be a hermit or ascetic, is because he is still in the post-modern frame. He is involved with the propagation of the institution, of justifying the institution. He is working toward the progressive society where individuals can somehow retain or otherwise develop their ‘hermeneutics’ within a relating of subject-objects; this is the communist world. Yet, while this may indeed come about, it does so through the relinquishing of that which allows for the heurmunetics to begin with. This is what Land is saying in the previous post; that once enlightenment has occurred there is no going back, that now one has given up that which allowed the enlightenment in the first place; hence, a ‘dark’ enlightenment. But as I eluded to in the previous post, where he misses is where Badiou appears to hold the more true: Land is mis-contruing the principle (regardless if he is addressing or even knows of Watts himself) the Watts put forth: The encroaching of the ‘common body’ upon the free individual does not occur by any sort of oppressive motion except in as much as the possibility of enlightenment exists. It is the misconstruing of what is enlightenment is and or means that launches the move of bad faith, and opens the door for the explanation of the significant event; which is to say, the exposure of what happened and what is happening in the philosophical-ideological move. If communism as a lived social experience does come about, it will be in due course and not ‘because’ anything happened to convince anyone that it should or should not or can or cannot happen; this is to say that nothing about the way human beings experience life will have changed, but only in the same manner as a parent may not understand the fashionable environment of a child and speak of the good ol’ days: There would be no communication whatsoever including an ability to have such comparative experience if anything had indeed ‘changed’. It is only in as much as there is a possibility for comparison that society may have gone from capitalism to communism; we cannot have anything else now, just as ‘if then’ communism were to be effective whenever. Nothing about the human possibility as human has occurred; or, if it did, then it already has: It is always an ideological construct, the significant question concerns ones orientation upon the objects presented: Not upon the constructs, but upon the very notion put forth by it being a construct. In as much as indeed a parent must be a parent for a child, there do we have reality, yet likewise do we have the philosophical necessity for divergence from that reality.

The preoccupation with ‘nothingness’ in this regard is just a further dogmatic proclamation that relies upon a total human inclusion. I am not’nothing’ neither do I do nothing; I appear within the ideological construct but only when I engage with it. Divergence is the move of discourse to the place that the present ideological nothing is placed; as Harman and his Lovecraft: Where monsters lie. 

The reason what Land is a charlatan is because he never get to why his proposals have any meaning at all, what ground allows for him to say such things. At some point we need to stop being childish about what is real. And this is to say that the ground is exactly ideological and assumed upon a type of privilege that is available to all in potential: Again, exactly what Watts is saying, that we are all equal in our fallen state such that we all have an equal potential for the enlightenment that comes through the ideoligical posture and route: And this is the Marxist description of the state of identical reality.

To diverge from this leviathan is now not only a sin, against the ‘religious’ law, but also against the law in the ‘common’ sense because the ideological state of reality has commandeered the whole of the livable world unto its structure of meaning, which is to say, reality. Psychology and the philosophical psychiatry we are beginning to hear so much of from the ‘after-Zizeks’ is mere hogwash. So offended has the individuals of the real ideology become, so afraid of their own shadows, the shortened version of mediated rhetoric as seen to involve all existing human beings. No one dare challenge what they say because they can make sense; no one dare challenge them to ask why they make sense because everyone is so eager for their insecure reality to be justified; they cling together like so many rats on a piece of lifeboat. No one dares to read their philo-psycho mush and see it is a bunch of hogwash.

The Dark Enlightenment by Nick Land

Be ready:

While interesting to listen to — the unpacking of stasis meaning unto progressive meaning: the True Object toward which history always unfolds — Land is fully invested in the horizontal, seeing his plane as directionally dynamic while at the same time establishing his discourse upon its mono-pronounceable finitude. Even while he seems to offer a ‘new’ enlightenment called ‘dark enlightenment’, his whole proposal is s a game, a mental ideological masturbation ejaculating reactionary discourse in the all too ready arena of fear, making nothing better than an action movie proposed as substantial. Purely derived by his own enlightenment projected out onto the imagined reality, he is an agent of bad faith, a demagogue of sorcery and deceit: A priest of the democracy he argues against or away from; a true charlatan. 
If we can see this, then we have the grounds for the throwing away of all such ideological psychiatry, and for starting anew.

Perhaps, in this way he is being ironic. Make your own judgement. 

Here it is. 
00:00 Part 1: Neo-reactionaries head for the exit 22:28 Part 2: The arc of history is long, but it bends towards zombie apocalypse 43:11 Part 3 1:03:00 Part 4: Re-running the race to ruin 1:29:27 Part 4a: A multi-part sub-digression into racial terror 1:52:08 Part 4b: Obnoxious observations 2:22:51 Part 4c: The Cracker Factory 2:44:44 […]

The Gods & Technology: A Reading of Heidegger (pdf)

I am not involved in propagating an idea of newness, in fact, I freely admit that have nothing new to say. How it is said can appear in new ways, though, and the conclusion must then be said to be merely a part of the present condition of knowledge. 
I have only scanned and read bits of this piece here below, but his bit about Aristotle and Hiedegger’s cause may help in showing how what we know as reality is informed by a particular orientation upon objects, over merely a sort of evolutionary discursive meaning.