Serious Irony. 

Kierke-Gourd(Thank you, Carson Webb)

So greAt.  


the Divergent Proposal, part 4.

Part 4

It would seem that at least one term in a philosophical reduction would have to be able to transcend the discursive limit. But it is just his limit that defines the conventional faith, because it is not commonly understood as a faith; rather, is not seen as faith because no limit is noticed, or if it is noticed then it occurs as a pass. This is the effect of faith to grant a true reality. In this, then, there is no ‘at least one’ term that is not limited, but indeed no term is limited in this way because terms are understood to naturally always reach the object of their reference, such that it is the contingency of clause that shows what object is being reached and whether the clause is true or false. This is the meaning of the True Object of faith, of conventional reality itself. The pass can be noticed when the two situations are juxtaposed; but first we need be able to view what lay outside of reality, what we are terming not real. If what is not real cannot be ventured, then we have the mark for divergence, of the necessary departure, of the absolute withdraw from the relative world. We cannot move everyone, nor indeed anyone from their orientation upon objects. We simply describe the necessary ramifications of the situation at hand.


I suppose that there should be a primer of sorts for this undertaking.

I have already attempted to draw out a logical necessity for what is not real as a precipitated truth by showing where passes occur in conventional reckoning. The argument is that where there is a pass, that is, where a contradiction indicates an absolute end, and absolute limit, there is where we ought to see the indication of the fault of that method of reckoning, rather than an indication of where we need stop and suspend investigation as a sort of anchor. It is this latter process of staking out various ‘ends’, of ‘marking’ the ‘ends of discourse’ that is and had been the philosophical progress as reconnaissance, but that now marks philosophy, as it continues along a certain vein, in a certain mode (of denial), as correlationalist. But also see that such a move cannot be made by everyone; in fact, such a move will not be made by most, and it is for this reason that we do not argue that there is some truth that is more real than reality. We are not in an effort to prove a route that disproves real estimations of things. Instead, because we are involved in a proof of verification rather than proof of convincing, involved in a description of truth over an argument towards truth, we cannot decide that any proposal discounts or negates the overwhelming commonality of reality itself.  

In a quite Foucaultian manner, we see a real stratum, a horizon, upon or within which such that an archeology might be enacted. Yet the only way we can see through to an archeology of this sort is to not engage in the real estimation of things wherein and whereby all dimensions are in play. We cannot enact an archeology upon a dynamic of relative objective networks due to the simple fact that within such a network no strata can be viewed; this is the ironic redundancy that Zizek exclaims at every turn of his prolific rhetoric. In this regard, we can only then see Latour rightly oriented and acclimated as an ethnologist, as a cultural anthropologist to this sort of plastic dynamic landscape.

Thus we have part of the reason why, upon admitting that there is nothing beyond discourse, that we are not speaking of subjects and some subjective spiritual truth.

But there is another more practical reason: Why would I need to rehash and respeak spiritual ideals that everyone already knows, or can hear from hundreds of other people way more versed in the in’s-and-out’s of spiritual-psychological jargon than me? It would be like singing to the choir and preaching to the clergy. But it is not that I am uncaring or unfeeling; I try to be kind to people and to help the ignorant and needing as and where I can, and likewise be open to help that I might need in life. Here, though, I am involved in a critical venture, not a religious one. Indeed; by some of my essays and points it seems I have gathered at least a small group of individuals who apparently see in my writing an advocating of spiritual endeavor. While this may indeed be the case, that perhaps there is a spiritual dimension to my ideas, and I am not here to dictate upon people what they may get or use of my writings, but in this critical endeavor I do not find a use to reiterate spiritual-psychological ideas or ideals. As I just said: Everyone already knows them. Everyone already knows all the Zen-type Buddhist-Hindu Tantric reductions, already the ‘oneness’ of Hurserlian phenominalist groovyness, of enlightenment-speak, of fear-and-anger-is-not-the-way-to-go speak, of praying, of meditating, of look inside yourself, of subjective appraisal, of psychological categorical mish-mashing, of Lacan-Zizek negative-positive-self-reflexive-ironic distanced ideological posture, of ‘Christ consciousness’, of Bible Christianity sectarian propriety, of Yogic discipline, higher planes of existence, pagan or Wiccan ritual cleansing, psychic and astrological coordination, Islamic submission, Jewish obeyance and celebration, et cetera, ad infinitum naseaum. And if you don’t know them, there are plenty of places to go and people to talk to a read to discuss a multitudinous of possible interchanges of things and spirit, of symbol and psychical ascension. In my view, every object and series of objects can be related to symbols to achieve various sorts of spiritual meaning. Once I was quite interested in assembling, aligning and proselytizing about these linkages and exchanges, but with an open mind I found that any and every chain of reference leads continually to other chains in a cycle of meaning that excludes the possibility that any one is true. I tend to see spiritual growth and metaphysical truth as necessitating and requiring an adamantly defended limit, and often a position of bias that usually contradicts the intension behind the very spiritual ethical advocation.

Further; what need have I to posit psychological solutions to metaphysical existential issues? If I am to say anything about such ideas I would have only three things to say: One, see many of my earlier post of Constructive Undoing if you want my post-modern Christian-Vedic take on it all; two, see above, everyone already knows them and it only matters what denomination you already subscribe to as to what will appeal to your sense of righteousness; and three; I just plain cannot take myself that seriously. There is nothing wrong with me; in fact, I would have to say that there is so much wrong with me, so many myriads of ways I can take apart all the non-sense and sensual appropriation that goes on in my appraisal of myself and my daily encounters with people, situations and things, that anything I might offer as to how one is to best go about making sense of themselves, how they might relax or be calm, or confess your sins, or some sort of contemplative introspection and self reflection, or activity of service, while they indeed might be good practices, and thousands of people throughout time have been advocating such practices in every conceivable form, I simply see that these ideas and practices are merely real, and that – if I can say it – the spirit of meaning behind all these ideas and practices have lost their significance. We need to begin again in order re-contextualize them to their proper sphere, for their meaning has been usurped by the conventional faith, what Zizek, and Max Weber for that matter, might call the spirit of capitalism.

Hence we should see that when I say that I am not talking about or otherwise advocating a subjectivity, I am serving two purposes, two masters. For one: The reader should be unseated, should at least be surprised if not totally offended. In my early post I wrote, even as I tend to forget my plight, that hardly one will be up to the task, and as I gain readers I will probably lose twice as many, such that if there is one person in a thousand years who can hear such blasphemy then I have done well enough. And two: Discourse is a strategy. The predominance of philosophers and critical thinkers, but particularly our latest breed, find their purpose in a common humanity of inspiration, and so they capitalize upon this inspiration to advocate for the enlightening of the individual to their inspired purpose. What is occurring then is nothing less that a modernist proliferation of ideological phenomenal structure; this is exactly where Latour takes his cue. I call this strategy, as a mythological imperative, the conventional reality. Reality occurs in this way, according to this structure of meaning. This manner, the mode of developing a strategy for the purpose of establishing an ideological identity, is patent; it is manifest. It is the lens through which reality is viewed. Thus, I cannot propose to navigate around this; rather, I must simply set it aside.

I must do this because I am not concerned with advocating some proper reality; I am not interested in propagating the repetition of ideological categories; I already do that. I am interested, the point of my endeavor, is nothing less that the exposure of the basis of all religion. All spiritual categories; all religious ideals and dogmas (or at least all that I can discern or am privy to). I propose to explain how and why all religions arose they way they did and have. And in order to do this, I have to relinquish any stake I have in the outcome. In short, and in a manner of speaking, I have to make reality my object through disconcerning myself with it. I have to make or otherwise rely upon an essential segregation in meaning.

How might I do this?

Well, the description of doing that ironically becomes the description that destroys all positions that rely upon a transcendent True Object. It is a forensic effort over an argumentative effort. All the evidence had been brought to the court. In order to make a case we have to now sort the evidence. The trial has yet to begin; or, the previous trial was ruled a mis-trial.

Nothing to be concerned with. 

“Nothing is the state in which anything does not exist.

So there is truth, there must have been something first.

Zero cannot be one unless you take one away.

Nothing depends on its something.

Something is not anything.

Something is by itself.

Nothing is.

Something is nothing, but nothing is nothing to be concerned with.”

The Dismal Rejects. 1985. 

We might see in this simple song the basis for conventional speculation and its repetition under the inspired ‘more true’ method of argument. 
In response to Latour’s defense,we might call this reaction, the reaction to the real necessity to have nothing indicate a trascendental truth, the ‘devil’s advocate’. 

Indeed, contrary to Latour’s assertion, he is indeed a devils advocate, of the opinion based in the ideological omniscience, in bad faith. A faith that is proposed not to be of faith. This faith sees of reason the power to bring transcendence into meaningful coordination with reality. Through the proper philosophical method, reduction by elimination, he proclaims the positions cannot remain in-themselves and still interact. That there must be a reasonable and rational philosophical reduction. 

The only response to this insistence is “idiot”!  So here also we see why a divergence is necessary. The defenders of the ideological state will not admit a jurisdiction outside their purview. 
We will see if this opinion pans out as I make my way through his AIME book.
More in a bit. 

the Divergent Proposal, part 3

We should be careful about positing a transcendence, of proposing or implicating what content might be of such a situation.

We might remember an earlier post of Constructive Undoing where I put forth a quite post-modern idea that would rightly be seen to contradict the appearance of the situation alluded to in the last post (part 2). This idea is that there is nothing beyond discourse. What exactly am I saying, then, by proposing that the philosophy that identifies the table is not accounting for all that may exist of the table? I seem to remember that I have said that nothing exists beyond discourse.

It would be easy to come to a certain conclusion of an essential transcendental element or aspect concerning what I have called the divergent situation. But this is the problem before us: What is the truth of the matter? How might we accommodate the fact that nothing exists outside of discourse as well as the matter of discourse not accounting for the entirety of the table, the same situation I have called of the object, that by extension I include for what I am calling my self? A confusion might arise when I include these other things in equanimity: The table in itself is never found; the object, all objects, are never found; my self is never found in itself. There appears to be a discontinuity between these items; most people would not find it difficult to follow such reasoning that marks a table as an object, but then not be able to see how my self can be included as an object. After all, is it not the subject, the self, that is considering these things? Is it not a typical framing that sees a sort of thoughtful human subject thinking that is responsible for the object by which we can speak of one’s orientation upon objects? It is this view that sees that there are objects that do not fulfill the subjective mandate and that one need rather look inward, reflect upon oneself, to find the truth.

Unfortunately, we are not speaking of a subjective truth either; rather, subjective truth is still relative truth, still conventional truth, still a truth that is oriented upon, as we say, True Objects.

The problem with an essential self is that then we have exceptionalized one particular term to have a capacity that extends beyond the maxim that there is nothing beyond discourse. Here, essential would have to contain or uphold a meaning that is capable of being attached to something actually transcendent, as if here we have an objective world of objects that are spoken about and looked into, through which we never find the object in itself, that included the subject in-itself, so instead, we have to look to the subject itself to find the truth, and through this looking to the subject aside from objects, we then find something that is transcendent the world of objects, which is what we usually call spiritual and this is to say that what is spiritual actually is or reflects the truth. Yet to more thoroughly reveal the situation; even if we get a little more philosophical and find that there is nothing beyond discourse, still most people cannot bring this to its ends and instead retain the subject as the exception to mean that the subject apprehends the world of objects through discourse, through the naming of things, and this naming arises as an economy of knowable and relatable things, such that the subject, the knower, reserves a right within its unimpeachable position, a right that is exemplified by the term, here, essential, such that in as much as discourse may work to include the subject in a scheme of identification, such as psychology, there is still some part that is not being contained in the working of discourse as an inclusive economy, which is to say, that nothing exists beyond or outside of, that indeed there is something that exists outside of discourse by virtue of the this one term that bestows upon its object that ability or capacity to exist outside of said discourse.

Again, but ironically, this is indeed the case. Yet we must not be hasty in our appropriations. Nothing exists outside of discourse. Again, the problem involved in this statement, the problem that offends most human subjects, is that it is saying that indeed they, the subject(s), do not exist, which is obviously not the case. The corner in which they find themselves brings them at all times to have to find something that defies the very philosophical idea of nothing existing outside of discourse. They thus define an arena that is subjective and of a spirit. But what is occurring is that they are merely situating objects, arranging objects to accommodate their subjecthood, the exeptionality to the philosophical rule.

But what has happened? A moment ago we were talking about the condition of the table, of an object that we can thereby associate with objects in general; now it seems you you are talking not about objects but of terms, names of objects. But, if we can recall, in part 2 I was talking about how there is this thing, the table, that exists as a negotiation of terms, and that by extension I can speak about my pants, my feet, my brain, et cetera, but as well my thoughts, and my self. What can I possibly mean by this?

What are my thoughts? Well, just as the table exists as a fluid configuration of aspects, all of which are negotiated through discourse, thoughts likewise exist in the very same way. We may look for a table, or we may look for a thought. The only way that either one of these things may be distinguished is through a reference of meaning, references that are a part of the economy of negotiated objects. The caveat that pervades every type of description of this sort, and indeed lurks precariously worrying of its dissolution, is that thinking is that by which all this other stuff has an ability to exist. The distinction that reveals this hidden caveat, that holds the potential to show its decoupling, is that this economy grants the possibility of meaning by which thoughts may consider what reality is and how to negotiate it, which is to say then that, on one hand, thought, the term, has an exceptional ability, capacity or presence to identify something essentially not discursive, while on the other, thought is just another term that is informed as to its meaning through the discursive economy. Everywhere we turn, we find the philosophical fault; namely that if we can talk about how reality is reflected by discourse, that reality is discourse, then the only way we can know of this is to have some part of discourse not subject to this philosophical mandate. Which part is it?

Contradiction arises at various philosophical junctures and this is merely one of them. But at each of these junctures, there appears for the considering mind a hesitation, as Bruno Latour might say, a surprise that calls forth what we can call a pass. In our case here, the pass can be said to occur in the terms that are exceptions to the philosophical reduction. These passes occur within certain contexts, at the ends of particular meaningful reductions, such as the one I have put forth here. For example, in one reduction, thought can be said to be a pass; in another, self or subject. Though similar to Latour’s ‘passes’ – he uses the term to indicate where inconsistencies are overlooked or missed, and so where the operator passes by or over them — here we mean to indicate the junctures at which the operator does not pass; which is to say, moments of meaning at which the operator is offended; those moments where the operator falls back and does not pass. Presented in this light, we might begin to see how faith operates, and why we speak of conventional method, conventional reality, and conventional faith.


Never is the meaning of the philosophical mandate taken for what it means in itself. It is as if in the very reasoning by which we come upon an object only reducible to knowledge is the argument already occurring, such that philosophy is incapable of acknowledging what it is really saying. At all times, not only is there an aspect that is withheld from the proposal by which to gain the proposal, but this withholding allows for the meaning of the mandate to fall into certain pathways of meaning that deny there is anything being withheld, again, secretly passing over the problem. Rather, the pass is that there is an aspect of reality that is transcendent to the negotiation of objects, but further that this negotiation is allowed because of an ability for real mediation between the presumed transcendence and the real object in question. The mediation here is thought, but due to agency that appears within this meaningful paradigm, the meaningful paradigm that arises in offense of the contradictory junctures always held off and in suspension, thought itself is seen to be of an independent sort, stemming from an aspect or element that is independent of the object in question. The ‘subject’, the ‘self’, ‘consciousness’; all these terms are supposed to identify essential components of reality that are separated enough from the philosophical world to thereby enact philosophical mandates, even to be able to describe how itself, the subject thinking agent, is incorporated into the real truth of things, the in itself truth of the thing in question.

The point here is that humanity behaves as if there are indeed True Objects, object in-themselves that humanity not only can know but indeed exist independently and beyond human’s ability to know. Here we have the Speculative Realist and Object Oriented Ontology notions. But all that has happened in that a pass has been activated; in this case, regardless of what anyone wants to say about how the object exists only within knowledge, and not in-itself, the object still remains effectively an object in-itself, such that the awareness of how the Kantian idea fails thereby necessitates a certain pondering about a world that might exist beyond knowledge, since now knowledge concordantly is not confined by its own limit of having only known objects. Now one may speculate about what might occur in an essential case of objects not confined to our human knowing them.

Yet, this all is occurring within discourse. The Speculative possibility occurs in the same real paradigm of of applied knowledge; what is meant, or what has been meant, is that terms are conveying a truth of things, namely, that the known object does not exhaust the object. The basic presumption of the Speculative proposals of that there is something ‘more’, something that is able to view things from a distance, something that is withheld from the discourse that is doing the telling. While the meaning of the True Object may shed light along or toward a certain path, it is within the reaction to the offense that brings the Speculative, as if this arena is indeed an essential situation, activated by what we might call the Speculative pass.

We do not make the issue so complicated. These passes indicate one thing: There is an effective real faith that is determining how one is to appropriate reality. But there is not faiths; the idea of more than one faith is really an assertion of belief, but this idea of various beliefs admits its own fault, of how it occurs within the real faith, its basis oriented toward True Objects, or as we say, conventional faith. Hence, we can begin to see how we are indicting philosophy for how proposes to be speaking for all that might be real and true; we are indicting the assumption of the common effort in as much as this effort relies upon a series of passes that remain concealed by the method itself. Thus our issue is that the conclusion of philosophy, as an effort that is proposed upon a common effort, in the manner we describe, a common understanding as well as route or method for that understanding, is incorrect.

Due to this, divergence arises away from such faith, away from such speculative matters. The situation that requires as it indicates the philosophical pass is the rejection of contradiction as a method of coming to the truth. Instead, we merely say that such passes reveal that there is a discourse that is faulty, that there is a manner of appropriating discourse that is promoted as it is asserted as proper, real and true. In this sense, contradiction is that which is offensive, is that which marks where and when one has went astray, that one should fall back into the faith that posits an essential transcendent subjectivity.

Again: We are not advocating some essential transcendence. What we are proposing is that whatever might be transcendent, or nothing beyond discourse, as the case may or not be, is a result of the conventional faith, in so much as such faith is indeed an effective faith. There is nothing beyond discourse because discourse is how we account for everything, including what may be nothing in-itself; whatever may be beyond discourse in as much as discourse identifies objects, is thus a True transcendence. It works; it functions to grant reality, and it is the functioning that we are concerned with. Reality exists against a transcendence that can be noticed in those moments that we have identified as passes, those moments that are passed over because they are invisible to the operator; which is to say, the proposals function to grant real solute objects in-themselves. The first pass can be understood as the contradiction between the metaphysical proposal that reveals that no object is being discovered in-itself, but only through a relation of terms founded in knowledge, and its opposite, the reliance upon the terms to grant True Objects for the purpose of have an ability to make proposals. Thus, as much as such this reduction reveals that discourse reduces reality to this particular truth, of contradiction, shows that at least part of the object that is supposed to be accounted for by this metaphysical conclusion is not being account for, and that thus this particular meaningful vector, this particular methodological route, is faulty, not true. 

We have yet to step out from the umbrella of modern thought; post-modern is just another manner of being modern. When we attempt to gain an understanding of what is occurring, we have yet to see that the redundancy is the intrinsic mythology functioning to supply reality. Currently, I tend to concur with Zizek, to say that our current paradigm is capitalism, that the real catholic religion is the working of capitalistic value upon identified commodities, or what we call objects, but what can be more precisely identified as terms. The key is to understand that every mythology proposes itself upon all reality, the whole universe, and the entirety of history.

We are talking about how ‘philosophy’, as a particular identifying name for an effort, similar to say, a manual called ‘car repair’, proposes to be speaking for all that might be real and true, metaphysics. Thus our issue is that the conclusion of philosophy, as an effort that is proposed upon a common effort, a common understanding as well as route or method for that understanding, is incorrect. Hence we propose a divergent philosophical route; for our analogy, the manual called ‘car repair’ didn’t repair the car, in fact it arrived nowhere near a repaired car. The car may move down the road, but it is clogging the air with pollution, oil is leaking all over the road, the engine routinely overheats. It is repainted time to time and looks really great for a bit, the upholstery is repaired and sometimes replaced, and the interior is sprayed with air freshener; the car indeed may indeed function, but who the hell would buy such a piece of crap?

The significant question is how is it possible to step outside of the intrinsic mythology.

The answer comes when we no longer see contradiction as indicating the ends of discourse in an absolute sense, and that we are speaking of an end to a particular discourse.

the Divergent Proposal, part 2

The question left in the previous essay (the Divergent Proposal) asked us to consider what about the current philosophical proposals are apparent in our daily lives. We need unpack this. Easy at it may seem to refer to science and say that there indeed are processes at work that we do not recognize or acknowledge in our daily activities, we should have pause when including philosophy in this deferment.

We have already touched upon the presumed equivalency of philosophy and science, of metaphysics and physics. Indeed, the arena in which we are involved at this point is ripe for deception; we argue one one side in order to argue against it, to argue the other side. Let us take the usual philosophical example, from the basis that is assumed common of the likes of Bertrand Russell. His description of the situation is a good one. He considers a table and moves toward finding what the table actually is and goes on to describe that at no time do we ever arrive at a table. The table exists as a condition of multiple aspects that arrive according to the various routes of analysis, sensation, intelligence, the instruments used, mode of comparison, et cetera. In fact, it might be possible to bring in Harman’s “Third Chair” as a response to this situation. Nevertheless, in considering an object, there is no knowable reduction that encounters a table, as we say, in-itself.

Now despite that Russel is probably responding to the 200 years of critical philosophical thought since Kant by suggesting that the object exists through different modes (well get to Latour later), it is sufficient to say that through the working of all such modes, even then, we still never get to the table itself, but instead find out selves and the ability to know of the chair within a network of approaches, attitudes, and views. At root, again despite out intellectual strategies that appear to offer us new ways in the attempt to find it, we still find that we never get to the table in-itself.

Something odd has occurred here that I have not seen addressed anywhere in the philosophical literature. Nowhere do philosophers address this shift; I only hear of ‘turns’, but no one ever talks about why or how such a shift occurred. They only justify why it is logical or sensible to begin to speak about something in a particular way. What I always see is philosophers starting in the middle. This shifting of starting in the middle bahaving like it is a beginning, we call a type of pass.

So it is time to start at the beginning again. Any philosophical and or critical effort worth its salt begins its proposal at the beginning. Now, of course, with this statement we should then see that indeed most philosophers would have something to say about that; they would probably say, for one, that that is why people go to school, maybe major in philosophy or at least take a couple classes or read some books. But also, as many are indeed accredited academics, studies and well learned if not proven intelligent, they would say that they indeed have a position (just look at my papers and books Ive written) and that they do start at the beginning.

Again, we have something odd that has occurred here. Are you feeling it? Do you see it?

My hint is that the problem is in the very route by which such beginning are being said to have substantiality. Indeed, there may be a ‘beginning’ of philosophical considerations located somewhere in time, somewhere in the historical library, but isn’t that what and where philosophy gains it stature? From the neverending shuffling and proposing upon various manners of statements, of arguments? We do not find a beginning here. Those philosophers who would site this route might say that, well, one needs to know the issues, the various proposals made around particular topics, and then through addressing and getting responses upon various proposals made through considering particular vectors and types of philosophical arenas (epistemology, ontology, computer science, artificial intelligence, ecological idealism, et cetera) one has developed a position and there by has allowed a sort of organic beginning to arrive by the mere fact of now the operator being involved in the network of discussions. Indeed, the philosophers of this route would say that the very idea of beginnings is another philosophical arena unto itself. (And here I am considering such beginnings. LOL)

Further, though we can site the ideas of Kant as a certain beginning by which to draw conclusions as to what is and has been occurring over the past 300 yeas or so, we could just as well start with the Ancient Greeks. The point is is that it doesn’t matter where we start in the historical discursive record, what matters is what is occurring when a person reads a philosophical work and come to certain ideas about what is occurring and or what to do next, where to go, where to look.

But lets go back to the simple philosophical situation. The table; the object. The basic: Im sitting here on the couch typing on my computer with my legs up on this table. I am going to purposefully limit my scope and focus on the table. What is the table? Take a moment. What do I need to know, have, experience the table?  Of course, there is a slew of critical thinkers that would say, Oh, well, what about the table are you trying to consider? Its “beingness”? it relation to your knowing it? Its structure? Its physicality? Its relations to other things? The mind that is considering it?

Blah blah. Ok yeah; humans have at its disposal potentials located of individuals for various kinds of approaches and solutions to various problems that it also can creatively apprehend. Such is intelligence, ego, superego, wit, privilege, schooling, strategy… Again: We are not attempting to elaborate upon what might occur in the middle of things. We are not advocating the mediating subject. We concede that there is this real aspect of being human and that humanity functions within reality along dynamics of all these possibilities of novel and rehashed ideas that arise from real human viability. There are philosophical thinkers that merely want to showcase their super philosophical intelligence, and likewise there are spiritual gurus who only want to ‘be helpful’. We grant all the ideas that arise to make various real explanations.

What is the table? Let us take the Kantian and Russelian idea as a beginning. In the framing above, we can say that the table exists only as knowledge and that such knowledge exhibits a network of functional categories that are ever changing, dynamic in the flow that is the human and universal exchange and negotiation of information, the views offered through encountering the table at different observational and sensational junctures allowing for any particular frame of reality by which to enjoin further negotiation for progress.

Really? So me sitting here right now, the table that I have my feet on is really a product of a dynamic network of knowledge? In this respect, if the real table is indeed is totally accounted for and described by that statement and extrapolations, rebuttals and reiterations and proposals of actuality, then I would have to say then that the table on which I have my feet is not real. In fact, if I extrapolate to other objects the same basis, such as that cup, the floor, the window, the tree outside, electricity, my car, my hat, coat, chair, book, my foot, legs, pants, bulbous belly, fingers, eyes, vision, brain, thoughts…then I must say that at least part of what is occurring is not real, including most significantly, that aspect by which I am able to have such a consideration, that I call, colloquially, my self.

By this situation I just described, we, in some partial yet significant way, discount what philosophical considerations that propose upon me what is real and true. And by this we can categorize these new Realist proposals as of another sort of ontology, another sort of teleology. In fact, we have only then to see that what they are proposing, as psychologically as well as politically and objectively,, falls entirely into the realm of phenomenal ideology. I am a psychological being only in as much as I must speak about what is occurring in particular manner to make sense to those occupants of that real world in which I find myself.

We must admit then, given all the Zizekian-Lacanian-Hegalian ontological posturing that a type of non-philosophical event is occurring. The way I frame it is that I must behave as a lie. I must wholeheartedly and truly take the form of that which I argue against in order to expose and reveal the faultiness of that position, and that is the only way any sort of progress can occur. So if this is the case, then I have only to offer that such Realists, again, are involved in a Bad Faith, because they are posturing upon an existential maxim of honesty that cannot occur truthfully in any ideological stance.

But, we cannot say that somehow I have a better grasp on some truth of reality. No. The functioning of reality occurs the only way that its does; the significant question is rather about orientation upon objects, and not whether any particular mode of existence is more or less real.

I am concerned with truth. Reality is left to those so invested in objective identities. I propose through a divergent route that uses ideological structures in order to expose their fallacy. In short: The offensive route is toward the destruction of the transcendental object of faith, the fetishized commodity of identity. Yet see that this is not to suggest that reality will somehow relinquish what we must say are their idols. This never occurs. Rather we merely attempt to lay a foundation by which to speak about what is neglected, in fact, agued out of existence, or rather, this can be to say, what has been usurped by the discourse of power.

Ill get back to what happened later in this essay.


“It is not so much that God does not exist, or that there is no God, but that the term no longer helps us in the effort to find out what is really happening, actually occurring.”


A comment on the Mysterium Tremmendum

(From reply to View from a Burrow: On Courage…thought it is a good indication of what we are getting at in our investigations…)

…Perhaps, but I think there is too much agency in this interpretation.

If I may:

This is to say that to read Zizek from a position that is ‘outside of’ Zizek equates to the ‘spontaenous’ by which he speaks of the lie. Zizek must be read ‘of Zizek’, and not ‘of Lance (myself) upon Zizek’, so to speak. When this (the former) occurs, then one might see that Zizek is not implicating any sort of agency, but is sorting out a situation wherein such and such must be the case. From such a position, what is terrible has already occurred and so there is no inconsistency, no lie: There is no agent that needs to ‘attempt’ or ‘try’ to do anything: The agent occurs ‘outside’ the situation. There is no ‘reflection’. The un-reflection, the spontaneous occurs as a necessary situation to justify the situation itself, the absurd situation, where the operator has been terrified out of such divisions, out of any state of reflection or non-reflection. Within this situation arises a justification, a ‘world’ of the possibility of spontaneity, of some division of human thoughtful attributes, so the operator may speak about it in a sensible manner.

When we can see a relation such as it seems you bring here, of the similarity of K and Z, in this light, of the consequences of the actual situation of trembling against the ‘mysterious tremendum’ as opposed to merely trembling against the idols of the mystery – the lie is seen, not as some thoughtful introspection upon the possibility of of there being different manners to come upon or behave or appropriate The world, not as if there is indeed some Lie of which Everyone somehow Is dealing with as some sort of grand common human basis – this is the Lie itself, the deception occurring. It occurs as a condition of coming upon the tremendous fear itself, not as some conceptual paradigm.

The ‘greater’ humanity that deals with this Lie as if at some times they have to not deal with it, or deal with it as some sort of transformative catalyst innate to the common humanity: This is the Idol that Kierkegaard is speaking of. The activity of ‘raising ones awareness’ is part of the idolatry, and this idolatry is part of the situation that …  “takes place only when the traumatic truth is not only accepted in a disengaged way, but is fully lived…”

When we begin to see this, then we can begin to see a type of Hegalian movement of history, indeed, see ourselves beyond the daily struggles of phenomenalist living, of want and psychological agency that involve such idols. Indeed, once the idols have been set aside and the traumatic truth is accepted because the only way one has to deal with it is to disengage from it, then there is no struggle. There is only conditions, only occasions to speak and do.

But the actual situation is that there is no transformation to be had: This is the offense of which Kierkegaard speaks. The resentment of which Nietzche speaks: That to talk about how there is no conceptual bridge, no act of agency, that will get one ‘beyond the idol’ is the very situation that is ‘sin’, that is our ironic situation, our absurd situation.

And Im not entirely sure how you intend you meaning, but: There is no courage to be had; to stand before the mysterium tremmendum all courage is obliterated. Any courage that may be effectively enacted is courage that faces only idols. The trauma of which Z is speaking, cannot be mitigated by some rationality, some conceptual strategy; any strategy he might be speaking of is merely a condition of the situation that has already occurred that applies no strategy of itself.C

The Search for Wisdom in the Anthropecene .

Excuse The misspelling in the title. I’m lazy.
I’m always giving Prof Bryant crap; I think he got tired of fielding emails from non-students of his, but I take it personally. I’m just an ass that way.

There is something that just strikes me as off about Bryant’s stuff. He seems to come upon good observations, but his responses — I can’t quite put my finger on what it is that appears to me to be missing something that I see is quite vital.

Here is a latest post of his:

One that strikes me is his ambivalence , his kind of wishy washy ness. I feel like philosophers take that as a kind of admirable quality, but there is a difference between mushy and open.

(I’m such a shit talker — but to no one that cares: why would anyone who makes a living at something care about the opinion of someone who does it with no consequences attached to his standard of living? It would seem the professional’s ability to house and feed herself is vested in coming up with particular kinds of problems and solutions, of exhibiting a certain kind of attitude. How else could they have been hired and stay employed?)

A pivotal discernment to his essay: He appears to be so oriented upon, what I call, True Objects, what others setting aside strictly philosophical designations would probably call “things out there”. He is bringing up some airy forlorn  sadness out getting back to the question of Wisdom, but is already lost in the field of objects, already oriented in his being toward looking for himself, or the solution to the world and living a good life, out in the world. In this, I would say as much as he calls himself an OOO or a Speculative Realist, I would say he is clueless even in what those labels mean or are saying. Like he just attached himself to the label cuz it seemed like it had some solution for him….

I would say it all makes sense. And the philosophical question is how to put it in words that make sense.

But this is not a closed mind, a pompousness as if I know it all, but exactly the opposite. It is that it all makes sense, and there is a problem in this because it seems that it should not.

exactly the opposite of Bryant.

not that Bryant is closed minded, but perhaps that he is already looking for the answer in objects, those things that exclude, somehow, the investigator. and in this way is closed to the possibility that may lay outside of such objects (in that subjects are now objects also; that we cannot no longer doubt).

So the query goes to those who would say that it does not all make sense. Against which I would have to say what? is not made sense ? how is it possible for you to come to a sense of what does not make sense without a sensibility by which what does not make sense indeed makes sense as to in being of a category that ‘does not make sense’?

It is this question that many will say does not make sense; but then I will have to refer those to Bryant and his kind, for there is not some ‘One’, some ‘wholeness’ to which we refer. No longer. There is not a ‘one humanity’. There is a real humanity, but then there is also something else that that this humanity, this humanity oriented upon objects, cannot admit, cannot see, is entirely unable to view. It is this type of offense that route most people to exclaim “Nonsense!!”.

And I say: Well, Ok then,thank you for that. and As I have said. We have discerned how the question concerns one’s orientation upon objects, rather that  the assertion that somehow we have made a ‘turn’, such that now there is ‘A’ real view of objects. The question arises because now there is an issue that concerns one’s orientation upon objects.

Many of the so called OOO’s and the SR’s are caught in a limitation that I call the orientation upon the True Object.

We have to understand how this occurs.

Because the True Object occurs only in faith. 


more in a bit….


“Our mission: the cessation of philosophizing?” With this provocative suggestion, Heidegger opens his lectures on Anaximander and Parmenides, delivered at the University of Freiburg in the summer semester of 1932….” (Taken from ‘Philosophy News’ ) 

But of course, philosophy didn’t end and still won’t. Thus our tack must be different.  Divergent : exposure of what is occurring.  ( not really much different.  Lol). 

The first order of anything that would be proposed for reality of truth is not proof, but rather permission. The first order of business is to establish the guidelines or parameters by which the truth will be allowed as real. If this is not done, or where this is not done, there we have license for real latitude of what might be true; I.e. Belief.  We must first establish the real possibility, then what is true extends beyond the possibility of mere subjective belief.  

the Divergent Proposal.

The other week I read a post that I believe was by Donna Haraway ( I could ne wrong) that was addressing something to the effect that was “the cresting and crashing of the Speculative Realism wave”, and again I was left in an odd sort of state. I don’t remember just what exactly her point was – probably due to the lurch I find myself in when I read about the philosophical turns and phases; but it doesn’t matter. The significance of coming across the essay has been an occasion to speak: What, exactly, ‘crested and crashed’?

The Entry into Discourse (the very first posting of Constructive Undoing) and the subsequent essays of the Direct Tangents concerned one thing: Why is Francois Laruelle using such complex and verbose language to express such a simple idea? Why did he have to have a “Dictionary of Non-Philosophy”? A better question now, one that goes to the point of this essay here, one that answers the obviousness of the mistake inherent of Haraway’s proclamation, is why would readers need such a dictionary?

It seems obvious that what prompted the Dictionary (of NP) is people did not understand what he was saying, or maybe that it was difficult to keep his definitions in order to be able to make sense of it, to thereby understand what he is saying. It is this that indicates that indeed a divergence in the estimation of occurrences is needed. My position has always been that I understood him at first read. Now, of course, those who need the Dictionary, those who in this specific case feel that NP is/was something really cool, but also those who delve and delineate and smash and ponder others’ ideas to get to what that other is actually saying, but as in this case with Laruelle, will say that I do not understand him. The same with Alain Badiou. I will not go into the whole of my dealings that are the first half of the Constructive Undoing posts; suffice it to say that no matter what I might say to paraphrase in the attempt to describe how I understand Laruelle, those so well read and versed in the Dictionary will always retort with the the definitions. In fact, they have learned the definitions so well (probably better than Laruelle himself) that they will string together Laruelle’s terms into sentences that propose to describe to me what he is saying, or what Non-Philosophy really is, or is really saying, to tell me how I am wrong in what I have gleaned and understand of Non-Philosophy. My question back is what exactly do these definitions they are flouting mean; just what are those definitions referring to? Invariably I get in response more of Laruelle’s Non-philosophical definitions. In other words, they offer me no substantial nor tangible meaning, no basis from which or for which the terms they are using have any meaning for me that says they understand what he is saying. They are incapable of telling me ‘straight’, for a colloquialism, but constantly refer to terms that have a meaning of which one needs to be informed as to a particular meaning that further has no meaning without again referencing terms that occur to meaning along a line a clausal order that lay, some how, outside regular experience. What they do use in place of this substance I seek, this relation to my direct and very real everyday experience, is more philosophical jargon, referencing various other philosophers as to their usage of terms that relate to Laruelle’s usage either through some academic and or traditional lineage, or philosophically historical lineage of ideas.

Their defense can come from an equivalence they see of their philosophy and physics. Specifically, they take the presentation of thesis measured against a common human’s informed ability to reason, as this ability is gained through the learning of just what it is to be informed to the issues of the reasoning. In short, it claims the same type of privilege that physicists claim. They call their philosophical ‘science’ metaphysics, as if to emphasize not only the ability of reason to create a path, as well as potential for development of a method, but also the ability to apprehend a truth, much like physics, that goes beyond, deeper or higher than pedestrian or regular everyday reasoning. The difference, though, between physics and metaphysics is that physics holds its claim as a science because it only gains and proceeds by what is offered of objects. The scientific tradition is verified due to its offering nothing, but only that which is offered to its method. The problem with the supposed philosophical science of metaphysics is located in the fact that what is offered to the supposed philosophical reason has no common object, but rather the assertion of such a common object occurs only within the assertion itself, of the supposed reason that is proposing to be come upon by what is offered of the common object. This is to say, there is no object that is offered to philosophy but what philosophy makes for itself. Whereas physics developed its method through response to what was and is given by the common object, philosophy problematizes this very same object through an assertion, but then justifies its method by avoiding this very fact, as if the object treated by physics and metaphysics is indeed the same object. This move is why we can attempt to identify what is or was ‘modern’; modernism has been identified as having to do or otherwise concerning a number of ideas that can tend to appear similar or of a common type. This type has been ‘of ends’, teleology, concerned with oneness, involved with meta-discourses that propose upon a proper and correct manner of the universe.

Yet, when we begin to look at philosophy we begin to see there is an insidious persistence about its presence on the scene, so to speak. For example, it is not difficult to see that any move that proposes to be done with such meta-discourses is itself an assertion toward an encompassing meta-discourse. What we can see, and say, then, is that the only thing that happened with the exposure of the ‘modern’ philosophical problem, in so much as this problem may have been already exposed, at that, by the post-modernists, is that we now have a situation of many people proposing meta-discourses who are hoping to propose the meta-discourse that ‘wins’. In short, we see that the post-modern proposals went heard but unapplied, unrecognized as to their meaning and or the origin of their meaning; rather, the application was upon a mistaken appropriation of the meaning. This is to say that despite the post-moderns’ supposedly exposing some ‘problem’ with some ‘previous manner’ of coming upon World, it appears that in response to this exposure, ‘philosophy’, or the designation of the operator of the modern philosophical metaphysical method, is still occurring, still behaving in the same manner only now ‘hiding’ it, or at least attempting to obscure the fact that indeed nothing has changed in how the modern philosophical method functions, and whether it is realized or not, the philosophical operator is still involved with the attempt to establish a true object through an investment in the fetishized commodity; which is to say, concerned with establishing identity through capital marketing. What we have now, of this situation, is what we may call a “pass”; part of our effort is to look into what is occurring with these ‘passes’. It is the description of the event of Being that even reveals Being unto itself, and the movement that occurs with the description in hand evidences such passes.

When one looks at this, it is not difficult to see that such ‘philosophers’ (the ones I’m in a discussion with, the ones who ‘know’ about Non-Philosophy, but also many modern philosophers) are lost in dialogue, what I’ve noticed has been categorized as an intellectualism. They are caught up in terms, in complex ideas, in historical schemes of sense, in lineages of meaning that are supposed and proposed to be talking about fundamental, basic and or essential ‘Truths’ of reality. In fact, when you discuss anything with such heady philosophers, it is rare that you can get them to admit anything that can relate to everyday experience. They are incapable of speaking to reality without recurring disclaimers and conditional terms on one hand, and then without constant referral to what other people think or have thought or said. This is the overt aspect of the conventional route. They are ready to announce their prodigious intellect and memory of various authors and their individual contributions and how these ideas relate to other authors and their ideas. Papers and book are written which are nothing more than comparisons, proposals of established and novel ways such ideas might intertwine and make distinction, which end in the authors offering their great syntheses of their opinion of what ideas might be better or worse, and or how various ideas might be applied to various social and political occurrences and events. This overt conventional manner is quite analytical as opposed to what has been coined as its philosophical counterpart, continental philosophy. Thus it is really the continental school that offers the greater obstacle to the overcoming of conventional route, for one’s interest is often insufficient to find what they are looking for in the continental library, especially if they are busy colliding ideas to see what comes out.

The question concerns the view by which such modern practices, as an embodiment of what is modern, are able to be questioned, since if we understand Zizek we should not be able to have such a view, that the view itself is a symptom of that which it is viewing. What we are seeing, though, or beginning to see, what the post-post moderns (Laruelle, Badiou; I feel Zizek and Latour deserve their own catagory) revealed by their descriptions, now that certain philosophers are offering their own estimation of what is ‘new’ (Brassier, Harman, Meillassoux, Bryant, to name a few) is that the historical traditional philosophical designations fail in their conventional estimations: That the speculative and practical designations fail, and are unsuited anymore to any precise discussion of what is occurring. The aggregate of philosophical wisdom has been reduced to a discursive fashion, of sorts, such that we need now diverge from the philosophical fad that obscures the truth of the matter as it asserts the proper manner of coming upon the situation by the mere over-concern (what has been called in certain circles overdetermination) that people have with establishing themselves as an identity. What we are calling out is just this reflexivity of the Zizek sort: Zizek should be properly classified with the identity he presents by the presentation of his ideas; namely, he argues the exact position he exhibits through his proposals, and that what is occurring is not as much what he proposes except in as much as he occupies a particular historical niche, so to speak, a historical position that coincides with the post-post-modern. It is once this is acknowledged that what is divergent can be revealed as to its own presence, which is to say, its own ontological basis. This is the difference that is always negated in the conventional determination, by its assertion of omniscience and omnipotence.

The essential question one needs ask is: What about such over-reaching philosophical assertions is apparent in my daily life?