Kierke-Gourd(Thank you, Carson Webb)
Kierke-Gourd(Thank you, Carson Webb)
It would seem that at least one term in a philosophical reduction would have to be able to transcend the discursive limit. But it is just his limit that defines the conventional faith, because it is not commonly understood as a faith; rather, is not seen as faith because no limit is noticed, or if it is noticed then it occurs as a pass. This is the effect of faith to grant a true reality. In this, then, there is no ‘at least one’ term that is not limited, but indeed no term is limited in this way because terms are understood to naturally always reach the object of their reference, such that it is the contingency of clause that shows what object is being reached and whether the clause is true or false. This is the meaning of the True Object of faith, of conventional reality itself. The pass can be noticed when the two situations are juxtaposed; but first we need be able to view what lay outside of reality, what we are terming not real. If what is not real cannot be ventured, then we have the mark for divergence, of the necessary departure, of the absolute withdraw from the relative world. We cannot move everyone, nor indeed anyone from their orientation upon objects. We simply describe the necessary ramifications of the situation at hand.
I suppose that there should be a primer of sorts for this undertaking.
I have already attempted to draw out a logical necessity for what is not real as a precipitated truth by showing where passes occur in conventional reckoning. The argument is that where there is a pass, that is, where a contradiction indicates an absolute end, and absolute limit, there is where we ought to see the indication of the fault of that method of reckoning, rather than an indication of where we need stop and suspend investigation as a sort of anchor. It is this latter process of staking out various ‘ends’, of ‘marking’ the ‘ends of discourse’ that is and had been the philosophical progress as reconnaissance, but that now marks philosophy, as it continues along a certain vein, in a certain mode (of denial), as correlationalist. But also see that such a move cannot be made by everyone; in fact, such a move will not be made by most, and it is for this reason that we do not argue that there is some truth that is more real than reality. We are not in an effort to prove a route that disproves real estimations of things. Instead, because we are involved in a proof of verification rather than proof of convincing, involved in a description of truth over an argument towards truth, we cannot decide that any proposal discounts or negates the overwhelming commonality of reality itself.
In a quite Foucaultian manner, we see a real stratum, a horizon, upon or within which such that an archeology might be enacted. Yet the only way we can see through to an archeology of this sort is to not engage in the real estimation of things wherein and whereby all dimensions are in play. We cannot enact an archeology upon a dynamic of relative objective networks due to the simple fact that within such a network no strata can be viewed; this is the ironic redundancy that Zizek exclaims at every turn of his prolific rhetoric. In this regard, we can only then see Latour rightly oriented and acclimated as an ethnologist, as a cultural anthropologist to this sort of plastic dynamic landscape.
Thus we have part of the reason why, upon admitting that there is nothing beyond discourse, that we are not speaking of subjects and some subjective spiritual truth.
But there is another more practical reason: Why would I need to rehash and respeak spiritual ideals that everyone already knows, or can hear from hundreds of other people way more versed in the in’s-and-out’s of spiritual-psychological jargon than me? It would be like singing to the choir and preaching to the clergy. But it is not that I am uncaring or unfeeling; I try to be kind to people and to help the ignorant and needing as and where I can, and likewise be open to help that I might need in life. Here, though, I am involved in a critical venture, not a religious one. Indeed; by some of my essays and points it seems I have gathered at least a small group of individuals who apparently see in my writing an advocating of spiritual endeavor. While this may indeed be the case, that perhaps there is a spiritual dimension to my ideas, and I am not here to dictate upon people what they may get or use of my writings, but in this critical endeavor I do not find a use to reiterate spiritual-psychological ideas or ideals. As I just said: Everyone already knows them. Everyone already knows all the Zen-type Buddhist-Hindu Tantric reductions, already the ‘oneness’ of Hurserlian phenominalist groovyness, of enlightenment-speak, of fear-and-anger-is-not-the-way-to-go speak, of praying, of meditating, of look inside yourself, of subjective appraisal, of psychological categorical mish-mashing, of Lacan-Zizek negative-positive-self-reflexive-ironic distanced ideological posture, of ‘Christ consciousness’, of Bible Christianity sectarian propriety, of Yogic discipline, higher planes of existence, pagan or Wiccan ritual cleansing, psychic and astrological coordination, Islamic submission, Jewish obeyance and celebration, et cetera, ad infinitum naseaum. And if you don’t know them, there are plenty of places to go and people to talk to a read to discuss a multitudinous of possible interchanges of things and spirit, of symbol and psychical ascension. In my view, every object and series of objects can be related to symbols to achieve various sorts of spiritual meaning. Once I was quite interested in assembling, aligning and proselytizing about these linkages and exchanges, but with an open mind I found that any and every chain of reference leads continually to other chains in a cycle of meaning that excludes the possibility that any one is true. I tend to see spiritual growth and metaphysical truth as necessitating and requiring an adamantly defended limit, and often a position of bias that usually contradicts the intension behind the very spiritual ethical advocation.
Further; what need have I to posit psychological solutions to metaphysical existential issues? If I am to say anything about such ideas I would have only three things to say: One, see many of my earlier post of Constructive Undoing if you want my post-modern Christian-Vedic take on it all; two, see above, everyone already knows them and it only matters what denomination you already subscribe to as to what will appeal to your sense of righteousness; and three; I just plain cannot take myself that seriously. There is nothing wrong with me; in fact, I would have to say that there is so much wrong with me, so many myriads of ways I can take apart all the non-sense and sensual appropriation that goes on in my appraisal of myself and my daily encounters with people, situations and things, that anything I might offer as to how one is to best go about making sense of themselves, how they might relax or be calm, or confess your sins, or some sort of contemplative introspection and self reflection, or activity of service, while they indeed might be good practices, and thousands of people throughout time have been advocating such practices in every conceivable form, I simply see that these ideas and practices are merely real, and that – if I can say it – the spirit of meaning behind all these ideas and practices have lost their significance. We need to begin again in order re-contextualize them to their proper sphere, for their meaning has been usurped by the conventional faith, what Zizek, and Max Weber for that matter, might call the spirit of capitalism.
Hence we should see that when I say that I am not talking about or otherwise advocating a subjectivity, I am serving two purposes, two masters. For one: The reader should be unseated, should at least be surprised if not totally offended. In my early post I wrote, even as I tend to forget my plight, that hardly one will be up to the task, and as I gain readers I will probably lose twice as many, such that if there is one person in a thousand years who can hear such blasphemy then I have done well enough. And two: Discourse is a strategy. The predominance of philosophers and critical thinkers, but particularly our latest breed, find their purpose in a common humanity of inspiration, and so they capitalize upon this inspiration to advocate for the enlightening of the individual to their inspired purpose. What is occurring then is nothing less that a modernist proliferation of ideological phenomenal structure; this is exactly where Latour takes his cue. I call this strategy, as a mythological imperative, the conventional reality. Reality occurs in this way, according to this structure of meaning. This manner, the mode of developing a strategy for the purpose of establishing an ideological identity, is patent; it is manifest. It is the lens through which reality is viewed. Thus, I cannot propose to navigate around this; rather, I must simply set it aside.
I must do this because I am not concerned with advocating some proper reality; I am not interested in propagating the repetition of ideological categories; I already do that. I am interested, the point of my endeavor, is nothing less that the exposure of the basis of all religion. All spiritual categories; all religious ideals and dogmas (or at least all that I can discern or am privy to). I propose to explain how and why all religions arose they way they did and have. And in order to do this, I have to relinquish any stake I have in the outcome. In short, and in a manner of speaking, I have to make reality my object through disconcerning myself with it. I have to make or otherwise rely upon an essential segregation in meaning.
How might I do this?
Well, the description of doing that ironically becomes the description that destroys all positions that rely upon a transcendent True Object. It is a forensic effort over an argumentative effort. All the evidence had been brought to the court. In order to make a case we have to now sort the evidence. The trial has yet to begin; or, the previous trial was ruled a mis-trial.
“Nothing is the state in which anything does not exist.
So there is truth, there must have been something first.
Zero cannot be one unless you take one away.
Nothing depends on its something.
Something is not anything.
Something is by itself.
Something is nothing, but nothing is nothing to be concerned with.”
–The Dismal Rejects. 1985.
We might see in this simple song the basis for conventional speculation and its repetition under the inspired ‘more true’ method of argument.
In response to Latour’s defense,we might call this reaction, the reaction to the real necessity to have nothing indicate a trascendental truth, the ‘devil’s advocate’.
Indeed, contrary to Latour’s assertion, he is indeed a devils advocate, of the opinion based in the ideological omniscience, in bad faith. A faith that is proposed not to be of faith. This faith sees of reason the power to bring transcendence into meaningful coordination with reality. Through the proper philosophical method, reduction by elimination, he proclaims the positions cannot remain in-themselves and still interact. That there must be a reasonable and rational philosophical reduction.
The only response to this insistence is “idiot”! So here also we see why a divergence is necessary. The defenders of the ideological state will not admit a jurisdiction outside their purview.
We will see if this opinion pans out as I make my way through his AIME book.
More in a bit.
We should be careful about positing a transcendence, of proposing or implicating what content might be of such a situation.
We might remember an earlier post of Constructive Undoing where I put forth a quite post-modern idea that would rightly be seen to contradict the appearance of the situation alluded to in the last post (part 2). This idea is that there is nothing beyond discourse. What exactly am I saying, then, by proposing that the philosophy that identifies the table is not accounting for all that may exist of the table? I seem to remember that I have said that nothing exists beyond discourse.
It would be easy to come to a certain conclusion of an essential transcendental element or aspect concerning what I have called the divergent situation. But this is the problem before us: What is the truth of the matter? How might we accommodate the fact that nothing exists outside of discourse as well as the matter of discourse not accounting for the entirety of the table, the same situation I have called of the object, that by extension I include for what I am calling my self? A confusion might arise when I include these other things in equanimity: The table in itself is never found; the object, all objects, are never found; my self is never found in itself. There appears to be a discontinuity between these items; most people would not find it difficult to follow such reasoning that marks a table as an object, but then not be able to see how my self can be included as an object. After all, is it not the subject, the self, that is considering these things? Is it not a typical framing that sees a sort of thoughtful human subject thinking that is responsible for the object by which we can speak of one’s orientation upon objects? It is this view that sees that there are objects that do not fulfill the subjective mandate and that one need rather look inward, reflect upon oneself, to find the truth.
Unfortunately, we are not speaking of a subjective truth either; rather, subjective truth is still relative truth, still conventional truth, still a truth that is oriented upon, as we say, True Objects.
The problem with an essential self is that then we have exceptionalized one particular term to have a capacity that extends beyond the maxim that there is nothing beyond discourse. Here, essential would have to contain or uphold a meaning that is capable of being attached to something actually transcendent, as if here we have an objective world of objects that are spoken about and looked into, through which we never find the object in itself, that included the subject in-itself, so instead, we have to look to the subject itself to find the truth, and through this looking to the subject aside from objects, we then find something that is transcendent the world of objects, which is what we usually call spiritual and this is to say that what is spiritual actually is or reflects the truth. Yet to more thoroughly reveal the situation; even if we get a little more philosophical and find that there is nothing beyond discourse, still most people cannot bring this to its ends and instead retain the subject as the exception to mean that the subject apprehends the world of objects through discourse, through the naming of things, and this naming arises as an economy of knowable and relatable things, such that the subject, the knower, reserves a right within its unimpeachable position, a right that is exemplified by the term, here, essential, such that in as much as discourse may work to include the subject in a scheme of identification, such as psychology, there is still some part that is not being contained in the working of discourse as an inclusive economy, which is to say, that nothing exists beyond or outside of, that indeed there is something that exists outside of discourse by virtue of the this one term that bestows upon its object that ability or capacity to exist outside of said discourse.
Again, but ironically, this is indeed the case. Yet we must not be hasty in our appropriations. Nothing exists outside of discourse. Again, the problem involved in this statement, the problem that offends most human subjects, is that it is saying that indeed they, the subject(s), do not exist, which is obviously not the case. The corner in which they find themselves brings them at all times to have to find something that defies the very philosophical idea of nothing existing outside of discourse. They thus define an arena that is subjective and of a spirit. But what is occurring is that they are merely situating objects, arranging objects to accommodate their subjecthood, the exeptionality to the philosophical rule.
But what has happened? A moment ago we were talking about the condition of the table, of an object that we can thereby associate with objects in general; now it seems you you are talking not about objects but of terms, names of objects. But, if we can recall, in part 2 I was talking about how there is this thing, the table, that exists as a negotiation of terms, and that by extension I can speak about my pants, my feet, my brain, et cetera, but as well my thoughts, and my self. What can I possibly mean by this?
What are my thoughts? Well, just as the table exists as a fluid configuration of aspects, all of which are negotiated through discourse, thoughts likewise exist in the very same way. We may look for a table, or we may look for a thought. The only way that either one of these things may be distinguished is through a reference of meaning, references that are a part of the economy of negotiated objects. The caveat that pervades every type of description of this sort, and indeed lurks precariously worrying of its dissolution, is that thinking is that by which all this other stuff has an ability to exist. The distinction that reveals this hidden caveat, that holds the potential to show its decoupling, is that this economy grants the possibility of meaning by which thoughts may consider what reality is and how to negotiate it, which is to say then that, on one hand, thought, the term, has an exceptional ability, capacity or presence to identify something essentially not discursive, while on the other, thought is just another term that is informed as to its meaning through the discursive economy. Everywhere we turn, we find the philosophical fault; namely that if we can talk about how reality is reflected by discourse, that reality is discourse, then the only way we can know of this is to have some part of discourse not subject to this philosophical mandate. Which part is it?
Contradiction arises at various philosophical junctures and this is merely one of them. But at each of these junctures, there appears for the considering mind a hesitation, as Bruno Latour might say, a surprise that calls forth what we can call a pass. In our case here, the pass can be said to occur in the terms that are exceptions to the philosophical reduction. These passes occur within certain contexts, at the ends of particular meaningful reductions, such as the one I have put forth here. For example, in one reduction, thought can be said to be a pass; in another, self or subject. Though similar to Latour’s ‘passes’ – he uses the term to indicate where inconsistencies are overlooked or missed, and so where the operator passes by or over them — here we mean to indicate the junctures at which the operator does not pass; which is to say, moments of meaning at which the operator is offended; those moments where the operator falls back and does not pass. Presented in this light, we might begin to see how faith operates, and why we speak of conventional method, conventional reality, and conventional faith.
Never is the meaning of the philosophical mandate taken for what it means in itself. It is as if in the very reasoning by which we come upon an object only reducible to knowledge is the argument already occurring, such that philosophy is incapable of acknowledging what it is really saying. At all times, not only is there an aspect that is withheld from the proposal by which to gain the proposal, but this withholding allows for the meaning of the mandate to fall into certain pathways of meaning that deny there is anything being withheld, again, secretly passing over the problem. Rather, the pass is that there is an aspect of reality that is transcendent to the negotiation of objects, but further that this negotiation is allowed because of an ability for real mediation between the presumed transcendence and the real object in question. The mediation here is thought, but due to agency that appears within this meaningful paradigm, the meaningful paradigm that arises in offense of the contradictory junctures always held off and in suspension, thought itself is seen to be of an independent sort, stemming from an aspect or element that is independent of the object in question. The ‘subject’, the ‘self’, ‘consciousness’; all these terms are supposed to identify essential components of reality that are separated enough from the philosophical world to thereby enact philosophical mandates, even to be able to describe how itself, the subject thinking agent, is incorporated into the real truth of things, the in itself truth of the thing in question.
The point here is that humanity behaves as if there are indeed True Objects, object in-themselves that humanity not only can know but indeed exist independently and beyond human’s ability to know. Here we have the Speculative Realist and Object Oriented Ontology notions. But all that has happened in that a pass has been activated; in this case, regardless of what anyone wants to say about how the object exists only within knowledge, and not in-itself, the object still remains effectively an object in-itself, such that the awareness of how the Kantian idea fails thereby necessitates a certain pondering about a world that might exist beyond knowledge, since now knowledge concordantly is not confined by its own limit of having only known objects. Now one may speculate about what might occur in an essential case of objects not confined to our human knowing them.
Yet, this all is occurring within discourse. The Speculative possibility occurs in the same real paradigm of of applied knowledge; what is meant, or what has been meant, is that terms are conveying a truth of things, namely, that the known object does not exhaust the object. The basic presumption of the Speculative proposals of that there is something ‘more’, something that is able to view things from a distance, something that is withheld from the discourse that is doing the telling. While the meaning of the True Object may shed light along or toward a certain path, it is within the reaction to the offense that brings the Speculative, as if this arena is indeed an essential situation, activated by what we might call the Speculative pass.
We do not make the issue so complicated. These passes indicate one thing: There is an effective real faith that is determining how one is to appropriate reality. But there is not faiths; the idea of more than one faith is really an assertion of belief, but this idea of various beliefs admits its own fault, of how it occurs within the real faith, its basis oriented toward True Objects, or as we say, conventional faith. Hence, we can begin to see how we are indicting philosophy for how proposes to be speaking for all that might be real and true; we are indicting the assumption of the common effort in as much as this effort relies upon a series of passes that remain concealed by the method itself. Thus our issue is that the conclusion of philosophy, as an effort that is proposed upon a common effort, in the manner we describe, a common understanding as well as route or method for that understanding, is incorrect.
Due to this, divergence arises away from such faith, away from such speculative matters. The situation that requires as it indicates the philosophical pass is the rejection of contradiction as a method of coming to the truth. Instead, we merely say that such passes reveal that there is a discourse that is faulty, that there is a manner of appropriating discourse that is promoted as it is asserted as proper, real and true. In this sense, contradiction is that which is offensive, is that which marks where and when one has went astray, that one should fall back into the faith that posits an essential transcendent subjectivity.
Again: We are not advocating some essential transcendence. What we are proposing is that whatever might be transcendent, or nothing beyond discourse, as the case may or not be, is a result of the conventional faith, in so much as such faith is indeed an effective faith. There is nothing beyond discourse because discourse is how we account for everything, including what may be nothing in-itself; whatever may be beyond discourse in as much as discourse identifies objects, is thus a True transcendence. It works; it functions to grant reality, and it is the functioning that we are concerned with. Reality exists against a transcendence that can be noticed in those moments that we have identified as passes, those moments that are passed over because they are invisible to the operator; which is to say, the proposals function to grant real solute objects in-themselves. The first pass can be understood as the contradiction between the metaphysical proposal that reveals that no object is being discovered in-itself, but only through a relation of terms founded in knowledge, and its opposite, the reliance upon the terms to grant True Objects for the purpose of have an ability to make proposals. Thus, as much as such this reduction reveals that discourse reduces reality to this particular truth, of contradiction, shows that at least part of the object that is supposed to be accounted for by this metaphysical conclusion is not being account for, and that thus this particular meaningful vector, this particular methodological route, is faulty, not true.
We have yet to step out from the umbrella of modern thought; post-modern is just another manner of being modern. When we attempt to gain an understanding of what is occurring, we have yet to see that the redundancy is the intrinsic mythology functioning to supply reality. Currently, I tend to concur with Zizek, to say that our current paradigm is capitalism, that the real catholic religion is the working of capitalistic value upon identified commodities, or what we call objects, but what can be more precisely identified as terms. The key is to understand that every mythology proposes itself upon all reality, the whole universe, and the entirety of history.
We are talking about how ‘philosophy’, as a particular identifying name for an effort, similar to say, a manual called ‘car repair’, proposes to be speaking for all that might be real and true, metaphysics. Thus our issue is that the conclusion of philosophy, as an effort that is proposed upon a common effort, a common understanding as well as route or method for that understanding, is incorrect. Hence we propose a divergent philosophical route; for our analogy, the manual called ‘car repair’ didn’t repair the car, in fact it arrived nowhere near a repaired car. The car may move down the road, but it is clogging the air with pollution, oil is leaking all over the road, the engine routinely overheats. It is repainted time to time and looks really great for a bit, the upholstery is repaired and sometimes replaced, and the interior is sprayed with air freshener; the car indeed may indeed function, but who the hell would buy such a piece of crap?
The significant question is how is it possible to step outside of the intrinsic mythology.
The answer comes when we no longer see contradiction as indicating the ends of discourse in an absolute sense, and that we are speaking of an end to a particular discourse.
The question left in the previous essay (the Divergent Proposal) asked us to consider what about the current philosophical proposals are apparent in our daily lives. We need unpack this. Easy at it may seem to refer to science and say that there indeed are processes at work that we do not recognize or acknowledge in our daily activities, we should have pause when including philosophy in this deferment.
We have already touched upon the presumed equivalency of philosophy and science, of metaphysics and physics. Indeed, the arena in which we are involved at this point is ripe for deception; we argue one one side in order to argue against it, to argue the other side. Let us take the usual philosophical example, from the basis that is assumed common of the likes of Bertrand Russell. His description of the situation is a good one. He considers a table and moves toward finding what the table actually is and goes on to describe that at no time do we ever arrive at a table. The table exists as a condition of multiple aspects that arrive according to the various routes of analysis, sensation, intelligence, the instruments used, mode of comparison, et cetera. In fact, it might be possible to bring in Harman’s “Third Chair” as a response to this situation. Nevertheless, in considering an object, there is no knowable reduction that encounters a table, as we say, in-itself.
Now despite that Russel is probably responding to the 200 years of critical philosophical thought since Kant by suggesting that the object exists through different modes (well get to Latour later), it is sufficient to say that through the working of all such modes, even then, we still never get to the table itself, but instead find out selves and the ability to know of the chair within a network of approaches, attitudes, and views. At root, again despite out intellectual strategies that appear to offer us new ways in the attempt to find it, we still find that we never get to the table in-itself.
Something odd has occurred here that I have not seen addressed anywhere in the philosophical literature. Nowhere do philosophers address this shift; I only hear of ‘turns’, but no one ever talks about why or how such a shift occurred. They only justify why it is logical or sensible to begin to speak about something in a particular way. What I always see is philosophers starting in the middle. This shifting of starting in the middle bahaving like it is a beginning, we call a type of pass.
So it is time to start at the beginning again. Any philosophical and or critical effort worth its salt begins its proposal at the beginning. Now, of course, with this statement we should then see that indeed most philosophers would have something to say about that; they would probably say, for one, that that is why people go to school, maybe major in philosophy or at least take a couple classes or read some books. But also, as many are indeed accredited academics, studies and well learned if not proven intelligent, they would say that they indeed have a position (just look at my papers and books Ive written) and that they do start at the beginning.
Again, we have something odd that has occurred here. Are you feeling it? Do you see it?
My hint is that the problem is in the very route by which such beginning are being said to have substantiality. Indeed, there may be a ‘beginning’ of philosophical considerations located somewhere in time, somewhere in the historical library, but isn’t that what and where philosophy gains it stature? From the neverending shuffling and proposing upon various manners of statements, of arguments? We do not find a beginning here. Those philosophers who would site this route might say that, well, one needs to know the issues, the various proposals made around particular topics, and then through addressing and getting responses upon various proposals made through considering particular vectors and types of philosophical arenas (epistemology, ontology, computer science, artificial intelligence, ecological idealism, et cetera) one has developed a position and there by has allowed a sort of organic beginning to arrive by the mere fact of now the operator being involved in the network of discussions. Indeed, the philosophers of this route would say that the very idea of beginnings is another philosophical arena unto itself. (And here I am considering such beginnings. LOL)
Further, though we can site the ideas of Kant as a certain beginning by which to draw conclusions as to what is and has been occurring over the past 300 yeas or so, we could just as well start with the Ancient Greeks. The point is is that it doesn’t matter where we start in the historical discursive record, what matters is what is occurring when a person reads a philosophical work and come to certain ideas about what is occurring and or what to do next, where to go, where to look.
But lets go back to the simple philosophical situation. The table; the object. The basic: Im sitting here on the couch typing on my computer with my legs up on this table. I am going to purposefully limit my scope and focus on the table. What is the table? Take a moment. What do I need to know, have, experience the table? Of course, there is a slew of critical thinkers that would say, Oh, well, what about the table are you trying to consider? Its “beingness”? it relation to your knowing it? Its structure? Its physicality? Its relations to other things? The mind that is considering it?
Blah blah. Ok yeah; humans have at its disposal potentials located of individuals for various kinds of approaches and solutions to various problems that it also can creatively apprehend. Such is intelligence, ego, superego, wit, privilege, schooling, strategy… Again: We are not attempting to elaborate upon what might occur in the middle of things. We are not advocating the mediating subject. We concede that there is this real aspect of being human and that humanity functions within reality along dynamics of all these possibilities of novel and rehashed ideas that arise from real human viability. There are philosophical thinkers that merely want to showcase their super philosophical intelligence, and likewise there are spiritual gurus who only want to ‘be helpful’. We grant all the ideas that arise to make various real explanations.
What is the table? Let us take the Kantian and Russelian idea as a beginning. In the framing above, we can say that the table exists only as knowledge and that such knowledge exhibits a network of functional categories that are ever changing, dynamic in the flow that is the human and universal exchange and negotiation of information, the views offered through encountering the table at different observational and sensational junctures allowing for any particular frame of reality by which to enjoin further negotiation for progress.
Really? So me sitting here right now, the table that I have my feet on is really a product of a dynamic network of knowledge? In this respect, if the real table is indeed is totally accounted for and described by that statement and extrapolations, rebuttals and reiterations and proposals of actuality, then I would have to say then that the table on which I have my feet is not real. In fact, if I extrapolate to other objects the same basis, such as that cup, the floor, the window, the tree outside, electricity, my car, my hat, coat, chair, book, my foot, legs, pants, bulbous belly, fingers, eyes, vision, brain, thoughts…then I must say that at least part of what is occurring is not real, including most significantly, that aspect by which I am able to have such a consideration, that I call, colloquially, my self.
By this situation I just described, we, in some partial yet significant way, discount what philosophical considerations that propose upon me what is real and true. And by this we can categorize these new Realist proposals as of another sort of ontology, another sort of teleology. In fact, we have only then to see that what they are proposing, as psychologically as well as politically and objectively,, falls entirely into the realm of phenomenal ideology. I am a psychological being only in as much as I must speak about what is occurring in particular manner to make sense to those occupants of that real world in which I find myself.
We must admit then, given all the Zizekian-Lacanian-Hegalian ontological posturing that a type of non-philosophical event is occurring. The way I frame it is that I must behave as a lie. I must wholeheartedly and truly take the form of that which I argue against in order to expose and reveal the faultiness of that position, and that is the only way any sort of progress can occur. So if this is the case, then I have only to offer that such Realists, again, are involved in a Bad Faith, because they are posturing upon an existential maxim of honesty that cannot occur truthfully in any ideological stance.
But, we cannot say that somehow I have a better grasp on some truth of reality. No. The functioning of reality occurs the only way that its does; the significant question is rather about orientation upon objects, and not whether any particular mode of existence is more or less real.
I am concerned with truth. Reality is left to those so invested in objective identities. I propose through a divergent route that uses ideological structures in order to expose their fallacy. In short: The offensive route is toward the destruction of the transcendental object of faith, the fetishized commodity of identity. Yet see that this is not to suggest that reality will somehow relinquish what we must say are their idols. This never occurs. Rather we merely attempt to lay a foundation by which to speak about what is neglected, in fact, agued out of existence, or rather, this can be to say, what has been usurped by the discourse of power.
Ill get back to what happened later in this essay.
“It is not so much that God does not exist, or that there is no God, but that the term no longer helps us in the effort to find out what is really happening, actually occurring.”
(From reply to View from a Burrow: On Courage…thought it is a good indication of what we are getting at in our investigations…)
…Perhaps, but I think there is too much agency in this interpretation.
If I may:
This is to say that to read Zizek from a position that is ‘outside of’ Zizek equates to the ‘spontaenous’ by which he speaks of the lie. Zizek must be read ‘of Zizek’, and not ‘of Lance (myself) upon Zizek’, so to speak. When this (the former) occurs, then one might see that Zizek is not implicating any sort of agency, but is sorting out a situation wherein such and such must be the case. From such a position, what is terrible has already occurred and so there is no inconsistency, no lie: There is no agent that needs to ‘attempt’ or ‘try’ to do anything: The agent occurs ‘outside’ the situation. There is no ‘reflection’. The un-reflection, the spontaneous occurs as a necessary situation to justify the situation itself, the absurd situation, where the operator has been terrified out of such divisions, out of any state of reflection or non-reflection. Within this situation arises a justification, a ‘world’ of the possibility of spontaneity, of some division of human thoughtful attributes, so the operator may speak about it in a sensible manner.
When we can see a relation such as it seems you bring here, of the similarity of K and Z, in this light, of the consequences of the actual situation of trembling against the ‘mysterious tremendum’ as opposed to merely trembling against the idols of the mystery – the lie is seen, not as some thoughtful introspection upon the possibility of of there being different manners to come upon or behave or appropriate The world, not as if there is indeed some Lie of which Everyone somehow Is dealing with as some sort of grand common human basis – this is the Lie itself, the deception occurring. It occurs as a condition of coming upon the tremendous fear itself, not as some conceptual paradigm.
The ‘greater’ humanity that deals with this Lie as if at some times they have to not deal with it, or deal with it as some sort of transformative catalyst innate to the common humanity: This is the Idol that Kierkegaard is speaking of. The activity of ‘raising ones awareness’ is part of the idolatry, and this idolatry is part of the situation that … “takes place only when the traumatic truth is not only accepted in a disengaged way, but is fully lived…”
When we begin to see this, then we can begin to see a type of Hegalian movement of history, indeed, see ourselves beyond the daily struggles of phenomenalist living, of want and psychological agency that involve such idols. Indeed, once the idols have been set aside and the traumatic truth is accepted because the only way one has to deal with it is to disengage from it, then there is no struggle. There is only conditions, only occasions to speak and do.
But the actual situation is that there is no transformation to be had: This is the offense of which Kierkegaard speaks. The resentment of which Nietzche speaks: That to talk about how there is no conceptual bridge, no act of agency, that will get one ‘beyond the idol’ is the very situation that is ‘sin’, that is our ironic situation, our absurd situation.
And Im not entirely sure how you intend you meaning, but: There is no courage to be had; to stand before the mysterium tremmendum all courage is obliterated. Any courage that may be effectively enacted is courage that faces only idols. The trauma of which Z is speaking, cannot be mitigated by some rationality, some conceptual strategy; any strategy he might be speaking of is merely a condition of the situation that has already occurred that applies no strategy of itself.C