The issue of route.
1) The entirety of reality is constituted in the condition of knowledge involving the subject and the object. The subject is usually understood as the human being, and the object all other things of the universe.
2) The common way of describing this situation is that there is a knowing human being and an object of its knowing ‘out there’ in the world. Emmanuel Kant explained the repercussions of this situation as having to do entirely with the knowing subject, and not so much to do with the object out there ‘in-itself’. All objects are thus subjective appropriations of objects.
3) The situation of the subjective appropriation of objects is usually understood as involving sensory experience; accorded to the conventional Kantian ideal, such sensory experiences are thus partial and flat, appropriating pieces or portions of the object in question that are likewise superficial in quality, and never gain or are able to attain the object in-itself. In this way it can be said, as a type of definition, that the sensed material is consolidated for the subject as an object.
4) One problem is how such subjective appropriations appear to be common for all humans for particular objects across a particular field of time and space. Another issue due to this situation is whether communication from multiple subjects about the same object will be able to amount to a more thorough description of the object itself.
5) The problem with the Kantian situation is that it appears to deal with quite objective occasions of the world. A description of that sort tends toward the assumption of a particular and universal manner of having the world and the individual person. While we may be able to describe the situation where every human being appropriates objects through their subjective abilities and attributes, such description is already assuming an essential segregation of world objects, such that not only is there is a knowing subject but that objects may indeed be known as to what is in-itself the object of our appropriation, but as well, that there is this common object that we are lumping into a privileged category for what can be called the subject human being knower, or humanity in general.
6) This situation thus grants us Wittgenstein’s proposal. But as opposed to Witt’s ‘facts’, the question is usually always about objects, but objects that are before us as a common sensual-psychic manifestation, i.e. the object that is not the thinking-knowing subject; the question involves how the subject appropriates objects. Yet what we have found has been found through a dissolution of essential categories; in Kant’s instance, a rejection of super-naturalistic metaphysics of spirits and Gods and ethereal forces. What occurs when the subject appropriation is taken to mean the actual subject, and not humanity in general of which the individual automatically belongs as an essential category, then we see that this issue becomes not so much subjective appropriation of some object in-itself, but more about what one can say about objects, as what is said stems from that object which only occurs in the appropriation.
7) So likewise, when we consider subjects and objects along these lines and we begin to see that all objects are subjective appropriations, we have then to consider how the object that is appropriated and called a ‘common humanity’, is likewise a subjective appropriation. If this is the case, then what we have thus far been considering (historically but presently) of the possibility of objects is seen to be or have been a categorical error.
8) The error can be located in the reflexive reciprocation that occurs in the subjective appropriation of objects; i.e. the subject thinker-knower has before her an object (distinct; separated) and this object is the subjective appropriation (blurred; enjoined).
9) In this situation, a distinction must be made in order for the subject to even consider the object; the contradiction cannot lay open to thus collapse reality. The manner by which such an error is typically repaired is thus to reify essential real categories: the subject human being, and the object that is not the human being. Through consideration of this, we thereby find ourselves back in the Kantian, or perhaps Cartesian, situation.
10) Due to this repetition, the progress in concepts that has lead us back to its beginning, we must reconsider what was meant originally, the assumption being that whatever it was that we understood originally that progressed through the linkage of concepts and ideas to bring us back to the beginning, must be incorrect; this is Correlationalism, that the addressing may consider the object, adiscourse, but now strong and weak Correlationalism is to be placed into an essential category such that a new corrective discourse may be presented. The issue then concerns how concepts tend to propose away from a given humanity, concepts that gain their meaning upon an incorrect appraisal of what humanity is, as integral to reality, that then propose to change what humanity is.
11) One way to resolve this is to adjust the Kantian paradigm to eliminate the subject, to make all real things objects. Hence the subject is implied of the object in a real determination, and thus allows for a transformation of the Kantian problem. The difference found by essential categories now becomes a difference between the previous route and the new route, i.e. the previous route derived the subject through its objective identity, the new route derives the object through its subjective determination. It is a case of what is stable for what can be viewed.
12) In this way, reality is understood to have changed. This change has come about through a subjective renegotiation of what the relationship between the subject and object is. The subjective appropriation is now understood to be not subjectively appropriated in the manner addressed by Kant.
13) Yet the problem here remains the same problem: objects are viewed as substantial, material that is founded in its presumption of concretion and are understood as at least partially contained or effected by the discourse that speaks of them. This is to say that the categorical error has been suspended for the sake of the real directional and impositional aspect discourse is understood to have upon an object, and thus the subject and reality is likewise effected.
14) The solution that does not repeat the error notices that discourse does not speak of True Objects, does not renegotiate the terms by which such True Objects constitute reality. Instead, reaction against the categorical error does not suspend itself again, but rather admits the imperative by which reality is able to convey or have any meaning whatsoever.
15) Hence: Terms are objects; or rather, the issue concerns how one is oriented upon objects.
16) Where discourse must proceed upon at least a partial revealing of (True) objects, there reality is posited, therein and by this route the potential for the absolutely True Object may be found. This route is presented in the hard correlational limit; where the term-identity reigns, there what is argued as weak and strong correlationalism may inform reality to its possibility.
17) Where discourse proceeds upon itself, such that the object offers occasions for discourse at functional junctures, contrary to the view that sets systems upon True Objects, there we have irony, a discourse that upsets the conventional route through rejection of its proper method for coming upon objects.
18) In this ironic case where terms are objects, the approach would be to see that the repetition is human, and that the repeated effort to avoid this repetition always views its move as something more than human, some culmination of concepts that will miraculously lift the human out of its recurring motion to a more real, or more correct discursive assessment of reality. Such progress is thus based in a denial of the human being for the sake of its concepts, objects in themselves that are intuited from the transcendent aspect of reality, the Kantian ideal.
19) The divergent approach would look into this motion, to disseminate the components of and thus reveal how objects are being used, instead of posing another more real or more true appropriation of objects, in themselves or not, where the subject is always set aside for its real determinations. Discourse itself itself is not at issue; the question of divergence concerns how one is oriented upon objects.
20) When what is human is fully admitted, then a discussion of what might be beyond human, all too human, might have veracity, but then the discussion might wish to give up such a proposal. The effect of throwing away the ladder thus might give rise to a reinstatement of human beginnings. But this could only be a move full of doubt.
The issue of route.