Monthly Archives: July 2015

The Reason of Architecture 

the irreconcilable divide between analytic and continental philosophies, at least from an Object Oriented perspective, is that the the latter has come upon the view where no separation of agencies exist. So what we are really up to is then how to contruct a world and what that means.  

continental philosophy and cultural capital

Object-Oriented Philosophy

Analytic philosopher Eric Schliesser with THIS story from an art museum bookstore. It’s about as balanced and well-written an account from the other side as you’ll find.

However, I don’t think that the museum gift shop patrons were merely acquiring cultural capital with those books. A lot of them really are good books. (And I say this as one of the few continental philosophers to have enjoyed the Sokal Hoax.) Mainstream analytic philosophers need to ask themselves tougher questions about why their books mostly aren’t being sold in art galleries. Nor is it cause for pride.

My view, as expressed on this page in the past, is that the analytic/continental divide is not “merely sociological” (whatever that’s supposed to mean). It is irreparable and unbridgeable. It will not be repaired, and one side will not divide the other, but both will eventually be replaced by something different. The root of…

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The issue of route.
1) The entirety of reality is constituted in the condition of knowledge involving the subject and the object. The subject is usually understood as the human being, and the object all other things of the universe.
2) The common way of describing this situation is that there is a knowing human being and an object of its knowing ‘out there’ in the world. Emmanuel Kant explained the repercussions of this situation as having to do entirely with the knowing subject, and not so much to do with the object out there ‘in-itself’. All objects are thus subjective appropriations of objects.
3) The situation of the subjective appropriation of objects is usually understood as involving sensory experience; accorded to the conventional Kantian ideal, such sensory experiences are thus partial and flat, appropriating pieces or portions of the object in question that are likewise superficial in quality, and never gain or are able to attain the object in-itself. In this way it can be said, as a type of definition, that the sensed material is consolidated for the subject as an object.
4) One problem is how such subjective appropriations appear to be common for all humans for particular objects across a particular field of time and space. Another issue due to this situation is whether communication from multiple subjects about the same object will be able to amount to a more thorough description of the object itself. 
5) The problem with the Kantian situation is that it appears to deal with quite objective occasions of the world. A description of that sort tends toward the assumption of a particular and universal manner of having the world and the individual person. While we may be able to describe the situation where every human being appropriates objects through their subjective abilities and attributes, such description is already assuming an essential segregation of world objects, such that not only is there is a knowing subject but that objects may indeed be known as to what is in-itself the object of our appropriation, but as well, that there is this common object that we are lumping into a privileged category for what can be called the subject human being knower, or humanity in general.
6) This situation thus grants us Wittgenstein’s proposal. But as opposed to Witt’s ‘facts’, the question is usually always about objects, but objects that are before us as a common sensual-psychic manifestation, i.e. the object that is not the thinking-knowing subject; the question involves how the subject appropriates objects. Yet what we have found has been found through a dissolution of essential categories; in Kant’s instance, a rejection of super-naturalistic metaphysics of spirits and Gods and ethereal forces. What occurs when the subject appropriation is taken to mean the actual subject, and not humanity in general of which the individual automatically belongs as an essential category, then we see that this issue becomes not so much subjective appropriation of some object in-itself, but more about what one can say about objects, as what is said stems from that object which only occurs in the appropriation.
7) So likewise, when we consider subjects and objects along these lines and we begin to see that all objects are subjective appropriations, we have then to consider how the object that is appropriated and called a ‘common humanity’, is likewise a subjective appropriation. If this is the case, then what we have thus far been considering (historically but presently) of the possibility of objects is seen to be or have been a categorical error.
8) The error can be located in the reflexive reciprocation that occurs in the subjective appropriation of objects; i.e. the subject thinker-knower has before her an object (distinct; separated) and this object is the subjective appropriation (blurred; enjoined).
9) In this situation, a distinction must be made in order for the subject to even consider the object; the contradiction cannot lay open to thus collapse reality. The manner by which such an error is typically repaired is thus to reify essential real categories: the subject human being, and the object that is not the human being. Through consideration of this, we thereby find ourselves back in the Kantian, or perhaps Cartesian, situation.
10) Due to this repetition, the progress in concepts that has lead us back to its beginning, we must reconsider what was meant originally, the assumption being that whatever it was that we understood originally that progressed through the linkage of concepts and ideas to bring us back to the beginning, must be incorrect; this is Correlationalism, that the addressing may consider the object, adiscourse, but now strong and weak Correlationalism is to be placed into an essential category such that a new corrective discourse may be presented. The issue then concerns how concepts tend to propose away from a given humanity, concepts that gain their meaning upon an incorrect appraisal of what humanity is, as integral to reality, that then propose to change what humanity is.
11) One way to resolve this is to adjust the Kantian paradigm to eliminate the subject, to make all real things objects. Hence the subject is implied of the object in a real determination, and thus allows for a transformation of the Kantian problem. The difference found by essential categories now becomes a difference between the previous route and the new route, i.e. the previous route derived the subject through its objective identity, the new route derives the object through its subjective determination. It is a case of what is stable for what can be viewed.
12) In this way, reality is understood to have changed. This change has come about through a subjective renegotiation of what the relationship between the subject and object is. The subjective appropriation is now understood to be not subjectively appropriated in the manner addressed by Kant.
13) Yet the problem here remains the same problem: objects are viewed as substantial, material that is founded in its presumption of concretion and are understood as at least partially contained or effected by the discourse that speaks of them. This is to say that the categorical error has been suspended for the sake of the real directional and impositional aspect discourse is understood to have upon an object, and thus the subject and reality is likewise effected.
14) The solution that does not repeat the error notices that discourse does not speak of True Objects, does not renegotiate the terms by which such True Objects constitute reality. Instead, reaction against the categorical error does not suspend itself again, but rather admits the imperative by which reality is able to convey or have any meaning whatsoever.
15) Hence: Terms are objects; or rather, the issue concerns how one is oriented upon objects.
16) Where discourse must proceed upon at least a partial revealing of (True) objects, there reality is posited, therein and by this route the potential for the absolutely True Object may be found. This route is presented in the hard correlational limit; where the term-identity reigns, there what is argued as weak and strong correlationalism may inform reality to its possibility.
17) Where discourse proceeds upon itself, such that the object offers occasions for discourse at functional junctures, contrary to the view that sets systems upon True Objects, there we have irony, a discourse that upsets the conventional route through rejection of its proper method for coming upon objects.
18) In this ironic case where terms are objects, the approach would be to see that the repetition is human, and that the repeated effort to avoid this repetition always views its move as something more than human, some culmination of concepts that will miraculously lift the human out of its recurring motion to a more real, or more correct discursive assessment of reality. Such progress is thus based in a denial of the human being for the sake of its concepts, objects in themselves that are intuited from the transcendent aspect of reality, the Kantian ideal.
19) The divergent approach would look into this motion, to disseminate the components of and thus reveal how objects are being used, instead of posing another more real or more true appropriation of objects, in themselves or not, where the subject is always set aside for its real determinations. Discourse itself itself is not at issue; the question of divergence concerns how one is oriented upon objects.
20) When what is human is fully admitted, then a discussion of what might be beyond human, all too human, might have veracity, but then the discussion might wish to give up such a proposal. The effect of throwing away the ladder thus might give rise to a reinstatement of human beginnings. But this could only be a move full of doubt.

O.O.O. Oh…oh…ohh. 

The question is no longer that of Being, for Heidegger has destroyed being, like a forensic analysis of material. Being was viable so long as there was a dialectic whereby reality could be based upon its one vision through the oscillating features held from one another, like a binary star. Hiedegger destroyed the dialectic (for conventional method), encompassing the description of how such an interaction takes place for reality, what the dialectic does, how it works, a description from a distance, in a nice neat package, defining the Trueness of the Object called Dasein, ready for distribution. Hence, the question anymore is not of being, but of truth. The issue with Graham Harman is that he stands upon the dialectic through setting aside the destruction of being, and thereby enacts a deception. He thereby may speak of other than human Daseins through the dialectical vehicle, all the while holding the dialectic out of sight, withdrawn as the Dasein by which other Daseins are possible is likewise set aside for the sake of proposing again a ‘new’ one reality where the dialectic is gone, and the subject likewise dead. He thereby may propose a new ontology of being: Object Ontology.
I must admit, as a read more of Harman I am becoming increasingly disillusioned and bored; I tend to see the rise of Speculative Realism and then it’s Fizzle to have ran along these same lines as I am experiencing and discovering. And I must say that it is because of what has occurred, what was enticed early on as a sort of promise has lead to merely another philosophical system; quite boring, but even more irritating was that it seemed like Harman might be one to be able to pull it off, but then he comes up with another system that proposes a more real version of reality. So conventional; so regular, run of the mill. So it is, the reason for this motion of his that lead to a positing a more real system is explained by the essay of the Significant Event, that such deceptions can no longer stay viable; that is, except in so much as the deception is working, and where it succeeds is exactly in that audience where denial is operative. The deception works because the conventional method is already submerged and distanced in a self imposed deception: the term-object identity.
The boredom of Dasein explained by Harman is symptomatic of the reversal and contrivance we see in Harman’s Ontology. Admitting the short reading, the boredom of Being Dasein in need of some danger is at the heart of why Harman’s seem so boring: because the danger of Object Ontology comes in response to the boredom of being that is, in itself, a preliminary mood, that is, a mood that has not been allowed its maturation, has not been let to risk, and so discusses subsequence. Like a lacuna, this mood that Harman seems to understand is the offense that is the Ontology in its Ontological functioning. Harman is required for his Dasein of many colors to describe as enactment the results of having True Objects as the basis of a reality that is ubiquitous as it is total in its assertion of a universe of only objects. This is to say that he is arguing his identity, an identity that has arisen due to his investment in the State of reality. Here multiple Daseins exist as the evidence of the description of how it’s being is not presence, like an oxymoron, defies and contradicts its own meaning. Beings may exist with a certain facticity of ‘being there’ as an environmental inclusive state, but the being of Dasein thereby includes the fact of other Daseins within its own ‘there being facticity’. The implication here is the point of contention between eternity and progress, between what Badiou calls ‘immortal’ and ‘victim’; Harman is enacting his victimization. The dangerous move apparently seen by Harman is gained by his view of his Dasein as a meaning of meaning, as a Being that is exempt from the situation that Heidegger presents to mean Dasein. The meaning of Dasein for Harman is already a meaning represented as a object of Harman’s presentation. Harman apparently already was viewing the significance of Heidegger’s work as a significance fundamentally different than what the meaning of Dasein would entail, which is to say, the corpus that is the explanation of Dasein was already in the format of meaning that represents as a presentation the True Object (meaning of meaning) as an objective reflection, over the meaning that the corpus presents. Harman already was was viewing the world as a whole constituency of True Objects, already was his faith unquestioned, already his faith not doubted, his naïveté a sham before it could be authentic. Rather than the danger which is the being bored as the boredom that is being, Harman’s risk, what is dangerous for Harman, is by his faith, that his deception might be uncovered.
But in one manner of speaking, he need not be worried, because his faith is vindicated in the power that establishes reality, as he is invested in this reality, as he has faith in this power, he is justified. His risk is entirely of his faith.
Nevertheless, the boredom or disappointment comes because while his categories seem to really get at something, he leaves us flat in a world of intellectual ‘weirdness’; but the weirdness is barely interesting — or maybe as interesting as watching someone solve a Rubic’s cube. I know now that every time he preludes an idea with weird, it’s not going to be weird at all but rather mundane and obvious; but somehow I am sure that it is weird to a certain type of type of reader and author, and this type is probably one who is oriented upon the True Object. For a while I thought Graham was really following the philosophical maxim of looking to oneself, but it’s seems his route for this is more conventionally methodological than it is novel or introspective.
Yet, I should say that we must give Graham the benefit of doubt; I am sure that Graham indeed feels that he is looking to himself and not being conventional (why else would he say that ideas might be ‘new’?). And this is exactly where the discourse of the Significant Event gains its footing; because Graham can not see beyond his faith. Faith makes true. The discursive posturing may appear quite the feat of meaning, but philosophically speaking, while impressive, it risks little.

A Short History of Yoga

This is pretty cool. I didnt know even a rough history.

So then i would add: “…in the early part of the 21century, the division that was East and West philosophies began to dissolve. And history began to repeat itself. This moment of human historical conflation and coalescing of knowledge coincided with a revealing of the truth of the matter, and sprituality renewed its self through a completed denial whereby humanity saw itself a new universal enity.  

Who knew that it would have taken another 4000 years for the extent of the repetitive nature of human consciousness to to acknowledge and sink in, but at that, likewise be forgotten to allow for again those same spiritual dislaimers of ideological real fantasy.”


yan writes

The “Gymnastic Yoga” adopted by the West emerged at the end of the 19th century, but Yoga is really a spiritual quest and earliest known writings about it goes way back to 3000 BC in a collection of ancient texts known as the Vedas. The early Vedas were a collection of texts containing songs, mantras and rituals to be used by Brahmans. Around 800 to 500 BC, some in the Indian society started to question the traditional Vedic religious order. A movement began to shift the focus of religious life from external rites and sacrifices to internal spiritual quests. Some of these philosophy and practices were compiled into the Upanishads, which became the last collection to be filed under the vedic corpus, and formed the spiritual core of the Indian religions.

Later around 500 BC, the teachings of the Upanishads were integrated and made more accessible to people through…

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Lacans Foreshadow of the aphilosophical 

…the difference, though, between Zizeks appropriation of the situation and mine is that  Zizeks default is toward the ideological, toward the total truth of the real true object. He makes no offering of how he has come to such truth; rather, his assumption is of a foundational psychology, as this psyvhological subject truly exists within A and The True common human reality. He argues the ubiquity of ideology because he figures his identity within it, an ideological figure. He is only powerful by being complicit in its operations of power. 


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