The very short version of how the PMG and Zizek are related is they both present discourses that are offensive. We have already described how that may be the case with the PMG. The works of Zizek, though, are different. In short, they arrive from nowhere, that is, they arrive from the exact place that Zizek describes and or attempts to indicate all through his writing.
This is to say that he is saying nothing of some world that is an objective feature wherein we have subjective human beings. Indeed, he can be taken to be saying something of the situation as presented in this way, but it is more that he is merely describing the view that he has; his works and motions are a direct effect of being In the world, but more: That is all one can really say, it is not an effect per say, it is merely being in the world.
Now, this is as offensive as it is awkward to describe. The terms by which we propose to be able to communicate are taxed when we try to describe the event of Zizek and his productions. This is why we have a cultural or political analysis, when he approaches from those vectors: Because there must be an object to occasion the subject, and there is no separating him, Zizek, the subject, from the productions that appear as mediations of an object, political and cultural. The discourses appear as having to do with analyzing objective situations, but because these situations only occur for the subject of discourse, the distance that is enacted is the objective case as a type of fetish, a magical thing that is this segregate neutral object yielding up information of itself to the likewise segregated essential subject. This is the Kantian reality extrapolated in historical discourse to the Hegelian and later Lacanian reality, but essentialized as a subject: The inuited transcendent. Zizek negates this by his discourse because through his philosophy he is describing the negation of the objective case, the contradiction inherent the knowledge of the object. It is this contradiction that is upheld by a distinction between what is real and not real, and re-solved in the real reduction allowed for through faith in the True Object.
Zizek describes every situation I am explaining of him here, but he does not recognize any segregation involved with a subject, and instead makes the real reduction to a sort of revolutionary agent negated in the being presence that is Dasein, the same way as Badiou and Laruelle (and others) posit a convergence of sorts of thought and universe, a thus true-reality. Yet typically, conventionally, very few really dare to get to the meat of what he is saying, and if they do, often they react as the blogger I reference in the previous segment. They get a feeling against what he is saying because the meaning of his discourses offends, what we might call, ‘regular’ reality, or how most people come upon reality. They therefore do not take that crucial step to see how it is possible for him to make such statement, and instead analyze the objective representation and organization of symbols as these appear to occur ‘outside’ or ‘extra-subjectively’, at once, verifying that what Zizek is saying is true, as well as implicating that Zizek’s presumption toward offering a total inclusive explanation of the world somehow is missing a part. This excluded part can be said to fall into what Graham Harman calls ‘accidental’ but is perhaps more suited to fall into the blank spot of the Parallax view, the gap ‘between’ such angles of view.
To be grateful, I can only notice where Zizek is blind because he is describing the situation that is not offensive to me, indeed, he is describing the world how I would describe it if I were Zizek, and thus it is just this paradox that allows me to offer a shift in view whereby the subject does not remain in a field of objects as a point of nil, requiring this a complete and total submersion of agency unto view, or as well an equation of elements. Instead, while fully acknowledging the veracity and good description of the situation, I say the parallax view is a real description, and that the gap or blind spot offered is and accounts for or allows for reality, i.e. That place where ‘accidents’ happen, that contingent place of causality and multiple individual agents. Thereby we can say that this place from where Zizek gains a solute meaning is not real, and be able to justify his ideological claims as real without negating the fact of the alternate agent who does not or barely understands Zizek’s position as well as the human who understand him completely. For Zizek’s tends to negate alternate agents in a reduction to the view as if such a view indeed accounts for all reality, that is, as if other agents also fall into his description — they most often don’t, but they can only if Zizek (and Badiou and others) takes a certain tact and applies a certain strategy, and this strategy is exactly the cultural, ideological and political analyses. He (they) must withhold (Harman, Hiedegger) the bare fact from his assumed audience. This is why Badiou in his latest book (it seems, I have not read it because it just came out in French, but it seems obvious where B is going) speaks of particular philosophers as opposed to others. The mark that Zizek (and Badiou) makes by his discourses is an indicator by which a true historical movement may be reckoned, not as some particular idea of whatever time or period as opposed to and amidst a certain era of various thinkers, but rather an a signal or beacon for those who completely understand the position from which such discourses arise in their particular manner, that indeed we are not dealing with some segregate, essentially transcendent subject that causes any sort of progress in the universe whatsoever — but that this view is no longer making a claim about what is more real.
This is the situation that is offensive to those who are oriented upon the True Object of reality; we can tell already who is offended and who is not. The mistake of post-modernism is it wanted to bring Dasein into a known and acknowledged state of living in reality, as if now (then) such knowledge could be (finally) put into terms people would understand, as if various people had not for centuries already been putting the same situation in terms they thought should be readily comprehended by everyone! But (again) it achieved only balk, offense and nonsense — but at most, another way to talk about things. Hence we have the post-post modernist apologists like Badiou and Laruelle who come up with the (hardly) novel idea that some truth function can be a universal function without the agent being privy to how the function may manifest in anyone or anyplace else but him or herself, such that the agent has only to express the truth that is particular to her agency, such that what returns cannot be foreseen nor compensated for its lacking truth, since itself as a function of the same truth is truth likewise. We hear in this an echo of the bodhisattva who said that enlightenment is a strange thing for if two people who were enlightened came together, they would have nothing to say to one another to be able to let the other know that he was enlightened. Indeed, Zizek can’t help emitting his ‘enlightened’ self, though I doubt he would put it in such terms, and we have to see also that it is the nature of being a bodhisattva that each is enlightened to his own truth in his own way, and that is why we have such an extensive literature of the eastern philosophies, none of which say it all, but together often can they contradict each other, yet neither miss anything, and all this over hundreds if not thousands of years.
The issue at hand is the exposure of this process evident in both east and west.
Another aspect of Zizek that should be recognized is how the blogger mentioned in the previous segment critiques him to rebut by pointing out his method. Zizek appears to offer an antithesis to situations and show how they are not what they seem, but then also pull a surprise by showing how this subsequent situation is also not what it seems. The blogger suggests that Zizek now has had his covers pulled, and so one can play his game (Zizuku! Lol) by doing the same method with any situation. I would say go ahead and try; its easy to say “oh, he’s just doing this”, but it is another do actually do it. And I’ll bet even if someone tries, it will appear inauthentic and trite. And this is because they do not understand him, are offended, and are reacting in the way I described above.
But the real offensive point is indeed that every situation, every object, can be situated discursively in the fashion Zizek enacts. (Zizuku! But I think in a spirit missed by our said blogger.) It is more that Zizek is but a real occasion for meaning, and so activates a particular world as various occasions for meaning. But this does not mean that it is merely a parkour trick; hardly. It means that the reaction of the said blogger is typically real given the condition that reality exposes itself to when it’s objects (of knowledge) are taken to their sensible ends: Nonsense. Yet, what this means is not merely the reductive conventional veracity of Sartrean revolt from which arises true agency; it means that now what is real is able to be seen as a contrivance, a convention, a decision, but in a way such that it’s reality is not so much reducible to it being some sort of illusion, not that reality as we see it is not in itself true or not real; that is ridiculous. The post-modern assumption in argument that it was or is somehow getting to a more real situation of reality has already been shown historically as incorrect; this is the lesson condensed into an actual as opposed to conceptual object of the PMG. On the contrary: The situation shows that reality is true unto itself essentially, really-true; but also, that it itself there by its particular discursive method is not true, but merely real, and that we can thereby speak of truth as not reducible to a real contingency except in the manner of extending the means of the human being beyond its rightful occasion, that is, over (and under ?) determined conceptual objects, which are, as we just said, ideological, political and cultural, and this, viable through a transcendental deception.
Again: What this whole process amounts to, what the Zizekian subject announces in-itself, is that the real historical process that preoccupies and concerns itself with subject agents of psychology and free will must be left to its determinations, its own laws of how the individual should procure its place in the world. But not only this; what we can say is a ‘deception’ qualifies to this meaning outside of what real meaning dictates; we are dealing with two mutually exclusive manner of knowing. We speak of ‘conventional faith’, this that limits one’s ability to know anything in particular. Yet what has been a move for a truth of polemical reduction (often called ‘dialectical’) is non sequitur to the results of the investigation at the ends of discourse, aka. contradiction. Faith here breaks down, but as we said above, it does not mean that the reality of faith is some sort of illusion or not real. One only has to look, but no one wants to, and this is because it is offensive to come up to nothing in-itself.
Can we speak of an architecture of racism?
Too fantastic to be real??
A US Supreme Court ruling has forced the Smithsonian institution to release classified papers dating from the early 1900′s that proves the organization was involved in a major historical cover up of evidence showing giants human remains in the tens of thousands had been uncovered all across America and were ordered to be destroyed by high level administrators to protect the mainstream chronology of human and to favor Darwin’s evolution theory.
Who: The Smithsonian institution.
What: During the court case, new elements were brought to light as several Smithsonian whistle blowers admitted to the existence of documents that allegedly proved the destruction of tens of thousands of human skeletons reaching between 6 feet and 12 feet in height, a reality mainstream archaeology can not admit to for different reasons, claims AIAA spokesman, James Churward.
When: «There has been a major cover up by western archaeological institutions since the early 1900′s…
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Do we really love the Olympics?
I really liked the following quote which is quoted by Aldous Huxley in his book The Perennial Philosophy:
“Ga-San instructed his adherents one day: ‘Those who speak against killing, and who desire to spare the lives of all conscious beings are right. It is good to protect even animals and insects. But what about those persons who kill time, what about those who destroy wealth, and those who murder the economy of their society? We should not overlook them. Again, what of the one who preaches without enlightenment? He is killing Buddhism.”
From “One Hundred and One Zen Stories”
…recognize the agency of non-human entities. Wow. Maybe soon we might be able to be honest.
starts about 3:39 in
“Drawing from lived and theoretical frameworks that de-privilege the human and recognize the agency of non-human entities, the conference addresses a core debate between the understanding of ecological rights deriving from legal and evidentiary frameworks and those grounded in experiential and situated struggle. Speakers include: Eduardo Abaroa, Subhankar Banerjee, Mabe Bethônico, Ursula Biemann, Minerva Cuevas, Cormac Cullinan, TJ Demos, Eriel Tchekwie Deranger, Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation (ACFN), Jean Fisher, Gaia Foundation, Brian Holmes, Otolith Group, Fernando Palma Rodríguez, Elizabeth Peredo and Wild Law UK.”
Satire. One always should keep a good humor in one’s pocket for those times when something hits a little too close to home. It seems a little too obvious why such American shows such as “The Daily Show” and “The Cobert Report” Arose when they did: With the generation after the post-moderns, after the hippie eternal happiness, after the disco bliss and the punk rock sarcasm, what was left to do? We repeatedly come across the strange social childish reaction that has to do with being different than the parents, topping or rather absorbing and retreating the same situation that is being human in the contradicting urban world by enacting attitudes and fashion opposite to the previous generation. Or at least we like to think (as children) that we are being ‘different’ or enacting our individuality. Then the so called adults love to go on a about the similarities of when they were kids, and differences. The new and the old. But it does seem that the new generation is always trying to be the different that is now the new different. The problem is they never quite achieve the new newness; it’s always a rehashing of the old, and because young people tend to have such a myopic view of the world and then as young adults behave and act and even force this ‘new view’ out upon the world to have everyone then believe it is that way, that this new is indeed cooler and more hip than the last new new, that this new is thus better.
Might we take a moment and offer a funny picture of the last 150- so years. Factories and farms. Young people go to the cities and find the harsh situation of small freedom, a new struggling freedom condensed from stretches of slow landscape, to boxes of fast frustration. They get pissed and want to assert themselves and so, as children do, pick fights. World War One and Two. In all this industrial technological speed, sex becomes likewise more intensely viewed. Men get the business suit, women get the bikini. So some dude is looking for a chemical to promote weight loss. He finds LSD and goes rides a bike around town. The urban testosterone Wars end and there’s a bunch of kids with nothing to do now that industrial freedom has allowed for the suburban image of large freedom again. The adult kids of the Wars now feel good with their new buddies, who in their winning group have established a type of secure utopia, the good fight has yielded the good life. They have kids and these kids become rapidly bored since the utopia of the Wars have brought the Beaver Cleaver serenity. But these new generation kids have to be discontent. They they find drugs. Jazz and Rock, Roll, the Beats and the Hippies; their frustration is not in confinement but the opposite. They are all high in their new large conceptual landscape. They assert their war against what seems to them in their childish myopia to be the aggravating problem: The limitations put upon humanity by systemic norms. But there is no norms; the ‘norms’ are really just that the stressed out city life pressed up against itself for some room, and got it. Now the children don’t appreciate this roomy environment of contentment; this roomy environment is actually conceptually confined because there isn’t really room for everyone, but only the bullies who won the World fight.
Post-Modernism. What was modern was merely one or two generation’s idea’s put into practice, of humans dealing with industrial technology. Post-Modern is thus a further War on the Peace that the previous War achieved. Humanity takes on a dynamic never seen before. Being comfortable is not allowed to be comfortable. The ends have to be rerouted to the means; we cannot stay in ends because we’re really pissed off about our lack of freedom, which is really a traditional type of childishness reinstated as a real determinator of what is allowed to be real. We cannot rest in a peaceful adulthood because we have to justify our situation to the kids, who perpetually demand a newness in the face of freedom, such that what is freedom and happiness cannot be so because of the industrial deferment to the childish view. This is capitalism: The move to the city allowed for an intensity of competition that needed be justified against the degree of frustration required to negotiate the factory life style (production as real imperative). The route of justification is passed down to the child because it is the childish attitude that needs be upheld if the peace of the new is to be justified for its effort.
So the hippies had an experience. This experience is revolution. But the revolution never came to pass in the world, but always had to be foreshortened and qualified against the real standard already in place. It seemed that the standard was the problem that could never be removed. Disco then dealt with it by avoiding the question and doing lots of cocaine. The more intense, sincere and honest portion of the children saw that the revolution failed in the face of reaction. Punk, or urban rock and roll, dealt with it by being pissed off and sarcastic, getting drunk and belligerent and dying in heroin sulk. But neither did peace, avoidance nor anger rid the problem; so those who were not so concerned with things in general as freedom, instead focused their efforts in how to be happy given the urban condition. They found it in money. By neatly avoiding the community effort towards freedom, which leads to war (a true community of self righteous children fight) they instead concentrated their efforts for themselves (why not be just self righteous without the implication of community). Cocaine became crack, and crack reflected money.
So this situation needed to have a new against it. Whoever got the most toys may have won, but what was left was a whole population who were not getting very many toys. We needed a route whereby the most possible children got to at least have a shot at getting the toys they want. The avoidance and sarcasm allowed for small group of insensitive psychopathic people to get one over on everyone else. We needed a new route to be new against the previous attitudes of justification: satire. The traditional justification of childish want for the new has gotten us to where we do not take our seriousness seriously. This is the middle route. This is the route of moderation. As long as we justify our childishness by not taking so seriously that we indeed have no control over our attitude then we can have our toys and be happy in freedom because we are attempting to allow everyone to have toys. As Barak Obama said, we have to make it to everyone who wants it and is willing to work had and make the effort can have an equal shot at getting it (the American Dream).
But this sincere satire will be trumped also, because it still is a childish justification. Perhaps it is a type of last resort of justification of that which can only be justified, but it is that justification is based in a denial of what is truly occurring. What is truly occurring is the process of coming to terms with the reality that there is no freedom but in justification, that we are determined by objects, and that such justification is inherently a local function, a function of social locality of the individual and that the extrapolation of such justification outside or beyond the ambiguous locality yields the ethical contradictions that Zizek notices.
What we have then in the discussion of the philosophical revolution, the move of rejection of Object Ontology and the new realists, has to do with not some reconciliation of the Real, as the post-post-moderns (Badiou, Laruelle, Zizek) would have it, where ideology and the individual obtain a sort of truce and combine in some effective agency, but more in the divergence that the Significant Event recalls. That ideology is a particular enforcement of reality, but that what is true is even more strange than what Graham Harman would have (but I would have to read more of his to qualify this opinion). And that history is the process of coming to terms with this truth; reality the vehicle for this process…
…but that this, in the end, is never comprehended, because its conveyance of meaning is always usurped in the conventional rhetoric of Faith.
No wonder we need satire.
Ok; next part 4 we will get to the relation between the PMG and Zizek.
“What happened ??”
In the event of reading an essay generated by the PMG, we have to think from the perspective of not knowing that it is a fake, keeping in mind that this program is admittedly old and stunted in its potential, but that it would be possible to write a more complex protocol that could generate more lengthy and involved syntactical and contextual structures that would ultimately be very difficult to discern as bogus. Under this presumption that we are indeed reading a piece of legitimate theory, we need only to understand the turn in thought that occurs upon being let into the joke, so to speak, and what that says not only of being human, but more, of thought itself, as well then what history is and means. This is because in this type of upsetting, the ground for our theoretical efforts is not so easily found, for often enough the ground itself is in question by the mode of offering of the theory.
Indeed, from this setting is elicited a mounting frustration resolved not by confronting the situation — the subsequent post-modern thought thought itself to confronting it — but by completely rejecting the whole of the line of thought that brought about the situation in first place (Object Oriented Philosophy, Speculative and the ‘new’ Realisms) loosely defined against history as Cartesian, Copernican or Kantian, and for our present situation as ‘phenominalist’ and its corresponding conventional paradox noticed by Quentin Miessalloux as correlationalism. The problem here in these latest proposals is that they cannot get beyond the problem so they reject it by sublating the problem as the impetus and catalyst by which such ‘new Realist’ positions may arise. In other words, they assert that the method must be applied in moderation and from there we might then be able to find a True basis, a ground, for real discourse. Moderation and mediation is thus the mode where reality is true — but hasn’t this been the maxim of all real conventionality, an assertion of revolutionary action based in a return to the norm, a reactionary move?? Are they really saying that The True Reality should be found through moderation ?? I want to say ‘yes’, but in response to what (really) does this ‘yes’ arise (can we be really honest) ? (Come on; are we allowed to be honest yet ? Well, maybe not yet. ) If indeed the answer is yes, then it is not too difficult a stretch to see the reinstatement of a metaphysical imperative, which is to say, for other terms, a manifest destiny, a providence that has encompassed the whole of humanity throughout history as it continues to do so at this very moment — but set aside in argument, the question of ‘God’ or ‘spirit’ being left now to the opinion of religion, the conventional reality of the pure multiple.
Note that it is absolutely ironic and consistent with the unbiased argument that the question of the philosophical revolution occurs and is answered in the setting aside of the question itself. This is the Speculative move. But the issue left is how and why this move came about, as well as how it continues to be a problem, because until then, we can only hope — but again, what is conventional faith ? This is then how we get to the significant philosophical issue, and the continuance of the status quo methodology is how we get to the necessity of revealing just what is entailed in the conventional reaction (denial).
These two sites (really, the one just links to the other) can serve as an example of how we react:
Consciousness is a funny thing; making meaning is all it does. No matter what one wants to make of it, the very making is meaning made. The question is always whether this meaning has any essential teleology; the stringing along or construing of meaning is the issue here. The conflation or association the site above has made between the PMG and the discourses if Slavoj Zizek is significant. Just as Alan Sokal helped to deflate the Post Modern bubble (a bubble, I might say, created by many accredited people who had no clue), the process of revealing how consciousness works, as opposed to merely riding upon reactionary theoretical tropes in the attempt to assert a more real reality and thereby create an identity, must evoke uncomfortable meanings, confronting and even breaching the fashionable trend of the day.
For what we are dealing with here is the maxim of operational consciousness: In the effort for the True Object (which is really itself) the individual takes True Objects as essentially separate universal entities as problematic items for the purpose of asserting the Truth of such entities to establish itself, the individual. This maxim is responsible for reality, as this phenomenon enacts a strange force that is the power of itself; the power of reality is that it allows for and or creates an arena in which real elements may interact in a real way. This is so true that it hardly need be stated, and when it is stated people roll their eyes because it sounds so ridiculous. Yet if it isn’t stated then people do not roll their eyes and can continue in plausible denial; it is after it is stated that real progress may occur, for until that point, it was only as an illusion of progress, as reality is never an illusion. For we are really dealing with me and you, and the object that allows for real determination of this distinction.
As to the blogger that came up with ‘Zizuku’ (so great!): In reality, therefore, an intelligent person may read Zizek and see a pattern to his rhetoric. Just as the PMG’s products are discounted against actual human agency, Zizek’s mode is discounted as a ridiculous game, but both which are seen to be included for ‘good’ human production of theory given that the limitations of their modes are identified, made into a real-true object, and now can be moved upon to actually yield ‘better’ theoretical productions. As I have said, the issue concerns how we distinguish between an essay that is basically a random assemblage of syntax that appears to make sense, and an actual researched and thought out humanly constructed meaningful assemblage of contextual significance? How do we reconcile ‘random’ through an ‘ordering’ of method, since the essays are generated along a specific path of commands (a program), using a specific pool of terms that are assembled based upon no apparent consideration of the various individual terms’ meanings? And as to Zizek in this regard; what does it mean that Zizek’s discursive performances can be discerned to a scheme (Zizuku)? How are these presentations related, what is being apprehended and comprehended, and how is this assessment a reaction?
First, the PMG. So to back up a little bit, the point here is the ‘better’ productions. The problem the PMG revealed was that where discourse was at issue, deconstruction, the questioning of discursive authority, and hermeneutical analysis being operative, the post-modern ideal itself was taken in a mistaken mode, as indication of a further True Object that might be gained through such methods. The fact of the ability to program such a generator, nevermind Sokal’s ability to write a fake paper that was taken as legitimate post-modern theory, shows that the ‘program’ of human meaning itself taken as a route by which to construct and or reveal more meaning yields nonsense, but that the result of the nonsense, taken as a further product of its own method for meaning, yields the sense that such ‘low level’ meaning making is nonsense: This is thus the sense that comes from nonsense that makes the nonsense sensible. By a reduction of discourse to its own operational bases as a means to analyze its productions (deconstruction; hermeneutics) against the result of this process as an analysis, we get at a real outline of the situation handed to us: A real nonsensical meaning is essentially a baseline from which all other meaningful discourses may arise; this is what we can justifiably call ‘void’. Then the production of meaning that notices the nonsensical result: The real event that begins the count of the pure multiple. Hence, the PMG is the instrumental manifestation of the baseline for making meaning, and thus while it does show that the meaning we make might just as well be just as nonsensical, that we are also merely ordering machines without a basis where we can find the ‘order of the order’, the more significant meaning we get from this temporal marking of the parameters of knowledge is out of a type of Sartean revolt: We revolt from this abyss of free syntax back into the contextual limit. But more; once we fall back into the imperative for context, we see the contextual world as deriving from a necessary order that gives significantly meaningful order, or, orderly meaning: purpose, teleology. This is not a critique of the situation, as post-modern ideals would usually advocate (Zizek: the example somehow undermines the veracity of itself), but merely a stating of the fact of the matter.
In other words, the ideal that discourse is all there is yields (or has yielded) a Kantian intuited world where the products of the PM method arose due to the True Object that is the discourse and method, such that this True base thus necessarily yields a better more real Truth of the universe: This is the mark of conventional faith. The PM discourse itself as an arena arisen from the efforts of individuals attempting to establish their identity in a true reality ironically yielded a theoretical reality that came to be called out for its nonsensical rhetoric. The discursive arena itself supported a Truth that functioned to further a real theoretical validity. But this validity was soon revealed to be just that: theoretical but basically nonsense. Structurally sound and justified within a particular discursive cohortive arena by the fact of its placement within institutions of ‘higher learning’ (pun absolutely intended).
Thus our question that comes to bare on the situation: What grounds theory? The answer is ironic, but the irony is missed in most cases, typically, as evidenced by the past 200+/- years of philosophy. I need not rehash the essays of Constructive Undoing, but enough to say that language is supposed material of its own objective analysis, the object that is language as well as the object of its clausal reference, of its intent meaning; the irony being of a particularly Kantian problematic (extrapolated conventionally in the 200 year span) in so much as every object of this discursive case is taken to be or have been intuitively apprehended, which is to say, from the assumed transcendent affection. In this case, it is of no matter what ones logic or personal belief is because there is no theory that does not operate within knowledge and discourse.
So the question comes to be pivotal to how philosophical effort should proceed, and it is in response to this problem that Realist philosophies such a s Harman’s OOO arise; though i would hesitate to lump this ‘new’ effort into a common theme, the effort does arise in a common thread to the Significant Event as well to reflect upon the issue of this essay here, which is how consciousness functions when confronted with its own limit, and what that likewise means in (the production of) reality.
Thus next up in part 3: What is the relationship between the products of the PMG and the rhetoric of Zizek?