The irony cannot be over nor under determined.
It is not an easy thing to do, whenever, to throw away the ladder, but when the time comes, it turns out to be the easiest thing. I am sure Neitchze or Witgenstein had quite a different meaning than this amended version I am putting here, and the ‘passing over in silence’ offers obvious difference. But if one thinks about it, it is then not so different after all. N’s meaning always tends toward some ‘(non-) spiritual’, if you will, overcoming, some ‘inner to outer’ kind of deep superficiality as opposed to the superficial deep. Yet here we must come right out with it and be bold: Throw away the entirety of the philosophical library. That’s right I said it. Of course, though, this statement and call to action is ironic because I can only say it because I have read enough of it, and if one were to do it then they really needn’t my instruction; so the voicing is kind of useless. ‘Enough’ then becomes a highly suspect and enigmatic form because I don’t think I’ll ever get enough of it, but yet somehow I have had quite enough. It is the philosophical maxim that one can never read all the authors and their books so at some point one merely has to take a position and enter the conversation. That is what I have done with Constructive Undoing, as one can go look at the first post of mine; “Entry into Discourse”, I think it is called.
What we find there is an odd sort of invocation. One has to ask of it just what Is involved in the capitulation. Well, if we must be honest, then we can say that Zarathustra must come down from the mountain. But was he up there with all the worlds philosophy books? No, I would say. But yes, the meaning of all the reading could be said to beckon one away from the meaning gained as the reading. But all the same, the meaning gained had nothing to do with the particular philosophical ideas etched in symbols, but had everything to do with the meaning they contained; hence we throw away the ladder. Whether books or no books, the meaning gained was gained by the reading of them and not gained by reading them, but one could not have forgone the reading of them to know that the reading of them brings the throwing away of them.
The point is in the meaning of them, and not the cumulative amassing of particular strings of sayings. So I say that the more I reference and address the particular authors ideas, such as “…in the same way that So and So talks about idea~X, Heem and Haw has a similar idea with idea~O, and these may thus derive and support my idea M — as soon as I use that structure, I am asking everyone to agree with the method of amassing sayings and that this method is the meaning one is supposed to have as a method, as opposed to the gaining of meaning. It is due to this non sequitur meaning of what I see as philosophy to a particular methodology, that I address the throwing away of the ladder.
So it is by this throwing away the ladder I am enacting a couple things. For one, I am granting that what I am saying has already been said somewhere by someone or by a synthesized group of their respective sayings. I am figuring that if indeed I say something that sounds like or is a straight reiteration of something someone else said, then I grant that my idea was not a novel idea. Also, thus I am saying that once the situation has been understood, only certain necessary repercussions arise. These repercussions are the fidelitous suture of event to its subsequent multiple. This situation marks the necessity of throwing away the ladder, because once having understood, the rest follows without much effort; it is the effort of the hardest risk that brings such fidelity to the foreground. Likewise I am saying that the apparent repetition of my thought upon others is a philosophical issue, such that one should notice that the manner by which I proceed assumes as part and parcel that I am not plagiarizing other authors so much as I am conveying my piece of what cannot be plagiarized, as they did the same for their peices, and that the issue, as I just said, unfolds necessarily, each author being but a finite manifestation; just as one cannot read every and all items concerning a subject, one person likewise cannot write about and thus exhaust all the repercussions of what is basically an eternal situation. What is plagiarized is an ownership of phrasings, of ordinations of symbols; so I say that if the meaning I put forth sounds like other authors ideas, then I admit that either those other authors did indeed help me in my phrasings, and or such ideas are necessary to the eternal situation. It is thus that the situation of terms become marked, as well as the designation and construction of history, as well a pronunciation of the capitalistic investment.
Yet if what I say is indeed new, then this too is part of the philosophical issue.
Indeed, in the bibliography I will indeed site those authors and books that contribute to this philosophical enterprise, and even site specific verses, but I feel to note all the authors’ ideas that are reflected in my writing, i would end up footnoting every sentence, and every sentence upon that, such that I would be writing for eternity, in and as eternity, as my book would be essentially the whole of human writing bound by hypothetical hardcover. In essence, the conventional method of rigorous scholarly citation applied to my work would effectively necessitate the removal of my finitude; so it is that which necessitates my throwing away the ladder, and the concession that every philosophical argument that has been made is correct at least in its potential. Where I might rebut any particular argument that I may have not noticed, let it be known that I acknowledge the conventional propriety that may be or have been held such that they might get the street cred for their (now) rebutted and proposed incorrect proposal.
Having thus outlined the situation, that the ladder needs be used in order to throw it away, that the nature of the throwing away has thus been the problem, and that the authors are all correct and have valid points, we are left in this state where everything philosophical is gone anyways. I need not cite any authors because I have already said that my ideas are not new, and in so much as everything has been said I should have nothing to say. Thus we have the nihilism I’m starting to hear people have positions on. So what am I saying? Why am I still writing?
Hence I speak of divergence. Nihilism only arises against the conventional state, so no longer do I rise against it; it is useless to do so, it is nihilistic. Like Jello Biafra of infamed punk band Dead Kennedys said (I paraphrase): there is no effective change that occurs by going against the system; one must change the system from within the system. If I were to continue to rehash and cite and question and repose and rebut and cite, nothing will have occurred. In fact nothing indeed could occur; Badiou appears to call this the nihilistic ethical state [oh kay, here’s a cite: “Ethics”. Badiou], and it is not difficult to correlate Kiekegaard’s ‘ethical/universal’ here, and thus we have ended with the point at which divergence diverges: correlationalism. What confines this or defines this state is exactly the move for reconciliation of categorical imperatives, or rather, the reliance upon that which the categorical pure reason allows as then essential ethical categories; for if there is no choice, we have then the imperative situation. Yet likewise, where there is choice, it is imperative that we choose. This is the problematic that Kierkagaard addresses through all his works. It is the effort to reduce this situation to a solution that defines the correlational arena, and all Western philosophy (should I say to distinguish and say all continental philosophy ? But even the analytics are attempting a one reduction I think) since the Greeks has been the effort to reconcile this apparent difference. Judaism seems the only one that actually keeps that which is Cesar’s with Cesar, so to speak, keeping ‘God’ as entirely unknowable, and the practical manifestation and activity privy to this known-unknown unto itself as Law. But the discussion of religion will follow later.
That which breaks with this historical philosophical effort recognizes difference; not the difference that requires the different element to recognize the universal maxim that we should respect difference, which is the conventional correlational move, but rather the difference that realizes that this idea, or respect for the idea, does not contain that which is different.
By this initial distinction, we can begin to consider truth.