The Tanzanian government plans to kick 40,000 Maasai people off their ancestral land to make way for a luxury big game hunting reserve.

Ronnie's Blog

Maasai

Update, 8:45pm GMT 25 November 2014: The Tanzanian President has tweeted that he will not pursue to deal with the hunting reserve — but we cannot back off until the Maasai are guaranteed permanent rights to their land, in writing. We’ve updated the petition text to reflect this additional, critical, ask.

The Tanzanian government plans to kick 40,000 Maasai people off their ancestral land to make way for a luxury big game hunting reserve. A section of the famous Serengeti plains, which teems with lions, leopards, elephants, wildebeest, zebra and buffalo, is to be sold to a Dubai-based company, the Ortelo Business Corporation, for a commercial hunting ground.

The Tanzanian government has been forced to back down once before — last year, after massive local and international opposition to the plan, Tanzania’s president promised the Maasai they could stay on their lands. Now the government has made a sudden u-turn…

View original post 47 more words

Advertisements

Shaviro at Irvine

It is an operational maxim of mine that one cannot ( should not ) act (or behave) from a position of novelty; that is, from a presumption of truth, as if everything has not already been said or is being said, as if something that hasn’t been heard before thus amounts to a disappointment or offense to what one (I) may have to say.

That having been said, I have at this time not read this guy, but I have a feeling from just looking over his web page (http://www.shaviro.com/Doom/index.html) that he is and was onto something eternal in the way I have just described.

But I could be wrong.

We will see.

Object-Oriented Philosophy

10806469_10204968398750608_924594983641702639_n

View original post

Harman and the True Object.

The question is no longer that of Being, for Heidegger has destroyed being, like a forensic analysis of material. Being was viable so long as there was a dialectic whereby reality could be based upon its one vision through the oscillating features held from one another, like a binary star. Hiedegger destroyed the dialectic (for conventional method), encompassing the description of how such an interaction takes place for reality, what the dialectic does, how it works, a description from a distance, in a nice neat package, defining the Trueness of the Object called Dasein, ready for distribution. Hence, the question anymore is not of being, but of truth. The issue with Graham Harman is that he stands upon the dialectic through setting aside the destruction of being, and thereby enacts a deception. He thereby may speak of other than human Daseins through the dialectical vehicle, all the while holding the dialectic out of sight, withdrawn as the Dasein by which other Daseins are possible is likewise set aside for the sake of proposing again a ‘new’ one reality where the dialectic is gone, and the subject likewise dead. He thereby may propose a new ontology of being: Object Ontology.

*

I must admit, as a read more of Harman I am becoming increasingly disillusioned and bored; I tend to see the rise of Speculative Realism and then it’s Fizzle to have ran along these same lines as I am experiencing and discovering. And I must say that it is because of what has occurred, what was enticed early on as a sort of promise has lead to merely another philosophical system; quite boring, but even more irritating was that it seemed like Harman might be one to be able to pull it off, but then he comes up with another system that proposes a more real version of reality. So conventional; so regular, run of the mill. So it is, the reason for this motion of his that lead to a positing a more real system is explained by the essay of the Significant Event, that such deceptions can no longer stay viable; that is, except in so much as the deception is working, and where it succeeds is exactly in that audience where denial is operative. The deception works because the conventional method is already submerged and distanced in a self imposed deception: the term-object identity.

The boredom of Dasein explained by Harman is symptomatic of the reversal and contrivance we see in Harman’s Ontology. Admitting the short reading, the boredom of Being Dasein in need of some danger is at the heart of why Harman’s seem so boring: because the danger of Object Ontology comes in response to the boredom of being that is, in itself, a preliminary mood, that is, a mood that has not been allowed its maturation, has not been let to risk, and so discusses subsequence. Like a lacuna, this mood that Harman seems to understand is the offense that is the Ontology in its Ontological functioning. Harman is required for his Dasein of many colors to describe as enactment the results of having True Objects as the basis of a reality that is ubiquitous as it is total in its assertion of a universe of only objects. This is to say that he is arguing his identity, an identity that has arisen due to his investment in the State of reality. Here multiple Daseins exist as the evidence of the description of how it’s being is not presence, like an oxymoron, defies and contradicts its own meaning. Beings may exist with a certain facticity of ‘being there’ as an environmental inclusive state, but the being of Dasein thereby includes the fact of other Daseins within its own ‘there being facticity’. The implication here is the point of contention between eternity and progress, between what Badiou calls ‘immortal’ and ‘victim’; Harman is enacting his victimization. The dangerous move apparently seen by Harman is gained by his view of his Dasein as a meaning of meaning, as a Being that is exempt from the situation that Heidegger presents to mean Dasein. The meaning of Dasein for Harman is already a meaning represented as a object of Harman’s presentation. Harman apparently already was viewing the significance of Heidegger’s work as a significance fundamentally different than what the meaning of Dasein would entail, which is to say, the corpus that is the explanation of Dasein was already in the format of meaning that represents as a presentation the True Object (meaning of meaning) as an objective reflection, over the meaning that the corpus presents. Harman already was was viewing the world as a whole constituency of True Objects, already was his faith unquestioned, already his faith not doubted, his naïveté a sham before it could be authentic. Rather than the danger which is the being bored as the boredom that is being, Harman’s risk, what is dangerous for Harman, is by his faith, that his deception might be uncovered.

But in one manner of speaking, he need not be worried, because his faith is vindicated in the power that establishes reality, as he is invested in this reality, as he has faith in this power, he is justified. His risk is entirely of his faith.

Nevertheless, the boredom or disappointment comes because while his categories seem to really get at something, he leaves us flat in a world of intellectual ‘weirdness’; but the weirdness is barely interesting — or maybe as interesting as watching someone solve a Rubic’s cube. I know now that every time he preludes an idea with weird, it’s not going to be weird at all but rather mundane and obvious; but somehow I am sure that it is weird to a certain type of type of reader and author, and this type is probably one who is oriented upon the True Object. For a while I thought Graham was really following the philosophical maxim of looking to oneself, but it’s seems his route for this is more conventionally methodological than it is novel or introspective.

Yet, I should say that we must give Graham the benefit of doubt; I am sure that Graham indeed feels that he is looking to himself and not being conventional (why else would he say that ideas might be ‘new’?). And this is exactly where the discourse of the Significant Event gains its footing; because Graham can not see beyond his faith. Faith makes true. The discursive posturing may appear quite the feat of meaning, but philosophically speaking, while impressive, it risks little.

*

nihilism unpacked

synthetic zerø


Massimo Pigliucci and Julia Galef on the Rationally Speaking podcast discuss the various epistemological, ontological, mereological and ethical strains of nihilism. The conversation is of an introductory nature but has value in the range that it covers, and in sections that deal with the vacillation between the mood of nihilism and the fact of nihilism. Interestingly, Pigliucci also goes onto discuss the Stoic Week experiment in the therapeutic function of philosophy as a practice of living- a shared concern of the curators of this blog, insofar as we entertain its possibility, and especially a concern of my own in relation to the Stoa.

The Stoics are many things, and it is often there cold rationalism that is emphasised against the acute awareness of an existence that they thought required such a rationalism in order to allow us to cope with it. The question of Stoicism in the context of nihilism might be the question of…

View original post 79 more words

Apology. Harman and The Facticity of the Event.

I apologize.

See that this blog is not so much an assertion of what I believe is so correct, but more a working space where I play with ways to situate discourse and test out the ideas they purport against what I am trying to say (which is why I would like feedback).

Strong words, dare I admit, of that last segment. In fact, I’m feeling I’m getting a little too defensive. The blog format is beginning to yield its limitations and I think I’m trying to plow through it, to demand upon…what? Ultimately, upon myself. Upon my silence. As if I can just yell loud enough I might break the partition. Very few people comment, and while these are valuable and appreciated, they do not constitute the attacks I seek. So I cannot but wonder if it is because I make no sense, or I make too much sense. I don’t know because few people have engaged.

And this blank brings me back to the impetus of this whole thing. To expose. All this so far has been and is preliminary, and I suppose I attempt to address the philosophers that see this foreplay argument and discussion as the primary issue, to get them to see it is really the result, the subsequence of the issue. That the re-present-ational edge of contemporary philosophy is really the dabbling in the whitewash, of subsequent issues.

As a side here, we might venture to suggest that what we have is a world that may be situated opposite to how university philosophy departments like to introduce existentialism. It may be not so much that there is a ‘real world’, and then, how Kiekegaard puts it, there might be a teleological suspension of this ethical real world; rather, we might see that it is the real world that is in suspension.

Thus I have said we recede. We have discussed what is subsequent first because it is represents the barrier to significance, and by approaching in this way come to the point of contention, thereby to be able to discuss what is first instead what is usually seen as last, as the object.

Thus also I have said we diverge from the (as Harman seems to suggest that Heidegger advocates) inadequate philosophical discourse of True Objects.

*

The issue is one’s orientation upon the object.

*

So I repeat myself because the format of the blog seems to lend itself to having to reiterate what has already been said in order to say something more. I feel a book is on its way.

As the previous segment: Harman wrote this synopsis of Heidegger, and he even admits in it that he thinks Heidegger is the greatest philosopher of our time. Now, if these statements are true, then we can say that Harman most probably not only understands Heidegger very well, but agrees with him in much of what he is saying, that is, Harman must also see that Heidegger is putting forth a description that is a good description of the issues, good, valid solutions to good and valid problems.

What I am saying is that if Harman does indeed reside well within the situation above there in the previous paragraph, then his first and second objections are forced, derivative not from Heidegger’s meaning; the objections are non sequitur to Heidegger’s ideas. Not ‘objections’ but completely estranged, fabricated. How is this? To put it in Heidegger’s terms, which Harman aptly explains (strangely enough) and to address his second objection: the facticity of being itself contains and accounts for change as part of its historical environment of facticity. If indeed the facticity for Harman is the arising of the question of change in his environment then it is exactly the occasion for which Harman is incorrect in his operation (see below).

Secondly, as to his first objection: Heidegger’s claim that there is only world when Dasein is present is really saying that such world, the work of objects, arise as such only with the instance of the human ‘being there’, that without Dasein, there is nothingness, which ironically is the ‘ground’ of the facticial event. Harman rejects this privilege and allows for the Dasein of podiums and fire and paper and such, but we could see that this rejection is based in the offense against the essential subject of a different privilege, of agency, the individual (see the next segment as well as previous post in the Significant Event). The question that must be asked then has to do with what facticity actually denotes, which then brings to the front the point of the issue with Harman; one of two situations must account for Harman’s mistaken digression from the philosopher he so thoroughly admires and understands:

Either,

1) Harman does not understand Heidegger for Heidegger’s meaning, and so is involved in the conventional mistake, as I offer the description by Lacan and Zizek (previous post of the Significant Event);

Or,

2) Harman does understand and so is contriving a position that blatantly ignores the meaning of the facticity of being, and so is being deceptive. This is to say one of the subsequent issues:

A). Harman is being deceptive as a strategy;

Or,

B). He is lying about his admiration for Heidegger and his scholarship is thereby called into question.

If indeed (1) is the answer, then it is easy to address Harman to the mistake as he is involved in the conventional faith in the True Object. If (2), then we have a marker of the pocket veto and evidence of the opacity of his proposals. (B) can be properly dismissed as a route back into (1).

***

Next we will address next some particular Object Ontology ideas.

An Unheard Blow: A Strike that Can’t Be Blocked to Graham Harman’s Wondrous New.

Dealing with Graham Harman and the True Object oriented.

I got a copy of the book series called “Xplained” on Martin Heidegger written by Graham Harman. I thought it was something different, but when I got the book and started reading it I saw that it is more an actual kind of primer of Heidegger. It is very good; it places everything in a nice historical perspective with Heidegger’s personal history and influences, with Husserl and Phenomenology, and brings in the contextual philosophical problems he had and indeed philosophy in general faces, the significance of his proposals and such. One can tell Harman is quite informed, and I am sure one does not place very much weight on a layman such as myself, my opinion, to say that it evidences quite a scholarly understanding of the subject — as if Harman or the institution of philosophy really values, cares or needs my stamp of approval.

Yet is this very ignorance that evidences the exhaustion of institutional philosophy. The vastness of the human world populace as well as our internet availability for exchange of information of all sorts and types marks a coincidence whereby (institutional, academic, conventional) philosophy must now 1) be resolute in denial by closing its blinders to narrow its view, while 2) asserting its relevance for a larger totality, by 3) redoubling its effort to deceive, and 2) be oriented toward reconciliation upon politics and ideology. But, as I’ve said, there is plenty of drama in reality that needs a grand discourse to negotiate; reality demands its big negotiators. I am more concerned that such discourses assume to be talking about what is true outside the grand narrative. We have to ask what such grand narratives are based upon and how it might be possible to actually believe that such narratives are indeed accounting for all of reality. indeed; could they really hear what I’m saying here? I doubt it. It is more that such individuals are involved in a division of labor.

This, what could be called a philosophical ‘turn’ is more like a ‘shift’ but is really a motion of denial based in offense, or an outright deception.

It is true; philosophy, as the discourse that indeed addresses the One reality in its oneness, ends with Heidegger. Whereas prior to and including Heidegger, in one way of viewing, one orientation, philosophers were attempting to inscribe, or otherwise suture the subject and object, the subject into reality, to reconcile the individual and reality, Heidegger does away with the need for suturing. The philosophers since and in the interim until Laruelle and Badiou begin on one hand to describe how this ending manifests for the subject — a phenominalist step for sure but one that, one one hand, enfolds upon the object, involves with it, without reducing the object to subjectivity (Sartre), but on the other, turns the subject out upon the object and removes its more ‘artistic’ interpretations for the sake of ideological and social contingencies, such as gender and race and social justice (sufficient cultural critique). But despite such delineations, philosophy continues upon the same course of attempting to reconcile reality and the subject of conventional power. Heidegger’s meaning is thus set aside as a True historical Object, so what seems should be philosophical effort has not been undertaken but rather has changed its course upon an assertion, as Miellassoux might suggest that the motivating base of previous philosophy was mistaken. The question should be upon how philosophers see themselves enacting anything different than any other period authors.

*

Laruelle and Badiou thus can be seen to represent an historical ‘fulcrum’. Laruelle transcribes the Heideggarian tool-work into its discursive actuality, such that philosophy can no longer stand on its own for its own, but must unknowingly assert its primacy and importance against the ignorance revealed of it by non-philosophical means. But this is not to say that philosophy becomes useless, but rather a different type of mechanism for dealing in reality has taken place. We propose that this ‘new’ mechanism is denial, for if ever there was a One reality, discourses needed not to deny anything because the assumption of power was de facto the omniscient and effective power (colonialism). Badiou, on the other hand, models the ‘Philosophical scenario’ (called: the Romance; but again, by one orientation) in mathematical schemata, his book “Being and Event” a model and description of said Romantic Event (the Significant Event). Again, another historical marking; here though, one that evidences at once a total understanding and acknowledgment that indeed such Heideggarian Event is not an (small ‘r’) romantic personal experience of caprice and individual interpretation (as conventional philosophy would have it, as it continues to argue for its Object), but rather a specific mapping of the routine transcendental (clausal) consciousness under certain conditions. It is this mapping that the individual invested of the State of reality does not wish to see, such a description that is utterly offensive to the faith in the transcendental clause of conventional discourse that allows for the exploitative capitalistic fetishism.

The latest philosophical (realist) ‘turn’ is founded upon nothing more than an assumption and assertion that discourse presides over what the human being is in its essence; such a position must be asserted as it is denied because of the overwhelming presence of elements that would not inherently conform to the grand narrative except that they must due to the ‘magic’ of capitalistic fetishism demanded upon the human beings as an enforced imperative of divinely inspired progress, denied as such based upon the True Objects of historical discourse. Hence conventional real discourse. For what Heidegger is showing us is that discourse is merely a vehicle.

The problem arises in so much as the precipitate of his ideas shows that Heidegger (at least) was dealing with ‘two sided’ objects; where one side is the Event in its most full meaning, as ‘environment’ but also revealed of the Romantic scenario, and the other side still sees discourse as inherently involved and associated with actual True Objects. To distinguish how we might answer, and the results of answering, the question of side, we have to ask (as Heidegger did of thinking) if philosophy really has any integrity, or if philosophy is now merely another means to an end for various capitalist literary venturers? Is the act of being creative and imagining into logical writing automatically philosophy? How can we discern what is philosophy from creative writing? And if we have to consider such a question ‘philosophically speaking’ then I’m afraid we’ve already found our answer. For it is the ‘two sided’ object that establishes a partition that offers no quarter and no types; a boundary that evidences the move of conventional discursive power.

*

Therefore it is a strange twist that Harman puts upon the reading of Hiedegger, and indeed upon his readers. For if one is not keen on the reading of this book, Harman’s explanation of Heidegger, it would be easy to see that Harman is merely giving us an easy version of what Martin was saying; but he is not. Harman is giving us a loaded explanation of Heidegger. It is not difficult to feel a strangeness in this reading; the explanation is interspersed with interpretation in the guise of explanation that lends itself to give itself to Harman’s argument and project, which is Object Oriented Ontology, so by the end of the book it appears the ‘first and second’ objections come naturally of course, but it is after all the course that Harman has laid for its outcome. When we begin to see what is occurring, it is not His OOO that then seems weird; it is weird that his deception would be taken as honesty.

His first objection: Dasein is not only human. That is; it is not the human ‘being there’ that causes things to come into play. Rather, Dasein may be other things too; ‘being there’ rocks; ‘being there’ podiums; etcetera.

Harman’s second objection. Change is not accounted for; and, “how can there be multiple simultaneous perspectives on the same entity” (pg. 163).

I’ll just come right out and say it: Harman’s objections are non sequitur to Heidegger’s proposal. And I do not need to go and site argument by argument. This is to say that Harman’s objections are derived, or maybe better said, contrived, through a misdirection implemented by Harman. For, if Harman does indeed understand Heidegger as he seems to, then he should see that his objections to Heidegger are non sequitur to Heidegger’s meaning, that the meaning Harman is using to formulate his objections do not correlate with the Event by which Heidegger brings philosophy to its end. Therefore, Harman derives an argument based upon a structure of argument that is assumed to be able to be made of Heidegger, and thereby appears to ignore the meaning of the argument in its place as the Event.

In other words, one can say that if indeed Harman has understood Heidegger, then Harman should have been allowed to be able to come upon the Significant Event. But ironically, two contingencies yield for us the same result for Harman’s proposals. For if Harman was come upon by the Significant Event, then it is in so much that he gained inspiration from this encounter that he may move to say something new of reality; but most probably, due to his orientation upon Heidegger and his ideas as True Objects, as indicative within the term-object identity, Harmans’ reading was an occasion by which to deny the said Event as some True Object (term-object identity) for the purpose of establishing his real identity. Either way, Harman thereby can be said to have enacted a pocket veto; a veto that has held in the pocket until such a time when it was needed to retain real identity.

Hence it is highly ironic but unfortunately conventional that Harman is involved in an act of deception by presenting ‘Object Oriented Ontology’, as we will describe more thoroughly in the next segments.

Pursuit of Our Dreams

NOEMAYA

There is nothing that cannot be achieved through concentration.

In all esoteric traditions in which the aspirant is initiated into the way for the attainment of truth the most important requirement is the intense longing for the goal. It and it alone if held with consistency brings about the result.

This though first appearing as a mystery turns out to be a universal structure of consciousness. Intense longing does not actually create a result; the result, the goal, is always there in the universe but only potentially. Intense longing is rather a ritual on the part of seeker to show the extent to which it gives itself to the goal, a ritual for winning her heart; and the extent to which we give ourselves to the goal the goal gives itself to us.

Intense longing is no mere curiosity, no hobby, no entertainment. I should long for the goal to…

View original post 724 more words

The 4th Dimension

NOEMAYA

If we were exclusively 3 dimensional beings, then we would not be able to experience a 3 dimensional world. Why? Below is the reason:

Construction:

  1. Circle is a geometrical construct that needs two dimensions for its construction.
  2. The construction of a circle is possible only in a 2-D space.
  3. Two dimensional space is a necessary and sufficient condition for the construction of a circle.
  4. When we say that a certain geometrical or topological construct is N dimensional we mean that an N dimensional space is the necessary and sufficient condition for its construction.

Perception:

  1. Circle as a 2-D construct can be perceived fully only from above, from above the 2-D space in which it is constructed.
  2. To fully perceive a circle one needs to transcend the circle’s space.
  3. One has to be transcendent to the circle in order to perceive the circle, or else the circle itself…

View original post 323 more words