Monthly Archives: October 2014

The Issue of Route.

The issue of route.

1) The entirety of reality is constituted in the condition of knowledge involving the subject and the object. The subject is usually understood as the human being, and the object all other things of the universe.

2) The common way of describing this situation is that there is a knowing human being and an object of its knowing ‘out there’ in the world. Emmanuel Kant explained the repercussions of this situation as having to do entirely with the knowing subject, and not so much to do with the object out there ‘in-itself’. All objects are thus subjective appropriations of objects.

3) The situation of the subjective appropriation of objects is usually understood as involving sensory experience; accorded to the conventional Kantian ideal, such sensory experiences are thus partial and flat, appropriating pieces or portions of the object in question that are likewise superficial in quality, and never gain or are able to attain the object in-itself. In this way it can be said, as a type of definition, that the sensed material is consolidated for the subject as an object.

4) One problem is how such subjective appropriations appear to be common for all humans for particular objects across a particular field of time and space. Another issue due to this situation is whether communication from multiple subjects about the same object will be able to amount to a more thorough description of the object itself.

5) The problem with the Kantian situation is that it appears to deal with quite objective occasions of the world. A description of that sort tends toward the assumption of a particular and universal manner of having the world and the individual person. While we may be able to describe the situation where every human being appropriates objects through their subjective abilities and attributes, such description is already assuming an essential segregation of world objects, such that not only is there is a knowing subject but that objects may indeed be known as to what is in-itself the object of our appropriation, but as well, that there is this common object that we are lumping into a privileged category for what can be called the subject human being knower, or humanity in general.

6) This situation thus grants us Wittgenstein’s proposal. But as opposed to Witt’s ‘facts’, the question is usually always about objects, but objects that are before us as a common sensual-psychic manifestation, i.e. the object that is not the thinking-knowing subject; the question involves how the subject appropriates objects. Yet what we have found has been found through a dissolution of essential categories; in Kant’s instance, a rejection of super-naturalistic metaphysics of spirits and Gods and ethereal forces. What occurs when the subject appropriation is taken to mean the actual subject, and not humanity in general of which the individual automatically belongs as an essential category, then we see that this issue becomes not so much subjective appropriation of some object in-itself, but more about what one can say about objects, as what is said stems from that object which only occurs in the appropriation.

7) So likewise, when we consider subjects and objects along these lines and we begin to see that all objects are subjective appropriations, we have then to consider how the object that is appropriated and called a ‘common humanity’, is likewise a subjective appropriation. If this is the case, then what we have thus far been considering (historically but presently) of the possibility of objects is seen to be or have been a categorical error.

8) The error can be located in the reflexive reciprocation that occurs in the subjective appropriation of objects; i.e. the subject thinker-knower has before her an object (distinct; separated) and this object is the subjective appropriation (blurred; enjoined).

9) In this situation, a distinction must be made in order for the subject to even consider the object; the contradiction cannot lay open to thus collapse reality. The manner by which such an error is typically repaired is thus to reify essential real categories: the subject human being, and the object that is not the human being. Through consideration of this, we thereby find ourselves back in the Kantian, or perhaps Cartesian, situation.

10) Due to this repetition, the progress in concepts that has lead us back to its beginning, we must reconsider what was meant originally, the assumption being that whatever it was that we understood originally that progressed through the linkage of concepts and ideas to bring us back to the beginning, must be incorrect; this is Correlationalism, that the addressing may consider the object, adiscourse, but now strong and weak Correlationalism is to be placed into an essential category such that a new corrective discourse may be presented. The issue then concerns how concepts tend to propose away from a given humanity, concepts that gain their meaning upon an incorrect appraisal of what humanity is, as integral to reality, that then propose to change what humanity is.

11) One way to resolve this is to adjust the Kantian paradigm to eliminate the subject, to make all real things objects. Hence the subject is implied of the object in a real determination, and thus allows for a transformation of the Kantian problem. The difference found by essential categories now becomes a difference between the previous route and the new route, i.e. the previous route derived the subject through its objective identity, the new route derives the object through its subjective determination. It is a case of what is stable for what can be viewed.

12) In this way, reality is understood to have changed. This change has come about through a subjective renegotiation of what the relationship between the subject and object is. The subjective appropriation is now understood to be not subjectively appropriated in the manner addressed by Kant.

13) Yet the problem here remains the same problem: objects are viewed as substantial, material that is founded in its presumption of concretion and are understood as at least partially contained or effected by the discourse that speaks of them. This is to say that the categorical error has been suspended for the sake of the real directional and impositional aspect discourse is understood to have upon an object, and thus the subject and reality is likewise effected.

14) The solution that does not repeat the error notices that discourse does not speak of True Objects, does not renegotiate the terms by which such True Objects constitute reality. Instead, reaction against the categorical error does not suspend itself again, but rather admits the imperative by which reality is able to convey or have any meaning whatsoever.

15) Hence: Terms are objects; or rather, the issue concerns how one is oriented upon objects.

16) Where discourse must proceed upon at least a partial revealing of objects, there reality is posited, therein and by this route the potential for the absolutely True Object may be found. This route is presented in the hard correlational limit; where the term-identity reigns, there what is argued as weak and strong correlationalism may inform reality to its possibility.

17) Where discourse proceeds upon itself, such that the object offers occasions for discourse at functional junctures, contrary to the view that sets systems upon True Objects, there we have irony, a discourse that upsets the conventional route through rejection of its proper method for coming upon objects.

18) In this ironic case where terms are objects, the approach would be to see that the repetition is human, and that the repeated effort to avoid this repetition always views its move as something more than human, some culmination of concepts that will miraculously lift the human out of its recurring motion to a more real, or more correct discursive assessment of reality. Such progress is thus based in a denial of the human being for the sake of its concepts, objects in themselves that are intuited from the transcendent aspect of reality, the Kantian ideal.

19) The divergent approach would look into this motion, to disseminate the components of and thus reveal how objects are being used, instead of posing another more real or more true appropriation of objects, in themselves or not, where the subject is always set aside for its real determinations. Discourse itself itself is not at issue; the question of divergence concerns how one is oriented upon objects.

20) When what is human is fully admitted, then a discussion of what might be beyond human, all too human, might have veracity, but then the discussion might wish to give up such a proposal. The effect of throwing away the ladder thus might give rise to a reinstatement of human beginnings. But this could only be a move full of doubt.

SE part 10ai, part B: The Revolution Will not be Televised (nor disseminated in virtual media or social networking sites).

I suppose the question left is a trick question because one cannot dismiss the link already established between philosophy and ideology and politics; there is indeed reality to be dealt with. The question behind philosophical learning has to do with if it has already been or is being dealt with by the historical discourse, if there is a progress of the human being itself, if the philosophical discourse is actually moving the individual human being to better ‘know thyself’, if a record of historical discourse allowing the human being a better purchase upon what it is to be a human being and what occurs in this process? Or, does conventional philosophy perpetually lure the human being away from itself? Or to be even more crass; Does the conventional route present a deception of itself, for itself, so that it can move upon a platform of substantial belief such that human beings are gaining some sort of solution? And then of course the pivotal issue of this forum: What is education?

The trick is seen inso much as such a question may be voiced from a valid position, because then the proof that would put philosophy in bed with politics and such, and thus deflate what otherwise would be a ‘good use’ for philosophy to a ‘well esteemed and well paid methods for engineering maintenance’ and would elevate the lowly conventionally methodological philosopher to have to drop his broom for a gun in the effort to defend that identity thus created by ideological faith — but this is reality. The trick in this discussing types or routes for learning is in so much as one sees that they are being deceived; a trick of mirrors; it is not that there is no mirror, but that the mirror into which philosophy most often looks shows its identical reflection, that is, the right hand in the reflection still is the right hand from the reference of the reflection; the left, the left…

The notice made by Negarestani (essay link in part A) might give rise to the construction of meaning that will show how the terms themselves allow only particular formations of concepts, that the structure of a given situation allows for and recalls to itself necessary arrangements of meaning and thus offers what might be called a ‘lexicontology’, amoung other transformations, a type of argument for determinism. Our situation thus asks into the excess, the ‘world’ that is the haphazard method of finding the necessary arrangements, what can be called the conventional bias. Notwithstanding this problem, his can be seen as further evidence of discourse coming to terms with itself, as the (engineering, of Negaresanti’s essay) discourse is seen as not arising from some unitive structure toward some systematic resolution (revolution), but rather that the structure is the object in correspondence with discourse at various functional junctures; a quite deconstructivist approach. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to see how such offer-recall of objects locates the imperative of faith to disjoin from the object and deny its recall (distance). Presently such an ontology is not part of the real discursive structure-function (it grants no reflection), but there again, the Significant Event suggests that in so much as we are already and always human, such an ontology would be merely another real scheme of faith, yet one which in respect of the position that would recognize such ontology would bring about a repetition of history, a reinstatement of beginning such that a much longer period of knowledge would have to be allowed to rebuild the subsequence of discourse to the point that such a repetition could be recognized. Of course, the usual arguments against determinism will always apply, for the significant feature of an effective ontology of determinism, one that functions as such, must relinquish the position that determinism proposes, which is also the relinquishing of its counter argument, contingency, which only happens in the conventional human reality; this is what is meant by, with Zizek for one, but others, forgetting, and its repercussions, a (re-)instatement of repetition (Kierkegaard), as well as the mistake denied of redundancy.

The purpose of any revolutionary discourse is to jolt the human being from its individual sleep of reactionary default. So, it may not be too far a stretch here to completely offend the reader by saying that the human being does not change through history, but reality does. The default linkage is that which informs the offense inherent to the rebuttal because the rejection stems from a particular direction, or vector, of linkage; the dismissal of such a statement comes from the individual that is invested in the state of reality determined by the term-object identity, where the subject is held against the object in a directional mode, subject-> object, as an imperative, the conventional method. For reality, where discourse is able to come about through the inversion of this relationship, there we have Harman’s Object Oriented Ontology, object->object, but where this is really a motion of object->subject, the situation implied of this essay, but ironically, of a determinism as determinism, the route that is always denied in effective reality despite its conventional appropriation. It is the Significant Event that allows for this effective determination.


Of the second type of student from Part A we mean to suggest that such humanity and the world is not questioned but is rather taken as a platform upon which to wonder and ask upon the objects of its view. Thus all discourses are merely information about objects, even as the object in question is the human being. Mythology and history offer stories of past humans and insights into the nature of humanity and what it means to be a human being. Scientific books tell of methods of analysis that were correct and incorrect, answers that were correct and incorrect and why they were so. The whole range of possible information grants this student a picture and a palette, and a canvas upon which she can create and add to the wondrous and vast compendium of personal, social, useful and not useful items of the human plate.

Tangental to such neutrality, the issue brought up in part A about the move students may make into gathering more discursive information indicates a particular priority of vector for knowledge. For the implication of such a movement does not necessitate any particular discourse to be revealing to the student, rather it presents the possible repercussions of the route. It is just as sensible, along these lines, that a person would venture into ‘spiritual’ discourses as well as strictly philosophical notions and begin to see the elements of those routes as truely true. For example; there are many many people who like to offer us a vision of ‘planes of existence’ where there is a ‘Godhead’ of consciousness, and this Godhead thus can be disseminated along certain logical lines to bring various states of Being that thus serve to explain the human participation in the universe. We might call this a type of New Age conflation of a further variety of philo-spiritual systems, one that arises from the ancient Hindu, Buddhist and or Kabalist ideas, but also modern theoretical physics. One could also read Alastair Crowley and describe the truth of how the universe disseminates along Magickal lines. Pagan or Wiccan cosmology offers a route as well to tell of the truth. Likewise, modern science offers its own meaning for its research in its own right, of non-locality and complexity and such, often removing from its discourse the spiritual voice but all the while telling us of this Truth of the universe and our true place in it. Philosophers, oddly enough, appear to be the most stubborn, for as soon as one brings of a term that has possibility to be unclear or is already attached to certain authorial matrices, such as ‘phenomenon’ and ‘discourse’ and ‘transcendence’, and ‘metaphysics’, these students will route the discussion to the potential of truth that such philosophical discourses hold, so when one speaks they must automatically resolve themselves by their speaking to ‘idealist’, ‘realist’, ‘materialist, etcetera… domains of truth that, as a part of the philosophical truth, are held in suspension for the discussion that arises simultaneously toward and upon the philosophical truth. But these are more than just speaking; somehow, for all such speakers, they appear to constitute The Actual Truth of the universe.

Here, though, we are addressing specifically philosophical truth, but through this discursive vehicle bringing into question all routes. But not that philosophy as a particular discursive arena thus amounts to The true reduction of all routes, but that any route, if viewed as a particular suspension of meaning as opposed to its being involved with terms that are understood as actually anchored of objective truth, may be reduced to any other route. This is the principle that all discourses are valid and hence contribute to the transformation of that principle; that individual discourses constitute the economy of discourses by which reality is manifested. Hence the query that brings the respective routes of the second and first student to the question of a particular vectorial move that conflates the two students to one route that then presents itself suspended (ironically) in particular assertions of truth: What is occurring that brings the student to assert a particular truth in opposition to another? And, what is that situation that is able to move through such anchored scaffolding to thus be able to make the correlation of all systems? Hence, the question that is brought by my sited essay above (by Negarestani): What is the function of the structure, and the structure of the function? This is not a suggestion to delve into subjective justification per say, but is rather addressing under what conditions does a unitary discourse of reality arise? What does such a unitary discourse as and in its unity suggest of reality?

I shall back up and elaborate, for the question of ideology has to do with that for which it does not account, or otherwise accounts for it by incorporating the (it’s) presented lack into its structure. From where, or how, does, the ideology of reality function as an incorporating structure?

This question involving the first student is: If the student were so interested in the question of existence and her presence on the scene and how the world might be or otherwise present itself, is the historical philosophical discourse necessary to her finding those things the traditional discourse ponders and proposes of questions and answers? This is to ask, is the conventional route the only route? To be more specific: Is it necessary to read Husserl to know about that of which phenomenology speaks? Of course, all those prideful philosophers will have a field day ripping apart this question so much that they will see such a question as hardly reflecting a knowledgable positions of the issue. They will bring such questions as “well, yes, because phenomenology was a system of thought coined by Husserl in which he said this and that and phrases things this and that way… so if anyone were to know about phenomenology, they would necessarily have to have read him or at least spoken to someone about his ideas”. And of course I would have to say that they completely used their over philosophical brain that processes given information to arrive at that answer, just like the second student I just mentioned.

So I shall reiterate: Is it necessary to have read Hesserl to come to a notion (very, very generally speaking) that all phenomena of the world arise in the subject? And again I can just hear it: “the only way one would know there was a subject in which phenomena arises in is to have knowledge of philosophical rhetoric”.

Am I making any head way here?

Again: If a person were so interested, could they come upon the meaning of Husserl’s founding premise without having to have read about it? And I am not asking if they could know that Husserl said this. Along this line, can a student understand Husserl without a primer, without the usual historical and academic philosophical contextual introduction? We suggest, contrary to the conventional assumption, that perhaps Husserl’s idea is not an idea that came about due to Husserl, but that such an idea is innate to the human experience given that one is motivated to plainly look.

Likewise; Is Kant’s notion that knowledge reflects of itself, an idea that can only be gained by knowledge of Kant?

Likewise; Is Fauerbach’s idea of an economy of human knowledge dependent upon Kant’s idea? Is any proposal of authors dependent upon the previous statements of other authors?

Likewise; Is Harman’s idea of Objects (Object Oriented Ontology) due to his pronouncing the idea, or is such an idea innate to reflective human experience? Is Miellassoux’s idea of an object that exists antecedent to the thought about it an idea that he and only he came up with? Was his idea dependent upon other authors’ proposals? Nevermind that if we say ‘yes’ we are setting aside the very method by which we insist upon questioning what the author is really saying.

So; If such ideas do indeed depend upon and are allowed to be generated because of previous authors’ proposals, then we have a proposal of a particular type of human reality. We have the conflation, but conventional discernment, of philosophy as a conspiratorial agent of political and ideological investment.

If not, then we have a completely different situation.


Part of the problem of the point of contention is that if we can say that authors are drawing upon ideas that are innate to the human being, then we can say that it is possible to point to specific notions of respective discourses, certain subsequent conclusions put forth by various authors based upon the innate factor or element, that do not reside innately to human reflection, that is, to all humans who may reflect, proposals that are particular to that author’s presence in the world or experience in knowledge and or their particular method of disseminating the innate experience of knowledge, articles that must be learned through the banking model. We can say that humans are capable of understanding the subsequent moves, but we are also saying that the subsequent moves are sufficient to the necessary premise, that if the premise is innate, we can thereby understand why or how the author might draw such subsequent conclusions, even we might see them as incorrect. It is by this maxim, this discrepancy that is the evidence supporting argument, i.e. I know what you mean here/ I don’t know what you mean there, or, I know what you mean, but the consequence is mis-drawn, is an indication of problem and elicits from this situation the aspect of the discourse on the Significant Event that we have called opacity, where the distinction put out upon the reality implied by discourse reveals faith and its operative mode of the veto, but specifically to those authors who appear to recognize the discrepancy, the pocket veto. Hence also, we set aside the question of conventional reality and its authors, for its method assumes and relies upon such opacity (argument; choice; veto), the space wherein arises impetus for real progress, and instead we address particular philosophical discourses that evidence opacity (the pocket veto) within itself as its presentation reveals opacity between what is innate or necessary, and what is hypothetical or contingent; for what is innate appears through all discourses in one way or another, through various shades and veils, screens and partitions, despite how ‘Pure Reason’ may be located in Kant to be a conventional Western philosophy property. Such propriety is entirely hypothetical and practical.

Now we can get to the clincher, the most offensive proposal of divergence, the caveat that would often buck the philosophical reader. We can also say that what is innate to the human being is only innate to those for whom it is innate. The problem is inherent to the proposal of divergence, for when this is mentioned within a treatise that is called philosophical, whatever the phrasing, the meaning will always be brought back to the conventional philosophical rhetoric, the meaning of meaning. One problem is in the use of the term ‘human being’, and this is used specifically to avoid the term ‘humanity’ for certain contexts. The individual, on the other hand, does refer specifically to the human being invested in reality. So it is that the distinction is commonly and en route seen to divide by which to implicate the whole, and, move for the whole by making distinctions by which the whole there comes. It is thereby (by this method) that divergence will not be understood, for when we speak of the human being we must be speaking of an individual, one that is a single member of a common whole, and a potential that thereby is available to the whole. In this case, if there is an idea that is innate of the human being, then we are also saying that any and every human being may have access to it. Yet, the question must be, if every human being has access to this innate idea, why do they not express as an idea innate to themselves that they apprehend this idea? But not only this; if there is an innate idea found merely through the looking at that which is innate to the human being, why do people require it being described by others for them to understand the innate idea? What is it about such innateness that is being aroused un-innately? Yet if such innateness is aroused by a sort of sympathy between (subject-)objects, such that perhaps a type of ‘resonance’ is occurring by which such latent idea thus is apprehended as innate, what is the situation where 1) only particular people are privy or have access to such discourses of the idea? And, 2) even if such discourses are available to people, most people do not or cannot apprehend them? And, 3) even if such discourses are supposed to be apprehended they are not viewed as have arisen innately, but rather comprehended as a unit of information that had not been there prior to the learning it, that is, the gaining of the piece of information that says it is innate amounts thus to it being innate as a price (distance; commodity) of definitional information?

The situation presented by these three instances, which occur at all times in nearly every place one can come across, thus must signal a divergent discourse, one that speaks of humanity but a specific humanity that apprehends the innate idea. We can no longer assume that any sort of revolutionary transformation can or will arise, (for the revolution has de facto already occurred) and neither, without a certain forlorn demeanor, can we settle to treat all production of discourse strictly like a work of art. The category of which we speak no longer compromises itself to a usurpation of multiple perceptions or interpretation of sets of sets, but even sets these conventional term-identities within a different categorical imperative. We thereby speak of divergence in its most full and true sense. This situation is similar, say, to people who know how to program computers. As an analogy; no one will suggest that the skills, language and let alone the perception upon computers that these people have automatically must be able to be reduced to the skills, language and perception of say the users of Microsoft Windows platform, that the programmers must reconcile their ‘computer programming world’, or the code or language they use and the perceptions of problems and solutions of computer programming, to the general user of Windows, the but neither must the Windows users be reconciled in their using to be automatically included in the programmers ‘world’. But this is exactly what is presumed of conventional philosophy for the category of philosophy as a single imperative within which all the -ism’s and -ologies arise. This is to say, that the significance of divergence does not reduce itself nor is required to reconcile itself to what is more real of reality, and, the discussion that considers these facets of knowledge of reality as an all inclusive meaning, while it may use the ‘results’ of such divergence for its varied purposes, likewise is incapable of addressing the divergent discourse beyond such addressing as being material of divergence (face to face).

The ramifications of discourse itself of attempting to describe and thus bring about such a reconciliation has a long history, indeed inscribes as it proscribes history, most significantly and poignantly in the rhetoric of revolution. But the fact remains that even the most recent conventional manifestations evidence the real attempt that still reifies and depends upon a discrepancy that is not being overcome. We propose that this is due to a confusion (mistake) that occurs in the effort to conflate what is inherently divided into a one reality, a confusion that persists due to the effort for reconciliation. The Significant Event thus describes how and why such an effort fails for reality, as well as describing how and why such real effort persists, and thereby exposes conventional philosophy as a play for importance of its namesake, for what could be better called, more legitimately, critical or political theory, cultural anthropology, critical psychology, or just plain ideological negotiation, or what might be for a more correctly identifying term, purely academic sets of conventional analytical methodology.

To put this in a conventional phrasing, “the revolution will not be televised”. The irony of divergence cannot be overestimated. Hence, for its weight in truth, we must discern such a divergent discourse that yet remains philosophical, as not real. There is no line being drawn here, the line is already drawn; reality will continue as it always does, conventionally.

Rethinking EVERYTHING…Really???

Culture Monk


by Kenneth Justice

~ Yesterday at coffee I ran into a friend I took a few college classes with back in the day,

Kenneth, I’m thinking about changing my entire life. I left my husband, quit my job, and I’m thinking about moving down South” she said

In her mid-thirties, I’m not sure if she’s having a mid-life crisis or if simply grew to hate her life,

I just woke up one day last year” she said, “and I realized that I absolutely hated my life. I go to work, come home and do chores, talked to my husband about stupid s**t, went to sleep and did it all over again. There hasn’t been anything in my life that is fulfilling or meaningful. It’s all just a revolving day of nothingness that doesn’t matter” she said

When I was in school years ago studying for…

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SE part 10ai: A Necessary Interlude.

SE part 10ai, part A.

As this essay is developing into what may be proper for a small book, I had to take a moment and wait for something to occur, since I was beginning to feel that this essay is tending away from the blog format.

Without introduction as to its applicability to this ongoing essay of mine , I might direct the reader to a paper that I found through the blog post by Synthetic Zero. Called “Frontiers of Manipulation” by Reza Negarestani, his paper can be viewed at For, what we have been waiting for, and wait for, philosophically is the proper occasion for the situation of terms.

So shall we continue with an interlude.


Part of the point of contention and the Significant Event concerns the route by which philosophical discourse is assumed to have been come upon and thus arrived for and in experience. We propose here two conditions that may represent a cleft that is overlooked in the assessment of philosophical discourse and its foundations, what we might call ‘the coincidental inspired’ and the ‘the information interested’ routes.

Take for example a young student inquisitive of existence. She is reading and say she comes upon Sartre and something in Sartre’s work elicits a ‘ah ha’ moment where the student sees that Sarte is making sense for what the student is wondering about, that Sarte is explaining something that she sees is significant for an answer to an unknown question about being human in the world that seems to be upheld somehow in herself. Of course, this situation happens everywhere, and one could easily read any informational writing, from books on engineering, history, anthropology and sociology, literature and poetry, to the DSM IV, The Pedagogy of the Oppressed, or the Bible, and have such a cognition, or Alistar Crowley, J. Krishnamurti, or the Vedas, or even Dr. Wayne Dyer or Marianne Williamson. But the movement here suggested is vertical, deep and motivated by a signal of question and answer that is ambiguous maybe at first, but refined in process.

Also we have another student who is curious, but when she reads she is merely acquiring information, information that is interesting to her and holds significance for this and that issue, but information nonetheless. Like a neutral being of process, her significance is in the absorption of information as to what it is suggesting a position for itself, as different positions can be gained from different authors, and through a gathering weighing of consideration, the reader can come to a position she most agrees with. The movement is horizontal and motivated by a deep interest in the uncovering the aspects of things of humanity and the world.

I am speaking quite generally as the distinction between these two people can easily be collapsed to represent a variety of routes, influences and impetuses involving both an innate question and curiosity for information. My intension here is not to arouse doubts and critiques over the possibility of this rather small and dry model of people, of how I am being too simple. So let us shorten our scope and speak specifically of philosophical interest, and see if I can get to the reason for my query set up by these types that will halt such skepticism for the sake of addressing what seems to me the more significant issue.

What should be noted of these encounters with knowledge is in what direction the students move. Inevitably, the readings will not answer the question entirely, but will leave some part of the hidden question of curiosity out of its answer or desire for information. So the student enquires further into her authors and materials found to be related to the initial inspiring reading. The question posed here asks about the nature of learning: Is the student of philosophy finding out about how she is actually manifested as a real human being? Or, is the student already manifested as a human being in the effort of looking for evidence of how this can be so? This is really the same question, but cleaved for the the purpose of the investigation. We are not necessarily evoking a rift in ontological and epistemological query; rather, this is a questioning of philosophy itself.

The issue I am getting at has to do with the human being and the question of existence, and if the traditional western philosophical heritage is 1) getting anywhere in the discussion, and 2) is really saying anything that is significant in its long and windy rhetoric that cannot or could not be found without it. The question thus centers more along the first type of student. For the question is really whether traditional philosophy is needed to answer the questions supposed of its answering.

— I would love some feedback.

End part A.