SE Part 10a. Transformation and Conversion.

The Significant Event is to be distinguished from an event in reality. The Significant Event involves reality but never occurs in reality; it is the encountering of the point of contention. Significance itself may occur in reality as various events can begin a count of meaning in the arena of pure multiples (reality), from events such as stopping at a stop sign, to having a good workout, to screwing up a business contract, to receiving an award, texting “ball” instead of “call”, accidentally or purposefully injuring someone slightly or seriously, winning the state lottery, being injured, enacting some small altruistic kindness, or reading an essay. All such events may occur at times and have small or large, momentary or lasting impact. Yet to speak about the Significant Event becomes an ironic venture, bringing the proposal of said event to an end that speaks of the last thing it would seem to indicate and by this thereby becomes the first thing; at once included in a description of all events, as well describing how such events belong to what is truly significant, what occurs is that all things come to belong to the Significant Event.

In reality, argument and discussion in general are seen to exclude the position from which its point is made, that is, the position is taken to be the argument. The real method presents the position and the argument as identical, or part of the same identity, and by this method, the Significant Event is never encountered for what it suggests in argument and occurs thereby ‘outside’ the argument; it occurs as a transcending operation of the argument. This is to say that conventional real discourse includes a transcendent clause. The irony of this proposal is that on one hand it can be said to be describing all events in reality under a rubric of potential, and on the other, eliciting from itself a truly exceptional situation. Thus it would seem contradictory to suggest that the Significant Event is not a moment of transformation; such a moment of transformation is to have enacted a pocket veto. Transformation implicates the transcendental clause of conventional faith such that some sort of progress must likewise have occurred, such as the motion that is evident in the expression “now, I understand”. The irony is that if such transformation has occurred, then no transformation was needed for it to occur.

Irony evidences the containment of reality in a universal ontological horizon that cannot be and is never breached, that is, except in reality through the transcendental clause. Hence, ironically, to speak of divergence; and this is to say, that the pocket veto evidences a willingness, a choice of faith, to breach the real ontological horizon, or, the teleo-ontology of reality itself. (Aside: might we propose a contraction of teleo-ontology, if just for the sake of orthographic brevity, and offer the term ‘tontology’ ? Or would the irony of its homonymic similarity to ‘tautology’ be almost to much to bare?) The proposal of such a break, the discourse that issues from and or speaks around such a break as witnessed by various authors, spiritual or religious but specifically philosophical, thus can be a measure of the temporal progress of historicity, the fact or item that is history, unto its ontology (the scheme of meaning’s meaning). But of course, to be able to measure such a bias, we must be able to find a baseline by which the variables of discourse, the terms and phrases, may find their position in such an ontology, as well as what aspect of quality of such variables marks the bias. The degree or manner by which such discourse reifies or maintains the ontology we shall call ‘opacity‘, such that to the extent such discourse leads to and or finds a transparency of reality, and thereby argues what is more real — which is to say, a discourse that proposes to better describe the break as the experience compels one to inscribe its meaning into reality to argue what is more true of reality — there we might then find its opacity.


The common rejection ( from part 8) found in reality against the proposal that everyone appropriates reality through a transcendent, develops into an intellectualized rebuttal. Where the common rejection occurs as a sort of ‘thoughtlessness’ of casual reading, or ‘regular everyday’ experience (what is that?), the more thought full rejection is established upon a well organized and recognized rhetoric. Of course, there is the common real religious or spiritual rejection that rejects that there should even be a rejection, since it is a very common idea that humans may lead spiritual lives and have some sort of contact and or understanding of some effective transcendent element in their lives, and that transformative experiences may occur along these lines. Again, we need not go much further in addressing this feature of human reality than to say that reality holds its potential in such a transcendent clause; the issue follows the same course so far laid in this essay, and proceeds likewise. The skeptics have a real argument to be made with the believers, and vice versa, as they are both subject to the description of the Significant Event. Though both see their activity involved with coming to terms with reality, nevertheless, both are in a process of reality coming to terms with the avoidance of what is not real.

Wait, the rejection might say, we have already delineated what can and might be meant by a transcendent. Foremost, we have elicited valid points to bring in at least an agnostic truth. Based upon the various manifestations of religious and cultural temperaments, the open and equal consideration of all such advocation of God or gods, spirits and such, the probability of the existence of any such God or gods, is equal to the probability that no such entities exist. What transcendent entity may exist tends toward the unknowable, and so we have only to judge upon social and cultural, and likewise materialist affects of such ideals. Likewise, transcendence falls into highly suspect forms; for one, the quality of transcendence as an experience falls often into forms of spirituality, as these tend to connote particular activities and discourses which likewise fall into the previous category. Such experiences, religious or otherwise, are common to humanity, yet are expressed and apprehended again against a common world of human activity wherein the criterion becomes the act, and the feeling of transcendence is a neurophysiological and psychological phenomenon that can be dealt with by science on one hand, and human psychological methods, such as occurs in the very human activity of camaraderie, understanding, consolation, sympathy, empathy and therapy. Even such experiential feelings can bring about drastic and strange events, the extreme examples found though motions of peace and violence, such as the trials and victories of Nelson Mandela, to religious fundamentalism, to that of the like of serial killer David Berkowitz, the ‘Son of Sam’, who said a dog told him to do it. Further, aside from all the subjective transcendent experiences, to say that something transcends various particular occasions, such as, the whole of humanity transcends the possibility of any human individual knowledge, or, adversity can be transcended, says nothing of any common human manner of appropriating the world except that the same forms of a term may be used to address various situations.

Here we have a usual real defense of what is true and real and a reiteration of the proper methodology for coming to such reality. And this is what we don’t want to hear, because it points directly at the reader, at the experience of the human being. It is as if to offer such a proposal that argues that the authors addressed in this essay are staking their claim upon the ability to intuit problems and solutions from what they had read of other philosophers joined with their general education and experience in life, is not merely silly and obvious — a truism — but indeed useless and unneeded. Nevertheless, the sentiment against such a statement, as the reader holds its own possibility sacrosanct and rallies her or his resources to keep that universal perception of a common humanity intact, to maintain the privilege of the reading and production of a subject viable in its appropriation of the object — such an assertion of sentiment appears, as well, overkill, reacting to the obviousness of the statement as one would respond to a threat, overestimating the meaning of the statement because the reporting of such material is felt to be a private matter — a private yet universal matter, perhaps like the reaction to a dissection of a cadaver, or surgical operation, or even a discussion about particular personal gastro-intestinal issues, is to many people — the imposition incurred as an offense to one’s essential being. It is no wonder that we can locate a particular manner of objective reckoning as conventional, based in an offense, and that, of faith. The reader is confronted with what philosophy says (of True Objects) against what it means. When we attempt to find and tell what the meaning means (what is meant from what is said), such as may be involved with the basis of many critiques and rebuttals of works, but also even some editorial summaries of works, as opposed to mere description of what is taking place, we are thereby saying something about what has been said, and where this is taken as an identity, enact a redundancy that is denied to produce conventional theory. We enact a distance between ‘meanings’, one meaning that identifies the Object and the other that identifies the meaning of the Object, and by this distance what is said enacts transcendence as a ‘hidden’ meaning of what is said by frankly excluding the experience, as well as enacting a proposal of method for how one is to attain the experience, such transcendence, which is for all purposes, a real transformation. This is the conventional method. Yet what is meant can be described (removed from its quality of presentation as a True Object) without enacting a distance, and this venture is ironic; it is offensive to one’s identity, or in other words, the identity of the One. So long as here remains a potential hidden in the proposition, we have an opaque position of argument.

So also it is in philosophical discourse that when a description is taken as what is being said of a True Object, as a meaning of the meaning of the Object, the description is taken as an argument instead of as a kind of forensic appraisal. The description is rebutted, and the argument that arises for a defense of the description to redress the rebuttal steps from its proper domain in the attempt to convince ‘its material’ of its veracity, which is quite noticeably silly if not plain non sequitur, but what occurs is no communication, or, the perpetuation of the real conventional methodology that posits transcendence as part of its route (en route). What occurs, or what should occur, is that the forensic description is left to its discipline describing the material, left not involved with the suggestion that the material is any different than what it is, which is the effort for meaning of the meaning of the True Object that is real.


The effort of the contemporary ‘realist turn’, of the most recently notable ‘Speculative Realism’ (if ever there was) is based in a foreclosing of previous historical discursive misappropriation to a present asserted truth. We have already begun to address this redundancy earlier. But to reiterate, the motion that concerns us is how this is done; it is very simple: It ignores the presence of the human being on the scene for the sake of a manifestation of discourse; that is, it assumes a common humanity as a categorical imperative. But for its sake it does not take mere discourse, but rather adiscourse that is presumed to have a static or universal ability to reflect the same thing; its method as the only imperative and the only method argues itself as a truism, a distinction within itself that is moot. This discourse that is presumed as all powerful, omniscient and ubiquitous in its potential, is a particular scheme of meaning that contains and pronounces upon all real things, and by this presumption ‘realism’ is permitted to have credence for what reality is through a potential transformation, a conversion of terms; i.e. If all there is is reality, then reality is constituted by real things, objects, but in fact, True Objects. Idealism, on the other hand, proposes that there is a (encompassing or bigger) reality over (regular) reality for which reality needs be reconciled, as if reality needs to dispel an illusion it has formatted of itself. Hence we can begin to see how realism and idealism merely dance around the point of contention regardless of their arguments. The partitions that are erected are called a ‘turn’ because some phrases of discourse will be left going ‘straight’ in meaning with the ‘previous reality’, but also because the human being on the scene is ignored and already accounted for by its (the propositional arenas located by the ‘turns’) discourse, and the difference that is proposed to be reconciled is reinstated in the course of the encompassing real-true method. To be fair; realism may address what is ‘really real’, but it gets nowhere further than that. Hence, this really real discourse is based in the offense of identity that cannot achieve its transcendental clause, the ‘grand’ transformation that is the posed culmination inherent of real discourse; realism thereby puts the fault not upon their human effort, not upon willingness itself, but upon the discourse, ‘The’ discourse, such that one merely needs to find the fault of the past to argue and thus produce the ‘now more real’ reality. Hence the conventional discourse achieves its Object, real transformation, through denial.

There are repercussions of this type of move that will have to serve as a topic for a latter essay.

We propose a partition that is indeed a boundary, and this is the hard correlational limit. The boundary is marked by the Significant Event and is viable by the pocket veto, whereby this mark reveals the opacity evidenced in various real discourses. The pocket veto is a signal of faith that identity is being challenged, so the iteration of this Event, the discourse that follows from it, can be registered as to the opacity that manifests due to the limit that such faith has inscribed as real or in reality; the discourse can be viewed upon its opacity as to what we might call its ‘saturation’ of meaning. A saturated discourse can be open, such as seen with Francois Laruelle and non-philosophy, or maybe even Levi Bryant and his ‘machine-object’ (but I tend to think Bryant is a ‘nonphilosopher’- qualified but thus ‘non-qualified’), where distinct principles are defined so as to relieve its dictates from such principality, or it can be closed, such as occurs with religious dogma. Other various discourses are opaque by their evidencing various internal vectors of meaning that are open, for example discussion that follows along in ‘proper’ understanding of the discourse, and others that are closed discussion that is moot due to objections that show misunderstanding. Nevertheless, opacity can be a measure or an indicator that something is being withheld as well as what is being withheld due to the offense of the Significant Event upon faith. In all cases, what is being withheld is the transcendent factor involved with the assertion for real solution.

End part 10a.



But unfortunately, it is real. —-


Many may have become interested, or involved, in OOO because of its appeal to a mythic underpinning to its grand narrative about the history of philosophy. Disappointment and despair at the wasteland of academic philosophy, the discovery of an online community of passionate thinkers, the gradual rise within this community of speculative warriors fighting for the new life that this thought can bring to a dying academia with its unthinking lackeys.

It is sad to see all this vitality undermined in favour of branding and commerce. It is a sad thing to see philosophy perverted into the marketising of pseudo-concepts. Witnessing such a spectacle can be a powerful motive for philosophising.

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Education as the fracture point: Emancipatory Education (archive 2012)

Symptomatic Commentary

No pedagogy which is truly liberating can remain distant from the oppressed by treating them as unfortunates and by presenting for their emulation models from among the oppressors. The oppressed must be their own example in the struggle for their redemption (Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 1970, p. 54)


As I am setting in a cold, concrete classroom, prepping essay instructions for a group of young students who are trying to get to the US university system here in South Korea, I keep thinking of my duty to my students.  The words for  Paulo Freire sit with me, but also how misguided many of the attempts to use him by “progressive liberal” educators are.  The focus was always on the banking model of education–fight against the idea that the teacher was an informational storehouse.  This notion of Freire’s is totally in line with prior liberal models of education, such as…

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SE Part 9: Some Zizek, with a pinch of Badiou.

We have encountered a description of divergence and how an arm of such motion remains conventional despite itself. On one side of things, conventional discourse functions to perpetuate its method by subsuming and sublating contradiction in real meaningful negation, exposing the contradiction as a form of negation that itself is negated but not reinserted as positive. Disputes have arisen concerning this, infamously around Hegel and his dialectic; venture to say that the argument is due to its want for inclusion in reality. Then on the other, this is all to say that the conventional method re-inserts or otherwise asserts its (hypothetical and practical) imperative, the True Object that compels through faith the downplaying of ‘mere’ intuition, so as to allow for contradiction as part of reality. The former can be said to identify basic movements of continental philosophy, the latter, analytic philosophy. We can discuss the significance of this apparent historical irony elsewhere. Suffice it for now that conventional philosophy can be categorized in this way; continental philosophy at least considers irony regardless of its analytical tendency for method which commonly reifies the more overt assertion of the primacy and ubiquity of the One reality.


It Is sufficient to argue backwards, to work from, as away from, the point of contention into a unitary discourse of inclusive reality, to take through intuition or inspiration of the term-object’s real-truth as a means to argue, as many authors do, a theory of simultaneousness, a theory whereby the terms coalesce or otherwise represent (albeit as an extended philosophical culturally relevant effort) an identical situation of reality (Zizek; Kair – myself, author of “Constructive Undoing”), or where real objects exert distances and effects in the same manner as humans do with objects, such that humans are also objects (Harman; Kair). It is sufficient for reality to argue through logic that there is no separation between, for terms, the experiencer and the experience, the subject human being and the object of its experience, the sayer and the said, the viewed and the seen (scene), or even the indication of overdetermined terms, such as ‘larger humanity’ or ‘society’, to the limit that expresses such idea, and then to suggest that such a situation may be realized and actualized into a sort of ‘new praxis’. Likewise it is sufficient to argue that objects are separate but ‘vicariously causal’ in their relation to each other. It is sufficient for the discourse of reality involved in the investigation of objects and subject-objects to reach a point when the saturation of meaningful terms allows for a redundancy of segregate categories to develop multiple Objects, or ‘multi-‘ universes, each overlapping universe holding the potential for truth by the nature of the necessary discursive ‘universal’ categories, categories that posit their segregation based within the intuited identity of term and object, that then may negotiate with other ‘universes’ toward a better ‘world’, and then propose a ‘new’ discourse that accounts for this. This is what discourse does in, or for, reality. When this occurs, though, that is, to reach the argument that makes the move for this deliberate (as maybe opposed to ‘organic’) — not over-determination, but its encompassment, the assertion implied by the unreflected intuition — designation or adamant removal of ‘sign’ for the sake of (faith in, intuition of) truth-reality, the terms of reality now must reflect themselves in relief, such that every term is the position-expression (matter, object) of a particular moment-space (energy, potential, kinetic), at once informing and being informed by reality in discourse — but without the inclusion of the position by which such a situation may arise; the True Object oriented clause of transcendence. That is, unless we posit that what is excluded is indeed not. This is then the opposite; imminence posited as reality, which is for no other terms, in definition, and in so much as terms are taken to indicate or otherwise show the truth (the true object), we have thus a return to what was just argued in the previous segment, redundancy and repetition.

What we have just come across is a real ironic moment. But this detachment, real individuals in a negotiated world, comes in the same course by which reality is always come by, choice, through the distancing of the object from the subject, through denial of that which offends ones faith, such that one universe can ‘no longer contain’ the meaning conveyed in the eminence (prestige, grandeur) of colluding meaning, the ‘singularity’ gained by the investigation into the (True) intuited object term — and ‘another’ universe is gained, another discourse. In fact, admitting the breaking of such singular activity, it is the revolt from this ‘meaningful’ abyss by which a real ‘multitude’ of universes arise. The real universe itself is thus not brought into question, rather, reality is now understood to involve a potential for many universes. Where once was the One, that which enjoined all terms’ meaning, that was (is?) impetus for which contradiction showed the route, now the same method has shown that the One is actually multiple (the pure multiple, ala Alain Badiou) which is the point behind the explication of conventional reality, the effect of contradiction being an indicator of what is ‘truly false’.

It is by this feat of consciousness that we can then begin to suggest that such intuition does not gain its footing from some ‘inspiring’ ethereal unknown, compelling the individual to act as an assertion towards some completion as yet unformed if not for the instruction of inspirational transcending element, but rather draws from what is already completed because what is completed is immanent; which is to say, the act, aside from the True Object-term identity, cannot manifest except that it is and does precisely as it does and is. Immanence, in this way, is what then allows for the multitude, of objects in a level playing field of universal operation, but more significantly, of individuals with their own ‘sense’ of truth, in a common arena of negotiation. But what is this sense? What is happening if everything is happening immanently? Is not such immanence merely another argument for and or relying upon a transcendental aspect or element? Have we not merely repeated the same arguments that want to decide upon what is immanence and transcendence?

Here then we have in action the evidence of the true power of reality. The limit come upon by the foreclosing of the transcendental ‘One’ universe, by the methodological reducing of what is or was transcendent of thinking to a True Object of such thought, reveals that what is or was otherwise transcendent has been usurped of its power by the real method, thus transforming this True Object, transcendence, into immanence that, again, proposes to be of some essential truth of reality. Radical or not, and irony aside, such a position gains little but a reification of the real method for establishing truth, as if the transcendent or now immanent aspect has inspired the individual to ‘bring down’ the knowledge of itself for reality, so that now all human beings fall under this rubric of truth. Then the Big or, this is not ‘really’ happening and everyone is really just doing what they do, and there is no encompassing true discourse; but then how are they doing that and how are we able to talk about there being none? What is the discussion about if it is really just the motion of immanent existence? This is hardly ridiculous, it is ironic. Because nothing occurs for the truth of reality without an inspiring transcendental agent. We have argued this elsewhere; whether or not we define terms such as to exclude a ‘transcendent’ clause, where maybe the human being is generating meaning by itself as a sort of ‘meaning machine’ but inclusive of all ‘other’ meaning that may be had, still, the effect is that consciousness operates so as to include and exclude as an imperative of real meaning. The issue of the point of contention, or the suggestion enacted by this point, is that consciousness, itself an effect of the human physiological being of the universe, functions to supply reality but resists at all costs the exposure that shows that reality does not present the truth of itself through inspired agency, that is to say, through an ability to have intuition of universally True Objects, except in as much as one has faith in the terms of discourse to define categories in particular manners so as to identify True Objects, and, only in reality can the agent be inspired by an intuition of the True Object. The limitation inscribed and described by this set thus implicates an exception to reality. Such descriptions (discursive schemes) that propose a grand explanation of the truth of reality thus proscribe a faith, and such faiths account for their trueness by default clauses that define the exclusions by which the system gains its stature for truth; and we may use Harman idea: anything that falls outside such an addressing is ‘accidental’. Such real schemes make so much sense to particular individuals that one can no longer get around them, discourse and discussion can offer no purchase for entry because every statement and every proposal has been accounted for by the tenants of inclusionary and exclusionary caveats. Hence, faith makes true.

To bring a most pertinent example of such faith in action is of course religious fundamentalism. Zizek describes the interactions of real faith in a recent article for the New York Times []. Fundamentalism can be understood as such a discourse of reality that sets inclusionary and exclusionary aspects in a meaningful saturation of True categories; faith. What we deal with from a Western perspective is that there is such extremism, for the example of Zizek’s article, ISIS, the self proclaimed ‘Islamic State’, and how to breach such faith so as to mitigate violence. The discussion about such violence toward peace is taken up elsewhere. The significance that Zizek points out is not that there is an essential difference, but rather they ‘are already like us (the West)’, and the way they are like us, for the point if this essay, is that we and them are not only part of reality (Zizek categorizes this ‘reality’ as Capitalism, a category I tend to agree with), but, and most significantly, oriented upon True Objects. If this is indeed the case, then we should rather look at how such ‘Western view’ holds the object out away from itself, that is, how the perspective that we have, that gains fundamentalism as a category, is likewise a fundamentalism, if that albeit a ‘non-fundamentalism’, a fundamentalism that on one hand denies its being such, but on the other proclaims its (admitted) fundamentalism as a more correct, true and real basis of reality. The Christian fundamentalism of the West has already included the democratic-capitalistic discourse in its faith, already incorporated the secular inclusions and exclusions into its designation for truth, such that its faith, again, likewise merely shows the power of faith in reality. By this reduction, we should then consider then how reality itself is manifested in a particular manner, and that this manner, by virtue of its method that has choice as an integral and indeed innate if not fundamental tenant for all that may be true, cannot be ‘opt out’ of, which is to say, cannot be decided upon based upon an arrangement of discursive meanings.


The suggestion offered then, which is and was already the enjoining of real method unto itself to reveal itself, due to the logic of the explication put forth in the previous paragraphs, is never taken, whether it was not actually of transcendence or is now of immanence; such placements, the truth of such discursive formulations, are considered but never actualized in reality because it is in itself contradiction of the method. The method is real because it functions to hold the object out from the subject; yet while this method is founded in discrepancy, it operates effectively because it represents what is presented at once as an immanent and attainable goal: the True Object. Such contradiction of said method is offensive to the individual invested in reality, and so elicits from this offense “nihilism” as a ground of reductive reason that serves as a Biblical cherubim, securing the individual in its real position of willful inspired agency. Hence we can begin to understand the issue that Miellassoux and Harman bring for their proposal, but also the situation that is already enacted by maybe Miellassoux, but at least Harman, Badiou, Zizek, and Laruelle bytheir presentation. In this way we can also begin to understand how the veto and the pocket veto might come into play for the discourses of these authors in the discussion of reality — and their methodological dependence for their offering of solution — as to what is being framed as not real.


A side note: An operative question, when for example one reads Zizek [Please see Agent Swarm’s post that makes an argument that concerns this same feature:, is, how then are such observations brought? For, there is nothing evident nor inherent to his arguments that describe how it is he is able to bring such a discussion, nor even, really, besides the social commentaries that read like edicts for action, what he is talking about. Zizek, for all his apparent eccentricity and genius, gives us no insight as to why what he is saying has any relevant meaning for us. His social historical anecdotes appear to give his writings substance, and we are to assume his draws from a well reading, excellent education and grand synthesis of big ideas, but then, when one actually listens to the meaning of his arguments, one can only see that his whole parade cannot have the substance we think it holds, that if one takes to heart the meaning of his philosophy, aside from yet implicit to the directly implied call to action of the social commentary, one can only see that the very act of reading and understanding Zizek is itself a motion of contradiction, irony; and this is to say, for such an experience, not real.

The only respectable move in this situation, then, is to ask into this doubt.


Reality, in this way represented by discussion and argument, is sufficient unto itself, which is to argue by the extrapolation of method that a free individual is self sufficient, that is, in the ideal utopia that is the society of free agents. The discourse of freedom (social justice) thus promotes this maxim. But when we look around at the apparent social situation and if we can trust what is said of history, never is there a time when such ideology can ‘hold all the eggs’. The mythology of progress thus holds out its activity against itself to gain a purpose, with all the usual disclaimers, ‘we tried’ being the most basic one, but in the context of this essay, more ‘we are simply doing what is to be done’, whether we want to call it the solution to the discrepancy between the 1st and 3rd Worlds, the haves and the have nots, the rich and the poor, oppressor and oppressed, security and terrorism, environmentalism and the human effect towards Earth’s destruction, or the discrepancy that the institution of philosophy holds within itself. The world thereby may present itself as a current unitary discourse that can be viewed in a manner that Zizek describes in his book, “Living in the End Times“, for it seems apparent, according to the analysis of ideology that reflects unto itself, that there would be an ‘end’ and that this end is evidenced in the very motion that it has ultimately promoted by its method of seeking into the terms for their objects’ essential in-itself truth. In short, denial in this sense is the discourse of reality failing. The redundancy involved in such an undertaking is seen to be revealing itself, but due to the nature of the operation of consciousness for having true objects, it (reality) resists its uncovering, and this resistance can be understood, so Zizek suggests, as an historical analysis of ideology through the ‘five stages of grief’.

Indeed, following our argument of the Significant Event, there is only one ‘stage’ effective here: denial, for there will only be an end in as much as there is always an end in sight and presented in history through the present, just as there was an ‘end’ of the various ancient empires, as well an ‘end’ to the Romantic Era, to Modernism, Postmodernism, an ‘end’ of Y2K, an ‘end’ of history and or philosophy — in the extended analysis oriented upon Objects, such historical progress appears then to argue a ‘great culmination’ that ushers in a ‘new era’. To be fair, perhaps there is a real motion of this sort, but the proposal to be considered is that such reckoning never occurs, or more precisely, it only occurs through the particular condition of knowledge as an indicator of true reality for the individual. It is this condition that expresses the power of reality in the manner of Paulo Freire’s deliberation upon the game of oppression (both the oppressor and the oppressed are oppressed in the game of oppression); i.e. a human being attains its individual identity through joining in the discursive determination of reality, by appropriating the discourse of power, which we may call the ‘priority discourse’, which is to say, by becoming the oppressor. It is all too common to see the how the priority discourse usurps such ‘existential’ meaning for its own ideological purposes, locating specific arenas of oppression where such game occurs in the world while excluding itself (the analysis, as well as the effort to counter it) from such a category of world-state. It is not too difficult from a historical view to see where such free agency has gotten us. But this is reality, as Zizek aptly confirms, explicates and reiterates through his whole repertoire. With this in mind, we can easily see how Freud’s notion of the ‘death drive’ is significant, only now, the denied redundancy has taken the form of desparate solution; this too is a feature of the ‘end times’ the Zizek addresses in his recent book.


To explain how or why reality in its truth does not present any essential segregation of elements, to rely upon the identity posed of logic to the meaning of a phrasing of terms, simply reifies that such duality is not being overcome in the discursive re-presentation of Objects, but rather is only seen to be being overcome by individuals invested in the intrinsic mythology that is denying its end as its end is taking place because of the denial inherent of the orientation upon the scheme for itself that is positing its own ending. This is a discursive situation of historicity, the fact of history as an object, the result of discourse having power of dominion over reality, a presentation of affairs that misses the reflection of itself due to itself operating to maintain real progress. But this is not so much ideology as a hegemonic assertion of power, not that discourse itself has power, because ideology is a real situation of discourse; it is reality itself, as a designation of ubiquitous power by which ideology can be said to be the vehicle of power as opposed to other marginalized ideologies. Likewise, this is not a situation of an actual temporal movie of static objects, of reality ‘before’ having some different quality in itself such that the discourse then was manifesting reality (powerfully) differently than now; reality then was the same as reality now: it was reality. Reality was not behaving any differently than it does now for the human beings living in those times; and this is to say emphatically that the human being is not segregate from the operating universe, but complicit with its operation. If there was a reality that was different due to the hegemonic power of discourse, then it was exactly reflecting the condition of the universe in reality as human discursive power, as said, within the scheme of meaningful terms by which such discourse can be said to assert power as a hegemony. Sure, manifestation of things in the universe presented different conditions, but the effect of what is real was exactly the same; what was different is that now we have an idea of discourse asserting a power of primacy over what reality is and means for all of history as a True Object, whereas before what we now situate as discourse was seen and or defined through another discursive operation. This is redundancy in your face; this is the condition of knowledge now. This is the limit denied as limit, even to its understanding in its discursive formulation. Such notions are entirely ideological, absolutely Idea, absolutely real discourses about what is and was true for all time: the hard correlational limit; mythology functioning intrinsically. The fact is that no historical end ever occurs except in as much that ‘history’ is an object in-itself; the individual investment in reality will not allow it. This is consistent with another argument Quentin Miellasoix presents in his “Beyond Finitude“, that of another arch-fossil that occurs due to death, and evident in Zizek also; if an end were to occur, its ending would have no basis, but only the basis that arrives through there being no end — and if there is an end, then it is the indication of limit as what lay beyond the limit and antecedent to thought-reason; that which is not real. So to repeat; such a break prescribed by such knowledge never occurs in reality, except so much as an individual may be inspired through intuition of a ‘more true and real’ Object, that is always transcendent to the discursive operation. So it is: no break ever occurs.

In this manner, by this conventional method, the meaning of the phrase that describes this real situation approaches but never breaches the point of contention, and thus is never realized — understood but never actualized for real human living and experience — for the meaning that is supposed to be conveyed. Such conventional method can be said then, again, to be one of Bad Faith. Such logic of identity is not sufficient for the purposes of coming to any truth, but only sufficient for reifying and reestablishing that what is true is real and that such unitary reality is found through the terms themselves, the method of such terminology, as terms are understood to be gaining the truth of the grand Object of universal reality. So to reiterate in Quentin Miellasoux’s formulation, such method arrives through contingency that itself is necessary, but does little in this way to reveal what the facticity of necessity actually is or how it is indeed necessary beyond the reinscription that contingency is the actual truth of reality. In other words, the discourse of the real that proposes to have found itself through its method only serves to reify that faith makes true. Irony confounds such necessary contingency.


What is revolutionary in the context of our extended analysis is what can be inferred in ‘transformation’, or for another term, ‘conversion’. Such change never occurs in reality, neither outside of reality. Again, Zizek accounts for this. Categories do not change, but are converted in real discourse. But such a conversion is itself a category that attempts to convince or otherwise describe the route one may take to come upon the revolutionary experience. Yet, once having this situation, we can then discern the issue of the point of contention as a starting point that begins the real count as an arbitrary moment in reality as an event of the pure multiple (Alain Badiou). Where then such multiple is seen by the individual to have elicited from itself an inspiration, an intuited true problem of reality, the multiple is thereby reified by the inspired agent in reality, and the proposal continues to assert its correction in different forms, through the varied categories, as real progress, now the issue of transformation being seen as sufficiently described so as to be able to bring about the revolutionary experience. Yet inso much as this may occur upon the organization of real meaningful categories, the experience does not connote what it proposes, but simply shows that reality is all there is, that the priority discourse is indeed omnipotent and ubiquitous.

For this essay, what we have then in this description of reality is not a proposal for such transformation; such a transformation is ultimately real in its potential. What we have here is an exposure of how such real determinations themselves rely upon categorical disseminations of the True Object. The issue of the Significant Event thus posits through the veto that such proposals of transformation are themselves based upon temporal categorical manifestations of such Objects; and further, that such inspired agency thus moves to its argument by appropriating and converting real historical categories (schemes; phrase universes, Lyotard) as they are seen to indicate significant moments of reality, i.e. events of the multiple. Thus when such multiples are taken in themselves to indicate that set which is not included in another set and even its own set, we can no longer be talking about the real intuitive individual negotiating the world, some solution for the conscious individual navigating Life; there is a plenitude of such real suggestions for living. On the contrary, we must address then that category that contains all categories but itself.

Hence the irony of the discussion of the Significant Event.


In future essays (I figure my doing so) I will show how such conventional methodology conveniently avoids its own fault of representation. I will show how the discourse of reality assumes that the logic of an arrangement of terms is supposed to present an actual truth, and how this presumption of faith thereby redirects the telling to consequences of faith. I most likely will begin with Slavoj Zizek’s writing (we will see; many authors can serve as an occasion for this showing) because he appears to recognize and address in a certain way, the ‘gap’; his ‘parallax gap’ is a phenomenon located in the particular phrasing of conventional logic. He seems to notice this fault, but because he cannot or will not address the gap itself, he suits himself to describe the conventional ramifications (social contingencies) of having the gap. He is a master in this, and I even venture to say that he is the exemplar conventionalist, the ‘pope’ of conventional faith and its dogmatics. And indeed, one could see in his mastery the impetus for his discussions lay in his not being able to address the gap itself; thus Zizek can also be used as an example of how the veto, but particularly the pocket veto, is put in play, and thus he also can become a site by which to reach in the heart of the point of contention. In short, through the occasioning of various authors, I will show a ‘hack’ for conventional philosophy.

Similar to this, also in the future I will probably put forth a discussion concerning Francois Laruelle’s ‘active linguistics’, which is, I feel, the basis of his whole non philosophical enterprise.

For now, for “The Significant Event”, I leave the argumentation that proposes to lead one to the truth of reality to those authors more thoroughly invested in conventional reality. It is necessary that the ‘concrete’ social situation of individuals be handled and addressed. So conceding to their efforts and that their efforts rely upon such a faith, and that such faith only is posited as exclusionary, that is it asserts the inclusion of all that is allowed to be counted as true, whereas such instance of faith belongs to a larger situation where such faith does indeed operate, we move to speak more upon divergence.

End Part 9.

SE Part 8: A Little Bit on Graham Harman and his Object Oriented Ontology.

Nonsense! Ridiculousness! The usual suspects rage.

So now we need to try and reel it in. If the fish has been snagged by the line, then we need to start to bring it back away from the fish of mere ideas, back from objectival discourse that sees authors and their ideas as True Things to be apprehended in their in-itself-ness, where the fish was swimming around looking for food and found it on the end of a hook and decided (whether it be of ‘natural’ instinct or not) to bite — we need to bring back the fish that has been snagged by the line.


See that this is not a rebuttal of Object Oriented Ontology; rather the distinction that finds OOO accordant with the divergent move is an occasion to speak about the Significant Event. To say that our issue concerns one’s orientation upon the object, and to further delineate that reality concerns a faith in the True Object, is actually the converse of Harman’s Object Oriented Ontology, and not its ‘opposite’ that would be then the ‘subject orientation’ necessarily.

To explain: Our thesis involving the pocket veto has implicated the Speculative Realists as dealing with reality in reality. If we have not been explicit, theirs (but Graham Harman in particular) is concerned with closing the ‘gap’ that appears to separate the subject and object in an extended discursive analysis based in traditional Western Philosophy, the gap that appears poignantly with Kant; Harman speaks about “how two objects touch”. Yet we should see that the primary concern that appears shaded if not explicitly avoided there is how to bring the subject individual human being into direct relation (contact) with the object. Harman moves for a leveling of the playing field by categorizing all real things, including the human being, as objects. The notice enacted here is that there was a previous discursive situation that presented a conceptual structure for reality that allowed for the gap. Thus SR divergence in this first sense, a real divergence.

What we should then see is that it is the subject-centered ‘reason’, ala Quentin Miellassoux, by which we may come to an idea of how one in reality is oriented upon objects, because it is by such subjective centrality that objects may be presented as such. The issue is put forth in the essays of Constructive Undoing as having to do with subjects, human beings, that are oriented upon True Objects. This is to mean that the individual of reality sees and references itself by and through Objects, and because such Objects cannot be known in-themselves, i.e. known as True in the sense of giving to us information about them that has nothing to do with our (subjective) perceiving or comprehending them, neutral data, so to speak, their Truth, the Truth about objects that we take and behave with as if they indeed are absolutely True is an act of faith. Such it is that reality in itself is a manifestation of faith. Hence, a divergence in a second sense that distinguishes what is True from what is real, that is, what is ironic from the faith in the True Object.

As shown in part 7 of this essay, the significance which links these two senses of divergence is the show of power. Specifically, it is the basic real assumption of post, but at least, post-post modernist assertion, that discourse determines reality. We have outlined how Miellasoux frames this in his ‘Correlationalism’, the weak and the strong forms. What is divisive (if we can follow the same type of categorizing for divergence) in the weak sense, is that such reality, if we may use this in the strong as well as weak correlational sense, already assumes that discourse does indeed reside as the omnipotent power for reality, so much though, that it is assumed and proposed given to include even our ‘innermost’ person, the makings and structures of our thoughts, such that there is no human being that is not determined in its manifestation as well as its moves (read: choices, options for movement) by discourse, that indeed discourse had and has determined what reality is. It is by this correlation that we have discussed the ‘individual of reality’ that is the individual of faith in the the True Object, and have thereby offered the strong divergence that succeeds from what we have called the ‘hard’ correlational limit.

It is by this designation that we argue the SRs are dealing with reality in reality; they are subject to the hard correlational limit, and thereby diverge from the previous determination of reality, the ‘subject orientation’ to the proposed new determination, ‘object orientation’. Due to the hard correlationalist model, because they were are already invested in reality, where the weak and strong correlationalism functions, they were already dealing in their being oriented upon the True Object. Hence the irony involved with Harman, at least, noticing this limit and finding his vector back in the limit to find and discuss what this True Object is, how it manifests in reality as reality. He is discussing the ‘subject as object’ and the real ramifications of this move. So it is also that what he is finding and what he is saying evidences the significance of divergence; both its weak and strong moves evidence the pocket veto.


We have come to an odd point that is in fact so odd that the fast reader might even miss it; I say ‘fast’ and immediately indicate the point of contention. Either this odd point is not so odd but is noticed as capable of being odd, or it is rejected. What is really odd though is if it has been rejected, we can account for it: the rejection is based in the assumption of (a prior posterior maxim, an experience of which is given prior to the experience) the real common humanity of individuals of whom the reader is part and in which the reader is invested through his her identity. The rejection is so commonplace of reality that the fast reader misses it, and often misses that a rejection has even been called for, and this is because the rejection is based in the maxim that all individual human beings have available the resource of intuition; so to say, as the previous segment Part 7, that Miellassoux has come by his argument by intuition is to say nothing more than he is a human being. Yes; this is true. But the point here, as we discuss the point of contention, is to say that which everyone assumes as true, out loud, to their face. It is to point to what it is we say is real and to elicit a reaction where what is revolutionary has been missed. The point is to expose that upon which the assertion of a unitary discourse of the real gains its stature, and thus be able to begin to speak that which historically remains silent; to indicate that what is missed cannot be ‘re-placed’ as another discourse of method that says it is now ‘practice’; to indicate not merely that while what is missed is indeed missed by its objectival understanding — even as what is ‘radical’ poses as this space, or the revolution that is proposed by this space, this ‘missing’, this ‘indivisible remainder’ (Zizek) — and is indeed the ideology functioning as ideology, is the discourse ‘working’ (Heidegger, the Work of Art) as it is supposed to as the condition of reality as knowledge, but more significantly, that such ‘indivisible space’ is in the ‘pocket’ of real discourse, in one case as potential but in the other rather as completely missed; and this is to say, again, the rejection is the evidence of consciousness functioning to supply reality, of distancing the individual from its object through identity, consciousness ‘denying’ that the True Object is not just true-real.

While the conventional (real) discourse may evidence its own saturation of meaning in terminology and thereby be able to slice and mash, dissect and describe, deconstruct and recombine term-object singular identities so to bring about a sufficiently dense description of the picture of reality and to thereby gain purchase upon a new solution to the old, this method of process never gains its object beyond the mere Kantian intuition of true meaning gained by the terms that are poised in faith to avoid their own objectivity; at best, such a method succeeds in describing the ‘reality of the moment’. What this means is that the same discourse of reality that discounts any real ‘god’ through its argumentation is allowing for its ability to grant or convey truth by relying upon a transcendent yet unspeakable power that is denied in the asserted and apparent power of discourse to convey its truth (God does not exist/ there is no God and the atheist position in general). It thus becomes obvious why there have been arguments made as to a particular definition of ‘existence’ that excludes some ‘actuality’ of God, to justify why we can thus say ‘God does not exist’ and be truthful in as much as there is a ‘truth in God’. The ‘speculative’ only gains its (Aquinas) stature as such by virtue of the ‘practical’; by virtue of the speculative itself, it is not speculative, but rather indicates what is not practical except that it has to be distinguished because what is practical is ubiquitous to (common) sense, or for another word, reality. Hence, we can begin to speak again of — not merely duality, but more so, dual bases of power that do not combine but instead evidence the limitation of a discourse that proposes itself in the human act as the One omnipotent and ubiquitous truth.


One world is necessary. The problem is what this world is, but if we have more than one world then what is the ‘whole’? Many are already discounting such a question; so let Reality be said to account for the one world; for all the problems that arise whether mental, social, psychic, material, physical, etcetera, all the scenes and issues are dealt with through a reductive method that finds a solution for the question of what we are to do, so that every solution is a momentary manifestation that defines for humans their place of activity — this ‘one place’ where a reduction of meaningful categories amounts, is reality, and the argument that would attempt to displace or discount this proposal, a real argument. This necessary situation of humanity is thus contingency, every situation is contingent upon another situation. This place is ultimately a place that settles for consciousness its own operation in its operating. There is no manner of thinking upon things that can remove the fact of thinking about them (as far as we can think we know of thinking), so let us grant that to offer any notion whether subjective or objective or any of the proposed philosophical turns and solutions is always a notion of consciousness in the attempt to place itself in the real world; it is the same with thought. The only way to avoid this feature of consciousness is to deny this feature, and this is also a feature of consciousness; what is reductive, as to method, is based in denial, and the place where reduction occurs to find solution as to what to do is called reality. That method which relies upon such a denial of operation for the sake of the reliance is what we call conventional, since it is the appearance of the world that takes what is presented as the common arena of human effort for the sake of the One thing to be addressed and solved. Every proposal of how such reality is manifested is a discursive strategy for approach based upon meaning and significance. Hence, to argue that the world is constituted through objects, and only objects, is a particular solution for how consciousness has been placed and is being placed in the world for the moment. This argument then is ironic, for it begs its own question of how it is able to come to such a conclusion for all argument, which is to say, for all reality; it is the expression of contradiction as meaning, as opposed to contradiction indicating limit.

It is this feature of human process that now arrives in a necessary divergence. For within such a framing, which is a real historical discursive framing whereby various proposals have been offered and challenged through the method of determining truth by the criterion of contradiction, the world as we know it or have argued has brought us to the place where our ability to offer solution is seen to be merely a vanity, merely consciousness doing its universal operation — and this is denied. What has occurred here then is consciousness through its own function of creating meaning has come upon its own process as transparent, that is, the meaning is that it only makes meaning and this meaning has no true basis beyond the establishing of true objects (identity), regardless of any necessary objectival in-itself point of reference, and distanced itself from this meaning. This issue then is called the point of contention’, for the issue concerns not only reality and how it functions — the contradiction is overcome by faith –but also reality as such that it is distinguished now as another object in itself.

Reality is conventional; divergence ironic. The former sees progress instilled and innate in the meaning of every statement, whether it be for or against, the stasis of term-object identity in an historical temporal discursive movement of and toward the One truth, whether it proposes to be gainable or not (for the assertion that it cannot be gained is likewise an assertion upon the progressive nature and ability of humanity, that we have through trial and error found that this is the case). The latter sees the ‘control’ of terms, subjects and objects, to be in the terms and objects themselves, as objects in themselves. Hence we have (again, inevitably, perpetually), in consideration of the SRs, a dual divergence; Graham Harman who steps into the object (objects is all there is) finds a reality that though logically consistent is nevertheless somewhat difficult if not contrary to any common human sense, which is of course what he would find (what is an object divorced from a subject? What is a subject if it is only an object?). Yet he asserts such true object as actually and really true, as if he is privy to a more true reality that everyone should now understand (the ‘thought police’ assertion). Then we have aphilosophy, which upon reflection might be better termed as “philosophy-A”, as there is supposedly already a ‘philosophy-X’ which seems (maybe) already still conventional. Here discourse is all there is and because of this all terms, their meanings and or definitions, are objects. This latter does not privilege the subject, nor attempts to arrive at the object by denying the historical formulation of the subject, but instead speaks of effects of consciousness. On one hand, the effect of consciousness comfortably distanced from its own operations (in denial so it “Don’t Even Know I Am Lying”) so it can operate effectively with the tool of logic develops conventional reality in general as a primary base upon which the subsequent base may take form in the fantastical extreme of ‘logically real’ nonsense, for which we can probably begin see the evidence of faith at work (Speculative Realism, and Object Ontology). On the other hand, the effect of consciousness that compromises the distance consciousness would impose for itself in reality arrives with the meaning of contradiction as meaning (irony, and — wink, wink — philosophy-A). But nevertheless such Objects must necessarily exist given the conventional allowance for plausibility in negotiation coupled with the capitalized identity. One can only wonder if the people in Liberia who raided an Ebola treatment center based upon their belief that no such disease exists, that it is a Western capitalistic conspiracy, needed some thought police.


Yet I leave such real conventional possibilities to their proper domain; the ontological description of objects that are not merely terms, real objects, grants a description of the interrelating of terms as an objective field. Yet this field comes about in the holding out from the subject, because it will collapse in the subject.

I thereby suggest the divergence that has a more substantial propositional base, even if, indeed, such a proposition is admittedly not real. For what is collapsing is in the tension that develops by the holding apart that which is natively indigenous. When there is no tension, then the subject may be breached as to how the object manifests reality. Hence, the dual nature of the divergence of which we speak.


I agree with Graham Harman’s assessment of the Kantian failure, that Western philosophy is caught and spends its time now reiterating the same arguments, the faults and merits of ideas that stem from a human subject center attempting to mitigate an apparent gap between the cogito and the object. Divergence thus takes two forms. We argue that Harman and Miellasosux and the ‘speculative’ sort lack in their approach, i.e. they are found in what we see is the hard correlationalist limit, and it is this limit that justifies their route into the object through the conventional Sartean existential revolt (from the limit back into the limit), the (Kantian) subject and its route having been played out is now retreading its own ground through different terms, so invested in the state of reality conventional philosophy is, and they are in effect missing — or perhaps not missing it; this is the significance of the pocket veto — the fault of the object-term identity which is the Kantian thesis; which is to say, they flat out do not recognize it, in denial through plain ignorance or in denial in the face of the contradiction.

This situation unfolds in the following manner: They are either relying fully upon the true object of faith, and if so are at once accepting their (Kantian) intuitive faculty as a common faculty of human consciousness, and so read Kant’s ideas as a true (historical) object to be discerned and built upon in the progress of human knowledge, thereby missing the significant feature of at least “The Critique of Pure Reason”; or, they are being deceptive in that the intuition they have had is a particularly significant inspiration such that the degree of such inspiration would impose an offense upon the audience in which they engage, that is, the philosophical audience, by suggesting a privilege that is not available to everyone but which nevertheless they have due to the very intuition that is common among real humans, but ‘specialized’ in them. But the discourse of the Significant Event offers that to suggest that they are merely very educated or intelligent or have an otherwise unique view but without the intuited transcendental operation is to flat out deny the very aspect of their being human as being human; that is, unless they were indeed inspired by a transcendental and undisclosed aspect or influence. The progress that they thereby propose as a ‘new’ route upon the given discourse suggests that humanity might move out of a particular paradigm of thought, but not move out from being human, and thereby tells and reifies the conventional route: that discourse defines what and how human beings are as real human beings, and this is to say that somehow human beings are being not only influenced but indeed controlled by a power for which humans have no control except that they use discourse, and further this is to propose the greatest offense: such ‘special’ philosophers are especially privy to coming upon ‘inspired ideas’ (that are — nod, nod, wink, wink– not ‘transcendentally inspired’) that somehow allow them to gain purchase upon the center of power of discourse. This assertion through denial is exactly the Kantian proposal: that we can intuit an object’s truth due to the very nature of human consciousness being limited in its functioning. But the Speculative Realists deny this is true.


The problem of divergence remains as I have indicated; Harman and Miellassoux are still dealing with reality in reality. By my own definition, they are working along the conventional route, so we have then to distinguish what divergence means, and this is the work we have before us concerning the Significant Event. Obviously, The Speculative Realists’ divergence is from the type of philosophy just mentioned above. They diverge from ‘subject oriented’ to ‘object oriented’; this is plain. Yet the significance of their speculative divergence misses what should be seen as the true statement of Kant, to wit, there is no knowable object in-itself that can be gained outside of intuition and that to have achieved a ‘non-intuitive’ position one must be presented in a categorical imperative that then situates the ‘practical reason’ in a manner that is able to distinguish the two in a ‘non-practical’ way. In contrast, the overdetermined and common (mis-)interpretation of Kant allows for Kant’s real meaning that has been appropriated by Harman. Thus, to repeat, in so much as Harman, at least, concerns himself with the Object now, in the same way as described of Miellassoux in the previous segment, his (Harman) presentation seems to be and or otherwise must also be relying upon an undisclosed aspect (the state of categorical imperative that behaves so as to allow practical reason as a categorical precipitate, a hypothetical imperative) that informs his ability to offer a discussion about real-true objects, and so therefore can have no veracity so far as truth beyond what is real (realism), as he admits. But he denies Kant, and so either must derive the categorical and hypothetical reasons as further objects already true, that is, the facticity of their being a part of the philosophical series opens them to their possibility of being false, which is how he seems to see it; or, he is relying upon that very situation that Kant describes, and so is being dishonest. So we have argued that reality relies upon — reality is a function of consciousness, a thing, for the argument is of effects and not so much about describing what an ‘actual’ real object is; that is Harman’s job (or maybe all of conventional philosophy) — a distancing of consciousness from the object of its real involvement or consideration of reality. Harman denies the ‘subject’ philosophical rhetoric and uses another true object by which to gain his stature to be able to say that such subject-oriented ideas are done with; that is, he relies upon the truth of the series of discourse (the true object located of historical argument) to come to his divergence. If I have not been clear, this is saying that his first proposal is that only objects (an object oriented ontology) contain or reflect truth, and so he grants an unimpeachable premise that the historical series is true, by which to make his statement about objects, a statement that denies that the ability to know true objects can only be intuited. This is redundancy in its finest and the mark of the repetition of real argument; this is discursive slight of hand and is indicative of how Slavoj Zizek involves the 5 stages of grief (see a later segment). Thus, the discourse of the Significant Event suggests that Harman (and M) has enacted a ‘pocket veto’ that places the transcendent clause ‘in his pocket’, such that it is already ‘had’, and by this is able to venture out into the world an ‘inspired agent’ of transcendence, motivated by a unspoken of aspect that in other days and discourses would be called ‘God’.

Oh shit. I didn’t just say that. Wait wait wait — aren’t we attempting to remove the transcendent?

Harman’s only saving grace is then by the real divergent move. Two objects touch vicariously and in sincerity. He has thereby re-instated the identity of the basic duality in essential reality, a reality that includes the individual vicariously, that is to say, reality includes the individual in place of the human being; he closes the gap by exchanging real identical categorical imperatives. This is ironic: Harman is arguing a removal of the subject by placing it in the position of the object sincerely, truly, and thus is he able to describe the True Object of the Subject; that is, nothing that is attainable through real tangible sensibility, except real contingency (as an Object), which is a system that defines itself in such a way so as to exclude that which is ‘accidental’. This appears to be the weight of his whole argument (though the jury is still out). Hence, by contrast, what is attainable is to describe the subject of the object, and this (sorry to keep dangling the carrot) is to introduce the significant event.


The odd thing is that hardly anyone will be able to see themselves beyond the terms by which they identify themselves in reality and so they will miss their own veto — if they ever had one — and and the description of the significant event will likely be just as nonsensical, but even more so. Yet if you are ready for more then the fish might not have broken the line.


End Part 8.

* * *

Whew! this essay is really developing.

Next we take up the ramifications of this dilemma I have shown of the Speculators of Reality and bring in some more Slavoj Zizek.

Maybe one day I’ll get back to Heidegger (sorry; I lied earlier).

But for sure, I will eventually get back to the matter at hand, and stop wading in the philosophical pool; but there are some ends that should be tied first.


It would be cool if a few people would comment.

Really End part 8.