The Significant Event, Part 4b (Part 5): Hard Correlationalism: The Crux of the Problem of Speculative Realism and the Critique of Conventional Philosophy. (And no, I am not mistaking ‘continental’ philosophy; I mean Conventional philosophy.)

We are still moving toward the meaning of the pocket veto and the significant event. Here, we consider Quentin Miessaloux and the ideas presented in his book “Beyond Finitude”.

*

Meillassoux’s argument arrives through the question: when modern science, or the mathematization of the world, had taken hold, what he identifies as the Copernican Revolution, why did philosophy move away from its announcement, which is to say, away from, as M puts it, “thought’s capacity to think what there is whether thought exists or not” [pg 166, Beyond Finitude]. This is really to question thought itself, but he stays with his problem of why philosophy did not move toward this, as he terms, ancestral object, where knowledge conforms to the object, and instead move toward the object conforming to knowledge.

His thesis concerns more a proper manner of thinking, and this concerns removing metaphysical thinking, thinking that involves a transcendental element or aspect, what QM frames more precisely as that derives from ‘necessaritan probabilistic’ thinking. Such thought stems from the notion that the probability of reality manifesting in just the way it is for any moment is extremely low, nearly impossible, and so in as much as reality does indeed manifest in such a way, it is thus necessary due to a transcending element or aspect that has determined the outcome against this highly improbable outcome. Indeed, he is arguing necessity over contingency, but necessity in its absolute form that does not arise due to contingency.

It is this proposal that I agree with. I appreciate how he has voiced this situation because it quite aptly describes the issue, the pivotal discernment, the axial moment in the discussion of ideas put forth by authors of philosophy that I call ‘the point of contention’, which lays out the divergent path as a necessary outcome of the motion of conventional discursive method and thereby involves unilateral duality in contrast to — what I believe is called — a bilateral unity.

Where QM and I differ has do with with his assertion of proper thinking, a proper method by which to suggest a ‘more proper’ method. His is the same problem that is evidenced with Immanuel Kant, and indeed I would say that he is offering little more than Kant in this respect. Due to the appropriation of conventional knowledge that uses Kant’s ideas as previously stated and thus already posited object to be considered built upon as progress in the effort for the truth of conventional philosophy, one could see that a more pronounced move should indeed be indicated; this in so much as synthetic a priori, the categorical imperative and Kant’s theses did little more than arouse suspicion and debate. QM is keen to understand maybe not only why, but also how to develop a move that would emphasize or reiterate what Kant was really trying to propose. Yet the impetus for the reiteration must then also have allowed QM to see that the fault of Kant’s force lay in his (Kant’s, but also ironically QM’s) reckoning of his (Kant’s) notion by a One reality that an insistence upon a universal ethics reveals. So it is that while QM may indeed notice the error to thereby be motivated to such a new turn, aka speculative realism, his also may be thwarted by this same problem of Kant. To wit; Kant suggests that the categorical imperative may imply a ‘right action’ of sorts, an ethical (good) action, that distinguishes then in relief what actions may be questionable, and thus he resorts the real ubiquitous power of choice by which the total and universal absolute manifestation of humanity exists, decision. In this distinction, we may thereby tend to not forgive QM, for it is the statement of Kant that should by now arrive with the question that is relieved of such universality; which is to say that where QM’s mentor Alain Badiou occupies the strong point of the human situation, and Francois Laruelle the strong position, QM himself makes the weak move by indicting reason, albeit a particular kind of reasoning, as the issue at hand.

QM’s approach is upon how such an object antecedent to thought proposes likewise a condition of thought, an elementary and necessary condition of the reality for which he is arguing a new propriety, i.e. ‘reason’ — but if there is a thing in its own right antecedent to thought, what does this say of thought? Thus it is interesting that his critique is held out away from itself; where if there is an aspect that informs human thinking that exists independent of thought, and presumably QM is moving in that direction, then thought itself is brought into question; but QM invokes ‘reason’. His move is toward an imminence of thinking that should properly be understood as stemming from mathematical truth, removed from the transcendental tendency for thought that arrives by the opposite move. Yet QM leaves untouched the question of thought and instead approaches from an effect of thought, that reason, and not thought, is an ideological construction formed out of a historical misconstruing of information that he identifies as a ‘necessitarian probability’. Yet, ironically, as he proposes that the fault of reason is due to this necessary probability that surmises a unitary discourse, he is nevertheless proposing that a unitary discourse may be arrived at through a discarding of the transcendental reason in favor of a more mathematical basis. His can be taken as little more than another conventional assertion, another argument to be considered, and yet his indicts such reason as a particular incorrect reasoning.

*

His move makes very explicit the rejection of the correlationalist dictate that would reduce thoughts’ “capacity to think what there is whether or not thought was there to think it” to the thought itself, and thereby posits objects that are not transcendental in their nature — or maybe more precisely, exactly transcendent, which is to say, to the correlationalism that would reduce all posited antecedents to the , what he calls, facticity of thought. In other words, we might see that where correlationalism reduces all that is to what can be thought in the moment, what is the real condition of knowledge, such correlative reality instead thus evidences the limit of knowledge and not the impossibility that any thing more exists.

But his is supposedly not a Kantian intuition that relays the object in-itself to knowledge through a transcendent effector that then calls for an elaboration on what is true of metaphysics; he is proposing a proper basis of method for metaphysical speculation. Strangely enough, though, it is the opening by which we need not any longer rely upon a Hegelian History, an opening where the nature of the object in-itself may be identified without a need of a transcendent interlocutor, which is for current modern philosophy a real Historical Consciousness denied as such due to the investment in the potential term-object identity that has gone beyond Hegel. Thus, it is not so much that anything may exist independent of thought — this is the oriented move of the Speculative Realists — but rather more that the corresponding question has to do with the discourse from which derives the deviation and thus the question — not of reason as QM proposes, but of thought itself, which is then to pronounce the counter-partial aphilosophical move. For there is never a mathematical conception that can avoid putting its use for humanity into terms, which is discourse, and apprehension of discourse cannot avoid a transcending effect (see my earlier posts). Real discourse always involves transcendence; the move he wishes to make, though, seems more inline with developing a ‘correctly fashioned’ discourse, one that will align thought with a real-true universe, which is, ultimately, a unitary discourse of the real, a discourse that only gains its footing through an assertion of a State of Reality, again, as in the previous segment (part 3), a revolt from the limit back into the limit. And again I say it is no wonder that QM and others must call their brand of Realism ‘speculative’; at least there is an appearance of an effort for humility.

Hence the deviant move that corresponds counter-partially to Speculative Realism is that move that says the issue concerns what is not real, the move that brings thought itself into question, which is more consistent with Miessalloux’s pronunciation of the problem than he seems to be able to admit. Indeed, math appears to exist and its functions manifest despite what we may think of it, and it thereby argues an existence apart from thought that does not fall pray to the all-encompassing correlational position. What occurs then is a necessity that shows math does not get ‘discovered’ by our thinking, we do not ‘solve’ mathematical problems; rather, math is presenting itself or ‘is presented’ by its solutions to us in the only manner that is able to be presented, which then argues that the ‘thoughts’ that solve mathematical problems are determined, and not truly based in some sort of free, intuitive, inspirational or imaginative agency, which is to say, are not based in any sort of contingency. At best, it would seem QM is saying that we should limit types of thinking that are allowed to be counted as true, which appears then to fall on the weak side of his mentor’s, Alain Badiou, thesis of ‘Being and Event’.

For what are we really saying when we make an argument? We are saying that the route by which such an argument was made is true in its facticity, its fact of it being an argument as a series, that because of the trueness of the fact that such arguments were made, this argument is likewise true but also more true; the argument that is being made is that it is a furthering of the progressive movement of historical argument, that indeed thisargument I am presenting to you now argues that it makes the next step in the progress toward the truth of humanity in reality; and this is ironic.

There is a problem here, then also with QMs proposal. He is not suggesting a particular type of reasoning or manner of argument is to blame, rather, he is indicting a type of reason, a particular manifestation of thinking. He is not talking about operations of reason as reason might be a foundation upon which to make various arguments; no, he categorizes the problem as reason itself. So then how is it possible that an argument has been made upon the historical content that is argument, where this furthest consequential proposal enjoins the facticity of progress in order to thereby argue that the facticity of the series is or was based upon an incorrect manner of proposing argument? It would seem by virtue of the argument QM is making that he would not only have to understand the previous proposals through that very faulty reason but then also understand that the manner by which he comes upon this furthest argument is significantly different than his (arch-fossil) predecessors; in other words, it would seem to have to be that the argument that he makes was not made upon the proposals of those before him, but rather his argument was presented intact, and the previous authors are merely vehicles for that presentation. What we have here then is a marker of the significant event in play, and an indication of the veto.

This is the reason why I bring the issue to thought itself. Graham Harman (Object Oriented Ontology) can be brought back in here. We are dealing not with objects of thought, for this way of viewing objects we are discussing, this orientation upon objects, does not exclude in a manner shown above, which quietly and subtly deceives by leaving the intuition of the transcendent as an element outside the speaking of issues; indeed, irony is at play here. We are dealing with and addressing the facticity of being human in the world, and thereby reducing all possibility of addressing to a matter of objects, and thought is another of these objects.

The reason QM does not bring his discussion to thought is because he sees that there is some form or aspect of his ability to bring argument that has been inspired to be able to view reality significantly different than the philosophers that he is presented with; this form is thus excluded from the giving of the system or scheme of meaningful objects, and this excluded element is exactly absolute transcendence. Hence he is arguing a divergence based in the possibility of elements or aspects that are antecedent to thought, objects that exist despite whether thought is there to think them. And, because the transcendent is de facto another object as soon as we speak about it, which is to say, terms are objects, this undisclosed object, the transcendent interlocutor, the significant experience of such element, to use Otto from earlier in this essay (part 1), is frankly excluded. on the other hand, we posit no exclusions here, and thereby delineate that the significant issue has to do with discourse’s limitation and Lyotard’s caveat: How does one speak of the significant event?

Hence, Miessaloux solves Lyotard’s problem by the conventional route, i.e. by falling back into the hard correlational limit, by intuition, but a particularized inspired intuition of the transcendent, the point at which such a division was come upon by him. In other words, he is following a distinction noticed as far back as Aquinas:

“Theoreticus sive speculativus intellectus in hoc proprie ab operativo sive practico distinguitur, quod speculativus habet pro fine veritatem quam considerat, practicus autem veritatem consideratam ordinat in operationem tamquam in finem.”

{Theoretical or speculative intellect is properly distinguished from the operative or practical, that the speculative has for its end the truth that it contemplates, the practical truth, however, orders the considered operation as its end.} Translation Google.

He is thus dealing squarely with the ‘speculative’ (surprising,huh?), yet in an odd sort of way he thus is also dealing with conventional reality, attempting to pose a solution to the problems evident of it by its philosophical discursive formulations, but without investigating that by which such formulations are made. Further, inso relying upon such prior ground, such assumption of progress, his statement represents a ‘false ego’, a ‘bad faith’, for being invested in the division of labor that sees his ability not only granted by the history before him through True Objects, but likewise upon a hierarchical structure of True forms, where his position is seen as highest. And further, though he may understand certain things of Aquinas’s ‘practical’, his statement evidences an assertion of Truth (albeit speculative) that does not require an explanation of his footing, but assumes it due to the commonly understood division of labor, but also the character of the common human being in reality and its ability to conspire with or be inspired by the transcendent that informs all things as to its necessary progress. He is proposing a route to Truth based upon a foundation that is inherently unstable, indeed, fantastical in its bearings, which is to say, upon a faith in the common One conventional reality.

Such conventional assertions, admittedly of reality, as I have said, bring solutions only of the type that deal with momentary present social situations and thus require the appropriate ‘revolutionary act’ of Marx that reality demands. Thus the bridge that ones such as Slavoj Zizek or even maybe Angela Davis cross.

The issue then concerns not so much the revolutionary act, for such an act is required at all times; rather it is the feature of human consciousness that sees such an act as necessitating some posterior (of real experience) transformation, some intuition, that thereby evidences a prior (informed, given) separation of the human being from the world — as if ‘contemplation’ is withdrawn from the revolutionary act.

It is thereby Meissaloux’s work becomes an instrumental occasion to discuss the pocket veto, the significant event, and specifically but in general the human being in reality.

End Part 5.

Next up: Just Kant stop with Miessaloux. I will reiterate the problem using a generalized iteration of Badiou’s thesis of “Being and Event.

After that, I will begin to discuss more thoroughly the significant event, the veto and hopefully return at some point to the Romance ands its role in the constitution of the individual of reality.

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52 thoughts on “The Significant Event, Part 4b (Part 5): Hard Correlationalism: The Crux of the Problem of Speculative Realism and the Critique of Conventional Philosophy. (And no, I am not mistaking ‘continental’ philosophy; I mean Conventional philosophy.)

  1. I will just say provisionally that those two definitions were strictly meant for your replies on the 19th or 20th of this month, where you refer to definitions as ‘real’. I referred you to the articles on definition and first names. That won’t answer every question or fix everything, but those two articles are good ‘examples’ at how your description of definitions as real would be directly addressed by these two in particular; on the other hand, I’d say perhaps 60-70% of the articles (if not all of them indirectly) would address that issue in particular.

    • Hey now. My copy of P and NP came.

      How shall our discussion proceed? I started reading; it should take me about a week to read it through. Or do you have another idea?

      • Hey Lance, I’m really happy to hear that you bought the book.

        I will say that after reading your comments with Dave, I don’t have much to say, so I will save my comments. I could easily go into a rant about religion, etc. etc., but I feel that’s not productive.

        In any case, I would start with the preface, and see what we can make of the preliminary thoughts. You may want to skip my translator’s introduction, but if you’d like to give it a read, it might give you a laugh or two. However, I would suggest that if you do read it, that you come back to it after having read the book. In that sense, it’s a Hegelian intro, meaning that if one understands it, then one gets the drift of the work at large. And I mean that without pretense.

        Once you’ve read the preface, which shouldn’t take you longer than a bathroom break, then we can move to the introduction. The intro is slightly longer and much more substantial, and that will probably give us the basis of our first meaty discussion. The first chapter, however, is extremely large and extremely important, and so I would tackle it in parts with you, especially when we get to the 10 exemplary descriptions of the One. We need to move slowly there in order to get the basics down. Chapter 2 is slightly less broad, and we can tackle that in one go. Chapter 3 is almost like a restart on the whole agenda, so we should pay attention there and take it more slowly. Chapter 4 is where we will want to spend the majority of our time. After that, we can figure it out.

        So take it slowly, and if you read ahead, I would advise rereading, as that is the only true reading.

        All the best,

        Taylor

      • Cule. Not to preempt our journey —
        Right from the first paragraph of the preface, I can already tell he is saying what I am saying. Lol. So lame of me. Yet, I see he may have described what I say is indescribable! That is what I grant him. That is the significance of it. What I endeavor to describe is how my ‘vision in One’ accounts for ‘its discrepancy’. So to speak: how there is apparently people who not only have not heard of NP, but for those who have, how they discount it: how this situation is possible. What I say is ‘not real’ though, is what L says is Real. Our ‘view’ is opposite but complicit. He includes the self-Ego in reality, and so describes how it can be so. I describe reality as including ‘me’ but not accounting for what is true ( vision in one).

        Sorry ;). But reading L is like listening to myself, but ‘from another’. It is truly great. I try to not have it be like that, but its then like trying to deny oneself. I am trying to suspend my belief, if you will…

        I am not sure how our interaction will proceed, but I am open to its possibility. I wonder if this book describes my issue. I think it will, or if it doesn’t, another of his books will! Its so great.

        So I’m reading now.

      • I’ll just throw stuff out there as I come across . And maybe you can tell me if I make sense, or if I should keep reading, or how I am not understanding.

        ‘Cloning’. once the ‘point of contention’ (my term) is breached, the the Vision in One has re appropriated the conventional discourse to speak of what I call ‘not real’. The discourse of reality (conventional), as a unitary (pre-)decided One that asserts its primacy over all that may be true through its meaning structure, Lyotard perhaps ‘grand phrase universe’, ‘meta narrative’, Badiou ‘pure multiple’, is seen for its assertion and exertion becuase the same scheme of terms now have a ‘different’ meaning as a whole due to the ‘force of thought’ that is not now imminent in the conventional sense (becuase now it can be seen as such), but ‘radically’ immanent — opening instead of closing the decision all structure of conventional discourse.

        Radically immanent, to me — but I’ll have to gain a more fluent reading — is where structures identify themselves through the force of Thought, due to their being only in that way for the One in One, but acted upon without the (fore)closing motion imposed by conventional reality. Reality, how I put it, offers occasions by which such radical immanence may be ‘put to use’ in reality.

        To me there is reality that is the daily life of drinking beer with your friends or purchasing groceries, how one deals regularly; what is not real is that which lays ‘behind’ such common conversational structures and colloquialisms, such that it informs the ‘person’ to their ‘vision’, it is not enacted as an asserted position, that is, except so much as what is enacted stems from the radical immanent of the force of thought.

        L’s. Gnosticism of the everyday thus includes all human beings in a discussion of the Real. I merely place everyone in reality. For my work is not based in reconciling the objects of reality, but rather the structures that inform what reality is, which arise, as I say ‘ironically’, such that it is not an ‘real’ endeavor in the strict sense, because I am not confronting real people with their real possibility beyond the redundancy that arises in real representation. I am not proposing to show them how reality ‘really’ is.

        Active linguistics ( which is not is this book I think) is the manner or attempt to renegotiate reality, to ‘show’ or instruct how such Vision in One goes about appropriating conventional discourse.
        But I could be wrong here.

      • I might point out — in L’s essay that is on the NonPhilosophy web site, ONPhil, where he describes the NP1-4. He indicates that NP may arise in different forms, of ‘three fundamental human types’; one of these he says, is the ‘spiritual’ type. Without proclaiming my NP-ness, I would have to say I fall into this type. As I said a while ago, and you corrected me : “should humanity be saved”. Should they be saved..then what happens. Should they be saved…well, can they be saved? Should they be saved..then what would this ‘saving’ mean.

        . But perhaps I don’t fall I to any category. ;).

      • I am moving slower through it than I anticipated. I have less time as I am am trying to complete a project.

        Pg 11. “NP will be nothing other that what the real experience of thought, what we call vision in One, takes from philosophy”

        In my terms: the real experience of thought is entirely contained as it is invested in reality. Thought is thus a philosophical designation, as L might describe it (as to his Intro here) a factum of philosophy, an ‘identity of the factum of the real’.

        Where L situates non-philosophy as a move ‘upon’ rather than ‘of’ philosophy, I on the other hand, situate ‘conventional methodology’ as L’s ‘philosophy’, and philosophy as more what he calls ‘non-philosophy.

        He places Real where I place Not Real. He precipitates out from the philosophical saturation and redundancy to have NP. I precipitate out from the conventional faith in reality by having what is not real.

        I retain philosophy as over, beyond and more substantial than the Greek designation. He places philosophy as specifically of Greek ‘residue’.

        His is an attempt to offer a solution to the immediate problem of the human being living life in the world. I attempt to displace that solute methodology that has the individual in the particular reality called living life.

  2. You write: “When I read L essays, I get the same meaning throughout. But it is not just NP, but many authors of philosophy. I know what he is saying; right now, this is the most concise and true way to put it. It is not NP per say, not ‘according to’ what he says or what NP may be, but rather the situation that is presented by reading NP, the meaning NP represents. My question is: how is this possible? ”

    This is problematic. NP ‘represents’ no ‘meaning’. You are right to question your own understanding and to want to be disproven, because the way in which you deal with NP isn’t contradictory, as you might like to call it, but misled. You’ve missed the point.

    But this is where I get back to not simply saying ‘you’ve just misunderstood’, because instead I leveled the claim that you have not read enough (and I don’t mean this in a derogatory way or in a supercilious fashion, I truly mean it as my own intuitive guesswork), and what you have read you have done from the perspective of ‘the same’, i.e., as though it were philosophy, the philosophy you say other philosophers fall into in a repetitive, deja-vu-esque way for you. I can’t tell why all these other philosophers present the same situation to you, because that’s not my concern. What concerns me is that when I read you I get the feeling that you have not read enough NP, and whatever NP you have read, you already ‘recognize’. But that seems to be the issue, i.e. recognizing what cannot beforehand fall into your purview of recognition (or if it does, then only due to illusion).

    How did you describe it? “I know what he is saying”. I don’t find that to be the case. You yourself admitted that you had only read Principles (at least as far as books go), and I hate to say that Principles is first of all difficult and doesn’t really work well as an introductory text. I’m not trying to make excuses for you, but to say that I wouldn’t choose that book (or Future Christ, translation or no) to begin with. Whatever essays you may have read (you imply that you’ve read many of them, but I also find this to be misleading), I am not quite certain that you’ve gone past seeing NP as a sufficient theory that is trying to merely ‘assert’ something, i.e. some situation, as you put it.

    I would like to know which essays you’ve read. I know I’ve asked you in the past, and if I remember correctly, you pointed to the Non-phi project. I also remember that from that volume, you seemed to address yourself (at least when we discussed it) to the editors’ intro and epilogue, and I find that highly problematic for many reasons, but the main one being that their take on NP and their usage of it there is not good enough to broach the subject or to enlighten oneself on the basic premises, axioms, etc. etc. etc. of NP. I am quite critical of what they tried to do there, because I find it to be quite opaque and unhelpful, not only for beginners but for people who have spent years reading these works.

    But, to reiterate, the Non-phi project is not a good starting place either. It is supplementary material, which means that for the most part it presents issues that presuppose a familiarity with not just the unified theory of philosophy/science (for example), but first and foremost the basic pragmatic aspects of NP in the act, i.e. how it works. Because that’s the main thing I will continue to drive home to you, since I feel you tend to ignore or to have not delved into the way in which NP is to be put to ‘work’.

    This is why I said to you last year in an email that I would like to tackle the reading of Philosophy and Non-philosophy with you (to be honest, I did not get your reply until much later, and because of the delay I assumed you didn’t have time for it or didn’t really want to, but that’s an assumption I later regretted making, since it actually helps to enable your ‘own’ reading or lack thereof of the key Non-phi arguments…). Let’s ignore the fact that I have translated this work and seem to be wanting to promote my own accomplishment, because I have no interest in self-congratulation. More important than my own work on the book itself, Laruelle expressly commented to me in correspondence that this work has been the most informative for the students and practitioners of NP, and one of the main reasons for this, as I see it, is that it is the first systematic exposition of NP as a practice and how this practice can be put to work (while at the same time giving the fundamental theoretical acquisitions for showing how this practice is based on axioms that serve to ‘justify’ it in the last instance).

    Which is to say that, in my opinion, starting with Philosophy and Non-philosophy is essential (at least for the English reader, with the scant material available at this time) for grasping the practical elements at work here. From there one could tackle Principles, but, as I said and want to emphasize, that translation is sorely plagued with infelicities that cannot but hinder any serious reading in English, and so I highly suggest leaving it aside for future study with someone who can complement such a reading with the French text (which could be a part of our work to do together, if at least you are willing to approach NP on its terrain and not from your own concerns, which you have indicated earlier–honestly, I might add–that that is what actually drives your reading of NP).

    From my view, the main interest for our discussion would lead to chapter 4 of Phi and Non-phi, which is the true ‘hinge’ of the practice of NP. Nevertheless, everything leading up to that is quite necessary preparation for grasping the practice that chapter 4 culminates with. If we could at least get through some of the fundamentals leading to chapter 4, and then work through the non-thetic processes involved therein, I cannot help but think that your usage and discussion of NP would not only be improved but drastically and vastly ‘other’ (I hesitate to say ‘different’, but it would take a whole separate non-philosophical discussion to see why, and it’s not important right now). But that would also suppose that you would not be reading the ‘same’ thing/situation, which is what you seem to be doing now.

    I hope you find this as an encouragement and as a friendly challenge, because I would like to help you find yourself in a position that allows you to be disproved. Because I think you would like that, and I would rather see you struggling to grasp these pragmatic essentials to NP than to continue to appropriate this false image and illusion of NP that you are projecting.

    I will leave on a short note. From your last few replies, I was taken aback by just how deeply convinced you are about the ‘reality’ of ‘definitions’. This already presupposes a certain image of thought and of language, and you already suppose that NP functions with these same insidious and aporetic or amphibological conceptions and presuppositions of language. This is why I pointed you to the dictionary, because if we were to discuss and analyze this and its articles (along with the highly important prefatory essay on the non-dictionary), then you would see in the most concise manner how ‘wrong’ (and I use that word sensitively) you are concerning NP and its ‘view’ on and practice of language. At the time, my last reply was simply to look at two definitions, because I had wanted to merely type up those definitions to juxtapose to what I find to be your naive prejudicial remarks about language and the ‘reality’ (as you say) of definitions. But I refrained from doing such a thing because I feel that it would come across as heavy-handed, and, to be honest, it would not foster the best back-and-forth between us, because I feel you would then be dealing with these two definitions out of the broader context of the theory and practice of the ‘dict’ (so to speak) that the non-philosophical dictionary engages. This, to my mind, would lead to only philosophical resistance on your part, and then we would continue to speak in different tongues to one another, and I would mostly fear that the tongue in which you would express yourself would not only repress the usage-of-language that NP exemplifies there, but also that it would resist any means of rendering itself ‘non-philosophically translatable’, as though attempting to counter any discussion of NP on its own terrain….

    I have more to say, but I feel this has already been a hand/mouthful. I look forward to your responses, as always. But perhaps I have not left you with much to say back, except ‘yes, I need to read more NP’. If we are left at that stage, then I will continue to practice patience as a virtue, just as my momma taught me.

    All the best,

    Taylor

    • Absolutly I am open to this interaction. I didn’t buy Phil and NonPhil. Because it was kinda expensive. But I would have got it first. I will endeavor to gain a copy.

      I suppose how our discussion will proceed, the logistics of it, we shal see.

      Thank you for your willingness to interact.

      Oh, and perhaps u have called me out on my reading; I have read much of the Dictionary; Principles; Laruelles description of NP on the website; the essay on Gnosticism. And here and there websites essays.

      I will not offer anything more now; let our discussion take place upon a common base of the book.

      • Well, don’t get the French version from Mardaga (since you can’t read French)!

        The only translation available at the moment is by Taylor Adkins (who dat?) and is published by Univocal through U of Minnesota P.

      • Hey now. Taylor . In the interim while I wait for the book; I wonder if you might give an appraisal of a piece of conversation I am having with Big Story Guide Dave at my post ‘Irony and the Individual part 2’. It is not necessary to read the post. I am interested in what take you may have on the last few replies/ exchanges (maybe more than a few) between him and I.

        If you have time and are interested.

    • Oh. Just btw: just a small comment; but well get into the book when I get it: it not that I see NP as merely a theory; this is actually what I’m arguing against. I am saying that the text itself Appears in reality, appears on the scene, as Philosophical theory. That the meaning contradicts the method.

      I am saying that such a dichotomy is real; that no method can achieve his meaning. That is, no real method.

      But let’s wait for the book. Maybe about a week. So we can have a common basis to speak to each other about NP.

      Talk soon. I remain open to possibility.

      • That’s still wrong. First, I’m not quite sure how to parse ‘appears in reality’; second, I really will have to insist again and again that not only is it not about meaning, but that your statements about ‘his meaning’ or referring to the meaning of NP in general is misguided and quite generally devoid of signification without an understanding of the transcendental status of ‘first terms’ in NP. First terms, and the ‘sense-of-identity’ of the axiomatization of non-philosophical language, is never ‘real’ but transcendental.

        I’m also not sure what you mean about the ‘dichotomy’; which, philosophy and non-philosophy? On the other hand, that doesn’t matter, because precisely no dichotomy vis-a-vis NP is ever ‘real’. So, ‘real method’ is actually again devoid of signification when read via the light of NP.

        Why is that, you might ask? Because the status of ‘real’ (and not just ‘the Real’, which has its own status, too) vis-a-vis NP doesn’t have the ‘sense’ that you are trying to give it. In fact, you’re using this word in a way that totally bastardizes and alienates any real terrain upon which NP would have a ‘sense’ that wouldn’t ‘contradict itself’ (or perhaps as you say, although I find this problematic because you’re speaking Lance-talk here ‘meaning contradicts the method’).

        This is why I directed you to those two definitions. You continue to perpetuate ways of addressing these issues that don’t at all have any status, signification or ‘sense’ (and not ‘meaning’) in NP. You are speaking di-rectionally, which means amphibologically, and that won’t do for our purposes.

        ” I am saying that the text itself Appears in reality, appears on the scene, as Philosophical theory. That the meaning contradicts the method. ”

        I don’t see your turn here. You say it’s not about theory, but then you seem to have substituted the word for ‘method’ in the next sentence. NP is neither simply ‘theory’ (a la sufficient theory, which is how I see you treating it, which won’t work because of its ‘unified’ status) nor ‘method’

        Second, ‘the text itself appears in reality, appears on the scene, as philosophical theory’. Again, you went back to what I just accused you of: treating it as theory. It is not a philosophical theory, and NP’s texts do not function or appear as philosophical theory. That’s just not correct. Secondly, if you mean ‘appears in reality’ in a naive sense, then I will simply state that that’s not even approaching the issue at hand but presenting a straw man argument. But, more concretely, the ‘text itself’ does not ‘appear’ ‘in’ ‘reality’ (all of these turns of phrases have to be reworked according to non-philosophy’s axiomatic rules, i.e. they have to be retreated rigorously). This is because if we speak concerning ‘appearance’ of Non-philosophical texts, then we must respect the way in which their force (of) thought already indicates a non-autopositional presentation, which is defined as the: “Immanent structure of reference of non-philosophical statements. This is a simple clone or reflection-without-reflected, a theoretical givenness effectuated by and as force (of) thought”.

        So what we would have to get into is the question of cloning (which does away with the philosophical circularity that you claim to find in NP) and ‘occasion’ or ‘occasionale cause’, which involves the way that philosophy’s ‘causality’ ‘receives’ the One’s foreclosure via its non-philosophical sense or noema.

        I won’t beat you to death with non-philosophical senses, because it would probably come off as absurd without the proper preparation for our discussions, but we’ll get to it.

  3. When you say ‘It is ironic that you pick this idea — transcendence — as an example, because my next essay speaks to this,’ that isn’t irony, but coincidence. This points back to what I said…I’m not confused when you say transcendence, but when you treat the word as interchangeable with transcendental, then it’s either carelessness or confusion.

    Furthermore, I don’t agree with your claim from Zizek. When I said Laruelle renounces authorship, it has nothing to do with meaning, method, irony, etc. etc. etc., but has more to do with the point I made concerning pragmatics, i.e. that non-philosophy is not a discourse but an indefinitely ongoing pragmatics that concerns the refining of usages-of-language and language-universes, such that non-philosophy itself must be put back through a pragmatics that strips it of its sufficiency. And there’s another point, which we won’t deal with, that treats NP not as unitary, stable or one thing but able to branch out into ‘styles’. In any case, Laruelle renouncing authorship of NP doesn’t mean he renounces the foundational works upon which said NP is currently based and from which it gets the majority of its impetus for now. This is why I mentioned that even stating the point about authorship was a copout (on my end) because it didn’t get to the heart of the matter, and honestly I didn’t have to bring it up because it wasn’t relevant (except to point back to pragmatics, as I shall continue to do here).

    In this sense, too, I don’t think you and Laruelle are in the same ballpark when you use phrases like ‘real discourse’. With your penchant for words like ‘significance’, ‘meaning’, ‘reality’, ‘real discourse’, ‘true object’, we can’t have a conversation about non-philosophy. Perhaps we can talk about 90s grunge, but not NP. And it’s not about the terms and their meaning, but the very fact that these terms imply, connote and rigidify the idea that NP is a theory (or method as you said) that is stable and sufficient and metaphysical in nature. That will lead to so many errors and confusions that it cannot be tolerated, not at least if we want to treat NP from its own identity, rather than treating it as just another philosophical discourse among others.

    You write: “Laruelle is saying, he is saying that the term is not identical with its (real) object, yet (many) of his readers will see just that: the method he is describing is being able to present an object identical with his terming; and the possible fault of Laruelle’s proposal is that it is supposed to have eliminated the ‘need for’ the suture between object and term, that he indeed has identified the object; hence, again, the evidence that the proposal of method is in Bad Faith in the very Sartrean manner. ”

    This is incorrect. This is where you and I have problems, because this is not Laruelle’s issue at all. His issue is not the connection between word and object, signifier/signified. That gets us back to problems of say Saussure and structuralism, for example, but it has nothing to do with non-philosophical pragmatics. The same goes with your assertion that the method contradicts the meaning in NP. This makes no sense to me, especially sense the ‘method’ isn’t a method but a pragmatics, which means: if we non-philosophically take Derridean deconstruction (say through one of its main texts, Glas or Of Gram) as ‘material’ to be reworked, it’s not at all a question of what something ‘means’ but how it eventually will be aligned with the One and the last instance when it is reprogrammed via non-philosophical pragmatics. I.e. what NP works with in this pragmatics and yields is not ‘sense’ or ‘meaning’ but ‘sense-of-identity’. This is why your statement about irony falls flat. If we’re going to discuss NP pragmatics, or what you might call its ‘method’ (although I have issues with this framing), then we would do better to unravel what lies at the heart of sense-of-identity. I won’t go into it now (since this would require many more replies), but that’s where I’m trying to lead us.

    This is why something like: “On the other hand, the meaning of what L is saying conveys to the person that already knows that the phrase is (radically, immanently, unilaterally dual) the same as the
    meaning that is gained” is wrong. I say ‘wrong’ here specifically because you again conceive NP as a theory that is already sufficient in its own manner to deal with ‘phrases’ in terms of ‘meaning’, when actually meaning is not the issue, at all. It never has been for NP, and so I again say that I don’t understand you when you try to reduce Laruelle or NP to your version of ‘bad faith’, or what I would just call sufficiency. For me, that’s the true irony, i.e. you deal with non-philosophy (and the hyphen is quite important) as a sufficient, stable discourse that seems to want to correct the ‘meaning’ of other authors and discourses. Or perhaps it’s not ironic, but a product of reading and understanding (have I been understood, has NP been understood?).

    You write “Again, one cannot simply assert that reality is not what it seems without relying upon an Kantian intuition of the True Object conveyed by the terms. The reliance upon such an intuition is faith: a real ordinance of the state of reality upon the individual human being. Hence, to avoid such confusion, Laruelle offers ‘non-philosophy’; his, I say, is the announcement of a completed divergence that I tentatively call ‘a philosophy’. Laruelle appears to assume that such divergence might ride along with philosophy, but then his becomes more like a toungue in cheek inside joke, because what is supposed divergent is accommodating that which is not: all the while the instigator gets to ride along with himself, radically. The only thing there is to say of this situation is it is highly ironic, if not conventionally suspicious.

    *
    Hopefully, I have removed some areas that seem problematic.
    Now see ironically : I could not have said this without your prompt. They together exist as a form of unilateral duality.”

    I would say I don’t get this, because I don’t, but I will be firmer and say that this again portrays Laruelle incorrectly. It’s wrong. ‘reality is not what it seems’? What are you talking about? “Completed divergence”. What? This again shows that you don’t really have any investment in investigating what non-philosophical pragmatics involves. And this is why your coinage of ‘aphilosophy’ apropos of your misunderstanding (and I want to venture to say lack of reading) of NP is devoid of identity (I could say meaning, but it would seem inappropriate). When has Laruelle ever taken up the question of what reality is or seems? That’s a traditional metaphysical question, and it’s actually dumbfounding…or sad that you include him in that kind of questioning. This too shows that your usage of unilateral duality is just an appropriation and actually has nothing to do with unilaterality. Yes, we’re working in tandem and shooting ideas off each other, but that doesn’t at all involve unilaterality, just to be clear.

    If you see what Laruelle is doing as a ‘bad joke’, then you either don’t take him seriously or you still haven’t read more than a cursory perusal of Principles, which, as I have tried to point out in my last reply, is simply unreadable in English (currently, albeit I don’t see a new version coming out).

    Perhaps that’s where I get frustrated. I want to understand and involve myself with your work, but I have always been confused by your writing, and the main issue involves Laruelle (that’s always been my issue). I leveled the critique at you once in the past that I felt you needed to read more of his work, and I would reiterate that assertion if it weren’t also an easy way for me to justify my lack of understanding. Sadly, I will have to trust my intsinct (and my reasoning laid out above) that we shall not have a cogent discussion of Laruelle and non-philosophy until you’ve read more and until you get down the basics of what NP sets out to do as a pragmatics.

    • Fair enough. Btw: it is coincidental but more so ironic because who would have thought the perfect example would be the one you picked?

      Definition of terms are real. NP is a system proposed as a method through a scheme of definition. It is philosophical at heart; NP is contradictory because it is not non-philosophical but philosophical . Hence the meaning is not the method of understanding definitions of terms. It is not theory but posed as theoretical.

      There is a lot of work to be done. For sure.

      I do appreciate your interaction. It helps tremendously.

      • So, as to the work to be done, I suggest provisionally taking a look at the articles on ‘First Names’ and ‘Definition’ in the Non-Dictionary. I’ll share these here with you if you’d like.

      • Yes. I think it is cool and quite humorous how you describe the “Principles” translation, and your copy mark up. Lol. It kinds bums me out though. I wonder how Laruelle allowed it? Do you know?
        I bought a copy of his “Christo Fiction”, thinking that because it was offered through UK amazon that it was an English translation, but, as you may know, it is not. Lol! I got it in French. Now I have to learn French! Too funny; I own his book that I cannot read.

        Yes any and all NP info is good; I’d appreciate the reference.

        It is true through: The manner through which I engage with NP is… concerns my work.

        Let me describe.

        When I read L essays, I get the same meaning throughout. But it is not just NP, but many authors of philosophy. I know what he is saying; right now, this is the most concise and true way to put it. It is not NP per say, not ‘according to’ what he says or what NP may be, but rather the situation that is presented by reading NP, the meaning NP represents. My question is: how is this possible?

        When I read Laruelle I see him describing a situation. Everything I read of him falls into the situation. I attempt to ‘step back’ to gain a different meaning than the one I already see, to doubt the meaning that I have gained, but inevitably the same situation is presented. His definitions, his terms, their meaning, his essays all reiterate the same meaning. I am incapable of not hearing this meaning. So I read more to see if it still holds true (hoping that it will not, that I will be ‘disproven’.) This is the same situation I find with Badiou, Zizek, even Miellasoux, though I haven’t read much of Harman, and many others, Sartre, Hiedegger, Hegel,Kant..almost all the names, and every author falls into the situation in one way or another. So it is that I attempt to describe this situation and what it means. And the funny thing is that Laruelle is already describing it! So ironic. So contradictory. So essentially, as I put it, not real — because, for example, you tell me that I must not be understanding NP, that is, the ‘real’ meaning. So great.

      • I looked over the segments in the NP dictionary. I feel there is a lot in those to discuss, but let’s wait until I get into P and NP. I just ordered it.

        For I think that when you and I start to talk, right now, there is a differentiation of view that my reading that book, having a basis between us, might help to lessen.

        Becuase every time you respond, then I respond.. Let’s wait 😉


        Are you faculty or associated at Chicago, or is that just a publisher that likes NP?

  4. Hey Lance. So, from your perspective your writing and Laruelle’s non-philosophy are ‘similar’. There are a lot of things I could say here. First, as you probably already know, Laruelle renounces the idea of an authorship of ‘non-philosophy’, as though it were ‘his’. He may have articulated it, but he does not claim it for his own.

    But that’s a copout and doesn’t address the main issue, which is my failure to comprehend your writing. Honestly, I don’t see any connection or correlation with Laruelle’s writing, and I have spoken about some of the reasons why I feel there is a disconnect. My main issue is that I find that you don’t ever account for the pragmatics that lies at the heart of non-philosophy, such that when I see you ‘name-drop’ (not to be crude) Laruelle and NP, I find no connection whatsoever. You seem to take more stock in some of the provisional fruits of NP without really giving any indication to the fact that NP is not a theory, but first and foremost a pragmatics.

    But, not to address salt mine’s defense directly, it’s not so much about ‘semantics’ as it is about syntax. I understand the words you use, but for the most part I do not understand the ‘meaning’ or significance behind the combination of phrases and sentences. Furthermore, at times you seem to genuinely confuse me with semantics, but more often than not it’s generally a question of understanding your flow of ideas and your ‘drift’. An example of semantics is in one of your posts (perhaps the first or second, I’ll have to look) where you more or less conflate the ‘transcendent’ with the ‘transcendental’, a conflation that cannot help but confuse a reader versed in philosophy. However, to be honest, that’s just an example, and it doesn’t even get close to the heart of the difficulty.

    I’ve leveled this accusation at you before, but your initial intent, at least when I came to defend Laruelle agqainst you, was that Laruelle and NP seemed to be too full of jargon. But I feel you have only substituted said ‘jargon’ for your own personal usage of terms and phrases, such that you have become comfortable with your own individual usage of language. Notwithstanding salt mine’s quip about language and the moon, pointing, etc. (which I find to be weak, no offense), this is where I have the most reticence. Because when I read you, I can’t help but face the impression that you treat language as though you were Humpty Dumpty, which is to say that words signify what you desire when you use them, and this leads me to lack any semblance of understanding when encountering your writing.

    Again, this probably comes off harsher than I intend, and part of that I think is the lack of emotional connection in a textual engagement. So let me end this reply with a ::) and a ^_^, because I genuinely would not be as honest if I had disdain in my heart for you or your project. And I don’t mean this sarcastically.

    Lastly, you cite Principles of Non-Phi in your bibliography. Not to badmouth APS and Rubzeck, but that translation is fucking horrible. Excuse my ‘French’. I can’t imagine anyone reading that text in English and coming away with any understanding whatsoever of the original. It’s so flawed, if you saw my copy of where I marked it in red ink, you’d see how every sentence has virtually half a dozen + errors….in all honesty, any serious reader of Laruelle (whether they know French or not) would be better guided by the original French than the nonsense that Bloomsbury has published.

    While I don’t want to offend you and have the utmost respect for you and your project, I do not in any way extend that courtesy to the aforementioned translation, which is one of the most wretched I have ever come across (perhaps with the exception of Future Christ).

    All the best,

    Taylor

    • Hey now Taylor. Please know that in our interactions you have presented yourself in a ‘best light’ so far as I’m concerned; you will not offend me no matter what you say because on one hand it appears that you are and or seek to be honestly involved (in honestly seeking) and on the other hand, I ask for criticism. Even if you were pissed off (somehow) at things I say, such that you really shoot me down, I would take it as the utmost compliment, because I think that I know you are not coming from a place of pomposity, of having to knock people to make your place. The best of colleague friends argue and even get mad at each other. It is easy to tell when someone just wants to primp their feather and strut and insult, etc..

      Yet also somehow I cannot help to know that people have lives and interests and often do not really have time to get into what everyone says; so I temper your involvement with my work by this feature of our lives.

      But hence, the issue of which I speak, that I address, that many (at least a few, Heidegger comes to mind but probably many others) talk about in their various ways. I never have time; the authors words merely speak to me when they do – and maybe with a little help from my interests. 😉

      *
      I am going to respond to segments of your reply, so you’ll have a context.

      TA: “So, from your perspective your writing and Laruelle’s non-philosophy are ‘similar’. There are a lot of things I could say here. First, as you probably already know, Laruelle renounces the idea of an authorship of ‘non-philosophy’, as though it were ‘his’. He may have articulated it, but he does not claim it for his own.”

      There is much I have said in this regard, especially in my discussions with Salt Mine. Indeed, my writtings are merely written according to the occasion; I have really nothing to do with what I say. And indeed, in my upcoming essay, I say that what we are talking about is accessable to everyone — but why isn’t it? What does This mean? Sounds like nonsense. So more to the point here: Regardless of how Laruelle situates terms in reality he cannot avoid it being there ‘his’; if it were not, then nonphilosophy would have no authors or people to speak of in reference to what “It” is or is doing or whatever. Just as I have said before that even if one were acting in, as, or otherwise any framing of terms and their meaning concerned with a ‘radical’ whatever, such a person cannot just dismiss through a situating of terms the fact that one goes out and has a beer with his friends and talks about ‘things’. It does not matter what ideas one has of themselves, for example they are a ‘speculative realist’, ‘idealist’, ‘realist’, ‘Christian’, ‘Buddhist’, ‘European’,’rapper’,’rocker’,’artist’, ‘alien’ or ‘baby boomer’ — in other words, everyone goes out into the world with some manner of speaking about ‘what they are’: this is real identity.

      Having said this, with reference to Nonphilosophy, I see a distinction between the ‘philosophical object’ that is NP method, and the meaning that is conveyed by the method of presentation, this latter ‘method’ by which the meaning is conveyed and ‘gives itself up’ in the unavoidable reality where identity is framed and manifested. In this — I only suppose at this point, since I imagine I will never be able to ask him personally — the ‘project’, framed as Laruelle has, is much more a framing-as-letting-go such that as he himself is involved, he can take from those who read his words occasions to speak further, and thereby completing the never ending circle that he began, as he began it in response to a ‘circle’ of discourse that he saw did not admit the ‘letting go’ but rather kept it ‘encompassed’ as the promotion of a particular ‘theory’. The dichotomy, which I’m sure he dissolves in a particular situating of terms, thus is constituted by the ‘First’ accommodating or otherwise accounting for the ‘multiple’ (readers, responders) as the multiple are enjoining a particular manifestation of theoretical set, who by that method of theory thereby may be able to understand or ‘see’ that their appropriation of the count has thereby been established, by virtue of their having appropriated it ‘correctly’, as the ‘First’.

      This is irony: the method contradicts the meaning. This is to say that the analysis of reality must admit this, and counter it. In reality, such an intimate or otherwise ‘special knowledge’ as it is proposed to be able to be taught or shown as any ‘best’ or ‘correct’ way is, by its very nature of being involved with humanity, an ideological position and assertion. And in so much as it proposes to be able to change something fundamentally human, as a social category, humanity in general, is for all purposes, religion. But this analysis, as I have said, is a real analysis, and thereby when (nonphilosophy is) read in reality, the phrase that is NP presents its own contradiction as method. Hence, I talk about how nonphilosophy announces a divergence from philosophy (L’s framing) and its unitary discourse of the real. The method, posed in reality, as it cannot be otherwise, contradicts its meaning.

      So it is I argue there is no method that can be learned and followed that leads one to the meaning that L proposes — except in as much as the method posits itself in contradiction (irony). Hence his presentation appears in bad faith — except in as much as the method implies its dissolution in meaning. For example: “I may have articulated it, but it is not mine”. This is a manner of speaking that means something particular, but denies its basic and overt (re-)presentation.

      TA- “But that’s a copout and doesn’t address the main issue, which is my failure to comprehend your writing. Honestly, I don’t see any connection or correlation with Laruelle’s writing, and I have spoken about some of the reasons why I feel there is a disconnect. My main issue is that I find that you don’t ever account for the pragmatics that lies at the heart of non-philosophy, such that when I see you ‘name-drop’ (not to be crude) Laruelle and NP, I find no connection whatsoever. You seem to take more stock in some of the provisional fruits of NP without really giving any indication to the fact that NP is not a theory, but first and foremost a pragmatics. ”

      I will grant you that I have not looked into the formulation of the project. Yet, I think it is Zizek who give a brief outline of how such discourse works; that is,for example, it not ‘assertion’ its not ‘agency’ its not ‘subjective imposition’, it is not exactly ‘praxis’, but it is rather [fill in blank], so here is how I will situate the meaning I really mean — All this occurs in reality, in real method. The ‘pragmatics’ shows that some ‘new’ solution is to be made upon the already contradictory presentation as if it is no longer contradictory.

      Please keep in mind that I am not so much discounting apparent real discourse and its resultant method applied to action, but merely indicating that regardless of how one may propose how they enjoin or alter or dismiss from reality, they are nevertheless always and inescapably involved with reality.

      My point about Laruelle might be understood through this historical anecdote: The band ‘Pearl Jam’ was given some award at a big music award deal (you know like MTv or something) back in the 90’s. Now, if you weren’t there (for the the 90’s ‘thing’), grunge or what became to be known as ‘alternative’ music, was especially prided in itself for a re-rejection of ‘commercialism’ (all too ironically). Eddie Veder, the front man of the group who was a kind of ‘icon’ representative of the post-80’s big hair commercialism rock, came on the music awards program and got up on the podium, in front of all the TV music world, and announced (in all his innocence and humility) that they, the band, would not accept the award. And the audience and everyone was flabbergasted; his supposedly humble gesture was taken as outright insult. The ridiculousness of the whole thing basically showed the hypocrisy of the supposed grunge ‘attitude’. The more authentic and I would say legitimate manner would be to humble accept the award but tell the reason why he cannot actually go to the show to accept it, through a letter or note that pays respect to the fans and greater music community by speaking about the fragile relationship an artist has with his her ‘muse’ (which is what the whole ceremony is paying homage to, music — thus subtly reminding the spectacle hoard what it is that they love and why it is) that the potential for disruption of this relationship he has with his art he cannot risk.

      But I’m getting way off into talk that my work addresses in its ways…so I’ll address the specific item you offer here:

      TA- “But, not to address salt mine’s defense directly, it’s not so much about ‘semantics’ as it is about syntax. I understand the words you use, but for the most part I do not understand the ‘meaning’ or significance behind the combination of phrases and sentences. Furthermore, at times you seem to genuinely confuse me with semantics, but more often than not it’s generally a question of understanding your flow of ideas and your ‘drift’. An example of semantics is in one of your posts (perhaps the first or second, I’ll have to look) where you more or less conflate the ‘transcendent’ with the ‘transcendental’, a conflation that cannot help but confuse a reader versed in philosophy. However, to be honest, that’s just an example, and it doesn’t even get close to the heart of the difficulty.”

      Significance could be said to mean the meaning that one gains from an event that shows itself as the only meaning that could be gained regardless of what anyone else say about it.

      It is ironic that you pick this idea — transcendence — as an example, because my next essay speaks to this.

      I think you are saying that I have not sufficiently defined what I mean when I say ‘transcendence’ and its derivations. So the effort of philosophy asks: what is ‘transcendence’? ‘Transcendental’? Transcendent? And seeks to define each term as to its variable meaning so as to locate and identify what is actually Is. This move is nothing less than Kantian intuition of the object.

      I simply say: rock. Do you not know what it is when I speak of a rock, a stone? Must I unpack all the possible meanings of ‘rock’ and thereby then be able to show what my solution concerning this rock is? I simply say ‘the rock was thrown in my face’, and you know what it is.

      So I would say that you have identified a problem upon which I base (as does Laruelle his) much of my work. Which is as you put: ‘versed in philosophy’. Hence I have said ‘jargon’, because if anything Laruelle is saying, he is saying that the term is not identical with its (real) object, yet (many) of his readers will see just that: the method he is describing is being able to present an object identical with his terming; and the possible fault of Laruelle’s proposal is that it is supposed to have eliminated the ‘need for’ the suture between object and term, that he indeed has identified the object; hence, again, the evidence that the proposal of method is in Bad Faith in the very Sartrean manner. The same goes with all (again, Laruelle’s ‘object of philosophy’, the ‘decision’ that is the object-term identity) conventional philosophy: most miss the meaning of the presentation for the (representation) conveyance of the (true) object, and thereby apply the object-term through a particular method so as to gain a ‘more true’ reality. I call this Kantian intuitive process of identification in reality, faith, and in the same manner, such methods arrive with metaphysical surety.

      On the other hand, the meaning of what L is saying conveys to the person that already knows that the phrase is (radically, immanently, unilaterally dual) the same as the
      meaning that is gained.

      Again, one cannot simply assert that reality is not what it seems without relying upon an Kantian intuition of the True Object conveyed by the terms. The reliance upon such an intuition is faith: a real ordinance of the state of reality upon the individual human being. Hence, to avoid such confusion, Laruelle offers ‘non-philosophy’; his, I say, is the announcement of a completed divergence that I tentatively call ‘a philosophy’. Laruelle appears to assume that such divergence might ride along with philosophy, but then his becomes more like a toungue in cheek inside joke, because what is supposed divergent is accommodating that which is not: all the while the instigator gets to ride along with himself, radically. The only thing there is to say of this situation is it is highly ironic, if not conventionally suspicious.

      *
      Hopefully, I have removed some areas that seem problematic.
      Now see ironically : I could not have said this without your prompt. They together exist as a form of unilateral duality.

  5. Hey there, I came back to read your posts. First off, at the moment I am busy with other translation projects, so I cannot help you there, but perhaps you could have better luck conferring with a French native who could try their hand at translating your work.

    Secondly, I am not certain that your application of what you call ‘irony’ to the essay on active linguistics is appropriate. Considering how you describe and employ this term in your post on that topic, I would tend to disagree, and I’m not sure that your assertion has anything to do with the essay at hand. But perhaps you were extending that designation to Laruelle’s non-philosophy more generally and globally.

    Finally…I can’t admit truthfully that I understand your work. This is not meant to be insulting, for perhaps the fault lies with my own limitations. In particular, your discussions of Meillassoux, Badiou and specifically Laruelle bring to mind virtually nothing of the matters these authors investigate, save for some overlapping of terminology that you reiterate here.

    From my perspective, this is perhaps a question of reading or communication. Quite frankly, it’s not that I find your ideas to be wrong, but I find your writing to be overburdened with a circumlocutiousness that I have difficulty with. Yes, philosophy abounds with this, but I find you hard to read, or perhaps hard to divine. Part of this is based on the fact that the little I can make out, I disagree with (in terms of premises). Beyond that, I find myself confused by the circling and mirroring of terms and phrases, such that the significance–not to pun on one of your key terms here–of these words and phrases falls flat and becomes devoid of designation. For example, in your first post, I recognize no semblance of relation between the words ‘significant’, ‘meaning’, and ‘event’, especially as they relate to Badiou (or Deleuze, for that matter), insofar as events are not determined, correlated, influenced, etc. etc. etc. by ‘meaning’ or ‘significance’. That’s just a small example, but I’m trying to explain that even starting off I feel alienated by the way in which you use these words to indicate your intent.

    I hope that I am not discouraging or offending you here. Thanks again for reaching out to me again, I will try to stay in touch and share my thoughts when possible.

    All the best,

    Taylor

    • Hi Taylor, I would like to take the occasion to try to translate. Usually this role is the more or less default stance I had grown accustomed to take, as some kind of (magical) “mediat sans mediation”. If I were to give you some vaguely signposted academic idea of where I was located prior to my discussions with Lance, I would typically say that I had discovered inthesaltmine a peculiar version of non-Laruellean non-philosophy that was sewn through with a thread of Novalis’ magical idealism which I took as a non-theological supplement to supposedly enrich the the value of thought with an additional concern for works of peace. Or something like that, it was quite a mouthful. A kind of scripted routine of pre-situated terms. I had a particular way of saying it such that it makes sense to me. It also works sometimes for publishing papers in academia, heh. With certain people who had taken the time to read my blog and who over time grew accustomed to my intended meaning, they were able to engage it on my terms. Otherwise, most others would just nod and agree with me while saying that they were impressed with the work I had done for my age, not quite realizing what they were actually agreeing to…

      In effect, however, I would simply pay close attention to what was being said by people, by which I mean the specific terms. It seems you are doing something similar, and to be sure I had and still occasionally have the same difficulty sometimes. I would get caught up on the other’s terms, just as perhaps you are caught up on those of Lance, and I would also have a difficult time articulating myself because I could not find the proper terms. I also realized I was surprisingly really good at looking into specific terms, “mapping the terminal territory” so to speak. I began to see that there were often certain logical structures and consequences already implied by these terms. In theory, if people somehow relied consistently upon the specific terms involved in the mindsets available to them, then one could in a manner of speaking (via posturing or whatever) “twist” your terms around in such a way that one would make themselves understandable to somebody else. Or, one could more simply suggest alternative possibilities. With the latter option, the mindset of the person one was speaking with could maybe expand and grow, but only provided they were actually willing to consider those new ways of thinking one was suggesting. The issue of bad faith marks the former, and as it concerns the Romance we have the phrase that “I could not make myself understandable to her”. To make yourself understandable to somebody else, you have to either impose your terms or else initiate somebody into your particular scheme of meaning.

      What Lance is doing is, in his own way, taking issue with the terms, seeing that both of those options assume that the terms are what really matter. Whereas, if language is simply “a finger pointing at the moon” as the phrase goes, then this reliance upon conceptuality often serves to make us all the more confused. Hence the tagline: “If we can get rid of cluttered thoughts, we just might somewhere”. We can only ever get at “things”, talk about “things”, but what about the things themselves? I would suggest it may help to look not so much at what, say, somebody like Laruelle is saying, which is to say look not at his terms — but instead, it may help to look at what he is himself looking at. He is pointing at something that we resonate with, and Lance I think has seen, or at least I think we are together coming to see, that which he is pointing at. And so we, in time, come to a greater understanding or consciousness. This is my rough attempt to translate, since your concern was terminology.

      • Thanks Dave. Taylor and I had a round of discussion a while ago (maybe you read the replies) when I first came upon Laruelle. So I see here then also the same kind of disconnect.

        Part (or maybe much) of my concern is How or Why such a disconnect ‘is occurring’. I think you see that.

        How do you see this? What do you think is going on? Do you see it merely as a ‘limit’ kind of pre-supposed of readers, and that you somehow are ‘more open’? Or is there more going on?

        In your essays you discuss what I could call ‘the significant event’, as a sort of event that brings a certain kind of discourse, such as ‘non-violence’ .

        How could one Not understand such an event?

      • I believe the reason is because they don’t take Lady Gaga’s philosophy seriously enough: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qrO4YZeyl0I

        Jokes aside, though, I don’t think it can be reduced to a mere ‘limit’. I happen to have had certain experiences which have given me to see things in the way that I presently do. Others have likewise had their own experiences which have led them to see these things a bit differently. So, here we have a disconnect. But these different experiences are each nevertheless a part of the same underlying reality, as a manifestation (?) of that reality. This is of course not to make light of the experience in question or to otherwise deny the feeling. But it is to say that here we all are, involved a kind of shared effort.

      • Hey now. I see a problem here. Of what can be known through the PM ‘multi-‘ universes, vocality, and such as you seem to show here.

        In as much as ‘ones reality and another’s reality, and this being a possibility located in the former ones reality’. The problem is exactly how it is held. For the contradiction would nullify a duality for the sake of the multiplicity in which the first one is involved, that is, the duality that Is the instating of the first toward the second that reflects back and includes the first such that that statement has gotten us nowhere. We are left in the same state, looking out and at various conventional moments concentrating truth in a reality lost in the ever question of which object is presenting the truth at what ever moment.

        The basic duality that keeps this in the forefront of the issue while nevermind ing the position from which such situation takes place.

      • Ah, I see. You are right. I am not sure what I was saying, lol. Speaking in terms of different experiences (as I did above) reinforces that basic duality, even if there is a same underlying True reality of which they are but multiple manifestations. Let’s try again: the question is How. We may call into question the conventional objects we use to talk about the experience, as a reduction of that experience. However, even in positing a kind of “principle of irreduction” (Latour) that serves to help us recover or restore truth in a reality lost by preserving multiple modes of existence or else truth procedures (Badiou), there is still the question of those principles or “first things” themselves. These seem to still serve the principality of duality, as if on principle.

      • When I first came upon your writings, admittedly I found them somewhat confusing. I made a lot of effort and invested my time in seeing what you write. It wasn’t so bad, after all, but admittedly I had to play catch up. I took it as a kind of challenge, and I thought I was able to rise to that challenge. Or perhaps more accurately I felt “convicted” by what you wrote, as though I had a firm belief that what you were saying was important. I wonder if Taylor does not feel particularly challenged to engage closely enough with what you (and me) are saying.

      • But with you, was it not more than a persistent curiosity about people in general, writings in general ? There must have been, it seems, something that caught your attention right off. No?

      • I looked back to when I first happened upon your blog, some 10 months ago…

        https://lancek4.wordpress.com/2013/09/04/post-post-modern-modernism-the-mistake-of-irony-or-the-ironic-mistake/

        I wrote to you saying that I had “some issues I have personally”, and we eventually called this type of thing a “the discrepancy”. I wasn’t happy. I wasn’t happy, it seems, with what Laruelle had to offer because I still had with me those issues, and their associated symptoms I somewhat described (loneliness, hand of mastery, etc.). Then we began to speak about this issue of bad faith…

      • Yes, well, I will address Taylor more directly when I have more time. But for now: It is a curiosity of mine which goes to the heart of my work, namely ‘what is real’, but more particularly, Am I being clear? The only way I can know if I am being clear in communication is to have people tell me exactly where I am not. You in this regard help me tremendously – but this then also asks of the first point: Are we communicating? What is this?

      • I wonder if it would be fair to say that the “salt mine” is a place of unreality. To enter in the salt mine would then be simply to explore or else map out the caverns of “what is not real”.

      • I think that is very fair. Yet I can’t help but wonder if the mines are a sort of nether world, neither here nor there but ‘wandering everywhere’ ?? ;)). For indeed, there is the mine that one searches through, digging, and there is the mine that yield the infinite load.

      • I wonder too if Taylor has something to say on his own behalf. I wish he would say more about what he doesn’t understand (I know I still have to ask a lot of questions), since it seems to me that he pops in and out infrequently. Partly what helped for me was that I wanted and was willing to put in the work required, which required of me that I continued to consitently pester you with silly comments. Ha.

      • Granted that people have different interests, but it is problematic to me that one could be so ‘up’ on nonphilosophy and not see the similarity between our ideas. I need to know where I am lacking. (Quite ironic , really lol )

        But you put it so well. Thanks again.

  6. You write at times that “My faith is in doubt”, as though to say that it is important to submit things to doubt. Of course any good philosopher or critical thinker would agree: Let us doubt everything!

    I am wondering throughout our discussion if the kind of faith I have been trying (and perhaps failing) to articulate in discourse goes rather like this: It seems to me that not everything can be submitted to doubt, since this requires an active process of continually considering the True Thing in question, and then doubting it or calling it into question. It is to be submitted to doubt, through your thinking. What is left is, as you say, the situation of terms. But what if we do not have enough time or energy to submit everything to doubt? Arguably it is not really possible, owing to our human finitude (i.e. reading Nietzsche through Heidegger – ?) or what have you, to actually submit “everything” to doubt. Everything is quite large, by most estimations.

    Is it more accurate to say that it is the “thing” (as in the True Thing) in every”thing” that you are given to doubt, rather than “everything” all together? Perhaps I am splitting hairs here. Instead this appears to me as: You simply submit to doubt each and every thing that presents itself to you as True Things, as they happen to appear in discourse, and otherwise you do not go out of your way to doubt “everything”. You take the occasion to situate terms, and there is always an occasion as we have discussed.

    Can I perhaps instead say something like “My faith is ironclad” as though no amount of doubt can reach it or touch it? It seems there are more than one, or at least two ways to effectively say Yes to life. We have the “amor fati” approach of the Mandelbrot-styled cosmos on one hand, and then there is also discerning a “calling” on the other. Is the later approach – as you say: yes there is ‘divinity’, in quotes – simply a manner of speaking? It depends how we look at the Everything: as “everything” or every”thing”. What reason is there to take it as every”thing”? Is it more divergent, assuming conventional religious understandings take it as “everything” and thus, mistakenly, as a True Thing? Does the other way not bring it to “thought”, but perhaps instead to “prayer”? Thoughts and prayers, pray without ceasing, or should we think without ceasing, hmm…

    At least two ways of saying Yes to life… It is in this manner that we are Janus-faced. They seemingly accomplish the same thing, from different angles, in the field of relations.

    • Hello. Good to hear you back. Somehow I think you said your grandad is sick and so took some time for him ? My Prayers for you and him and yer family.

      It is interesting u bring up faith in doubt. It is just such a great statement. Maybe you missed my essay a few back (maybe it was a comment reply to Big Story Guide ) where I spoke of it in the sense of having a faith that by its standing as a faith is, as a motion of itself, in doubt . So it is that my faith is in doubt. That principle by which faith has any meaning, including the objects of that faith, being in doubt. So it thus becomes less an activity and more a situation. So great.

      More in a bit …

    • I agree with your questions, that such questions may arise given the situation. Actually I have a short essay that addresses just these questions. Doubting every thing singly , or all together. So. Yes it comes down to terms. So then the further move is to doubt this, doubt that it is just about terms. Then if it is not about terms, then doubt whatever is left.

      For me, it is at this’s point that Lyotard becomes so insightful . Because the logical move would be to say that through doubting what is left the person thereby sees that he has no foundation. That every basis he supposes as true is lost. But I do not think this move is convey able . I do not think such a transformation occurs upon the explanation of the situation.

      For then as you and I have been discussing , the question becomes: how do I move forward?

      Indeed( how is it that I am moving forward. That is the true issue, I think .

    • ..,so, it is a quite meaningless if not fairly weak thing to say that how one moves forward is just to do what they do. Because the assumed transformation that is supposed of the end run of doubting everything is that all one Can do is continue on that path, but not because that is what makes sense as a decision, rather it is come upon in such a way that that is all one is capable of doing. There is ‘no exit’ from the meaning that established the route that calls for its own doubting, because the anguish that compelled such doubt can not be removed from the condition of release, such that the contradiction stays intact as the meaning of the whole move, such that no real decision upon any of it was ever made; rather one sees that the whole move is inevitable. Again, that doubting everything leads to the doubt that cannot be doubted — and this doubted. Nothing is left sacred; everything is fair game, except in as much as one cannot do but what they do.

      It really makes no sense; hence it makes total sense of everything. So the effort becomes how to put it in terms.

    • You know Dave; you are the only person that I have been able to discuss my writtings with who seems to understand them. I never really thought anyone would, and that is why I sees it as a miracle that you and I discuss along the lines we do.

      Yet, indeed, I am attempting to contact people, I am trying to be simple in how I say things.

      So I am wondering if you might offer your insight. If you might look at Taylor Adkins reply on SE part 5. I read one of his Laruelle translations and then asked what he thought of SE essays.

      I have a certain understanding of what his reply means: in a certain sense, he is not a person they are speaking to. But I was wondering what you get from it. I think I am being pretty straightforward, but obviously he cannot see it.

      I am wondering how you see it, the situation that his reply presents given that somehow you so quickly understood.


      Of course I account for his type of reply as ‘of convention’. I see it as marking an investment in terms of the True Object, of historical progression.

      But I am curious about how you see the disconnect.

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