The Significant Event; part 2.

The instrumentality of reality is faith; all forms of veto stem from the resistance, innate to the individual, to have reality find solution. The condition of reality thereby posits no solution but through faith, which I call ‘conventional faith’, and this insolute situation that requires faith is founded upon the True Object. The True Object is the basis of having reality, and the motion of reality, called progress, is toward the absolutely True object. Reality thereby determines that the individual human being should find the Truth through the terms of reality, and this is to say that the terms are seen to reflect or otherwise show what the True object may be and thus presents the route or method by which the individual may find solution; the solution found through conventional faith is called identity.

A human being’s identity can be said then to be the sustenance of reality. So it is the solution to the query instigated by such a form of consciousness is ironic, because the terms of reality confer a route toward the real Truth, whereas the True Object is what is informing the impetus for that search and the discrepancy involved in this endeavor is the true basis of reality – this designation withholds the truth of the matter only in as much as the terms’ meaning are seen to already be reconciled to the object they designate, and not so much to the individual who is refered the proper real route. The upholding this method then is one of faith, for what is viewed through reality to be the meaning of this solution amounts to a nihilism, which is offensive to the route that is presented as the real proper method.

So as much as there might be an individual of reality, we are then involved with the possibility of a significant event, and how this feature of being human involves an ability to veto, as well as what exactly is being vetoed.


In order to find what is being vetoed, and thereby establish what is meant by the veto, we have to look little further than a dictionary and extrapolate for discourse in general. Here is the first definition from

The power or right vested in one branch of a government to cancel or postpone the decisions, enactments, etc., of another branch, especially the right of a president, governor, or other chief executive to reject bills passed by the legislature.

What is being vetoed is a prior decision. In this way, it is not too difficult to see that the meaning of ‘veto’ can be set by a non-philosophical manner firmly in the philosophical method. Hence, the veto can address conventional decisions, the objects of reality, or the veto can address the conventional decision, which is, for another term, reality itself. Concerning the pocket veto (part 1 of this essay), what we are dealing with, though, is the latter ‘philosophical decision’, which Francois Laruelle calls the effort involved with “a unitary discourse of the Real” [Laruelle. The Dictionary of Non-Philosophy.], and therefore concerns the method by which conventional reality confronts and or addresses its own limitation.

Earlier I pointed out that those invested in reality through conventional faith have the power of veto, meaning that any event is an occasion for decision, and that significance is proximal to specific events. This real situation thus rides upon a power of veto, since it is assumed and taken for granted by such individual that every occasion for decision of every human being is equivocal in nature, and factors that might load or sway one’s decision making ability have already been decided upon in the real negotiation of equivocal objects; that is, psychology, cultural influence, social stature and situations, among others, are known to have limiting effect upon an individual’s ability to choose because granted an ability to freely assess any given situation, such a disposition has allowed a decision to be made upon otherwise divergent or problematic arenas of apparent choice, such that choice may be limited by such factors. Nevermind that such rationality must likewise be influenced by factors that are inherently invisible or selected out of for the purpose of making such decisions about what limits choice. Hence the conventional negotiation that establishes a particular and proper reality that has in effect the power of veto obviously and overtly available.

I also pointed out that what delineates the veto for it to be established as such is the ‘significant event’, as this event moves the veto from its place of omnipotence to ‘the pocket’, which is to say, the particular power of the veto becomes pronounced in that it must be ‘put away’ as in one’s pocket, held there for such time when it might be needed. What we must intend is thus ‘taken from us’ as we are subject no longer to the omniscience of reality where choice can be made upon all possibilities of significances, and are now subject to a significance that pervades all reality, yet showing itself on occasion. We do not choose until the significance presents us with an opportunity to veto, then we decide if we should veto the occasion of the continuing significance, for we are stuck: the veto is the decision to deny the significant event for the sake of reality, and reality each time is not as significant: We have a choice – but is there a choice? Therefore the individual who makes that decision, who vetoes finally the continuing significance, we have to wonder and ask if they ever really came upon the significant event. Soren Kierkegaard addressed this question as he spoke about the hero and the knight [Fear and Trembling , his book], and it is not a terrible thing to see that the hero is included where the knight belongs.

To reiterate: The veto is ‘put into the pocket’ of the individual who is come upon by the significant event. If no significant event arises, then the individual has no veto to speak about because choice is seen as a truism of reality. The issue concerns when and why the veto comes to be put in the pocket, and what if it is played.


Hence by virtue of the manners by which such arenas take shape for meaning, i.e. the former (conventional philosophical decision) includes and the latter (ironic cision) belongs, we should see that we are dealing with what is known as the issue of contingency and determinism, and due to the restraints conferred by the meaning of these terms, therefore likewise the issue of choice, free will or just plain will. Consistent with the simple definition above, then, we see that we are dealing with an establishment of a type of power and the possibility of its overturning, so as we are talking here of what reality has to do with the living human being, we are talking about power as it has to do specifically with that which is undisclosed to the real individual, but is nevertheless in process being disclosed to human consciousness, and not so much with the objects by which consciousness works.

Discourse is the vehicle of power, but where reality is indeed valid, here instead we should not take its recourse and say that the statement “one’s reality is determined by the discourse'” means that the terms themselves have a singular and particular effect upon how the individual is justified in reality. Such a meaning has to do with ideology, hegemony, social justice and the critical discourses of reality, for the individual is indeed justified in reality through discourse. But the overdetermination of this route, the conventional assurance, only serves to justify reality’s absolute dominion over the individual by promoting and instilling a particular meaning to freedom where by one has choice, which is to say, that reality is contingent absolutely such that even its contingency is contingent and may at some point become necessary. We are not addressing the functioning of such real discourse, not specifically undertaking what is usually understood as a ‘History of Consciousness’ critical theory as proposed by, for one, the department at the University of California, Santa Cruz. We are undertaking a critical discourse of reality itself, which nevertheless, as I show in my earlier essays, ironically connotes a disruption of reality such that the mentioned academic ideological critical theory may find purchases for social change – yet need I point out that it is this latter that tends to assert its primacy, propriety and dominance to the extent of driving out the implication that its voicing is not essential and never derives from anything more than direct, uncoverable and observable social situations – just as reality demands the a True Object, so does critical social discourse demand its transcendent purpose in the correlationalist default that resorts to real individuals. But this is not to say that social justice needs not be implemented…

I might remind the reader that earlier (part 1) I have identified the ‘Speculative Realists’ as dealing with reality in reality, and so I might add that Quentin Meillassoux’s thesis in his book “Beyond Finitude”, argues exactly the contingency of reality’s being contingent, that at some point it could become necessary, which could occur through the conventional philosophical method. Ironically then, in fact, it appears that this is what he is arguing; that reality needs to ‘own’ its contingency by eliminating the transcendent from its reckoning; in other words, he poses that reality will find its solvency with the removal of transcendental thinking.

I am not so sure about this speculation, except in that reality’s motion vacillates between transcendent and immanent stature for any conventional moment. It is this latter consideration that allows reality to be determined in scope of its incompletion, and within this larger scope, reality to be of faith. Hence, the universal totality that math-science seeks may be found in the real elimination of the transcendental thought that humans have of it incorporated, but what such science achieves is the determination of itself through the terms of its own reckoning, which is, for real discourse, redundancy. So it is that the move, apparently odd for Meillassoux addressed in part 4 of this essay, where knowledge absorbs the object instead of the object absorbing knowledge, is part of the necessity particular to conventional discourse in finding its absolute true reality – which is what M is involved with. It is the issue of the larger scope, which again, the Speculative Realists take along its objective route, the real route for the True Object, that argues my general thesis, i.e. Reality identifies a particular method of understanding the universe, that in response then places the impetus for truth upon meaning and significance, and thus shows the true problem of the transcendent and thought to be one of real discursive, which is to say, proper, meaning.

End part 2.

Next up, part 3: About legislation.


13 thoughts on “The Significant Event; part 2.

  1. “That it [the broken engagement] can be forgiven, if not here then nevertheless in an eternity. Is there anything dubious about this forgiveness? Yes, there is-that I do not have her forgiveness; and she is and remains an intermediate court, a legitimate court, that must not be bypassed. Her forgiveness certainly cannot justify me eternally, no more than a person’s implacability can harm anyone but himself, but her forgiveness is a part of a divine procedure. Why, then, do you not have it? Because I could not make myself understandable to her. … Suppose she had forgiven me. Then, of course, she would not have forgotten me. But can we see each other then? Suppose she stood beside someone else. When she stands that way within time, I am standing in her path and therefore shall go away. But if I stood in her path in eternity, where should I go. Compared with eternity, is time the stronger? Has time the power to separate us eternally?”

    Søren Kierkegaard, Stages on Life’s Way (1845), Hong p. 380-382, 390-391

    1. Because I could not make myself understandable to her.

      Was Abraham justified in remaining silent to his wife?

      Even if she would forgive me, she would not.

      Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical?

      How was Kierkegaard justified in leaving Regina?

      What is happening when the Romance flatlines?

      What justifies and what is ethical?

    2. … But taken in a ‘spiritual’ sense: what did K do to justify needing of forgiveness? (For that passage) how is he able to extrapolate the events around Regina to imply a sort of spiritual propriety ?

      1. K. wanted R. to forgive him as a “villain”. She accused him at times of playing games with her. According to him, it has to do with his depression, his melancholy, or else some kind of inexpressible sorrow that ultimately made him unfit for marriage. He mentions his depression alongside his “vita ante acta” or a life done before. He did not wish to “base the whole marriage on a lie”. And then following the break, or perhaps by virtue of the break, the Either/Or “kicks in”: either he was to be completely lost or else he would find himself in an absolute relation to the absolute, as Abraham did, albeit in a manner far different from that of the conventional priests. He wrote at one point in his journals that “She is also responsible for the remark about me: It no doubt will end with your becoming a Jesuit.”

        Yet, he did not ever become a priest….

        (I am confused.)

    3. I remember that passage. Where should I go in eternity? For if I stand in the way of her with another, I shall leave. But where shall I go?

      For I was never justified in her but that, even if I explained it to her, she explains it to me, the reason why I left. For I was never justified ethically in our time, but in eternity. I go into her arms.

      This is the issue I see. And I think the issue that you and I have gathered around . How do I go where ?

      But then ethically, she would not understand why I left.

      But maybe I’m incorrect. 🙂 ?

      1. I …. “Googled It”. Again we have vita ante acta:

        >> In a mid-September 2013 conference keynote Q&A session, Cave explained: “[And I think the good ones ultimately give themselves over completely to the process and there is no going back.] I am Nick Cave and there is no going back to what I was. And on some level, I see that as being successful in my job and on the other hand sometimes it’s fucking exhausting.”

        With Abraham – there is no going back. Well, after giving himself over, he is not lost in oblivion, and so he can say “I am Nick Cave” just as Abraham can then say “I am Abraham” or even someone like Kierkegaard, maybe, could finally say “I am Soren”.

        What was he before? … an addict, sure, but is that what he is talking about? What was K. before? What was Abraham prior?

        I once was lost but now I’m found….

        …was blind but now I see.

      2. More from Wiki:

        The notebook contained notes on the album’s songs, which were composed from “Googling curiosities, being entranced by exotic Wikipedia entries ‘whether they’re true or not’.” (The song We Real Cool also mentions Wikipedia by name.) According to Cave, the songs illustrate how the internet has influenced “SIGNIFICANT EVENTS (**my emphasis), momentary fads and mystically-tinged absurdities” and “question how we might recognise and assign weight to what’s genuinely important.”

      3. So great! Hey, all this made me remember that you have expressed that it was Wittgenstien that cought your fancy early on ( at some significant point :). Would you mind telling me, if you can, what that moment was and or what significance it was and or how you see it in the context of the Romance? ( perhaps that’s a very long telling, but maybe you could email me if you want; I did repky to you invitation , so I think u should have my email somewhere? )

      4. Hey. And I am not being obstinate on purpose – I am incapable it seems of understanding what you might see as a ‘next step’. For I feel I keep dominating the course of our discussion , and I would like to be able to understand u better .

      5. You were writing next on legislation, & so my mention of K.’s quote here I thought was relevant due to his saying that she is “a legitimate court”.

        I don’t think you are being particularly obstinate. I am just having a hard time understanding as well….

      6. Ah. An intermediate…a legitimate court: the ethical is real, it must be included in the deal, and it’s justifications be included and considered. He wonders how his actions are justified.

        I have an exception with K that evidences what I see as a true progress of history. His marks the ironic split but he could not reconsile it. That is, only in faith could he. Then the next 150 years were people attempting to ground the polemics of this split. But we are finding now it is futile. Convention ‘will not understand’. Lyotard: communication is not occurring .

        Hegel was his real counterpart, at least by his ability for encompassing the issue in real (conventional) discourse : the Historical Consciousness. K shreds his notion, and the proof of the fault of Hegel and even possibly Hedegger’s proposal culminates in the end of the Modernist agenda: Nazi Germany. This is the evidence that we are not dealing with some progress of True Objects, as I put it, though conventional philosophers would have it that ‘modernist’ agendas are an anachronism, that we have learned; but I would say that what ‘we’ have learned is how to less blatantly oppress people under the will of the modern historical consciousness, how to make people support the One True State of Reality without them realizing their complicity. It is probably the same occurrence that happened 2000 years ago in the Roman Empire. Maybe. One has to be careful about asserting conspiracy theories. Lol.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: Logo

You are commenting using your account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s