In Route: Examples In sanity

Have you heard of Simeon Styletes? He was a Christian ascetic from near 200ce in Persia, I believe, who sat up on a 50 foot pillar for like 40 years (40 years !!). I guess his whole life was in effort to get away from people and to devote himself to God, cuz he went into a monastery when he was young but they kicked him out for being too ascetic. He went in a cave first for a couple years, but people had heard of him, thought he was a saint, and so bothered him all the time. The pole, it seems, was so he could more thoroughly devote himself to God.

I’ve heard his whole sustenance was lettuce, which people would give to him from a long stick. And his excrement would petrify in the heat and people would take them as holy relics.

Other ascetics also abounded back then. Archeologists excavating monasteries from the early Christian Era would find these little rooms with no apparent doors or way to enter them. After excavating them they figured out what they were. The floors of some of these rooms had layers of (2000 year old) excrement and some had human skeletons. The archeologists surmised that these rooms were for ascetic practice; the monk would go into the little room and then seal himself in with a little hole for food and water. Some would die in there.

I’m sure you have heard of the flagellants. They were particularly famous in the Black Death; when nothing seemed to be relieving the plague, some (many enough) figured it was Gods wrath, and so walked around town to town flailing themselves in repentance earning others to join them.

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There is a whole history of people rebuking themselves for the sake of some spiritual endeavor, the art of which rose to new heights with Christianity. It is based in an extreme form of the idea of discrepancy between spirit and body. The apparent stubbornness of habitual or conditioned thoughts that do not conform with other more spiritual thoughts reduce and emphasize for many this basic divide of spirit and body, for such markers become analogies that characterize thoughts to be attributes of such polemics. It is easy to point at the world, and accuse and try to make the world appeal to reason, but when it is oneself, the pointing can get quite nasty; only those who are of a particular sensitivity renounce the ‘outside world route’, but then they are left with themselves, and the world that resides in them.

It is not difficult to see that this sort of conceptual discrepancy or mythical analytic construction is at work everywhere, and it can be seen to characterize what we know as history. The inability for people to reconcile certain thoughts to other thoughts is the basis for our current paradigm of spiritual religious reckoning, indeed, of our current historical- political situation, how people coordinate themselves to groups that advocate a particular way to reconcile the discrepancy. Of course, this is a vast over estimation, but there is a seed root of veracity here.

Such a discrepancy seems innate to being human. It seems to be a characteristic of being human that an overwhelming majority of people will not be able to find a sensible and non-violent (that which does not aggravate through blatant denial) reconciliation of themselves in the world. Just this fact in itself opens up a cornucopia of topics.

Here is a tentative offering of a speculative sort.

History is capable of being viewed as a dealing with this apparent issue that cannot be solved. At every juncture, the group, presented as masses of human beings arrive on the scene, is assessed and a solution is put forward. The solution addresses some of the individuals situations but the remaining people who’s problem was not solved, or only partly solved, are left still wondering. The group is assessed again, and a solution applied, and still, most remain unsatisfied.

Prophets are seen to advocate the necessity of reconciliation. But the prophets job is not to bring about a change; this is evident from the OT Biblical prophets. For if the prophets were sent by God to deliver a message, the message had the same effect as any other proposed solution; only some heard but most did not or could not. But in so much as the prophet did indeed become privy to Gods communication, then the true meaning of the communication cannot be said to reside at the moment of the communication any more than any other type of solution for various problems; in consideration of what we come upon, the prophets attain their effectiveness inso much as their message is was delivered unto the future. In this way we can then say that the prophets job is to insist upon an immanent and dire present situation that needs be addressed now, but that the situation is effectively eternal, which can be to say, ‘for a history of the future’.

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It is also not difficult to see how discourses arise in response to the ongoing and persistent discrepancy. If the ancient Greeks, near 3000 years ago, Heraclitus and Socrates in particular, to name two, were pondering what must have seemed ‘new’ at the time, a moment wherein the discrepancy erupted as a known experience, then the messianic social event that occurred around the Mediterranean near 2000 years ago was an indication of the development that continued from the marking that was noticed in a particular fashion by the Greeks, such that it returned as a solution to the Greeks in that they were the ones who ‘popularized’ the writings about this solution to their 1000 or so year old problem. Nevermind that Abraham wandered around the south east Mediterranean near the same time as the ancient Greek philosophers sat in their drinking halls; say it is a geographic and cultural manifestation.

(For now, we will set aside the Eastern presentation.)

This solution of the Hebrews thus took hold in the northern Mediterranean and Europe as a social event, and the substrative route was laid for progressive discourse for the next 1200 some years, if not even to this present day, the progress that is marked as a type in its envisioning of solution of the aggravating discrepancy. Yet when this solution does not work for the predominance of people, indeed exponentially more and more people, the imperative that is the endeavor for solution, which is inherent in the manifestation of human consciousness, represented in the conglomerate that is the unreconciled populace, whether they cognitively know it individually or not, asserts its agenda, which is the demand for solution. This demand does not view itself with such detachment, with such survey, as a history for the future; no, it sees itself with reference to The past as toward a future. Application needs be haved now. So it is the past is looked to as representative of success and failure, such that each may be used to refine the application for now. But in as much as the problem is persistent, as to the discrepancy addressed here, the past is primarily looked to for evidence of what has not worked. After 1200 hundred years of applied spiritual solution upon a basic substrate, the period we call the Middle Ages of Europe, from Aristotle to probably Scholasticism, eventually the substrate was played out, its routes traversed enough that the only route left was to change the substrate. Again, this does not necessarily occur due to some ‘ah ha ‘ moment, but more due to some social imperative where enough people are not content in the route’s ability to find solution; for a while, so long as the route holds still a reasonable possibility for solution, the route still stays the true route, holds reality in its truth function and defines the individual’s method for knowing itself. Then, when the route has played out, people situate another route. This ‘new’ route, following this European model here, could be said to be the ‘enlightenment’, or the Renaissance, and Descartes is often said to be the one who spelled out how this new route was to take shape, though many were involved in shaping the route.

The route, whatever its situation in history, whether ‘new’ or ‘old’, is always is looked upon as ‘real’, which is to say, as ‘now we have enough information from the past to establish what is actually true’, and solutions are applied always toward a grand solution that is proposed to be held at the end of the process of finding truth that the people are involved with in the effort of applying a solution. In one sense, the new always accounts for the old, but in another sense, the new is always already the old, for there was no human situation that did not belong to the condition of the real individual, which is discrepant.

In reality such contradiction is always denied in the acting upon the route; the solution to the discrepancy is always viewed with reference to the route’s potential. In reality, people view their purpose with reference to the problem that needs a solution, but the manner through which the series (problem-solution) is set has already given the condition by which the series may be termed, and thus meant, and always in reference to the particular route accorded to the condition of the route, as to its possibility of having or containing the possibility of solution. Presently, it seems, the route particular to our moment, is showing its failure.

Such discourse of history is always a social event, always of the pure multiple, of the ordination of reality. What concerns us, though, is the confusion that arises faced with a history that seems to inform our ability and capacity to view the truth. Hence the question of one’s orientation upon the Object, as well as faith in the True Object. What concerns us, so far as a human consciousness is concerned, is the individual of reality, and how such an individual may be determined in reality, which is to say, how real freedom leads to still more discrepancy. It seems like the old adage that says “insanity is doing the same thing, and expecting different results”. The insanity is the romantic view, but ironically, it is the Romance itself that leads one out of the chaotic relationship; what is romantic leads one on, manipulating and deceiving in a power play of want and desire, where the Romance fulfills love and brings truth in union. Hence we can speak of a ‘co-dependent’ reality, an ‘addicted’ reality, the ‘abusive’ reality, where despite the problem, the problem persists due to an incessant operation of denial, or its ‘positive’ formation, faith. So ubiquitous reality is, though, to speak with such adjectives still leads one along the route, and at that, of real insanity.

Who or what is speaking? To what or from where does the discourse indicate its solution?

I gotta say: the answer to both is always real but not always true.

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The Description of Irony.

The way we speak, how we organize terms, the meaning of such terms, do not establish humanity; they establish its reality through faith. The founding statement is or can be: As I proceed, I am finding the concepts difficult; this is an attribute of myself.

What is seen in the progression of non-philosophy, its method, ‘gnosis’, ‘spheroth’, its ‘stages of progression’, is what I associate as a movement from the romance (the scenario of reality) set as itself to its description as a proxy, to a justification as opposed to exposition, to the description of the content of faith. In other words, a movement from the necessary to the sufficient. What is necessary is that it is indeed expositional; what is sufficient is that it is not. This division I correlate as ironic to conventional. Such a move is itself legitimate and authentic in as much as it is founded, grounds, in the ironic, but also see, that the move evidences that its authenticity, though based in the ironic, tends to not recognize, or more so to disassociate from, its irony in the attempt to ‘isolate’ it, to ‘have it’ as the originating event that is seen as or becomes then as an ‘enlightenment’ into the True Object: a metaphysical ontology. The real move is subsequently seen as necessary to its origination, that is, true, in the sense of the true object that justifies identity, which in all cases is indeed real, or Real, and thus only sufficient. It is this evidence of division, that gains the maxim ‘faith makes true’ – yet ironically.

Yet also see, the more rigorous and scrupulous dissection of such real things, the ‘non-methodological’ aspect of non-philosophical cision, stems though, as it can be from its romantic base (as opposed to the less risked conventionality), achieves a good possibility of the description of the present state of reality, as philosophically ‘de-cisioned ‘, how such decision is manifested in terms at that particular moment in history, and announces irony in history, which is, the True Object in the last instance.

This whole statement relies on an implicit irony also, in one instance evidencing two moves, a quadripartite is brought. For, irony in its founding instance is a ‘profoundness’ of experience, not dissimilar to Rudolf Otto’s ‘holy’, [see Otto, “The Idea of the Holy”] and then also the move ‘of’ it that evidences the more conventional ironic statement (the last thing you would expect..). But then also we have the move from it that attempts to describe, or locate, the True Object’s ‘trueness’, the ‘if I follow this method’ result. This then also divides; what object is being told? The Event, the subsequent event, or then the further development that seeks to describe that these are one in the same? It is this later ‘one’ that, thus far, at least, I see as the more significant issue since the founding evenst occurs at all moments, immanently.

As above, there are at least two arenas of orientation:

1) The discourse of the subsequent that sees the event only as multiple, as events of real objects, the interrelating of negotiations of True Objects. This is the effort towards the proper real object, the discourse that sets itself in what can be called relative materialism, the transcendental move that allows empiricism, that is always framed as ‘philosophy of…’, epistemology, ontology, etcetera, that has history a temporal activity of actual physical agents involved with a movement of things in an essential true reality.

This is conventional reality of faith proper. This faith is typical, and it will not be explained out of, that is, until a particular mind comes across an ironic experience and seeks to investigate what it could be. But the main reason why conventional faith cannot be upset is because even if one has such an experience, the usual recourse is back into the True Object; in this case, it can be called a spiritual experience, and the individual will inevitably see the experience as referring to or stemming from some ‘more real’ object: a One truth underlying the relative truth, and the method for negotiating such relative things in order there by to achieve the One truth. This arena is suitable to be for, or to be called, the existence of the Other.

2) The subsequent discourse that recognizes the originary event while it seeks to locate it, to define it, thus establishing it as a true object. That which is established through a particular scheme of meaning of true objects, is sufficient for reality; its necessity comes in its sufficiency. But sufficient for what? For the One. This arena has more a philosophically proper setting. Here, discourse is understood to reside over reality, as a marker or maker of reality and thus of history, but also moreover reflecting the same type of progress of human understanding, of humans ‘coming to terms’ or otherwise realizing or discovering or uncovering their true placement in the universe as well as the true nature of the universe.

The One is always of or in time. What should be the de-struction of this arena, that the truth it argues is established in an unrecognized and absolute duality that cannot be overcome or reduced to its apparent unity, actually works for a disclaimer that grants credence when such Oneness is based in a conventional reality. But this avoids one of the two fundamental aspects of reality, what has been deemed the Subject and the Object; hence the historical oscillation.

The equivocating of Francois Laruelle and Alain Badiou s’ ideas can be found through the same matrix of meaning that is capable of elucidating the point of contention; the ‘anti-Badiou’, the Badiou-Laruelle ground, the ironic transversal of the method of non-philosophy, the coordination of the ironic into the symbolic: the reduction of philosophy to its deconstructed whole, the ‘object’ of non-philosophy, and the mathematical construction as the symbolic whole to be set, aside.

Again, my mind does not often bare such weight; I find it somewhat difficult to sort through, to find the right mesh, the right screen, rather, the right ‘authorial’ matrix to view Ideas as particular temporal objects to be referenced. Always there is another, and another, argument to consider, more subjects to be associated with their objects, and I find myself floating in a metaphysical world, an eternal abyss, of historical discourse.

The reason I can get through such ‘historical’ authorship, but in particular to this essay, Alain Badiou’s “Being and Event”, is because it is steeped in the motions of irony. Badiou’s mathematical relatings are not difficult to wade through because he is situating the Event of irony in math, or rather, because what he has situated in mathematics is ironic, and is not stepping too far from it to pose a solution, which I am gathering he does subsequently, as pointing toward a ‘new’ philosophy (or has offered a route for others to follow, such as what is called speculative realism?) In a manner of speaking, he has transcribed the possibility of the romantic structure into mathematical scheme, and by these symbols has achieved what can be called the ‘real romantic formula’ in as much as he keeps what is otherwise conventional discourse in close reading of the mathematical relations. But historically, ‘in history’, the extrapolation of the conventionally appropriated ironic base, thus drawing upon its converted object, reaches ‘with-out’ of the evental horizon, which is the best acknowledgment of the void-as-void that convention can have, into the evental site, so by that time the event has already coordinated with sufficiency, its ordinal, the ‘first’ that contains the vectorial discursive coordinations, which is to say, the subsequent determined meaning of things. When Badiou is read from a position of such sufficiency, he then is read as speaking about all reality, and thereby is describing the possibility of multiple individuals, but multiple objects as well, of pure multiples, real evental sites even while both of these types of objects are of the same quality: conventional. Everything is included with another in potential. Yet, when fidelity to the evental site is true, as opposed to real (read: of a True Object), that is, acquires or harnesses both objects in a single description without contradiction, then the evental site corresponds with the void itself and is then included in the ordinal as the ordinal belongs to the site; Badiou explains as much. Hence, “Being and Event” remains in its ironic bearings, as the motion of the romance being justified is formulated mathematically, and reality and the romance remain conventionally mutually exclusive while falling under a comprehensive, real, single description. I am unsure as yet if Badiou sees his mistake of taking the mathematical formulations to sufficiency, though it appears that if he does, he has already made a disclaimer as part of “Being and Event”: he has spoken ironically.

Yet then the situations that arise subsequently to what is subsequent (that maybe forms a ‘meta’ discourse, but which nevertheless remains of subsequence), what is only sufficient, that is, reality proper, continue in the route of what could be his mistake, and develop conventional philosophy proper that seeks sites upon which to philosophically decide upon multiple outcomes.

Other mathematical concepts, such as fractal and quantum discursive applications that seek to discern a meta-physics, appear to me to cloud the issue and assert a proper reality. To me this is a motion of mysticism: such sensible relations of true objects arrive at arguable metaphysics, which actually, when understood within their ironic bearings, again derives the maxim ‘faith makes true’, as then the multiple subjects of reality may be in discussion of which is more true; the faith that establishes the individual, so much as they may ‘find’ the truth by their own faith, is brought forth by reality, which is the ‘conventional faith’. But such metaphysics can have significance for establishing reality upon different trajectories or being an impetus for change.

These two motions combine. Again, the ‘One’ can be seen as of the ‘edge of the void’, the ‘first’ ordinal that straddles the void and reality; ‘the Real’, the real incarnation that reaches out into reality, as well as that which also falls back into the void ironically, but which is spoken to be oriented out into reality. We can say therefore affirmatively that the One is conventional, and thereby its nature begins the count of reality as an historical reduction. It describes the ‘object of the Object’, as well as the ‘subject of the Subject’, as these may be conventionally decided, the explanation of the oscillating motion of the minimal discrepancy that can be had for conventional reality, the motion set as basic objects; the ‘One-in-One’, the object of the ‘last object’ before the void in the movement of regression, and the pure multiple, the movement of progression, the Object of convention. Hence, Laruelle must posit a transcendental Ego.

We should see then where the ironic becomes conventional, especially in as much as we may have an Ego, of any sort. Yet the irony of these discourses I have shown to be complicit lay in just their complicity. The One has to account for how it may be situated against the Void. We must delve into the justification of the justification. For we are not in an endeavor toward any new thing, for what is news is a conventional movement. The conventional is the subsequent, the sufficient, the good enough; to bring in Soren Kierkegaard, the universal, the ethical. We are in an effort for what is necessary. We should see that what is described in its truth is destroyed, or rather, indicates a dissolution of what ‘has been sought’ in reality. The truth is thus the de-in-struction, the de-construction, of reality, and the truth revealed in reality is the real movement of historical progress. Wherever the truth is spoken, its reality becomes manifest while its truth, the object being described, the subject being exposed, is destroyed. This is the (a-?) philosophical effort: to reach God. So, if it has, then it was because God was destroyed in reality. To the point that philosophy says God was never the object, that God was merely a phantom, an illusion, there we have the evidence of my assertion, that progress has indeed occurred. And to the point, quite ironically, where there is Ego left, the Ego must be destroyed. And this is a discursive situation.

Such it is that we can speak of the ubiquity of the Law, conventional reality, and how this has determined how history is to be situated upon a particular static universal horizon.

With this situated then, we have only to see the return, so by its exposure, the return is likewise destroyed, and the repetition of human consciousness in the world may proceed as if it was never repeated, and reality be upset. Until that moment, history will continue to progress, and after that moment, likewise history will continue to progress. Because the human being is the only constant, and that it demands consistency.