Tangent: Bad Faith, Part 3

Ok, time to get serious. One has to have the time, see, to get really serious because when one gets really serious, things tend to get really funny, so funny, that most people will hardly have the time, so serious they are about having such a little amount of time. But thats a joke.

Bad faith is about being seriously serious. What is serious, as I have said earlier, is that which confronts one’s mortality, and the biggest threat that one has is, what I shall call, the Object. The Object is that which impedes or confronts the subject. If I am talking about something in particular, I have addressed an Object, and to the extent that I might think that I have actually indicated somthing else, something that is not the subject, I have barred the subject from existence because I am speaking about a particular object. This is the problem of duality.

Most people understand duality, but it takes a little more consideration to come to the point made earlier: Religion is the convetional effort to overcome duality. The typical and most overt analogy to what I am talking about is Heaven and Hell, Nirvana and like religious doctrines. This kind of overcoming duality is where the person puts-off the overcoming of duality to the ‘moment’ of unity, which usually means (but not always) ‘when I die’ – they go to heaven. The duality is overcome by ‘kingdom come’; this is to say that this duality is overcome by the complete negation of duality called that which is ‘after-life’. This is the very secular way of speaking about this effort: and we call it ‘Religion’. One will find continuing with my essays, that convenetion mimics, or reflects, what is true, but does not actually get to or reveal anything true in itself beyond its own ability to suspend truth in relativity, which is to say, in duality.

But that route is to easy; it is too easy to point to religion, or believers, or, the faithful and relieve or justify oneself as to one’s belief. I am talking about truth, not relativity. Yet, here is the difficulty: I cannot say that a ‘unity’ is the truth either. Unity, or a One Universe, as I have said in another post, is just as a religious proposition as heaven and hell. In fact, I can only say what is true in reality, and reality is determined as conventional.

So, again, it is not truth that is at issue. If the truth is at issue then one is in a conventional negotiation. The investigation into the truth of an Object is a conventional negotiation of reality. When this effort is taken as substantial, that is, as what I shall call essential, or basic truth, as that which informs and has nothing else or prior that informs it – when we have an effort into the truth of an object, an effort that is taken under a premise that it has something to contribute to an essential truth, as opposed to contributing to reality, as if reality is de facto truth – and this is to say, when the effort is supposed to contribute to an essential truth of objective reality, we have what is conventional: we have a religious undertaking: we have meta-physics. We have an effort that is made under an assumption that is the assertion of the true Object. Furthermore, and this is key: The true Object is always transcendant: it is never found, the truth of it is always the objective. An effort which proposes to find a true metaphysical proposition is a real contradictory effort; it proposes to find the transcendent and bring it down into the world as an object, so it thereby can be immanent, and this would be the true Object. Every real motion which proposes this objective against a truth is a metaphysics, and as such a proposal elicits maxims, or actual truths, it proposes religious truths called dogma. The conventional secular world avoids its religiousness by discursive slight-of-hand, and calls its ( as opposed to Religious) doctrines as ‘ideological’; in other words, it finds the truth of reality by segregating religion from itself: it thereby cannot be a metaphysical (read, ‘false’) reality, but the reality it proposes is thus the True Reality.

Hence we have come to the most solvent presentation of what religion is. Such a presentation explains a feature of human reality without recourse to any other discussion. it contains all rebuttal; we have thus what can be called truth. It is real because it cannot be otherwise and be communicated, but it is not of reality because it explains reality: it is true, it has no prior or other referent but itself. This explanation is thus the ground of any discussion that concerns religion. Every other explanation inevitably must fall to this explanation as its premise. Conventional reality posits a transcendent true Object by its very motion, and because of this fact, what is true of reality is that it is a religious proposition.

We have found a fact of reality; a fact is that which is real, and what is real cannot be avoided except through denial. A life lived in denial is, by definition, lived in Bad faith. When we can come to a full acceptance of such a disclosure of the single person in the world, then we might be able to get somewhere. Until such disclosure is accepted, we will only make decisions based upon a mistaken apprehension of reality.

We can now rejoin the discussion upon the question: why do I say that Francis Laruelle’s project of Non-Philosophy is in bad faith ?

* * * A Further Tangent.

What I am taking about is the strange, offensive notion that whatever is there is entirely contained in knowledge. If one has an open mind, this can easily be demonstrated: attempt to describe some object to someone so that they know exactly what you mean. At some point in this excersize I bet that you will not be able to convey what that thing is without referring to an underlying assumption that that person is human. At some point you will invaribly point to it, or say it is like this or that, or say ‘you know’ and will begin at some point to almost urge that person to understand what you are trying to indicate, you will try to convince that person that they really do know what that object is. Eventually, if the other person does not give into your urging or your compelling to agree with the common humanity, you will give up under the justification that this excersize is stupid or the other person is just being obstinate. But the fact of the matter is that there is only the object there, as a true object, to the extent that both parties agree that some reasonable amount of information has already been given before the exchange had even begun; there was already an established ‘scheme’, if you will, ‘matrix’ of meaning or understanding, knowledge, that supplies the true object prior to the interaction. Yet, as one proceeds to attempt to uncover what this knowledge is, or try to find some pattern or orderly sense to the scheme or matrix, they only find a further aggrivation of the scheme. At each juncture where the investigator comes upon a ‘truth’ of a situation, a true thing there, he or she has found only faith; they have found only the margin of thier encompassing belief, that which establishes for them thier identity as a human being in reality.

Of course, what we have now a days is a new faith; we have a world where people have given up the investigation into what is true and returned to the effort for the true Object – but, this is not because there is no truth, but because thier investigation is founded in convetional methodology: religion.

And it is not difficult to see this everywhere.

(But part of the problem I am explicating is this ‘new’-ness. As if people ever were ever not interested in attaining the Object.)

Ill let this soak for a little while now…

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Tangent: Bad Faith, part 2

So what is really going on? According to the lowest common meaning, everyone is in bad faith until they realize that they have nothing to lose and so then they get on with maximizing their potential to basically do what they want, or exercise their passion. While this may seem a great out for ‘living the dream’, I say that if this is a great summary of what Sartre took many many more words to say then Sartre was small minded and hardly deserving the credit given him as a big name philosopher – moreso, if we can truly agree with the adage that the more popular something is, the more likely it is of low significance and value and probably really sucks, then maybe there is something behind his big name: he was telling the world exactly what they want to hear, and backed up by the great academy to boot! (Or, he said exactly what only could be said at the time!)

One could say that such an existential take is nothing less than another conventional religion. Another system by which to classify and justify one’s placement in the world. Another out, another excuse to avoid the fact of existence.

But now we are getting somewhere. When we begin to understand the confining and ubiquitous quality of religious type propositions, of un-analyzed ideas by which we support our identity as human beings, we just might be coming upon a glimpse of the issue here.

Laruelle is indeed onto something; he has called his project ‘non-philosophy’ and it has to do with an indicating, a designating of philosophy. In my last post, I dared so much as to imply that the effort of philosophy is in bad faith; in fact, I do not exceptionalize philosophy, I call it what it is and include it in the motion of the general idea of thought itself as represented in human communication: I say it is part of the general human rhetoric: I call it conventional methodology. Yet here is Laruelle claiming a non-philosophy – and I say ( unflinchingly ) that Laruelle, too, is in bad faith by his proposition.

I must be some kind of nut. I have said earlier that the problem I have with Laruelle is his excessive use of jargon. As well, the reason why I decry his is not his proposition: it is that he cloaks it, apparently for a select few of jargonesque status. And this is because I can say as much in simple terms. What is significant in this exchange (albeit one-sided at this point) is that my ability to know what he is suggesting did not arise through any intensive studying or deciphering of philosophical or cultural critical/ theoretical texts. ( I admit that, at this point at least, I gather he has been a career academic and that I do not really know what his process has been.) I know what he is saying because it is apparent to me. There was no organized class of information or presentation by which I was informed of the issue: I found the issue because of my experience. I comment and/or rebut authors because I understand whether they understand the issue by seeing how they organize their terms.

The truth of the matter is not then, any longer, the issue, but the putting into terms the truth of the matter. So when we begin to comprehend what is occurring in reality, we begin to get a grasp on the bare fact of existence, and this is where I find purchase to speak.

– By now, if anyone has been able to hang on or be interested or keep reading, there must be some who are saying to themselves, if not out loud, ” we’ll, get to the damn issue; what is you point?” And to them I must reply “Why in such a rush? Where are you going so fast?” For if we are to be clear we must take our time. Part of the problem is that everyone is in such a hurry, everyone wants the punch line before the setup. Everyone wants to know where to start so they can take it from there and “make a name for yourself”. No one wants to start from the beginning. No one has time. No one cares, and no one cares to care – but somehow those same people have an idea of ethics: they do not want to be pointed out as the hypocrite, they’d rather hang onto their feeble idea of freedom and agency, and live in denial, the whole time proclaiming their righteousness. They would rather hang their personhood on conventional religion.

Well, I have time; so you’ll just have to be patient. Besides, for those who are getting an inkling of what this is all about, I haven’t even begun yet, but I’ve said exactly what needs to be said to be clear. The problem is the problem itself: how does one reconcile duality in the objective real world?

Tangent: Bad Faith, part 1

In an earlier post, I suggest that Francis Laruelle, by his Non-philosophy, is in bad faith, ala. Jean-Paul Sartre. So I might do well by explaining what this means.

One could easily come to a close idea of what bad faith might mean by comparing it to ‘good faith’. I would say that good faith is a kind of trust one has in another but before the other person has really earned it: the trust is given in good faith. And this can be closely associated with plain Faith, as in, I have faith in you, or, I have faith in Jesus.

Sartre comes up with the idea of Bad Faith in reference to what may be common to general human experience; so far as what may be real life, people tend to take it on good faith that it is real, or at least tend to take experience with the benefit of doubt. Even things that seem odd or disagreeable are still taken as an occasion for a plausible judgement as to what may be real or not.

Now, Sartre is making a claim against such typical experience, that such realities taken in good faith are actually of bad faith. One avenue of looking at this is to see that he stakes his claim on the possibility of freedom. In an extended analysis, one comes upon the peculiar confinement that reality places upon a person, that freedom is defined against other qualifiers of reality such that freedom itself is designated and so does not qualify itself to its meaning: freedom has no essential meaning – and this means that we are not really free.

Here we get to what is meant by existential angst. We want to be free; we feel free but upon consideration of what this means we never find any more freedom than what we want or what we feel. What has been termed an ‘ existential crisis’ is a moment when we become trapped in our existence; whatever the actual circumstances or events, we come to a point where a sensible decision into action becomes impossible, a catch 22, where the definers of free choice crowd in upon us and blur and do not allow us clearity. The decision, then, that is ultimately made is one of pure event, of pure experience: we are thrown into existence, the inevitable movement of existing itself. In response to this moment, one thereby makes sense of it, and thus comes to real freedom. Sartre says we make a choice out of the inevitable, what he calls the abyss of freedom, back into true agency where we find real freedom in our new found ability to choose truly of ourselves in reality, we ‘revolt’ against the abyss of freedom. Bad faith is the condition of the usual events of living before such crisis. This is the typical existential reading.

But this reading is wrong; it is a superficial reading that justifies freedom by denying basic existence for the sake of reality.

We cannot stop at feeling like everything is ok, because soon enough everything will not be ok again. Bad faith indicates a situation of denial. I contend that it is due to this denial that all problems occur – and if this is the case, then we will find that philosophy, and rhetoric in general, speaks of a maintenance of incorrection.

So what am I really saying when I say that Laruelle’s Non-philosophy is in bad faith? This is the issue at hand.

Direction 2.18

I have to start somewhere; I cannot, like most, start in the middle and expect to get anywhere but to an aggravation of the problem. I could start anywhere but I will begin with a few statements of what truth cannot be. Truth cannot be located in a real world, except as that world constitutes a reality. Truth cannot be found in discussion; only in reality can agreement be deemed as true. Truth cannot be relative because then we are left with an infinitely spiraling truth that there is no real truth but only a truth that we call truth, which is, in fact real. There are no terms which indicate nothing real.

What is serious has to do with death. Everything that is serious tends toward and responds from a tendency, or implied or inferred implication, of threat – and no threat is taken serious that is not linked to an idea of death. Death, while it may have something to do with what is true, really indicates what is false, and thereby we infer what may be true by the limitation set by our idea of the truth of death. If this manner of dialogue is not serious enough, it is because it speaks of death but is not offended by it, which is to say, I may have a natural response to impending doom, but I do not live life according to whether I will die today or tomorrow or ever: in so much as as I may die one day, and death, for what we can know for sure, ends all human relation, death must be true, but absolutely true, as opposed to just true in reality. What may be actually true, that is, not really true but absolutely true with reference to death, must be that which is most seriously false.

So, now that we have begun to spin some wheels, I will begin at a more definite beginning.

***

Thought.

The primary, that is, first and most basic, issue of thought has nothing to do with topics; or rather, it has everything to do with the subject. All problems are based in a fundamental misunderstanding of reality, a misunderstanding that is kept in place and indeed enforced because of an offense. The offense is so great that it effects a denial of what is true of existence. Such a denial thus allows for the establishment of the true object. In this way, reality is a misunderstanding of the truth of human existence. Reality is a method of negotiating true things, or real objects, that are created through denial. Though an object may exist, we can only know it in reality as meaning, and meaning is founded in knowledge; therefore, all objects are created as real through an agreement between human beings who misunderstand the truth of existence and reality. If I encounter an object on my own, I have no relatable knowledge of its truth except inso much as I have entered into a negotiation of knowledge with another human being. This may be said to be a line of communication but such a moment is really part of the question we are addressing. Also, If I know of a true object by myself, I have no need to refer to it as true or false. We cannot address the possibility of a human being alone in reality for such a pondering is entirely defined and contained in knowledge given prior to the consideration.

The matter of offense is a more involved issue that will arise and be made sense of as we continue.

For now, one should see that what I have to offer is merely an accounting of all the facts and that I am not attempting to convince anyone of anything. I have no strategy, no deceptive jargon by which to uphold a privileged mystery nor create a mystique. I have no hidden agenda, no career motivation, no deadline or line to tow; I have no reputation nor identity to maintain. I merely present the necessary conclusion given all the facts, and one of the facts that precipitates out from this giving is that no one will be convinced because very few people have the personal integrity to want to or be able to consider all the facts. Only those who already understand what I present will be able to see that it is true. The issue has always been the putting clearly into words the truth of the matter at hand.

The first and most basic fact is duality: there is no real reconciliation of duality. This is to say, there are only two types of such reconciliation: what i call, the ironic and the conventional. A conventional reconciliation of duality is ‘religion’, or a hoped-for truth, or a truth based in faith.; an ironic reconciliation is called (actual) ‘truth’.

The conventional reconciliation calls for or to a uni-verse, that is, One. Religious truth is, by definition, a conventional reconciliation of the apparent duality of reality in oneness. It avoids diversity and plurality by asserting that it all can be recouped in reality through some promoted method.

The ironic reconciliation is what will be developed as we continue.

For now, I’ll let you chew on what has been offered so far for a little bit.

Direction 2.18

I have to start somewhere; I cannot, like most, start in the middle and expect to get anywhere but to an aggravation of the problem. I could start anywhere but I will begin with a few statements of what truth cannot be. Truth cannot be located in a real world, except as that world constitutes a reality. Truth cannot be found in discussion; only in reality can agreement be deemed as true. Truth cannot be relative because then we are left with an infinitely spiraling truth that there is no real truth but only a truth that we call truth, which is, in fact real. There are no terms which indicate nothing real.

What is serious has to do with death. Everything that is serious tends toward and responds from a tendency, or implied or inferred implication, of threat – and no threat is taken serious that is not linked to an idea of death. Death, while it may have something to do with what is true, really indicates what is false, and thereby we infer what may be true by the limitation set by our idea of the truth of death. If this manner of dialogue is not serious enough, it is because it speaks of death but is not offended by it, which is to say, I may have a natural response to impending doom, but I do not live life according to whether I will die today or tomorrow or ever: in so much as as I may die one day, and death, for what we can know for sure, ends all human relation, death must be true, but absolutely true, as opposed to just true in reality. What may be actually true, that is, not really true but absolutely true with reference to death, must be that which is most seriously false.

So, now that we have begun to spin some wheels, I will begin at a more definite beginning.

***

Thought.

The primary, that is, first and most basic, issue of thought has nothing to do with topics; or rather, it has everything to do with the subject. All problems are based in a fundamental misunderstanding of reality, a misunderstanding that is kept in place and indeed enforced because of an offense. The offense is so great that it effects a denial of what is true of existence. Such a denial thus allows for the establishment of the true object. In this way, reality is a misunderstanding of the truth of human existence. Reality is a method of negotiating true things, or real objects, that are created through denial. Though an object may exist, we can only know it in reality as meaning, and meaning is founded in knowledge; therefore, all objects are created as real through an agreement between human beings who misunderstand the truth of existence and reality. If I encounter an object on my own, I have no relatable knowledge of its truth except inso much as I have entered into a negotiation of knowledge with another human being. This may be said to be a line of communication but such a moment is really part of the question we are addressing. Also, If I know of a true object by myself, I have no need to refer to it as true or false. We cannot address the possibility of a human being alone in reality for such a pondering is entirely defined and contained in knowledge given prior to the consideration.

The matter of offense is a more involved issue that will arise and be made sense of as we continue.

For now, one should see that what I have to offer is merely an accounting of all the facts and that I am not attempting to convince anyone of anything. I have no strategy, no deceptive jargon by which to uphold a privileged mystery nor create a mystique. I have no hidden agenda, no career motivation, no deadline or line to tow; I have no reputation nor identity to maintain. I merely present the necessary conclusion given all the facts, and one of the facts that precipitates out from this giving is that no one will be convinced because very few people have the personal integrity to want to or be able to consider all the facts. Only those who already understand what I present will be able to see that it is true. The issue has always been the putting clearly into words the truth of the matter at hand.

The first and most basic fact is duality: there is no real reconciliation of duality. This is to say, there are only two types of such reconciliation: what i call, the ironic and the conventional. A conventional reconciliation of duality is ‘religion’, or a hoped-for truth, or a truth based in faith.; an ironic reconciliation is called (actual) ‘truth’.

The conventional reconciliation calls for or to a uni-verse, that is, One. Religious truth is, by definition, a conventional reconciliation of the apparent duality of reality in oneness. It avoids diversity and plurality by asserting that it all can be recouped in reality through some promoted method.

The ironic reconciliation is what will be developed as we continue.

For now, I’ll let you chew on what has been offered so far for a little bit.

Direction.

One has to wonder what the point of this discussion may be. It is not at all an over generalization or stereotype to say that most people could not care less about philosophical-theoretical discussion unless ot has to do with their career. Most people work and play; that’s it.

I have to say that thats great. But I also have to say that they are willfully and blissfully ignorant and have thus little significance- or rather, their significance lay in their activity: which is exactly what our current philo- theoretical model says its all about.

.
So I too must act. And my action must be entirely consistent with my Being.
I must merely state my case: it is nothing less that the accounting for all the facts. A complete explanation of existance, reality, history and the basis of religion and spirituality.

Without unnecessary jargon, in (hopefully) simple language; anyone should be able to follow and understand the ideas with little study.

Of course, there will be those who see that such an endeavor must nessessarily be trite and uninformed, but i will account for such responses too. I will show how the traditional philosophical authors and their ideas all stem from the same problem and pretty much say the same thing. And I will show why they have been presented in certain ways as well as taken in certain ways. In short, I will invalidate the whole of what has been the establishment of institutional philosophy.

Sounds like a big order? Perhaps. But I will expect that most people will be incapable, even if they are interested, of accepting what I have to offer – and I will explain why this is so.

Ready?

The Exhibition begins.

Direct Tangent 2.9

Right now I am attacking (ooops, I mean critiquing) the thinker-(non) philosopher Francis Laruelle, and I have to admit that what he is saying is a somewhat difficult concept to convey in words, so, I have to figure that he must have seen that no one else has said what he is attempting to say, and so felt he compelled to say it. And he says it pretty well; I just am geared that way – that way of being able to grasp philsophical jargon – indeed, I had never heard of anyone saying what he has said either, and if they have then they didnt say it well enough – I suppose thats why Laruelle had to come out and say it.

But I am not so geared into desiphering jargon. What I mean by this is the discussion should not be presented as a puzzle, not in puzzle form, as if in reading the essay that is proposing to have disphered a particular puzzle, I have further to disipher the puzzle of the proposition itself; I feel, as a reader, I should be given the Rosetta stone from the start of the proposition, one that concerns not only the probelm but also the problem of how I am being presented with the problem. If the point of offering something significant is to be significant to all humanity then at least the majority should be privy to its meaning without having to invest too much time/money/education into its contruction or presentation. I disagree with the idea that explanation needs be complex or for only those so invested and learned in the jargon (read: discursive technology); I say: leave that to science – and a philsophy attempting to be (modern, contemporary, 2013) science either should be overtly presented and admitted to be a “philsophy of…{fill in the blank}”, in other words a technology and hardly Philosophy, or it is just a mockery of the human potential; it screams, anymore: idiocy. Of course; I have already (in another post) pointed to those people who seem to be writting to a priviledged few, that I think they largely really could give a crap about humanity and they are mere giving institutional lipservice to such an idea: they are really concerned with how they are preceived by others and not so much concerned with benefiting humanity in any way: the capitalist faith keeps them in line and justifies their activity a priori. If the capital investment at UCSC over the past 10 years is any indication, the departement of philsolphy better be being a science – or else!

To make myself (hopefully) a little more clear: I came accross a post-paper that talked about whether propositions exist in space-time, or something lilke that, or maybe it was discussing how propositions are manifested in space time. (I could be wrong for this particular essay because I admit I didnt take the time and read the whole thing, but Im sure there are many many discussion which proceed in just this way.) I couldnt really get into it – I guess because I dont think it is saying anything significant: it is a word game, in the very Wittgensteinian mode. But I gathered it was addressing the question of whether all propositions refer to things in space-time, and in what cases do and do not refer to things in space time; I expect also that such things in space time can also be defined as physical things, as opposed to mental, psychical, metaphysical, ethereal, imaginative and the like things. Now, I gotta say that anyone who is framing possibillity within the realm of space-time is not really being philosophical in the sense that I understand philosophy: they are being methodological: they are playing a game – and not only that: they are playing a game for which there are definitive rules for how to proceed, how to look, what the purpose is, what the goal is (we wont get into the discussion of hegemonic ideology here!). They are merely reworking logic as if logic can find out what is real, and these real things, the group that contains those categories just mentioned, thus are true because logic has do to with truth. Then I have to wonder if they understand that logic is a tool, not a determiner of criterion. Logic does not find for us what is True so far as true may be real, but logic finds what is true given a set of conditions, and the conditions are always presented upon other conditions that are supposed true for the set of conditions that are being questioned. This idea is what Wittgenstien offers us; but just as existentialism has come to be a buzzword that totally misses the meaning of existance, when Witt. says ‘language games’, most people -indeed, many many supposedly learned people – completely missed the bus, and in fact were huffing on exhaust fumes attempting to reap a career out of erudite dellusion.

*

It is here that Laruelle find his purchase for what he has to say. The ‘given’ propositions behave as invisible qualifiers for what is being considered or addressed. He presents this by suggesting that the method of philsophy is one of dividing propositions into a condition of either/or, and working out the reprecussions of this primary division along lines of further division until one reaches a point of contradiction. The contradiciton then indicates what must be true. This process is what is ususally known as the dialectical method. The philsophphers have taken the givens as static, as previously presented in the past, different ideas presented by different authors contributing to a progress of knowledge, a cumulating progress, presented now in acedemic learning, so as to allow a further development. But since, I’d say, Kant, everyone has been addressing the same problem and saying the same thing about it using different terms. (I will elaborate upon this some other time.)

Larualle has also found this, (as well, Kierkegaard did too; Zizek I will give the benefit of the doubt, considering he is actually a ‘cultural theorist’) that what occurs through the process known as philosophy, over time, is that the same problems are addressed and answered, but under different terms. The philosophical method does not, and is incapable of, keeping an eye on the ball, so to speak, because the eye itself is moving as the ball moves. Because philosophy is mainly concerned with solving the problem of reality, which is known as a positive solution, terms are taken as being capable of detemining actual things in-themselves, but what occurs over time is that the terms lose integrity for such particular identification and then this situation elicits new terms that are then applied as if to clearify the previous mistakes. The new terms are said to better indicate the actual thing in question, but what occurs in the effort to nail down terms to things, the conditions by which the individual is considering such fixed ideas have also changed; in other words: philosophy proposes its method to be like science, having particular static items for consideration.

Real things are not identified within a static space; which is to say, it is only within the idea of a static universe that an identification of a thing may be presumed stable. Real things are come by because of an economy of meaning that reflects the givien condition of any time. Though one can say ‘keyboard’ or ‘rock’ and have a definite and distinct idea of what that actual thing is, a ‘keyboard’ does not exist in reality in empty space apart from all else: it can only exist in context of meaning with other things. It is thus the philosophical process upon positive things that proposes to find a ‘total’ context, and thus find the True universe. The fact that through such positive philosophical rigor, for probably at least 400 years if not longer, we have found no conclusive truth reeks of a necessary precipitation: this is where Laruelle finds purchase for what he has to say. In fact, it is the complete misconstrual of Sartre’s ‘freedom’ and ‘revolt’ that we have the situation of what I would call ‘Neo-modernism”, or in other terms, the ‘New-materialism’, as if we ever need a ‘neo’ in front of any of these labels for the ‘new’ ideas: another positive assertion of true reality: faith in the true object.

Against this movement Laruelle proposes a project that attempts to find the authenticity that is routinely missed in philosophy; he thus finds “Non-philosophy”, a rigorous application of confronting the truth of existance and being in reality.

My issue with him is why he has to be so damn jargon filled.

Direct Tangent 2.6

So lets back up a little. Francois Laruelle is a contemporary thinker – I cant really say ‘ philosopher’ because – who is known for his ‘project’ called Non-Philosophy, which is proposed as distinguished from the thus framed traditional discipline of ‘philosophy’. It is a philosophy, but Laruelle rightly presents the implicated end-run of philosophy, the platform upon which the proposals of philosophy are founded, and thereby finds that he cannot present his idea as philosophy; since he has discovered or revealed or proposed philosophy as a thing in-itself by his idea, his idea then must lie not within philosophy but without it. This is his premise. Why he must disgise it in such supra-vulgar language is the question I answer through rebutting his project.

See, non- philosophy must be a project; it cannot be merely another theory. What he means by ‘project’ is similar to what we know as praxis, which can be defined as an authentic marraige in one’s being of thought and practice. It is not merely belief but belief that joins in the act as the act informs constructive learning; praxis, in this way, can be said to be existential because it it does not rise above reality in some ideal-theoretical fantasy of would-be could-be world, rather, it upholds the integrity of the human being responsible for its real world.

Yet, at its root, non-philosophy is a theory. Laruelle defines it as a project because of the contradiction that is presented upon the segregation and relagation of philophy to a thing in-itself. When he does this he is left with a necessary remainder ( did I hear Slavoj Zizek?) that if left there as an idea fades away in moot negation. So it must be a project; it must be something one does as well as thinks. But if this is so then his non-philosophy falls flat. It becomes nothing more than any other religion or philosophy.

The problem of non-philosophy, then, has to do with this problem of redundancy. Again, I am not totally sure why he has to dress it up in jargon; I see it as an indication of limit rather than liberation, and yet he apparently is talking about the latter. He has confused himself before he has finished his essay. And then, as I described previously, because he has manipulated the jargon so well, he has picked up other acolytes who have faith in his great gospels and attempt to develop the project and proceed to create what will inevitably be confusion, because they have began in a haze of religious confusion.

What I am saying is that while Laruelle has come upon the proper problem, his solution reveals that he is in what the philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre calls bad faith.

Direct Tangent 2.6

So lets back up a little. Francois Laruelle is a contemporary thinker – I cant really say ‘ philosopher’ because – who is known for his ‘project’ called Non-Philosophy, which is proposed as distinguished from the thus framed traditional discipline of ‘philosophy’. It is a philosophy, but Laruelle rightly presents the implicated end-run of philosophy, the platform upon which the proposals of philosophy are founded, and thereby finds that he cannot present his idea as philosophy; since he has discovered or revealed or proposed philosophy as a thing in-itself by his idea, his idea then must lie not within philosophy but without it. This is his premise. Why he must disgise it in such supra-vulgar language is the question I answer through rebutting his project.

See, non- philosophy must be a project; it cannot be merely another theory. What he means by ‘project’ is similar to what we know as praxis, which can be defined as an authentic marraige in one’s being of thought and practice. It is not merely belief but belief that joins in the act as the act informs constructive learning; praxis, in this way, can be said to be existential because it it does not rise above reality in some ideal-theoretical fantasy of would-be could-be world, rather, it upholds the integrity of the human being responsible for its real world.

Yet, at its root, non-philosophy is a theory. Laruelle defines it as a project because of the contradiction that is presented upon the segregation and relagation of philophy to a thing in-itself. When he does this he is left with a necessary remainder ( did I hear Slavoj Zizek?) that if left there as an idea fades away in moot negation. So it must be a project; it must be something one does as well as thinks. But if this is so then his non-philosophy falls flat. It becomes nothing more than any other religion or philosophy.

The problem of non-philosophy, then, has to do with this problem of redundancy. Again, I am not totally sure why he has to dress it up in jargon; I see it as an indication of limit rather than liberation, and yet he apparently is talking about the latter. He has confused himself before he has finished his essay. And then, as I described previously, because he has manipulated the jargon so well, he has picked up other acolytes who have faith in his great gospels and attempt to develop the project and proceed to create what will inevitably be confusion, because they have began in a haze of religious confusion.

What I am saying is that while Laruelle has come upon the proper problem, his solution reveals that he is in what the philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre calls bad faith.

Direct Tangent: Useless Jargon.

Lets be frank here: Laruelle’s problem is nothing more or less than what anyone who struggles with the reality of duality has dealt with. It is the same struggle that every religion proposes to solve; it is what the early 20th century magician Alistar Crowley also tried to solve with his Magick, no less.

In order to find the problem of L’s problem, we first have to get over the acedemic intellectual jargon; this is the first problem of all what- is-known- as philosophy. Acedemic jargon works to do two things: under the guise of a need-for condensed term, jargon creates a hierarchy of preists who thereby are so initiated and deemed worthy of considering the high problems of the court. Jargon thus is posed under a type of necessary fog ceiling of sorts that distinguishes those initiates as doers and considerers of great things. Hence jargon creates for those not initiated an aura of importance that justifies those big thinkers in the same way a congragation views the clergy, the bishops and the pope: the clergy is working in behalf of the congregation. It is like if I have a computer that does not work, I thank God for the programmers and technicians that I know or can rent for their knowledge and ability. The practicioners of philosophy so ordained in acedamia are viewed in the same way: under an assumption of thinking the big thoughts for the bennefit of humanity, or with skepticism, as if they really are doing nothing of importance. But the fact there are career, or at least ‘acting’ philosophers argues that they must be thinking something significant to the world.

The other thing jargon does is establish that indeed they are doing something important, because they have technical terms that (must) identify some vital disciplinary technolgy, like when physics comes up with ‘ quarks’ or ‘superstrings’ or ‘event horizon’ or ‘uncertainty’. Most people do not know much more that the basic ideas behind these things.

The difference between philosophy, or should I say ‘theoretical discourse’, and science is that science really does have use for much of their contrived terms in that science is dealing with segregated items of technology. Computers as a technology have little to do with the internal combustion engine but both technologies can be used to enhance each other – yet each with their own terminology that identifies particular items important to the technology. No one proposes or argues that a timing belt should have some epistomological relation of truth to a microprocessor, but the two may find harmony and use because they concern individual peices of technology; but what are the ‘peices’ of philosophy?

Philosophy, by and large has taken up this technological approach and has thus segregated itsself into disciplines and these disciplines then can be applied to aspects of reality as if there are pieces of ‘ thought reality’ that have a quality much like the computer and car engine. We have thus ‘ epistomology of business’, and ‘ ontology of civic duty’ and ‘computer ethics’ and like arenas that appear and propose to address particular things so as to procure usefulness in reality.

The problem with philosophy thus has more to do with the difference between bread-and-butter type paycheck philosophizing and the tendancy of those thinkers to synthesize some larger grand scheme about the truth of reality based upon their ventures into crunching the somewhat sketchy but apparently taken-as- practical ideas of what could be called ‘secular’ philosophy. Also there are those purist acedemics who read and read and read and analyze other philosophers who then are in the attempt to describe what those other philosophers were really saying and how significance might be drawn into our daily lives by these new profound insights. You see, it really is quite religious in its activity, the parish preists and reverends, the monks, the evangelists – one is hard pressed to miss the parallels between academic philosophy and institutional religion.

This is the problem Larualle is attempting to address. philosophers tend to believe in their efforts that they are doing some sort of fieldwork and then writing about their findings; the feildwork is seen as everyday life and their findings are philosophy. In this way, the problem lay in how they liken themselves to the other sciences that experiement with items of reality (fieldwork) and then state their findings. The philosophers, though – again – in their motion to combine ‘ technologies’ seem to over look ( or rather, probably forget to overlook) that the combining that they are involved in is Being itself: the human being and the world – and this is really all there is.

The scientists cannot help but be (in a way) humbled by the basic separation involved in their efforts, but the philosophers cannot help but move toward the inherent unity of their efforts. And the heads inflate, and the great meanings proposed in such the way involved in the great meaning tend to arrive the acedemic philosopher at the Truth ( at least this is the general feeling of those who have efforted the great effort that contemplated so intently).

Laruelle has rightly capitalized on this apparency and tendancy of philosophy to come to truths that are debatable. The point is that if these philosophers are indeed coming to the truth of the matter, or, to put it another way, if they are coming to the truths of the matters, then how or why is it debatable? The issue is that if all things are indeed relative such that we discuss, then this feature (the basic feature of debate and debateable things) of reality must not be in itself true but indeed must be relying upon something by which such proposals and arguments are seen to be coming to truth. For, of course, there cannot be a thing without something else, and if there is this thing of debate it must be by virtue of something else that is not debate. It cannot be relative since then we have a truth based upon a non-position that reduces upon itself infinitely and therefore has no substantial quality.

Now, this is just one way to put the issue, but I have done so in such a manner that avoids the acedemic jargon. It is the issue that Laruelle describes. So I ask: why all the jargon? Why all the acedemic hub bub? To me it is utter pomposity and it reveals that what he and those who step in similar discursive regalia are up to has little to do with solving any real problem but the problem of justifying their academic positions – but there is something else going on with Lauelle.

What Laruelle is proposing reflects upon his current position in reality. He is proposing his exact existential problem as if it is a problem to be solved objectively. He is caught in a way of speaking about his situation that defies the meaning he is attempting to convey and thus solve, which is the problem of apparent reality, which is exactly the problem I have proposed here.

Yet we should see here that this is just the beginning of the problem and that the other facets of Laruelle’s proposition also.hide under a facade of jargon.

So, it is only when we are capable of stating clearly the problem that we can begin to address the situation, for it is only then that we have the actual situation at hand.